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Preface: A history of communication 
 
In the United States the issue of police violence appears to have reached a climax with 
incidents in Ferguson, New York and most recently Baltimore, leading to vehement 
and sometimes violent protests in the past year.  
Some of my Dutch friends and colleagues have pointed out that it is quite a 
coincidence that I have finished my research precisely at this moment of turmoil. 
The truth of the matter is: it is not at all.  
Police violence has been a contentious issue for a very long time in the United States. 
It was so when I started this study, and it still is now. It was so fifty years ago, and 
there is a good chance that it will also be so in fifty years time. Indeed, this research 
has shown that there has been an impasse in the debate on police problems from the 
New York Police Department’s inception in 1845 onwards.  
Most Europeans, outsiders as far as this issue is concerned, tend to forget or even do 
not know about the long history of tense relations between police and minorities in the 
United States, with the issue of police violence as a dominant and constant factor. Yet 
for insiders — i.e. American minority groups and the police — this history plays a key 
role. More specifically, this study shows how the history of these groups influences the 
present-day debate about police violence. And while history can serve as a foundation 
to learn from, history in this case has become the biggest enemy of those involved.  
This study is not about the history of police violence. It is about the history of 
communicating about that violence, along with the communication about other 
problems that the police have dealt with in the past. To some, this seems confusing, 
even irrelevant. ‘But that’s not what’s at stake,’ they tell me. Or: ‘communication 
about police violence is merely a result of that violence’ and ‘it is so clearly obvious 
that the police …’. 
These people are absolutely right when they argue that communication often follows 
— and is influenced by — actions. Yet they disregard the equal truth that actions 
follow and are influenced by communication. This study makes clear that the history of 
communication and police-violence incidents have a mutual relationship. While police-
violence incidents serve as catalysts for the negative perceptions of minority groups as 
well as a driving force for debate, this debate negatively affects those who are involved 
in police–citizen interactions, including the interactions leading to procedural injustices 
and even police violence.  
Phrased more bluntly, communication about police violence can become as harmful, 
and perhaps even as lethal as the violence itself, as communication about police issues 
can reinforce these problems and make them even harder to solve. This potential self-
fulfilling prophecy is a very worrying phenomenon, which should be forefront in the 
minds of everyone dealing with police–community relations issues.  
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Perhaps less controversial, but equally worrying, is the fact that the debate on police 
violence is stuck in a perpetual loop. It is true that the arena of debate has changed to a 
certain extent in the years following the time frame chosen for this study, with a new 
mayor and a new police commissioner entering the arena in New York, and new 
slogans such as “black lives matter” replacing previous ones, such as “I am Sean Bell.” 
Yet these new developments have not changed the overall dynamics of 
communication.  
I strongly believe that the process of debate could benefit from courageous voices such 
as the black man who made a Youtube video of himself after he had been pulled over 
by the police, stating that the police officer was merely doing his job and that not all 
police officers are racist. Yet even though his anti-stereotypical statement has gone 
viral, and many people have applauded this, the effects remain limited.
1
 His voice is 
just one drop or ripple in a very big ocean, in which the debate on police violence, like 
a massive oil tanker, will not alter its course. My research shows that while each 
stakeholder is able to hand out blows and/or defend themselves, none of these blows or 
defensive moves are decisive. The result is a stalemate position in the debate, caused 
by a power equilibrium. This is not a tranquil condition, but rather a power balance 
between opposing discourses, including rigid positioning and harsh communication 
strategies. To make a difference, not just drops or ripples, but massive waves are 
needed. 
Ferguson, New York, Baltimore. Each of the incidents shows a repetition of the same 
moves: an incident between one or more white (or even black) police officers and a 
black citizen, followed by a vehement discussion in which stakeholders repeat the 
same arguments over and over again. Yet the solution for the bad relations between the 
American police and the black community does not lie in this repetition and sharpening 
of chewed-out arguments, but in a critical assessment of the communication by all 
stakeholders now and in the past.  
I have learned a lot from researching police violence and ‘the history of 
communication’. To me, communication and history form an inseparable academic 
duo. Together, they can provide much richer, deeper insights. I have also learned a lot 
about intergroup relations, and about the relative nature of truth. I find it interesting yet 
also worrying to see how different groups can view the same events from almost 
diametrically opposed, rigidly defined perspectives, while having no understanding for 
the reality held by detractors nor showing any willingness to develop such 
understanding in the near or distant future. The main case study of my PhD in this 
sense is not unique: just turn on the television or simply look around and discover how 
rigidity in thinking dominates our lives.  
Happily, this study is not the product of rigidity, but rather of flexibility and freedom: 
my PhD counselors fully supported the fairly unorthodox multidisciplinary approach 
for this study. Hence we commenced a project that was not so much restricted by rigid 
canonical methodologies, but rather driven by innovation and creativity. Thanks to the 




freedom my counselors entrusted me with and the confidence they gave me, I saw the 
opportunity and had the confidence to embark on this journey and complete it. 
Together, we have found creative ways to cross unexpected hurdles. I wish to thank 
them for their continued support and intellectual contributions.  
I would also like to take the opportunity to thank two other great advisors, my parents, 
who have stimulated me to get the most out of myself and taught me to think 
independently, irrespective of what others might think. From the very start, my mother 
has encouraged me to learn, study, go to university, write and finish my PhD. She has 
also helped me by transcribing the interview tapes. My father, who has given me 
valuable advice on the use of English throughout the years I worked on my research, 
has proofread the entire manuscript. There is no one else to whom I would have 
entrusted this task more!  
Special thanks go to Tim de Boer, CEO of Ketchum Amsterdam. As my (former) 
employer, he fully supported my research and gave me substantial time and financial 
means to work on the manuscript. His support and flexibility are much appreciated. 
These are things that make a boss a great boss! Another great boss is my current 
manager, Sierk Nawijn. Thanks to his support and ‘listening ear’ I was able to combine 
my work with the final stage of my PhD and finish the manuscript.  
In New York, my friend Greg Donaldson, professor at the John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, not only provided me with great insight, but also with valuable 
introductions to personnel within the Police Department. I would also like to thank 
John Jay College professors Eli Silverman, Delores Jones-Brown, and Martin 
Wallenstein for the perceptive talks we had about the New York Police, and all the 
interviewees for their time and candor in sharing their opinions with me. 
I also wish to acknowledge the members of the PhD Committee for reviewing the draft 
of this doctoral thesis and providing valuable feedback.  
I am grateful for the scholarships I received from the Nicolaas Mulerius Foundation 
and the Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds.  
And now: ‘hora est’. Every time I visited my grandmother, she asked me ‘Hoe gaat het 
met je proef?’ Indeed, at times my research did feel like a ‘beproeving’, and her 
unconditional confidence in me helped me a lot. It is a pity I cannot tell her anymore 






Politiegeweld is een steeds wederkerend controversieel onderwerp in Amerika. Een 
interessant, maar onderbelicht aspect hiervan is het publieke debat dat over dit 
onderwerp wordt gevoerd en dat volledig lijkt te zijn vastgelopen. Deze studie 
onderzoekt welke factoren hieraan debet zijn, zowel op het microniveau van 
individuele incidenten, als op het historische macroniveau. Zij bekijkt allereerst hoe, 
vanaf de oprichting van de New Yorkse politie, maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen het 
debat tussen de NYPD en haar criticasters over politiegeweld en andere (bredere) 
problemen hebben beïnvloed, en vice-versa. Het tweede deel van deze studie poogt 
inzicht te verschaffen in hoe de (totaliteit van) discours het debat heeft beïnvloed dat 
zich ontwikkelde na het specifieke schietincident van Sean Bell in 2006 in New York, 
door naar de (interactie tussen) de communicatie (percepties, interpretaties en 
positionering) van zes verschillende stakeholdergroepen te kijken: de NYPD, critici en 
verdedigers van de politie (politievakbonden, politieagenten), politici, juristen, en de 
media. 
Samen identificeren deze twee delen zes factoren die hebben geleid tot de 
patstelling in de debatten over politiegeweld en politieproblemen. Deze samenvatting 
geeft een beknopte weergave van deze factoren.  
 
1. Een stabiele machtsbalans  
De geschiedenis van debatten over politieproblemen in New York wordt gekenmerkt 
door een dynamisch veranderend machtslandschap, dat zich stabiliseert in de tweede 
helft van de twintigste eeuw. In het voortdurende, onverstoorbare machtsevenwicht dat 
dan ontstaat, zijn stakeholders machtig genoeg om hervormingsprocessen te 
dwarsbomen; het debat te traineren, of juist een nieuwe impuls te geven. Zij zijn echter 
niet in staat om duurzame hervormingen door te voeren en/of de debatprocessen 
aanzienlijk te verbeteren, laat staan om het debat succesvol af te ronden. 
Dit machtsevenwicht is het resultaat van historische ontwikkelingen die 
plaatsvonden in de twintigste eeuw, waaronder de opmars van de politievakbonden, de 
burgerrechtenbeweging en de professionalisering en bureaucratisering van de politie. 
Het is ook het gevolg van eerdere ontwikkelingen, waarvan sommige al vanaf de 
oprichting van de New Yorkse politie het machtsevenwicht hebben beïnvloed, zoals 
het feit dat critici de politie gebruiken als een vehikel voor politieke communicatie; de 
conflicterende, paradoxale opvattingen die in de maatschappij leven ten aanzien van de 
politie; de ontwikkeling van een sterke politiecultuur; de discretionaire vrijheden die 
individuele politieagenten van meet af aan hebben gekregen, en de banden die de 
politie van New York had met de politieke machine Tammany Hall in de tweede helft 
van de negentiende en het begin van de twintigste eeuw. De krachten die dit 
machtsevenwicht hebben doen ontstaan zijn diepgeworteld en robuust. Dit doet 
vermoeden dat stakeholdergroepen niet in staat zijn om zelfstandig een 
machtsverschuiving te realiseren.  
Het onaantastbaar ogende machtsevenwicht manifesteert zich niet alleen op het 
historische macroniveau, maar ook op het microniveau van het Sean Bell debat, waarin 
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stakeholders genoeg macht hebben om een slag toe te brengen aan hun opponent, maar 
niet genoeg om de strijd te winnen. Critici zijn niet in staat duurzame verandering te 
bewerkstelligen of écht een open dialoog te voeren met de politie; de NYPD en 
verdedigers van de politie zijn niet in staat hun critici het zwijgen op te leggen en 
reputatieschade te voorkomen, en de burgemeester is niet in staat om debatprocessen 
substantieel te verbeteren. Deze patstelling op microniveau is niet alleen een gevolg 
van, maar draagt ook bij aan het machtsevenwicht op macroniveau: enerzijds is de 
macht van stakeholders een gevolg van hun robuuste positie in de samenleving; hun 
politieke invloed, en hun hoogontwikkelde organisatie- en bewustzijnsniveau (die op 
hun beurt het resultaat zijn van brede historische ontwikkelingen en sociale context); 
anderzijds wordt de macht van stakeholders ook bepaald door hun communicatie.  
 
2. Diep gewortelde positionering en rigide communicatie van stakeholders 
De positionering en communicatie van verschillende stakeholders hebben het 
dynamische debatproces in New York zowel direct als indirect vanaf de oprichting van 
de New Yorkse politie beïnvloed. Alhoewel het onderwerp van gesprek gaandeweg is 
veranderd en nieuwe stakeholders het podium hebben betreden, waaronder 
minderheidsgroeperingen, is de wijze van positionering en communicatie van deze 
groepen nauwelijks veranderd. Al in de negentiende eeuw stond de politie lijnrecht 
tegenover extreem kritische groepen, zowel in de formele als in de informele 
debatarena's. 
Van begin af aan is de positionering van zowel de politie als de critici 
compromisloos geweest. Deze rigide positionering heeft zich door de jaren heen 
geïntensiveerd, als gevolg van de groeiende kloof tussen de politie en gemeenschap, 
samen met de eerder genoemde historische ontwikkelingen.  
De consistent gebruikte communicatiestrategieën van stakeholders vormen een 
onderdeel van hun starre positionering. Historisch gezien hebben politiecritici 
consequent bevlogen, agenderende, en soms opportunistische en schadelijke 
communicatiestrategieën gebruikt. Ook hebben veel critici de politie als een vehikel 
voor politieke communicatie ingezet. Politieagenten hebben van begin af aan eveneens 
consequent gebruik gemaakt van schadelijke communicatiestrategieën om kritiek te 
pareren en hervorming af te wenden. Het scala van hun strategieën is vergroot door 
verdere professionalisering en de deelname van vakbonden aan het publieke debat. 
Ook de New Yorkse politie als organisatie heeft haar technieken door de jaren heen 
uitgebreid, onder meer door het inzetten van haar onafhankelijke status om externe 
kritiek af te wenden. De communicatie van politiecommissarissen tegenover critici is 
vaak uiterst defensief geweest.  
De vaak diep gewortelde wij/zij-positionering en harde 
communicatiestrategieën hebben bijgedragen aan de vicieuze cirkel waarin de debatten 
vast lijken te zitten, zowel in de formele als de informele arena. In directe zin hebben 
bepaalde strategieën, zoals het gebruik van de politie door critici als een vehikel voor 
politieke communicatie en de strategieën van de politie en vakbonden om hervorming 
en kritiek af te wenden, teweeggebracht dat issues niet opgelost worden. Op een meer 
indirecte wijze heeft ook het samenspel tussen communicatiestrategieën het 
debatproces negatief beïnvloed, aangezien bepaalde strategieën de negatieve percepties 
en schadelijke strategieën van andere stakeholders versterken. Hierdoor stagneren en 
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verharden de debatten over politiegeweld, maar ook over politieprofessionalisering. 
Kortom, de positionering en rigide opvattingen van stakeholders lijken op een 
loopgravenoorlog die enkel verliezers kent. 
Het discours van stakeholders in het Sean Bell debat is zowel een gevolg van, 
als een bijdrage aan dit historische macropatroon. Zo is de historisch rigide 
positionering van stakeholders weerspiegeld in hun compromisloze wij/zij-
positionering in het Sean Bell debat. Maar ook op andere vlakken past de 
communicatie van critici, verdedigers van de politie en de NYPD binnen de bredere 
macropatronen. Een uitzondering is burgemeester Bloomberg die veel verzoenender 
communiceert dan zijn voorganger; de effecten van zijn communicatie zijn echter 
beperkt, door de robuuste krachten die hem hierin tegenwerken (zie onder 1). 
Als gevolg van voorspelbare communicatie wordt ook de interactie tussen de 
conflicterende grondtonen van het discours voorspelbaar. De vicieuze cirkel op 
macroniveau wordt versterkt door een machtsevenwicht van discours op microniveau, 
waarin geen van de stakeholders dit evenwicht of de koers van het debat kan 
veranderen. Hierdoor wordt de rigide positionering van de stakeholders versterkt.  
 
3. Gebruik van de politie als vehikel voor politieke communicatie  
Vanaf de oprichting van de New Yorkse politie hebben verschillende groepen de 
organisatie benut als vehikel voor politieke communicatie. In de negentiende eeuw 
werd het corps onophoudelijk aangevallen door conservatieve groepen die de macht 
van de politieke machine Tammany Hall probeerden af te zwakken. Het was toen 
algemeen bekend dat de politie verbonden was aan deze politieke machine en dat 
verzwakking van de politie de machine zou raken. Nadat de macht van Tammany Hall 
was afgenomen en de politie onafhankelijker werd, bleef dit gebruik echter doorgaan. 
Tot op heden beschouwt de samenleving politiewerk als een inherent politieke 
activiteit en probeert men via de politie bredere issues aan te kaarten en andere 
stakeholders indirect te raken. De politie zit hierdoor in een buitengewoon lastige 
positie, omdat zij niet de macht of het mandaat heeft om deze bredere problemen zelf 
op te lossen. Het gebruik van de politie als vehikel voor politieke communicatie heeft 
een open debat over politieproblemen daarbij op verschillende manieren getraineerd, 
en ook de professionalisering in de weg gezeten.  
De interactie tussen stakeholders op het microniveau van het Sean Bell debat 
bevestigt en versterkt voor een deel deze historische patronen. Radicale protestgroepen 
zoals de New Black Panthers vielen bijvoorbeeld doelbewust de politie aan als een 
strategisch middel om meer macht te verkrijgen, net zoals bijvoorbeeld 
communistische groepen in het verleden hebben gedaan. Mildere critici doen dit niet, 
maar hun communicatie in het Sean Bell debat richt zich wel sterk op bredere issues 
ten aanzien van het justitieel apparaat, de overheid en de samenleving, niet alleen met 
betrekking tot politiewerk, maar ook gericht op raciale en financiële ongelijkheid. 
Meer in het algemeen is het zo dat critici enerzijds, en de verdedigers van de 
politie en de NYPD anderzijds, bevooroordeelde opvattingen over elkaar hebben, en 
dat hun communicatie wordt gedreven door groepsbelang (gedefinieerd door de 
positionering van elk van de stakeholders in het debat). Hun discours heeft een negatief 
versterkend effect op de processen op het historische macroniveau: het gebruik van de 
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politie als vehikel voor politieke communicatie versterkt de interpretatieve framings 
van de NYPD en haar verdedigers, en geeft hun munitie om de critici aan te vallen. 
Deze framings vormen het beginpunt van nieuwe debatten, waarin het discours van 
politiecritici door de NYPD en degenen die haar verdedigen wordt gebruikt als wapen.  
De focus van de NYPD en haar verdedigers op meer rigide en radicale critici 
geeft deze laatste twee groepen bovendien een continu platform om de politie in te 
zetten als vehikel voor politieke communicatie. Dit leidt tot ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’: 
terwijl de politiecritici door zowel de NYPD als haar verdedigers worden bekritiseerd 
voor harde en 'oneerlijke' communicatiestrategieën, worden deze strategieën juist door 
de reacties van deze laatste twee groepen impliciet ondersteund. 
 
4. Voortdurende conflicterende opvattingen over de politie  
Van begin af aan heeft de maatschappij conflicterende, onevenwichtige en 
onrealistische opvattingen en verwachtingen over de politie van New York. Zo gaf de 
samenleving enerzijds de politie een zwak mandaat bij de oprichting, als gevolg van 
antiprofessionele en antiautoritaire sentimenten. Anderzijds kreeg de politie veel 
kritiek, vijandigheid en disrespect van de samenleving te verduren, omdat de prestaties 
van de organisatie achterbleven. Deze kritiek is paradoxaal gezien het feit dat de politie 
voor een groot deel een weerspiegeling was van de wensen van de samenleving.  
Hoewel bepaalde opvattingen en verwachtingen over de politie zeker 
veranderd zijn in de twintigste eeuw, blijven deze in veel opzichten paradoxaal, 
onrealistisch hoog en vaak niet met elkaar verenigbaar. Zij hebben veel invloed gehad 
op de macht van de politie en de ontplooiing van het landschap van de macht als 
geheel. Daarnaast hebben ze invloed gehad op organisatie en cultuur van de politie, 
evenals op hun positionering in de debatten. In de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw 
bleven de opvattingen en verwachtingen van de maatschappij het cynisme en het 
verlangen naar respect bij de politieagenten verhogen. Bovendien hebben zij een 
temperend effect gehad op de hervorming en de professionalisering van de politie, 
hetgeen resulteerde in snelle oplossingen en cosmetische hervormingsinspanningen. In 
feite hebben maatschappelijke beperkingen de politie belemmerd veranderingen te 
effectueren. 
Het discours van stakeholders op het microniveau van het Sean Bell debat is 
zowel een gevolg van, als een bijdrage aan de tegenstrijdige percepties en 
verwachtingen van de maatschappij. Terwijl critici de politie en justitiële stakeholders 
een defensieve houding verwijten, weten deze critici ook dat de communicatie van 
deze stakeholders in veel opzichten beperkt wordt door externe stakeholders, met 
inbegrip van de critici zelf.  
 
5. Discours en maatschappelijke context als katalysatoren van micro- en 
macropatronen 
De interactie tussen discours en sociale context draagt niet alleen bij aan de macht van 
individuele stakeholders op zowel micro- als macroniveau, maar is ook een krachtige 
motor van het algemene debat, gezien het feit dat elk nieuw incident van geweld als 
brandstof dient voor het uithoudingsvermogen, het bewustzijn en de woede van 
politiecritici. Zij communiceren hun boodschap en percepties in krachtige, 
agenderende termen die op hun beurt dienen als katalysator voor zowel de micro- en 
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macroprocessen van het debat. Meer in het algemeen heeft de interactie tussen labels, 
framings en positionering een krachtig versterkend en circulair effect op (de interactie 
tussen) het discours van stakeholders, niet alleen op het microniveau van het Sean Bell 
debat, maar ook op het historische macroniveau: de interpretaties van stakeholders 
dienen als uitgangspunt voor het debat, en deze interpretaties worden continu 
beïnvloed door de communicatie van andere stakeholders. Bovendien veroorzaken 
negatieve percepties op lange termijn langdurige schade aan de publieke opinie en 
publieksrelaties, maar ook aan de bredere sociale context van het politiewerk, zoals het 
succes van handhavende praktijken, initiatieven tot hervorming en de algehele 
legitimiteit van de politie. De door de media gepolariseerde weergave van de realiteit 
versterkt deze processen. 
Discours dat gecommuniceerd wordt in de formele arena heeft een negatief 
effect op de percepties, interpretaties en discursieve praktijken van stakeholders die 
elkaar ontmoeten in de informele arena. In deze arena staat een vijandige, zich 
geslachtofferd voelende groep politiecritici lijnrecht tegenover een even vijandige, zich 
eveneens geslachtofferd voelende groep politiemannen, die elkaar in termen van ‘wij’ 
en ‘zij’ zien, terwijl ze zichzelf beschouwen als deel van een minderheidsgroep die niet 
het respect krijgt dat hij verdient. Hoewel niet direct kan worden geconcludeerd dat 
deze omstandigheden in de informele arena van debat leiden tot meer (politie)geweld, 
kan worden verondersteld dat deze omstandigheden, die in zekere mate beïnvloed 
worden door processen in de formele arena van debat, een negatief effect hebben op de 
interactieprocessen tussen de politie en minderheden op straat.  
 
6. Circulaire debatprocessen op micro- en macroniveau  
Door de jaren heen hebben stakeholders in debatten over politiegeweld en 
politieproblemen soortgelijke discoursen gebruikt, die een product zijn van 
hardnekkige, onwrikbare oordelen over de politie, politiegeweld en diverse 
stakeholders. Hun communicatie is een resultaat van gebeurtenissen in het verleden die 
betrekking hebben op het vraagstuk van politiegeweld en de communicatie hierover. 
Samen met de andere factoren heeft dit geleid tot een vicieuze cirkel van 
debatprocessen; een machtsevenwicht op micro- en macroniveau, en een negatieve 
interactie van discours op microniveau, die elkaar versterken. De formele debatarena 
wordt gekenmerkt door een vicieuze cirkel van terugkerende schandalen, media 
aandacht, woede, protesten, debatten, defensieve reacties, en hervormpogingen, maar 
ook door terugkerende percepties, interpretaties en positionering. Het Sean Bell debat 
vormt hierin geen uitzondering. Het kan worden gekarakteriseerd als een voorspelbaar 
toneelstuk waarvan we de scènes al kennen en waarin de stakeholders vanaf precies 
hetzelfde punt beginnen als in voorgaande debatten. Ook in de informele arena zit het 
debat vast in een vicieuze cirkel: interacties tussen politie en minderheden blijven 
morele geschillen die worden voortgebracht, gevormd en gedreven door raciale 
verschillen.  
 
Door het analyseren van de dynamiek van deze debatten en het identificeren van de 
historische oorzaken, kan deze studie onder meer bijdragen aan een beter begrip van de 
patstelling die is ontstaan. Het onderzoek laat zien dat inzicht in de communicatie van 
stakeholders en de effecten die deze communicatie op andere stakeholders heeft een 
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belangrijke sleutel is tot een oplossing. Een andere belangrijke bijdrage van dit 
onderzoek is dat het laat zien hoe de disciplines van geschiedenis en communicatie 






About the Author 
 
Michelle Knight was born in Luxembourg in 1978 and grew up in Groningen, where 
she attended the Praedinius Gymnasium. After finishing high school, she studied at the 
University of Groningen, where she attained a propedeutic degree in history and a 
master’s degree in American Studies. She followed exchange programs at the College 
of Charleston and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
 
During her studies she became interested in the public debate on police violence. After 
a visit to New York she noticed how troublesome this debate was, and decided to write 
her master’s thesis about the public debate itself, rather than about police violence.  
 
After finishing her studies, Michelle was employed as a communications advisor to the 
international communications consultancy Ketchum (previously known as Schoep & 
Van der Toorn). There she worked for various clients, including several Dutch 
ministries, IBM and ABN Amro. Her work included ghostwriting, text writing, PR 
consultancy, account management, and media training.  
 
While working for Ketchum, she was approached by her former thesis advisors, who 
invited her to research the public debate on police violence as an external PhD 
candidate. She decided to combine her function at Ketchum with this new challenge, 
supported by Ketchum’s Amsterdam CEO Tim de Boer. For her research, Michelle 
visited New York twice, to conduct interviews with key stakeholders, visit several 
specialized libraries, collect information from databases, and seek advice from 
researchers at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice.  
 
Meanwhile, Michelle decided to change careers and follow two of her passions: 
writing and politics. She was appointed as a policy advisor for two Dutch MPs. 
Continuing on the path of her passions, Michelle is now a speech writer and senior 







“No justice, no peace!”1 
 
Chant heard from police critics at rallies held after the shooting of Amadou Diallo 
 
“We don’t hate cops. We don’t hate race. We hate wrong. There’s a difference between 
peace and quiet. Quiet means shut up. Quiet means suffer in silence. Peace means 
justice. We want peace, but we won’t get quiet until we get justice.”2 
 
The Rev. Al Sharpton on the shooting of Sean Bell in 2006 
 
“It’s a tragedy, not a crime.”3 
 
Chant heard from police supporters at rallies held after the shooting of Amadou Diallo  
 
“They [the jurors] will conclude that while this shooting was a horrible tragedy for all 
involved, especially Sean Bell and his family, that no crime was committed by 
Detective Oliver or any of the officers involved.”4  
 
Michael Palladino, President of the Detectives’ Endowment Association, on the 
 Sean Bell shooting 
 
A ‘tragedy for all involved’ and ‘No justice, no peace’ — two examples of 
stakeholders’ reoccurring statements in the ongoing debate on the functioning of the 
New York Police Department, in particular concerning the use of excessive force and 
the racial profiling of minorities in New York. This ongoing debate — at times 
vehement and at times more in the background — has been fueled by a series of high-
profile police-violence cases, such as that of Amadou Diallo, Abner Louima and more 
recently Sean Bell.  
While most academic research focuses on the actual incidents of police 
violence, an interesting yet overlooked aspect of the issue of police violence in New 
York is the public debate about it, in particular the dynamics of that debate. As the 
quotes above illustrate and a closer examination of the literature demonstrates, there is 
not only a pattern of police-violence incidents, there is also a pattern in the public 
debates following these issues. These debates oftentimes appear to result in a stalemate 
position, illustrated by the repetitive statements of participants after high-profile 
police-violence incidents, such as those quoted above. 
The public debate itself is an important part of the dynamics of police violence 
as a societal problem. Not only is the public debate a product of police violence but it 
can also be seen as an important causal factor in its resolution, as a debate generally 
speaking can either accelerate or prevent solutions. In the specific scenario of the 
debate held between the NYPD and its critics this impact is twofold, as the process of 
negotiation, mutual perceptions, expectations and positioning are influenced in the 
‘formal’ arena of debate through the communicative acts of spokespersons representing 
particular stakeholder groups, but also in the informal arena, through the less official 
contacts between police and public.  
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This study chooses to investigate this rather unnoticed and somewhat 
underestimated aspect of the overall issue of police violence. By doing so, this study’s 
foremost aim is to provide insight into the dynamics of the debate itself. The objectives 
for this are threefold. First, this study aims to contribute — from a modest academic 
standpoint — to a better understanding and possibly a resolution of the apparent 
stalemate in the existing public debate. Second, by investigating the public debate, this 
research aims to provide a deeper understanding of the pattern of police-violence 
incidents and the strained relationship between the police and its critics, as the debate 
is an integral part of this. Third, this research aims to contribute to the methodological 
discussion on how to deal with police-violence issues, offering an alternative way to 
research them. 
This introduction is organized as follows: Section I provides an analysis of the 
challenges facing police-violence research; Section II describes how the dynamics of 
the public debate surrounding police violence can best be regarded and researched; 
Section III presents an overview of the adopted approach. 
 
I — Lessons from past research on police-violence and 
police–minority relations issues 
“Tyrone Guyton. This was the first name I connected with police brutality. Guyton was 
a 15-year-old black boy who fled the scene of a robbery. He was shot in the back by a 
white police officer in Oakland, California, in 1973. I was 12 years old at the time. I 
knew Guyton had done something wrong, but even to my young mind, the punishment 
did not fit the crime.”5  
 
Kathryn K. Russell, associate professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of 
Maryland, College Park, in her article’s introduction in Police Brutality, an anthology  
 
“Like most informed Americans, I noticed these news stories [on police-violence 
issues], and I shuddered. When the police officers who beat Rodney King were 
acquitted, I was shocked. While the Louima case ran its course, I was horrified. The 
morning after the officers who shot Diallo were acquitted, I sat at my breakfast table, 
deeply troubled, reflecting morosely on the inadequacy of the courts to address all the 
many issues raised by a case like this one.”6 
 
Beth Roy, sociologist, in the introduction to her book 41 shots…and Counting 
 
What stands out in the introductions to police-violence and police–minority literature, 
such as those quoted above, is the anecdotal, personal, and partisan character of those 
texts. These introductions illustrate the relative scarcity of academic studies and the 
abundance of anecdotal, personal and partisan studies mainly originating from societal 
action groups, but also from scholars writing popular-scientific literature.  
Scholars who have chosen to do research on police violence, in particular those 
that write for a broader audience, have often expressed their frustration: “Even though 
the problem of police brutality is real, there remains a public haze, thick and 
oppressive, that surrounds the issue” is what Russell further observes in her article on 
police violence in the United States.
7
 In her research into the Amadou Diallo shooting, 
Roy similarly points out: “To write about the case of Amadou Diallo is to wrestle with 
at least two hard American problems: race and policing. Both have been subjected to 
3 
 
reams of expository paper, hours of vituperative discourse. Issues so emotional, so 
urgent, compel controversy; it is hard to turn away.”8 
Rather than providing a comprehensive overview of the existing literature, this 
section aims to analyze some of the challenges inherent in research into police 
violence, while simultaneously reflecting on the methodological considerations that 
underlie researching the phenomena of police violence in general and the current 
debate on New York police violence in particular. In this section’s analysis, a division 
is therefore made between an analysis of general problems related to police-violence 
research on the one hand, and a closer look at the challenges surrounding historical and 
communication studies on the other, as the topics and research approaches of such 
studies are more closely related to the topic of this study, i.e. a historical pattern of 
communication.  
 
I.1 — General problems surrounding police-violence research 
There is only a limited amount of academic studies that focus solely on the topic of 
police violence. The number of popular-scientific studies written for the general public 
in fact greatly exceeds the number of purely academic ones. In addition, the dividing 
line between these two different types of literature is not always very clear, as some 
academics appear to aim at the general public with their research.
9
  
The non-academic studies include journalistic reports on (a series of) police-
violence incidents, essay-style persuasive literature, observational reports from societal 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the New York Civil Liberties Union, 
as well as statistical reports from the Civilian Complaint Review Board.
10
 The 
literature tends to be presented as the outcome of research conducted in a scholarly 
vein, but regularly turns out to be anecdotal, partisan and inconclusive, as illustrated by 
the quotes from Roy and Russell earlier on, but also by the reports published by 
societal organizations which are presented as conclusive research, yet are based on 
isolated incidents of police violence and hence fail to validate a structural pattern.
11
  
From a historical perspective, police-violence studies generally have a limited 
research scope, as they tend to analyze events that took place at a specific moment in 
time rather than during a prolonged historical period. While these studies often 
mention the existence of a historical ‘pattern of police violence’, sometimes by 
referring to individual incidents/anecdotes, they do not research this pattern 
structurally. In an article dealing with the historiography of violence in America, Ira M. 
Leonard and Christopher C. Leonard only mention two studies that examine broader 
patterns of police violence.
12
 However, these studies do so only indirectly, while 
always placing police violence in the broader context of violence in America. The lack 
of historical depth has been noted by several other scholars.
13
 They argue that this is a 
missed opportunity considering that research into these patterns can expose the 
foundations of the police-violence problem.
14
 An exception is the book Street Justice: 
A History of Police Violence in New York City by Marilynn Johnson, which elaborates 
extensively on the history of police violence in New York.
15
  
In a critical analysis of existing literature on police violence — as part of a 
comparative study between the Toronto and New York police forces — Jeffrey Ian 
Ross points out that there are but a few academic studies that examine the causes of 
police violence in general.
16
 These studies are oftentimes ahistorical and atheoretical, 
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while the data are limited in scope. Less generalistic is the literature in the field of 
police torture, death-squad activity, deaths in police custody and police riots, not only 
in relation to America, but rather worldwide.
17
 In particular the literature in regard to 
police use of deadly force often lacks internal validity, while there is disagreement 
amongst scholars concerning measurement of police violence.
18
 
There is more research available in fields related to police violence, such as 
attitudes toward police violence and civilian overview (see discussion in Part I, 
Subsections 3.1.2 and 3.10.6). The body of research into the field of racial profiling is 
also quite extensive, in the context of car stops — ‘driving while black’ — but also in 
the context of zero-tolerance measures (see discussion in Part I, Subsection 3.10.5). 
Yet Amy Farrell and Jack McDevitt argue that while some of the research into racial 
profiling has provided important insights, for example that stop-and-frisk rates are not 
necessarily linked to the crime rates committed by ethnic groups (a common 




In an analysis of the literature on police violence, law enforcement scholar 
Herbert Locke points out a few challenges regarding the research into race-related 
police violence.
20
 Due to a “paucity of existing data” and the “difficulty of primary 
data collection”, Locke argues, many scholars have difficulties researching the issue.21 
Locke primarily blames the law enforcement institutions for this lack of information. 
In a historiographical section of his book on the negative and aggressive effects of 
police culture, sociologist Arthur Niederhoffer similarly concludes: “One reason, 
perhaps, for the apparent lack of interest on the sociologists’ part may have been the 
‘blue curtain’ of secrecy that screened most police organizations and prevented the 
researcher from gaining the necessary entree into the life and world of the police.”22 
Thus, Locke and Niederhoffer both maintain that law enforcement agencies — 
deliberately or not — do not provide enough data for scholars to produce sound 
research, resulting in both a disinterest of scholars to investigate the topic, and an 
accumulation of reports that are inconclusive. These conclusions were specifically 




Law enforcement expert David Griswold argues that those academics who 
have tackled the issue of alleged police misconduct have often used inadequate 
methods of research. In an overview of the literature available, Griswold concludes (in 
1978) that “for nearly every finding presented [in literature on police violence], 
criticism of the measures used or the failure to control for the other possible influences, 
counter evidence could be offered that pointed to the other possible explanation. […] 
The conflicting evidence paints a rather fuzzy picture, with no clear evidence which 
can be presented to resolve the issue.”24 Locke echoes these findings 20 years later: 
“Researchers do not know or cannot assert much, with empirical reliability, about 
whether there are racial reasons for police behavior because other possible 
explanations cannot be ruled out.”25 In other words, Locke and Griswold maintain that 
it is almost impossible to determine the motivations behind police misconduct. Similar 
observations have also been made in relation to racial profiling. Farrell and McDevitt 
argue that the identification and measurement of racial profiling is rather difficult, not 
only because adequate benchmarks are hard to find, but particularly because “the 
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decision to racially profile is an internal decision made by an individual officer.”26 
Ross has pointed out other methodological flaws in police-violence research. In his 
comparative study between the Toronto and New York police forces, he maintains that 
existing studies use ‘questionable’ methods such as the use of victims’ self reports, 
while hypotheses are rarely empirically tested.
27
  
In their critique of studies on police violence, Locke, Griswold and Ross also 
blame the scholars themselves. Locke argues that research bias is frequently prevalent 
in race-related issues, which police violence is often considered part of: “Research is 
generally viewed as important for, among other reasons, its capacity to set aside 
political or other assumptions in order to examine an issue dispassionately and without 
preconceived notions, [however] […] we have known this general proposition is 
considerably weaker when questions of race are at stake.”28 Ross similarly points out 
that “many studies are politically biased, thus their objectivity is hampered.”29  
It is striking how candid most ‘partisan’ writers and researchers, in particular 
those writing for a broader audience (and not always specifically in relation to race), 
are about their partisanship. In the foreword of a journalistic attempt to investigate the 
problem of police violence, journalist Ed Cray writes: “The Big Blue Line [Cray’s 
previous book] was an attempt to describe, with as much journalistic objectivity as 
possible, a contemporary social problem. It was not, nor is this new edition, an 
impartial book: Society as an institution cannot condone — nor does this writer — the 
deliberate violation of the law.”30 With these words, Cray admits his work is not value-
free. His book provides an anecdotal report of cases of alleged violence against 
minorities, but does not examine closely any indicative statistics.  
At first glance, this biased stance seems to stand apart from the challenges of 
research into police violence, as the bias appears to be a deliberate choice of those 
researchers. However, a closer examination of the literature shows that those who 
examine racial police violence have no other option but to make a biased choice in 
interpreting the scarce, elusive, multi-interpretable information from the start. Locke 
suggests that “if the evidence from a series of such studies seems impossibly 
inconsistent — as it often does — then perhaps researchers are asking the wrong 
questions”, arguing that research questions are focused too much on race.31 He 
continues the course of his argument by formulating a new set of research questions, 
which are not based on race, but on police misconduct in general, in which the issue is 
“stripped of its emotional content and consequences.”32  
Yet while Locke’s suggestion in itself may be valid, his own article, in which 
the racial element has been evaded, is to a degree inconclusive too. In his conclusion, 
he admits: “In the absence of being able to confirm that racist acts — behaviors that are 
racially motivated — are pervasive in policing, we nevertheless have to deal with 
racially linked outcomes in law enforcement.”33 Whereas the statement in itself is true 
— members of minority groups are the ones that file the most police brutality 
complaints — Locke fails to prove why these outcomes are racial in the first place. 
Moreover, he does not provide any explanations for the hostility between the police 
and minorities. Another problem with Locke’s analysis is that the four challenges 
discussed above, i.e. (i) a lack of data; (ii) unclear data that can be interpreted in 
different ways (and cause bias); (iii) secondary literature that is biased; and (iv) a 
biased stance adopted by the researchers; can similarly affect research studies that are 
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not specifically based on race, but rather on police violence in general, as data still 
remain unavailable, street encounters elusive, and researchers prone to bias. Locke’s 
suggestion to broaden the focus can still be valuable by itself, as further discussed in 
the next two paragraphs. However, contrary to Locke’s research methodology and 
outcomes, research into the broader context should result in conclusions that also 
pertain to the narrower context, i.e. the racial aspects of police violence.  
   
I.2 — Historical research into police violence and other law enforcement issues 
The limited amount of historical research into police violence does not stand on its 
own. Likewise there are relatively few studies that deal with the history of related law 
enforcement issues. In a study on the history of police professionalism, police expert 
Nathan Douthit (1975) argues how historical research could contribute to the then body 
of (mainly sociological and political) literature:  
 
“Since the late 1960s a number of studies on policing in the United States have 
appeared investigating major dilemmas of police professionalism. These studies have 
been largely the work of sociologists and political scientists. As a result they have 
explained the dilemmas of police professionalism almost entirely in terms of the 
interrelationships between police and other parts of the criminal justice system, sub-
cultures within society, law and the police bureaucracy itself. They have given little or 
no attention to the historical roots of police professionalism.”34  
 
Douthit is not alone with his call for historical research. In a justification of the 
relevance of his study into the inception and first decades of the New York Police 
Department, historian Wilbur Miller similarly argues that the historical roots of 
contemporary police problems can be traced back as far as the 19th century, observing 
that “Many conflicts and problems are endemic to police work, and my 19th century 
sources often sound quite modern.”35  
Historical research into police violence involves similar challenges as the ones 
mentioned before, including bias and a lack of objective sources. Take for example the 
book Police Violence: an anthology.
36
 According to the book’s blurb text, which 
discusses the lack of historical research studies, the book places police brutality “in a 
desperately needed historical and intellectual context”. While the text suggests that the 
book contains a selection of well-documented essays and articles, the anthology in fact 
does not differ from the aforementioned literature, as it consists of a collection of 
anecdotal, partial, and inconclusive essays, based on opinion and not on fact. For 
instance, in one of the anthology’s articles, specifically dealing with the oppression of 
ghetto inhabitants, Robin D.G. Kelley brings up the alleged use of “methods of 
surveillance and anti-guerrilla tactics developed in Vietnam” in ghetto neighborhoods 
in the United States.
37
 A harsh accusation, which Kelley assumes to be a fact, but for 
which he does not cite a source. In fact, in the course of his essay he only occasionally 
cites his sources, so it remains unclear as to where he obtained the information he 
presents.  
While Johnson’s book does extensively cite sources, this tome, too, has been 
criticized for partisanship.
38
 In a review of her book, Allen Steinberg identifies two 
problems: “Because Johnson sticks so close to her sources, which are mostly generated 
by critics and victims of police violence, and because she clearly sympathizes with the 
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victims, she tends to adopt their point of view, which is that police brutality is not just 
bad, but an aberration — unnecessary deviance that should and can be eliminated. This 
is a fine perspective for an activist, but for a scholar it begs the big question. Police 
violence isn’t aberrational, it’s essential.”39 Steinberg also criticizes Johnson for 
understating “moments of significant change”, and for not seeing such change in the 
light of broader historical developments.
40
  
 In the main, the scarce literature that is available is anecdotal overall, which 
illustrates how historians, just like other scholars, have had to deal with challenges 
similar to those described in the previous section. In order to circumvent these 
challenges, one could strip the issue further of its emotional content, as Locke argued. 
A rational line of thinking might be to broaden the focus from the narrow theme of 
‘police violence in history’ to larger historical developments which the police-violence 
issue is part of. An obvious and much better documented broader development is how 
the NYPD and other policing organizations have dealt with wider police problems, 
including police violence, but also, and more prominently, police corruption and the 
curtailing of the discretionary powers of the rank and file. Historians mainly refer to 
these developments as ‘the professionalization of the police’. This professionalization, 
as well as the debate about it, occurred (and still occurs) as a response to these 
problems. In the foreword to their investigative study into the New York police, 
historiographers James Lardner and Thomas Reppetto expound on this pattern: 
  
“This book is a history of New York’s police, from the 1820s, before the city got 
around to organizing them into a formal department, until the near present. Our aim is 
first and foremost to unearth and preserve a buried past and to show how the NYPD of 
today — forty thousand strong, with its high-tech war room of computer pin maps and 
its newfangled corporate lingo — developed out of a ragtag band of men who, in the 
mid-nineteenth century, slept in foul-smelling precinct dormitories for a good part of 
every tour of duty, smoked cigars on patrol, got their jobs through local aldermen (and 
lost them when the tides shifted), and often refused to investigate thefts unless rewards 
were offered.”41 
 
This quote epitomizes the authors’ desire to structure the history of the NYPD along 
the lines of professionalization. In other studies too, the notion of professionalization is 
used to structure the often complicated web of general problems American police 
institutions had to face in the past centuries.  
Placing the issue of police violence in a broader historical context of police 
problems, while also, more broadly, looking at how the NYPD developed and 
professionalized itself and how the debate on this affected the organization in the past 
and now (social context), can offer a broader context for police-violence research, 
taking Locke’s advice one step further. Although Locke broadened the focus by 
looking at police violence in general, he still had to face the same problems of scarce 
and vague data along with the biased research stance of others. The available literature 
on broader police issues, however, proves to be more conclusive, better documented 
and is non-partisan, simply because this literature does not have to deal solely with the 
issue of police violence and police–minority relations, nor with the explosive 
atmosphere that surrounds these issues.
42
 Thus, by looking at the broader historical 
context in which police violence occurs, the aforementioned challenges are avoided to 
a certain degree, while the origins and broader context of violence can be better 
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understood. These considerations should be taken into account for the research 
approach for this study, considering that the current debate on police violence has 
historic roots. 
 
I.3 — Communication research into police violence  
This section investigates some of the literature on communication and the (New York) 
police, in particular in relation to the issue of police violence. While the available 
literature is scarce, there are certainly some interesting communication studies 
available that deal with these topics. This section will discuss three different categories.  
The largest group of police-violence studies in the field of communication 
consists of attitudinal studies investigating perceptions of police violence (see 
discussion in Part I, Subsection 3.1.2). These studies are mainly quantitative in nature. 
The discussed perceptions are not linked to broader communication patterns: The 
communication between different stakeholders is rarely researched.
43
 Also, most of 
these studies do not focus on broader historical patterns.
44
 An early example of this 
type of communication research is police expert G. Douglas Gourley’s study of the Los 
Angeles Police Department in the 1950s, in which public relations methodology is 
applied to facilitate the understanding of police–community relations. In his research, 
Gourley perceives public contacts, such as street encounters, from a communication 
vantage point, arguing that communication is a determining factor in the Police 
Department’s overall functioning: “No matter how well a police department is 
organized, or how efficient and honest its administration, it is judged by individual 
citizens and, consequently, by the nature of its public contacts. People believe the old 
adage that ‘By their fruits ye shall know them’.”45 More generally, Gourley recognizes 
the importance of a PR methodology in police research studies. Just like Locke, 
Gourley believes that police–community problems can best be understood from a 
broader perspective, in this case by applying a broader public relations framework: 
 
“If […] police public relations are made under such difficult circumstances, and are so 
extremely important to the successful operation of a police department, it would seem 
only logical that procedures should be devised to measure the status of public relations 
at any particular time; and to determine which police techniques, actions, and attitudes 
are approved, and which are not.”46 
 
Specifically in relation to the topic of this research, a PR research approach can give 
certain insights into the debate on police violence, as it can reveal the attitudes and 
positioning of important stakeholders, as well as the two-way communication that 
occurs at a certain moment in time. However, on its own, PR research does not reveal 
the dynamics of the debate, as qualitative stakeholder analyses and surveys merely 
investigate a recent situation. Hence Gourley’s research is just like a photograph: a 
static overview of both the citizens’ perception of the LAPD in 1953 and the 
interaction between police and community as a result of this. Moreover, the problem in 
regard to the lack of sources that can be used for PR research purposes remains, to a 
certain degree, as police data would also be necessary. Gourley’s research was an 




There are also a few studies that investigate the communication about police 
violence from a more qualitative and often critical perspective. In her book on the 
Amadou Diallo shooting, Roy analyzes the diverging interpretations of stakeholder 
groups in regard to this shooting through critical analysis of the discourse obtained 
from interviews held with stakeholders. She characterizes her research as follows: “To 
ask, then, whether the particular four young officers who shot and killed Amadou 
Diallo were heroes or terrorists is a meaningful question only if the very starkness of 
the characterizations serves to open a portal into a very different universe of 
discussion.”47  
While it appears that Roy’s intention is to examine the divergence of 
perceptions objectively, her book is no less partisan, emotional and anecdotal than the 
other studies discussed so far. In a review of Roy’s book, Anna-Maria Marshall 
observes: “[Roy] does not adopt a scientific approach to isolate the particular factors 
that led to the shooting; she is not systematically collecting evidence or testing 
theoretical models that might explain the use of violence by policy [sic]. Rather, this is 
a deeply personal work in which Roy invites the reader to join her in her effort to make 
sense of the [Amadou Diallo] shooting and its wider consequences.”48 
In line with critical research tradition, but also with the partisan nature of 
popular-scientific literature on police violence, Roy points out her interest from the 
start in the introduction to her book: “I write as a white woman, intent on contributing 
to social change. […] In different aspects of my life I am, or have been, a journalist, a 
sociologist, a mediator, a therapist, a teacher — and the mother of a young man of 
color. Each of those perspectives motivates and informs my writing; none 
dominates.”49  
This latter promise, however, is not fulfilled in the book. Her partisanship 
becomes particularly clear in her analysis of judicial stakeholders on the one hand, and 
police critics on the other. Roy argues that the judge who acquitted the implicated 
officers was “pedantic, in his rendering of the law”. More generally, Roy maintains 
that “judges and juries tend to believe, through a thick bundle of cultural assumptions, 
the word of men-in-blue.”50 Conversely, she offers much more sympathy for the 
rhetoric used by those critical of the police. Although she admits some of this rhetoric 
was harsh, the statements made by police critics merely reflected “a need for emotional 
expression as well as political action, for passionate speech and the empathic 
connections that happen in consequence among human beings.”51 Thus, while an 
analysis of the diverging perceptions and interpretations of different stakeholders on a 
particular event could indeed provide meaningful insight into the issue of police 
violence in general, and its communication aspects in particular, Roy’s partisan, non-
academic approach prevents her from reaching meaningful conclusions.  
Third, there are also studies with a strong focus on media content analysis. 
Take for example Regina Lawrence’s study on how police violence incidents are 
represented in newspapers, or the research of Ross, discussed in Subsection I.1 
above.
52
 Through police violence statistics and newspaper analysis Ross examines the 
responses by media, citizens, law enforcement and politicians to the use of force in 
these cities, concluding that few cases actually reach the media, most people are 
apathetic to police violence, and actual change is limited.
53
 Yet this study, too, has 
been criticized for inconclusiveness. In a review of Ross’ book, Howard Giles and 
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René Dailey criticize the authors’ quantitative methods, pointing out that “large 
numbers of variables pertinent to Ross’s model have high amounts of missing data, 
making meaningful statistical comparisons almost impossible.”54 Some additional 
points of critique can be made concerning Ross’ qualitative methods. In his analysis of 
different cases, Ross categorizes stakeholder responses, but he does not analyze (the 
context of) these responses extensively, which makes this analysis somewhat limited. 
For example, the ‘apathy’ he observes can perhaps be understood and classified better 
when citizen’s statements are analyzed. Moreover, while Ross does put emphasis on 
the historical dimension of the issue at stake, he does not attempt to validate broader 
macro patterns of incidents and responses.  
Overall, the existing communication studies on police violence provide some 
valuable insights into the issue of police violence. Yet while quantitative analysis has 
its drawbacks due to a lack of data, the qualitative analysis is too limited, and 
oftentimes too partisan and anecdotal, to be conclusive. Moreover, the historical 
dimension of communication processes is mostly disregarded, or only discussed on a 
superficial level. Extensive qualitative research that is conducted from an objective 
research perspective and that addresses both historical and organic dimensions of 
communication can thus complement the existing body of research.  
 
I.4 — Conclusion 
This section has addressed the underlying causes for the challenges of police-violence 
research, in order to motivate the approach adopted in the present research. Four 
challenges have been identified: (i) a lack of data; (ii) unclear data that can be 
interpreted in different ways (and cause bias); (iii) secondary literature that is biased; 
and (iv) a biased stance adopted by the researchers. This section has shown that it is 
difficult to overcome these challenges, as the lack of clear data contributes to the 
methodological problems and the adoption of a biased stance. These challenges also 
pertain to research specifically dealing with the dynamics of the public debate on 
police violence: While the current developments in the debate on police violence have 
been registered in an ample amount of recent sources (public speeches, interviews, 
newspaper articles), the historical pattern of this debate has not. Moreover, bias has 
been found in the (very scarce amount of) literature on this specific topic.  
Hence broadening the focus might lead to better results, also regarding 
research specifically into the police-violence debate. In line with these observations, 
this study will investigate the pattern of debate on police violence as part of the general 
dynamics of criticism and response on police problems such as corruption and 
efficiency.  
This section has shown that while communication research can reveal the 
attitudes and positioning of important stakeholders, as well as the two-way 
communication that occurs at a certain moment in time, such research alone cannot 
reveal the dynamics of debate. While historical research can reveal these dynamics, it 
cannot expose the actual communication processes that take place in a public debate. A 
combination of these two disciplines would be an interesting way to broaden the focus. 
Hence this study will investigate the dynamics of the police-violence debate from both 




II — Investigating the public debate on police violence in New York 
What is this public debate on police violence and how should it be analyzed? This 
section will look more closely at this question. While the first paragraph specifically 
deals with the definition of debate, the chosen approach, and the formulation of a 
research question, the remainder of this section will discuss the theoretical tenets 
guiding this research. The starting point of the discussion is the most prominent and 
visible product of public debate: the communication produced by different 
stakeholders.  
 
II.1 — The scope and central question of this study 
The concept of public debate by itself is not only broad in both width and depth, but 
also fluid in consistency, as stakeholders, issues, arguments, and interactions can 
change over time, but also vary based on the vantage point and framings held and 
constructed by those observing and interpreting the debate, including its participants. 
The boundaries of the debate on police violence and police–minority relations are 
likewise not fixed, as these debates overlap with ones on different and/or broader 
topics, such as police performance, discrimination, and so forth. Moreover, it is 
important to note that, in the specific scenario of the debate on police violence, there is 
a second arena of debate which closely relates to the public ‘formal’ one described 
above. In this second arena, individual stakeholder-group members communicate 
directly with each other through street encounters. 
While the debate itself is fluid, the figurative arena of debate, i.e. the 
metaphorical space where the debate takes place, is constant, like a stage where people 
bring up issues and others criticize, oppose or agree with them. Within this 
metaphorical arena, a distinction can be made between the micro and macro levels of 
debate. On the micro level, the public debate involves specific topics and issues 
concerning particular stakeholder groups, which are perhaps not always 
communicating physically with each other, yet are still engaged in an ongoing debate 
through the media, which makes the debate ‘public’. Conversely, on the macro level of 
debate, stakeholders and issues change over time. For example, while (police) violence 
was omnipresent in the first decades of the New York Police Department, it was not a 
topic that reached the formal arena of debate, as will be further explored in the first 
part of this study. The different character of micro and macro patterns of debate 
suggests a two-pronged methodology, which also needs to take into account the multi-
level character and boundaries of the debate.  
While the notion of debate is amorphous, the particular debate central to this 
study nevertheless appears to develop, and hence can be structured, through certain 
patterns. More specifically, the New York Police Department is apparently in debate 
with critics, minority groups in particular, on police-violence incidents such as those of 
Sean Bell, Amadou Diallo, and Abner Louima, but also more continuously on a 
multitude of issues concerning police violence and racial profiling. This debate does 
not appear to be a one-off debate, or a debate occurring over a short period of time, but 
is rather a protracted process that peaks after certain events, and in which both 




The problem central to this research is why this debate continues without 
apparent progress, why participants appear to be repeating themselves, and why the 
overall discourse, as well as the way the discourses of different stakeholders influence 
each other, seem to contribute to a stalemate position.  
In order to find causes for this apparent stalemate situation, this study chooses 
to analyze not only the current (apparent stalemate) situation and the patterns leading 
to this situation, but also the causal relations between these two. For this purpose, the 
debate will be researched through a two-pronged approach encompassing both the 
historical research into the dynamics/macro patterns of the debate on police problems 
and professionalization and the in-depth analysis of the current micro pattern of 
organic communicative interactions between different stakeholders.  
 
This study adopts the following research question:  
Which factors contribute to the stagnation of the debate on police violence in 
New York, both on the micro level of individual incidents and on the historical 
macro level?  
 
This study chooses to research the macro patterns of police-violence communication in 
the broader context of communication on police problems.  
 
II.2 — Four theoretical tenets 
The chosen research approach and research question are supported by four theoretical 
tenets, which will be further explained below. These tenets have been derived from 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Public Relations (PR) theory, and principles of 
historical research, and aim to bring together the two different elements of this study 
into one holistic approach rather than two different ones.  
 
Theoretical tenet A: The dialectics of discourse and society 
The communication of stakeholders participating in public debates can be interpreted 
in different ways. In line with critical discourse theory, this research chooses to see 
such discourse as a product and an influencer of society, building on the assumption 
that society and discourse have a dialectical relationship.
55 
In this sense, 
communication is not only shaped by societal context, but language use is also a form 
of social practice, considering discourse cannot exist without social meanings.
56
 
Discourse “is constitutive of the realities within which we live, rather than expressive 
of an earlier, discourse-independent reality.”57 More specifically, discursive events 
(instances of language use, analyzed as text, discursive practice, social practice) are 
shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, and vice versa, resulting in 
discourse being both socially constitutive and socially determined.
58
  
In line with this dialectical relationship, this study specifically adopts Norman 
Fairclough’s assumption that language, and thus also the discourse used by participants 
in a debate, is always simultaneously constitutive of (i) social identities, (ii) social 
relations and (iii) systems of knowledge and beliefs.
59
 Also in line with this dialectical 
relationship is this study’s foundation that conventional linguistic theory is not 
sufficient to deal with the social aspects of language, as it does not take into account 
extralinguistic factors. In line with Wodak’s assumption that extralinguistic factors 
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such as speech situation, the status of participants, time and place, sociological 
variables (group membership, age, professional socialization) and psychological 
determinants (experience, routine, and so forth) should be taken into account, this 
study argues more broadly that the social background of stakeholders should be 
researched through approaches other than mere textual analysis.
60
 Of particular 
relevance in this matter is historical research into the development of different 
stakeholders, but also, to a lesser extent, PR research, with its strong focus on strategic 
communication devised and conveyed by organizations. The present study maintains 
that such strategic communication has a dialectical relationship with society as well, as 
it is the product of social events and processes.  
As a final point, this research emphasizes the importance of discourse as a 
research source, as discourse is a significant form of social activity (theoretical 
foundation); discourse can be used as a source of data (methodological foundation); 
discourse is a gauge of social change (historical foundation); and power relations are 




There are several implications for this research:  
1. In order to provide insight into the dynamics of the police-violence debate, this 
research investigates the dialectical relationship between language and society in 
the context of this debate. More specifically, this research examines the two-way 
influential relationship between the language used by different stakeholders on the 
one hand and the societal context as well as the dynamics of the debate itself on the 
other. This is in line with the critical discourse analysis tradition to “make human 
beings aware of the reciprocal influences of language and social structures of 
which they are normally unaware.”62  
2. The analysis of discourse should have a central place in this research, as discourse 
on police problems and police violence in particular is plentiful (methodological 
foundation), it can show the broader context and dynamics of these debates 
(historical foundation), and it can demonstrate the (power) relations between 
different participants in the debate (political foundation).  
3. The present study aims to examine language use in discourse to better understand 
the social identities of key players in police debates, as well as the social relations 
that connect these key players. In line with the critical basis of this study, such 
analysis should focus on the interaction and dynamics of different perceptions, 
interpretations and positioning held and conveyed by stakeholders in relation to 
events in society, rather than an interpretation of these events themselves.  
4. Discourse analysis alone is not sufficient to give insight into the dialectical 
relationship between the communication of different stakeholders in the debate and 
the societal context and dynamics of the debate. This context has a strong historical 
component, as the dynamic patterns of recurring incidents and communication 
suggest. This is also in line with the views of some CDA practitioners regarding 
the context of discourse.
63
 This supports the choice for historical research in the 
present study, considering such research can expose the historical context that 
shaped both discourse and participants.
64
 Second, it should involve some PR 
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research, as discourse communicated by stakeholders often involves preconceived 
strategic messages rather than spontaneous statements.  
 
Theoretical tenet B: Discourse as manifesting and sustaining power and ideology  
From the tenet that language is a social practice and the theory that power relations are 
formed and sustained by cultural rather than merely economic dimensions, it follows 
that there is a link between power and language.
65
 Theories based upon this assumption 
define power as a struggle between a dominant majority versus an underprivileged 
minority, arguing that hegemony and power within society are often put into effect by 
means of texts. This study starts more neutrally with the premise that power manifests 
itself in a multidimensional way within the debates on police problems and that power 
relations and dominance are not merely top-down, but rather involve an organic and 
dynamic struggle between different stakeholders.
66
  
The concept of power is not only manifested in the utterances within texts 
themselves, but also in the accessibility of texts to groups within society. This research 
is hence built on the assumption that the relationship between hegemony (“the 
predominance in and dominance of political, ideological and cultural domains of a 
society”) and discourse can be explained by seeing the power over ‘discursive 
practices’ as a battle for supremacy over ‘orders of discourse’ (the totality of discourse 
types of an institution and the relationships between them).
67
  
Within this battle for power, the use of language may function ideologically. 
This theoretical assumption is based on the linguistic theory devised by Valentin N. 
Volo inov et al., who maintain not only that the battle for power takes place within 
‘linguistic signs’, but that this battle is also a battle for the significance of these signs.68 
Phrased differently, language may be used to make certain depictions of society and 
with this any unequal distribution of power appears as factual, rational, and natural. In 
relation to ideology and power, this research specifically adopts Fairclough’s tenet 
“that language connects with the social through being the primary domain of ideology, 
and through being both a site of, and a stake in, struggles for power”.69 
 
The implications for this research are fourfold:  
1. As this study starts with the assumption that power manifests itself in a 
multidimensional way within the debates on police problems, and power relations 
and dominance are not merely top-down but rather organic, this study chooses to 
research the concept of power in a similar multidimensional fashion, by also 
looking at the ‘horizontal’ power relations between groups rather than merely at 
top-down power structures.  
2. Similarly, this study does not merely look at the dominant ideology, but at the 
different ideologies ingrained in the mindsets of each of the stakeholder groups in 
the debates on police problems. In this sense, the concept of ideology is not merely 
viewed as ‘a set of ideas proposed by the dominant class of a society to all 
members of this society’, as is done regularly in critical studies, but instead as 
ideas proposed by different groups in society, seen by members of this group as 
‘their truth’.  
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3. This study investigates how the language used by different stakeholders in the 
debate on police violence is both a stake in and a site of the struggle for power and 
ideology.  
4. In researching the discourse produced by different stakeholders in the debate, this 
research will also examine who has access to these sources, as power may manifest 
itself both within and through discourse on police problems (take for example the 
accessibility of statistics to stakeholders in debates on police problems).  
 
Theoretical tenet C: This study’s stance towards communication: no single truth 
A public debate typically involves stakeholders conveying and holding different and 
often opposing arguments, perceptions, positioning, and so forth. The current debate on 
police violence does not appear to be an exception in this matter — witness the 
vehement debates portrayed in newspaper articles. Considering that (i) research on 
police violence is often prone to bias, (ii) it is important to research the context in and 
of police problem cases, and (iii) researchers are not self-reflective of their own 
political involvement, this study, from a general ‘critical analysis’ perspective, stresses 
the importance of being critical towards discourse by placing it in a historical context, 
while being self-reflective.
70
 Self-reflectivity implies an understanding of, and 
reflection on, intentions and points of view. This critical basis has several implications 
for dealing with discourse as primary and secondary source material:  
1. This study does not examine right and wrong in police-violence cases, nor does it 
intend to take sides in the debate on these issues. Hence the communication of 
different stakeholders will be scrutinized accordingly. This stance takes critical 
theory one step further in that this research involves 360-degree criticism rather 
than a focus on top-down power relations/dominance, and criticism of those in 
power.  
2. This study’s stance toward certain acts of communication does not imply a 
denunciation of the messengers.
71
 Phrased differently, this study is critical of 
certain communication techniques and strategies in the debates on police problems, 
but merely to determine where communication processes are hampered, and not to 
blame particular stakeholders.  
3. As academic literature is also shaped by societal context, especially in the case of 
police-violence related literature, this latter literature should not be relied upon 
exclusively, and hence this study should also incorporate the findings of more 
general research on police problems and police professionalism.  
 
Theoretical tenet D: The definition of successful communication and 
a successful debate 
As this research intends to investigate factors that contribute to the deadlocked position 
of the ongoing debate on police violence in New York, a theoretical discussion is in 
place with regard to what a successful (process of) debate is.  
 The difficulties in defining successful communication become apparent when 
looking at some of the previous attempts in this regard. Take for example the ‘ideal 
speech situation’ theory introduced by Jürgen Habermas in his earlier work, which 
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holds that discourse is often ideologically impaired and that an approximation of the 
ideal speech situation can only be reached with rational discourse. This theory has been 
criticized by others for being too idealistic and simplistic.
72
 Habermas later on less 
idealistically speaks of a process that is rhetorically adequate when “pragmatic 
presuppositions” are met, i.e. full inclusion, non-coercion, and equality. During such a 
rhetorical process, arguments should be weighed in a non-partisan quest for the truth. 
Yet even with the supplementation of more substantive rhetorical theory, in which 
Habermas’ perspective on rhetoric can be seen as the process of making arguments for 
the “proper social-psychological space for making a responsible collective judgment”, 
such space still remains an idealization.
73
  
As the formulation of an ideal rhetorical process is so problematic and 
subjective, this research chooses not to measure the process of debate against 
predefined and fixed quality standards. Instead, this study more neutrally investigates 
the effects of the discourse used by individual stakeholder groups, as well as the 
accumulation of this discourse. Effects in this sense do not merely involve the 
influence of discourse on measures and policies, for example in the context of 
placement of “control mechanisms” to circumvent existing police violence, but also the 
influence on the perceptions, interpretations and positioning of different stakeholders, 
as well as on the overall level of satisfaction experienced by these groups.
74
 In such 
analysis, factors such as ideology, power, full inclusion, non-coercion, and equality are 
taken into account, yet not taken as a standard.  
 
Two choices have been made in this matter:  
1. On the micro level, the quality of communication is measured by looking at the 
perceptions, interpretations and positioning of different stakeholders conveyed 
through discourse, in particular their evaluation of the communication of other 
stakeholders and the overall process of debate. It is also measured by looking — 
from a helicopter perspective — at the outcome of the accumulation of the 
perceptions, interpretations and positioning conveyed by all stakeholders. 
2. On the macro level, this research will investigate three factors that can impact the 
quality of communication: (i) the dynamic expectations and evaluations of 
different debate participants; (ii) the social changes effected through policies, 
measures, and so forth; and (iii) the degree in which issues are reoccurring or are 
resolved.  
 
II.3 — Conclusion 
The discussion of theoretical tenets has shown that stakeholders’ discourse is the 
foremost aspect of debate that can give insight into the research question formulated 
for this study, considering that such communication is constitutive of, and socially 
determined by, society. More specifically, this discourse is both a reflection and a 
manipulator of the dynamics of debate and the power relations between different 
stakeholders. Hence the present study will research the reflection of society in such 
discourse, as well as the process of mutual influence between the conveyed 
perceptions, framings and positioning of different stakeholders in this, as this 
interaction can show the effects of discourse on the actual dynamics of debate. Such 
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research can be conducted through micro-analysis of the discourse used in a specific 
case study on a particular police shooting incident.  
 However, mere textual analysis of the communication occurring after a current 
police-violence case is not sufficient for two reasons. First, discourse is influenced by 
the societal context and background of different stakeholders in the police-violence 
debate, such as different community leaders, but also the police themselves. While 
analysis of the mutual influence between the discourse of different participants can 
show some of the effects of the societal context on discourse, such analysis is still too 
limited. Second, such textual analysis only reflects a certain moment in time and does 
not show the historical dynamics of debate. This research will hence also analyze the 
historical societal context of stakeholders, the police in particular, and how such 
context has historically affected the macro pattern of debate, and vice versa.  
 Ideally, the two-pronged research approach discussed in this section would 
contain a historical and current in-depth analysis of all stakeholders, the general 
political and societal background in which they communicate, and an analysis of the 
texts resulting from this. As such analysis is too extensive for this research and 
moreover, not all sources are available, this study has chosen to differentiate between 
language as a site of and a stake in the struggles for power and ideology, in that 
language analysis can best display the ‘site of’ part, and historical analysis the ‘stake 
in’ part. More specifically, the choice has been made to divide the present study into a 
micro-analysis of the discourse used in the context of one particular case study, and a 
macro-analysis of the historical dynamics of debate and the societal context in which 
such a debate takes place, by looking not so much at the discourse used, but at the 
broader communication processes. This latter analysis does not merely look at the 
history of the police-violence debate, but rather at the debate of police problems and 
police professionalism. Rather than researching the individual history of each of the 
stakeholders, this study looks at the historical developments of this particular debate, 
and analyzes the interactions between a variety of stakeholders who enter and exit the 
arena of debate as time goes by.  
 
III — Overview of this study 
Based on the considerations explained in this introduction, the following research 
question and structure have been adopted: 
 
Which factors contribute to the stagnation of the debate on police violence in 
New York, both on the micro level of individual incidents and on the historical 
macro level?  
 
Part I — The historical dynamics of debates on NYPD police violence. This part of 
the study investigates how political and societal developments, in particular the 
existing social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and beliefs, as well 
as the display of power and use of ideology influenced the dynamics of debate on 
police problems between the New York Police and its critics from the department’s 
inception until now, and how, although less extensively and from a historical rather 
than a discourse-analytical perspective, the dynamics of debate influenced such a 
societal context, in particular the social identity of different stakeholders and the 
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relationship between them, but also more broadly the political and societal climate over 
a period of time. This particular analysis aims to show how the context in which a 
debate takes place can contribute to the stagnation of the debate on police violence in 
New York. 
 
Part II — Micro-level analysis of the public debate on an incident of NYPD 
violence. From the perspective that language is a site of society, power and ideology, 
this part of the study investigates the use of perceptions, interpretations and positioning 
in the discourse of different stakeholders, as well as the interaction between the 
discourse used by different stakeholders, after one particular police shooting incident, 
namely that of Sean Bell in 2006. This particular analysis aims to reveal the 
stakeholders’ use of discourse, as well as its influence on the discourse used by other 
stakeholders.  
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Introduction to Part I — The historical dynamics of 
debates on NYPD police violence 
 
“I have covered a very long period of time in this book, more perhaps than I should 
have, to discuss various facets of the subject as exhaustively as I would have liked. But 
there is a need for a sweeping survey to gain perspective and to delineate patterns. The 
historian’s function is to examine change over time and, if I have not been sufficiently 
detailed to satisfy the historical specialist or sufficiently analytical for our colleagues in 
the social sciences, I beg their respective indulgences.”1  
 
James Richardson introducing his research into the early history of policing in New York 
 
“Police administrators have often pointed out that many of my ‘data’ are based on 
evidence too weak to obtain even an indictment, let alone a criminal conviction. True 
enough. But my concern is not with proving that corruption existed; that is taken as an 
assumption. Nor am I concerned with what Officer X truly did or did not do on a 
certain day. I am neither a detective nor an investigative reporter. Rather, my concern 
is with patterns of human behavior and how they change over time. Even if several of 
the instances of corruption in my analysis […] are false allegations, the analysis can 
still be valid as a description of patterns.”2 
 
Lawrence Sherman introducing his book on scandal and reform patterns of police corruption  
 
In their quest to provide a deeper understanding of the (New York) police and the 
issues they face, both scholars above focus on historical patterns occurring over a long 
period of time. Their defensive posture regarding their choice suggests that this broader 
historical focus is difficult to fuse with more detailed observational micro-analyses. As 
this study’s two-pronged multidisciplinary approach involves both types of analyses, 
certain considerations are in place, in particular keeping in mind that the metaphorical 
arena of debate differs in character from a historical macro perspective (Part I) and a 
language micro perspective (Part II).  
 From a historical macro perspective, the actors, dialogue and décor details in 
the arena of debate change over time. The constant factor is this arena itself, in which 
the action takes place. While the broader debate on professionalization and police 
problems takes place predominantly in the formal, public arena of debate, issues of 
police–community relations and the communication about police violence also pertain 
to the informal arena.  
This introduction deliberates further on the chosen tenets’ practical 
consequences for the historical research planned in this first part, while keeping in 
mind the above. The introduction finishes with an overview of the chosen structure, 
scope of research and use of sources.  
 
I — The police-violence debate in historical context 
This section looks briefly at the implications of the chosen tenets for Part I of this 
study. Starting points for the deliberations below include: (i) the apparent prolonged 
continuation of the debate on police violence, (ii) the notion that a debate can change 
over time, and (iii) the notion that a debate can be part of a broader set of debates. 
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Research built on these notions can lay bare the origins, broader context and dynamics 
of debate.  
 
I.1 — The dialectical relationship between language and society (tenet A) 
Considering that the debate on police violence is characterized by historical depth and 
development, while part of a broader context, as noted above, one can assume that the 
dialectical relationship between the discourse on police violence and the societal 
context in which a debate takes place is dynamic too. This historical dimension is 
reflected in the discourse conveyed by current stakeholders in the debate on police 
violence, such as recollections of previous police-violence events. In the police-
violence debate, this memory, or ‘framing’ — as will be further elaborated on in Part II 
— is diverse as different stakeholders have different memories. These recollections do 
not merely reflect on past events, but are also the product of events both in the past and 
present.  
This study does not aim to investigate whether such memories expressed 
through discourse are truthful, but under which circumstances (social context) they 
have been formed in the mind.
3
 In keeping with the demarcation set out in the general 
introduction, the first part of this study primarily looks at these circumstances, i.e. the 
societal context of the debate on police problems, and how they affected macro 
patterns of communication. Some of the stakeholders’ perceptions and their dialectical 
relationship with social context will also be discussed. A more complete (textual) 
analysis of perceptions is provided in Part II.  
The analysis of Part I is structured along the historical patterns of (discussion 
on) police professionalization and police problems. Although the issues, as well as the 
stakeholders that support these issues, differ in the police-violence and 
professionalization debates, both can be classified as dialogues which take place in a 
metaphorical arena of debate between stakeholders who bring up issues and those that 
oppose them. This relationship has been observed by historians themselves, although 
indirectly. Police historian Samuel Walker:  
 
“The concept of professionalism provides a framework for the various reform ideas 
that were proposed for the police as well as the actual changes that were effected.”4 
 
In this sentence, the phrase “ideas that were proposed” can be read as the “issues 
proposed by stakeholders” and by the same token, “the actual changes that were 
effected” relate to the success factors of debate. In other words, the process of 
professionalization can be seen as a macro pattern in the debate on and the 
development of the NYPD. Walker further argues that the current debates on police 
problems, such as that of police violence, are an extension of this macro pattern and 
that hence the history of professionalization “sheds new light on the origins of our 
contemporary police problems.”5 From this macro perspective, the pattern of 
professionalization resembles at first glance the pattern of police-violence incidents 
and debate following such incidents. In particular, both appear to be historically deep, 
while peaking at certain intervals. Police professionalization is a “pendular business,” 
James Lardner and Thomas Reppetto point out, as “the profession [swings] decisively 
back and forth between scandal and reform.”6 This pendular pattern, comprising 
repetitive occurrences of problems, scandals, criticisms, responses and reforms, 
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resembles the (assumed) repetition of police-violence scandals and the communication 
on such scandals.  
Hence the history of professionalization relates to the historical dimension of 
the dialectical relationship between the police-violence debate and its societal context: 
While police problems, the issue of professionalization, the background of actors and 
the overall political/social climate comprise ‘the social context’ part of this 
relationship, the discussion on these issues constitutes the ‘discourse’ part.  
For the purpose of this study, the analysis of the professionalization movement 
should focus on specific aspects related to the scandal-reform processes, such as the 
scandals that occurred, who demanded reform after such scandals, how the police 
reacted to this reform, what the end result was, and how these issues were 
communicated. Such analysis should also comprise a helicopter view of the social and 
political context in which such debate took place. Brief case study analyses can show 
the processes of debate in more detail. This approach will be further concretized in 
Section II of this introduction. 
The dialectical relationship between discourse and social context also 
manifests itself in the informal arena of debate, where police and citizens communicate 
informally. These police–citizen interactions comprise an important part of the broader 
pattern of police–community relations. While there is a lack of primary data that 
provide insight into these interactions taking place in this arena, particularly from a 
historical macro perspective, the historical pattern of police–community relations can 
be researched in different ways. Brandl et al. argue that citizens’ perceptions of the 
police are of equal value to the comprehension of police–community relations as the 
actual encounters themselves, as these perceptions contribute to the overall relationship 
between police and community, in the same way as street encounters do.
7
 This study 
extends Brandl et al.’s line of thinking in two ways. First, not only citizens’ 
perceptions but also those of the police might contribute to this overall relationship and 
hence deserve attention. Second, communication processes could also be influenced by 
mutual expectations. Hence, Part I will also look into the expectations and perceptions 
of both the public and the police. The analysis will also investigate the processes that 
take place in the formal arena of debate in regard to police–community relations.  
 
I.2 — Power and ideology (tenet B) 
The relationship between power, ideology and discourse is dynamic, similar to that of 
discourse and society. In line with the two-pronged approach of this study, this 
historical part aims to research the debate’s dynamic pattern of power and ideology 
from a historical-analytical rather than a micro communication perspective.  
 Within this historical context, this study chooses to link the dynamic power 
struggle on opinion, beliefs and ideologies specifically to Wodak’s ‘life of arguments’ 
theory, which holds that over a period of time, arguments are recontextualized from 
one genre or public domain to the next.
8
 The struggle over arguments, in other words, 
is reflected in the dynamic recontextualization process. Yet while Wodak suggests 
investigating the life of arguments by a comparative analysis of different genres in 
which such arguments are recontextualized, this study conversely chooses to analyze 
this specific historical struggle of opinion, beliefs and ideologies by historical research 
of secondary sources, aiming to reveal ‘the life of arguments’ in the debate central to 
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this study by first looking at historical patterns and then by structurally comparing 
these patterns to discourse at a later stage.  
 In order to do so, this study will be structured by a historical pattern of 
developing power relations, in line with the structure of other studies focusing on the 
power of the police. Leonard Ruchelman: “The subject [of police–community 
relations] tends to be rather narrowly defined [by other scholars] as a sociological 
problem in inter-group relations. To broaden the focus, it is necessary to view police–
community relations as a power phenomenon.”9 Similarly, other historians tend to see 
the interaction between the police and the governing organizations, such as the mayor 
and his office, as a power game. According to Cyril Robinson, the mayor and the 
police comprise two teams “playing a (usually) friendly game of catch, the ball being 
responsibility for tackling the city’s problems.”10  
 By focusing on the historical pattern of power struggles, the life of arguments 
is examined from a historical-communicative perspective. Such analysis can give 
insight into the macro patterns of debate, and the factors that contribute to the apparent 
stagnation of the debate on the historical macro level. Research into the power 
phenomenon can specifically identify those stakeholders who are in power, and have 
the power to influence public debate and to change policies. Important for the purpose 
of this study is how independent the NYPD is from other organizations. Is the New 
York police force mainly autonomous in its actions, or is the organization strongly 
attached to city government or other groups or institutions in society? By the same 
token, it is also important to know how the internal power struggle has developed over 
the years, as it can help identify those stakeholders that are influential within the 
department, and expose to which extent they determine the police’s formal and 
informal response to issues. Of particular interest is the development of the rank-and-
file officers, as their degree of awareness, organization and influence could impact 
reform and debate outcomes. For the same reason, the notion of power can also be 
important for the comprehension of those stakeholders initiating debate.  
With the above in mind, the research into the dynamic process of the landscape 
of debating stakeholders will consist of the following elements: (i) the distribution of 
power; (ii) the power lines between stakeholders; (iii) the level of awareness of each 
stakeholder, and (iv) the positioning of each stakeholder in debates. The dynamics of 
ideology will be researched as part of this power struggle, by looking at the arguments 
and beliefs held and conveyed by different groups in regard to the professionalization 
movement and police problems, in particular police violence.  
 
I.3 — ‘No single truth’ from a historical-analytical perspective (tenet C) 
This study’s critical analytical stance primarily impacts the analysis of stakeholders’ 
discourse (Part II), but also the analysis of secondary sources (Part I), which can be 
viewed as discourse too, and are also equally shaped by societal context. In order to 
deal with societal influence on secondary sources, this study’s focus is broadened in 
various ways (as discussed throughout this introduction), so that more general literature 
on police problems and police professionalism can be used, rather than the often 
partisan historical police-violence literature. Second, the analysis of secondary sources 





I.4  — Successful communication from a historical-analytical perspective 
(tenet D) 
The success of debates on the macro level will be determined by three different factors: 
(i) the dynamic expectations and evaluations of different debate participants; (ii) the 
social changes effected through policies, measures, and so forth; and (iii) the degree in 
which issues are reoccurring or are resolved. 
 
II — Overview of Part I: Structure, scope and use of sources 
The dynamic processes of the ongoing debate on police problems will be researched in 
Part I through a broad examination of the communication’s societal context. This 
involves the historical developments that took place regarding police problems, as well 
as the characteristics of the actors that played a vital role in the development of the 
force, and with whom the police debated on police problems. Special attention is given 
to the power struggles between these different actors. The debate on police problems is 
viewed from a historical-communicative perspective, from which the analytical focus 
will be on the décor changes and plot developments rather than on the details and 
specific conversations within the arena of debate. 
Considering that this part’s aim is to expose the origins, development and 
broader context of the dynamic pattern of communication on police violence and in 
particular its societal context, this study chooses to research the history of the 
communication between the New York Police and its critics from its inception, the 
year 1845, until now, rather than limiting this time frame. Three major transitional 
points have been chosen, roughly reflecting the different phases of the 
professionalization movement, as well as the emergence of the civil rights movement 
in New York: 1845–1900 (Chapter 1); 1900–1950 (Chapter 2); and 1950–2006 
(Chapter 3). The third time frame officially ends with the shooting of Sean Bell in 
2006, although certain events following the shooting are briefly touched upon in 
Chapter 3, when relevant. 
 The research in Part I will be based (mainly) on secondary sources. This 
literature tends to be delimited by a specific time frame and often does not have the 
primary objective to lay connections between early-day policing and the present. None 
of the existing historical studies focuses specifically on the dialogues between the 
police and its stakeholders on police-violence problems (although Ross’ study comes 
close).
11
 The analysis for Part II will distill and unite relevant insights of these 
(delimited) secondary sources, and by doing so investigate the broader dialogue 
patterns from the creation of the force to the current situation. The analysis for Part I 
focuses on three components:  
 
Component 1: The stage. To understand the debates that take place, the 
characteristics and historical development of each ‘actor’ (and stakeholder) in the 
debates will be scrutinized. In general, these actors include: society as a whole/public 
opinion, groups in society criticizing the police (reformers), the media, political 
machines (Tammany Hall), the New York police as an institution, the police 
commissioner, and individual policemen. As stakeholders change over time, the 




Component 2: The visible action. The second component involves the actual debates 
that took place in the formal arena of debate. Different cases of reform and of scandals 
that occurred in the chosen time eras will be scrutinized. This component comprises 
two different analyses:  
 
 A brief analysis of some of the individual debates. How can the dynamics of 
individual debates concerning police problems in New York be characterized? 
Which positions do individual stakeholders take? Can trends, constants and traits 
be determined in the substance of the debates? How have the different actors 
themselves developed over time? How have the political and societal contexts 
influenced such individual debates? 
 
 An analysis of the macro pattern of debates. How can the dynamics of the 
overall pattern of debate be characterized? How do the different actors manifest 
themselves in the debates on police problems? How do the different actors relate to 
each other? Can trends, constants and traits be distinguished in the way the 
dialogues are being held? Which factors result in a negative debate outcome? How 
have the political and societal contexts as well as the display of power and use of 
ideology influenced the dynamics of debate?  
 
Component 3: Behind the scenes. The final component involves the quality of 
police–community relations, which can give insight into the informal, more intangible 
arena of debate.  
 
The analysis of the ‘stage’ on the one hand and the macro and micro patterns of 
debates on the other, can reveal why actors behave as they do and more broadly 
explain existing communication patterns. 
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Chapter 1: Negligence as a goal 
1845–1900: the birth and growth of the New York police 
 
This chapter examines the early historical patterns of the debate on police 
professionalization and police problems from 1845 to 1900. In order to understand the 
dynamic process of debate that took place in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
Section 1.1 first examines the historical stage that forms the backdrop of the debates on 
professionalization and police problems. This section will also provide a historical 
overview of the actors involved in these debates. Section 1.2 examines the 
development and succession of specific debates held within the chosen time frame. 
Lastly, Section 1.3 examines the informal arena of debate, by looking at the historical 




1.1 The historical stage: Developments and actors 
This section scrutinizes the social context in which the professionalization and police 
problem debates took place. It does so by providing a brief overview of New York 
society in the nineteenth century and the inception and growth of the New York Police 
Department. In addition, the historical development of the different actors involved in 
these debates will be scrutinized. The analyses examine how the Police Department 
was connected to the social and political background in the nineteenth century, as well 
as how different actors influenced the department.  
  
1.1.1 New York society and the debate on the adoption of a 
professional force 
The adoption of a professional police force proved to be an arduous process in New 
York. It didn’t take decades — it took centuries. In fact, New York was the only 
American city in which the level of policing was less up to standard in the eighteenth 
century than in the seventeenth century.
1
 By the end of the eighteenth century the night 
watch system was antiquated, yet it still took almost 50 years for this to be replaced by 
a more professional police system. The famous quip “While the city sleeps, the 
watchmen do too,” in fact symbolizes the incapability of the watch to deal with safety 
issues.
2
 The cause for this can be found in the political and public climate of those 
days. First, there was a general suspicion regarding increase of governmental power, in 
line with New Yorkers’ inclination towards liberty and democracy. In his analysis of 
police systems in America, early police scientist and reformer Bruce Smith observes 
how this attitude was not only typical to New York, but it was also a trait that was 
ingrained in the entire American society. He asserts, “Such attitudes are probably 
inherent in the American concept of personal liberty, and represent a stubborn 
resistance to any precise delimitation of its sphere.” For this reason, the New Yorkers 
“preferred a policing system with minimal competence over professionalism.”3 
Historian James F. Richardson similarly concludes in his study on the New York 
Police Department, “[New Yorkers] objected any activity that interfered with personal 
liberty. […] In short, they did not want to be policed.”4  
Parallel to these strong Democratic sentiments, there was a general fear 
towards militarism and anything else that reminded New Yorkers of British rule. Police 
scholar Samuel Walker observes, “the paramilitary aspect of the London police 
conjured up images of the British army and the American War of Independence, an 
event that was still not too far distant in the American past.”5 Historian Wilbur Miller, 
who conducted extensive research on both the New York police force and the London 
Metropolitan force, similarly concludes that the police were seen as a standing army, 
“susceptible to the political manipulations of an ambitious despot.”6 Ironically, the 
tense relations between ethnic groups in society, which in fact required a strong force 
to manage, instead delayed the adoption process tremendously. In an extensive analysis 
on the adoption process, Richardson explains that each group in society had specific 
demands on how the new force should be structured, how much power it should be 
given, and which tasks it should carry out. Since democracy was regarded highly by 
New Yorkers, the new force had to ‘balance’ between these — sometimes even 
conflicting — demands.7 Logically, this delayed the entire adoption process. Political 
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factions simply could not agree with each other on this matter. Walker points out, “they 
[Americans] were much less afraid of the idea of a police in the abstract than they were 
afraid of what their political opponents would do with such a force.”8 The slow 
adoption process gives insight into the functioning of New York’s nineteenth century 
society: New Yorkers demanded democracy at a high price, feared granting 
governmental institutions power, and maintained anti-British as well as anti-
professional feelings.  
New York was a heterogeneous ethnic society politically divided between 
different factions representing different needs from different ethnic groups. These 
factions can be divided roughly into two groups: the democratic faction demanding a 
locally controlled government, and a conservative republican faction demanding a 
state-controlled government. The battle between these two factions dominated life in 
the nineteenth century, resulting in widespread corruption in many fields, ranging from 
business to almost every governmental institution. Even the judges in New York were 
dishonest at the time. Miller points out that “while the English magistrates were 
sometimes viewed as acerbic authoritarian old men, New York police justices were 
frequently seen as venal corruptionists.”9 Partisan politics in fact had a devastating 
influence on society. As one journalist described it: 
 
“The success or defeat of either division of the furious factionists who are daily doing 
their utmost to destroy the reputation, property, health, and morals of this city, must be 
a matter of remarkable indifference to any citizen who truly regards the great interest 
of the metropolis.”10  
 
Several factors contributed to the New Yorkers’ decision to adopt a European style 
police force for their city, in spite of their fears for the police as an institution. For one, 
the situation in New York had reached a point of unbearable impunity and chaos, due 
to the sharp increase of immigration resulting in substantial safety issues. The outdated 
night watch was not prepared for the increase in scandals, the upsurge in crime, the 
vice and the disorder. Between 1814 and 1834 safety complaints quadrupled.
11
 Miller 
sees the year 1834 as a turning point: “This disorder, new to a people accustomed to 
policing themselves and proud of America’s law-abiding reputation, spurred business-
oriented newspapers to campaign for reorganization of the police along London 
lines.”12 However, he adds, it was mainly the general increase in crime that eventually 
led to the creation of the new force. It was one specific murder, the Mary Rogers case 
— sensationalized in the press — that was the eventual trigger that led to the adoption 
of a London style police force in 1845.
13
  
 Historians argue that it was perhaps also fear of the ‘dangerous class’ that 
made New Yorkers decide to adopt a more professional policing system. The theory of 
the dangerous class (by some historians referred to as the ‘dangerous classes’) in fact 
dominated nineteenth century society, as historian Eric H. Monkkonen explains: 
 
“In this theory, crime was produced by a specific class of people, the dregs of society, 
what Marx called the lumpenproletariat. In the nineteenth century, the “dangerous 
class” [was] made up of paupers, criminals, the underemployed, and tramps.”14 
 
In New York, the concept of ‘dangerous class’ had an ethnic component, as the group 
comprised mainly foreign-born, mostly Irish, unskilled workers. The group however 
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had much political power due to universal male suffrage.
15
 When immigration to New 
York increased with immigrants from Italy and Poland and other countries, the concept 




 It was essentially the fear of the group’s democratic power that prevailed. 
Miller points out that “to New Yorkers roughs seemed to be a dangerously well-
organized and pervasive alien element in democratic politics, which ideally rested on 
rational decisions by educated voters.”17 New Yorkers expected firm action against the 
dangerous class, and therefore eventually accepted a European style police force in 
1845.  
 
1.1.2 The creation and early years of the New York police: 
A reflection of society 
“I look upon the size of certain American cities, and especially on the nature of their 
population, as a real danger which threatens the future security of the democratic 
republic of the New World; and I venture to predict that they will perish from this 
circumstance […] unless the government succeeds in creating an armed force which, 
while it remains under control of the majority of the nation, will be independent of the 
town population and able to repress its excesses.”18 
Alexis de Tocqueville, 1830 
 
It took more than 20 years of political and public debate before New Yorkers finally 
took reform advocate Alexis de Tocqueville’s advice to heart: In 1845 a full time day-
and-night force of 800 men — the first in the United States — replaced the antiquated 
night watch.
19
 A special act, designed to fix the qualifications for appointment, 
payment scheme and duration of appointment of police officers, accordingly gave birth 
to the new force, and moreover, created the conditions for a whole new era of policing. 
The whole event should thus be seen as a milestone in law enforcement history.
20
 
Although the skeleton of the New York police was — strangely enough — 
modeled after the much detested London Metropolitan Police that had been established 
in 1830 by Sir Robert Peel, the new police force was far from a copy-cat of the British 
‘Bobbies’ and ‘Peelers’, both nicknames derived from the founder of the London force. 
Instead, New Yorkers had “borrowed selectively” from the British, and the new police 
force still resembled the night watch in many ways.
21
 The main reason for this selective 
borrowing was the aforementioned aversion of New Yorkers to anything authoritarian. 
They only adopted the democratic elements of the London police force, whereas the 
more professional (and in their eyes undemocratic) characteristics were left out. The 
result was an awkward blend of old and new features. This new type of force was not 
unique to New York, but was a phenomenon occurring throughout the United States, as 
American cities in general accepted the outline structure of the London force, but 
adopted only the aspects that matched their conception of a democratic society.
22
 
Although the department underwent some changes in structure throughout its 
first 60 years of existence, these changes were superficial and did not touch upon the 
core of the organization. Rather than examining these changes in detail, this paragraph 
will now further focus on the overarching characteristics that were a result of the 
political and public climate of that era.  
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The police structure was from the start a result of the New Yorkers’ conflicting 
feelings about police protection. Both the Police Department and the commissioner 
himself lacked power. Especially in its early years, the department was restricted by 




Richardson points out that the commissioners never succeeded in gaining 
complete control over the police.
24
 Walker similarly observes that police chiefs were 
figureheads, and “apart from a morning meeting with all the captains, there was no way 
a police chief could effectively supervise those under his command.”25 It was 
essentially this lack of supervision and communication methods that made the captains 
in turn virtually autonomous “despots, whether enlightened or otherwise.”26 
The policemen themselves likewise enjoyed a great amount of authority, also 
referred to as ‘discretionary power’. Their power should not be mistaken for the power 
of the police as an institution, for that was essentially weak. This relationship in fact is 
causal, as personal discretion compensated for the hiatus of institutionalized power, as 
well as the distrust of New Yorkers in the police. As Miller puts it, “Personal, informal 
authority filled the void created by democratic mistrust of institutional formal 
authority.”27 Discretionary power allowed rank-and-file officers to make “decisions 
when or whether to invoke the law under specific circumstances” and has been 
described as a “personal interpretation of the law not openly acknowledged in the 
criminal justice system.”28 As Alexander ‘Clubber’ Williams, one of the most 
flamboyant figures in the early history of the New York police, allegedly said: “There 
is more law in the end of a policeman’s night stick than in a Supreme Court 
decision.”29  
In 1919, New York Police Commissioner Arthur Woods was one of the earliest 
academics to formally acknowledge the precarious role of the patrolmen, when he 
observed that “in this duty of law enforcement, the policeman is in a very real sense a 
judge.”30 However, even if the term discretionary power was not in use in the 
nineteenth century, both public and police understood that the power and personal 
authority of the individual police officer was considerable.  
In New York thus emerged the concept of the ‘personal policeman’, who is not 
bound to a formal set of rules and who had an amazing choice of when and how to act. 
This specific character clearly comes to light in Miller’s comparison of the early New 
York Police to that of the British, in which he characterizes the concept of ‘personal 
policeman’ as follows: 
 
“The image of the London bobby and the NYC cop: The one is polite and abstains 
from deadly weapons; the other might be less polite and is certainly very well armed. 
These images are obviously stereotypes but sociologists who study the complex 
modern reality of British and American police forces have found significant 
differences in the definition and practice of their authority. To a certain extent these 
differences make the stereotypes seem not entirely far-fetched after all: The British 
policeman exercises a sort of impersonal, restrained authority, the American 
policeman, a more personal and less restrained authority.”31 
 
In this excerpt, Miller argues that both the London and New York patrolmen possessed 
power, but that this power was different in nature. In a summary of the powers of the 
nineteenth century cop, Lardner and Reppetto describe what exactly the broad police 
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powers of the New York patrolman entailed. The patrolman’s authority varied from 
broad stop and search powers — patrolmen could “stop and examine pretty much 
anyone carrying a package” — to arrest procedures and station house bookings:  
 
“Underneath the bureaucratic rigmarole, lies a level of discretion and improvisation 
and just plain uncertainty that, to judge by its persistence, seems to have suited the 
convenience of people outside as well as inside the police profession. From the 
beginnings, their democratically elected masters have been reluctant to tell the police 
just which laws to enforce, against whom, or by what means. Whether we’re talking 
about gambling and prostitution in the nineteenth century or the stop-and-search 
practices of the early twenty-first, the police have been left to sort out many of the 
most difficult questions for themselves.” 32  
 
Strangely enough, and in sharp contrast to the wariness of many New Yorkers to give 
the police as an institution more power, these same New Yorkers willingly accepted 
the unrivalled amount of power given to individual patrolmen. Why did the public — 
who were afraid of authority — grant the individual police officer that much power? In 
his analysis on the acceptance of this power, Miller stresses that it was precisely the 
fear of institutional power that forced the nineteenth century New Yorker to accept the 
discretionary power of individuals. More specifically, “informal or extralegal 
discretionary power in the street and station house was [for New Yorkers] the only 
bastion against the underworld.”33  
This tolerant behavior towards policemen persisted throughout the first 
decades after the New York Police’s inception, even though the police were involved 
in corruption scandals and closely linked to corrupt Tammany Hall politics, and even 
though the policeman’s discretionary power was unchecked by judicial cautiousness.34 
This development has also been noted by NYPD chronicler Gerald Astor, who asserts 
that it was in fact this close relationship with Tammany, that made the power 
acceptable, “since the police’s originally direct and later indirect accountability to 
elected officials reduced the fear of arbitrary power.”35 Miller offers a similar analysis, 
by comparing the New York police to their British counterpart: “Contemporary New 
York was much more democratic than London, but the rule of the people seemed to 
place less emphasis on the rule of law.”36 
Apart from the tolerance of New Yorkers towards personal power, there were 
other factors that stimulated personal authority of individual policemen. First, police 
practices were characterized by a set of informal processes, unwritten and sometimes 
even unarticulated rules, which allowed discretionary power to flourish.
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Communication technology was still in its infancy, and there was no formalized 
professional training for individuals. This made police work virtually unsupervised.
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In fact, no one pointed out exactly what the police should do and what was expected of 
them, and consequently the policeman had to make a calculation on what ‘they’ 




 As a final point, historians argue that the department also had a specific role in 
controlling ‘the dangerous class’ of society. It was in fact the department’s task to 
make sure this class was kept in place. Violence was one way of dealing with this 
group of society, but as Monkkonen points out in his analysis, the role of the police 




“[The police’s] managerial tools included both supportive techniques — food, lodging, 
and in some cases, assistance in job hunting — as well as destructive techniques — 
beatings, contempt, and arrests for offences ranging from drunkenness to the most 
vague offense of all, that of being a suspicious person.”40 
 
Thus the response to the dangerous class was mixed, and the police had a delicate role 
in managing them. New York’s fear of the dangerous class, as well as the concept 
itself, persisted throughout the nineteenth century, and so did the police’s role in 
managing these classes. Only by the end of the century did the concept become 
somewhat outdated, as the components of the group started to fragment. One of the 
reasons for this fragmentation, according to Monkkonen, was the fact that the police 
and other institutions began to professionalize. By the turn of the twentieth century, 
each faction within the group of the ‘dangerous class’ — the poor, the criminals, the ill, 
the homeless — received a label of its own. Specialized agents and groups in society 
started either to help or attack these separate groups. Within this broader spectrum, the 
police solely took responsibility for fighting and preventing crime.
41
 
In conclusion, the organizational structure and behavior of the New York 
police in the nineteenth century was closely tied to the political and public climate of 
that era. Hence, the department was given a weak mandate, resulting in a distorted 
distribution of power between different actors, including the rank and file’s high 
discretionary powers. 
 
1.1.3 The department’s role as a Tammany Hall marionette 
The influence of politics and public opinion on the organizational structure and the 
behavior of the New York police become apparent when looking at the relationship 
between politicians and the police in that era.  
  The patronage system, which already existed before the creation of the force, 
took solid forms after 1845.
42
 In fact, the whole system at the time depended upon 
satisfying politicians. Recruitment of new officers was set up in such a way as to 
ensure that politicians stayed in complete control of the police. Political loyalty was the 
only real qualification for appointment. The application tests were a farce, and 
purposely designed in a way for the police board to have “the widest latitude possible” 
in its appointments.
43
 For example, in order to prove his literacy, a New Yorker with 
sufficient political ties only had to recite a newspaper’s title.44 Even then some 
applicants could only qualify with a helping hand. Police scholar Robert Fogelson 
observes: “Small wonder that within a few days many applicants grew several inches 
taller and years younger, learned to read and write, and like the pilgrims who traveled 
to holy places, recovered from serious and even chronic ailments.”45  
From the moment of recruitment onwards, the police dependency took on 
many forms. After passing the test, policemen were not permitted to make any political 
mistakes. For instance, a policeman who accidentally arrested or even insulted a 
political influential would be transferred to a less lucrative ward, in the worst case to 
outskirts of New York, also known as ‘Siberia’.46 This unwritten rule made no 
distinction between the policeman and his boss. Police chiefs themselves were often 
selected by Tammany bosses. For this reason they had no choice but to comply with 
the wishes of these bosses. Fogelson points out: if a police chief chose not to show 
42 
 
“cardinal loyalty to the machine”, he would soon find “the entire apparatus of local 
politics and criminal justice aligned against him.”47 
 During election time the link between the police and the political machine was 
particularly visible. The police actively contributed to the political campaigns and 
policemen were expected to aid these campaigns in any kind of way.
48
 On Election 
Day, the men had to leave their posts to keep known rivals of their ward leaders away 
from the ballot box.
49
 The political role of the police had far-reaching consequences for 
the outcome of elections. Roughly 10,000 votes were manipulated by the police at a 
time when less than 100,000 people actually voted.
50
 It also influenced the continuity 




Yet the police’s political function was much more pervasive than their role in 
the elections. As police scientist Eli Silverman points out “the department’s 
organization, management, recruitment and promotion policies were all enmeshed in 
the dealings of New York City’s patronage-conscious politicos.”52 Because the system 
was so integrated, and Tammany’s influence reached everywhere, even the judges 
cooperated. “He is a boy from the neighborhood” was Tammany’s ‘advice’ to judges if 
the defendant’s family was linked to Tammany Hall.53 Indeed, Tammany’s power 
reached everywhere.  
Police loyalty even went as far as not enforcing the law if Tammany Hall 
desired this. A good example is the non-enforcement of existing liquor laws. “Never 
get between the people and their beer!” was the Tammany bosses’ advice to the police 
in the nineteenth century.
54
 The existing liquor laws — only backed by a protestant 
elite — were a complete farce at the time: the police were told ‘off the record’ to 
disregard them and as a consequence liquor joints were widespread: a good example of 
how Tammany Hall gained power by granting favors to the masses.  
What is striking is the fact that the police simply accepted Tammany’s wish 
and consequently did not do the job it was supposed to do: enforce the law. The reason 
for this paradoxical functioning of the police, Fogelson points out, can be found in the 
fact that the new force persistently remained an “agent of Tammany Hall” rather than a 
“guardian of the public peace.”55 
The mayoralty of Fernando Wood (1855–1858 and 1860–1862), who, as 
Lardner and Reppetto ironically point out, was the first mayor “to appreciate the full 
value of the police”, exemplifies the ties between the police and politicians.56 His 
leitmotif in all of his public utterances was that “the mayor lacked power, and as long 
as this was the case, the city could never be properly governed.”57 With a series of 
legal actions he managed to take control of the police to serve the interests of the 
political machine. When the possibilities of re-election looked grim, he asked captains 
and policemen to donate money for his political campaign. Those who refused would 
then be put on a special list, meaning that they could be fired for the smallest mistake 
or wrongdoing, no matter how insignificant.
58
  
 The close relationship between politics and policing was a direct result of the 
political and public climate at the time, and especially of the antiprofessional 
sentiments that were widespread. These sentiments also resulted in a distorted 
distribution of power. Democratic New York demanded police power to be checked, 
and accepted the fact that it was checked by political power. By letting the politicians 
control the police, the power of the police was effectively subverted. The immediate 
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consequence was that the police as an institution became Tammany Hall’s marionette, 
and that Tammany’s power was sweeping across New York. Tammany in fact filled 
the power vessel which the police left unused. Moreover, both developments 
stimulated each other: Tammany’s impact on society prohibited the creation of a 
professional force, and the amateurish police in turn reinforced Tammany’s power.  
Cyril Robinson’s research on the relationship between police and local 
government elaborates extensively on this concept of ‘the police as a political tool’.59 
Robinson asserts that the police as an institution was the vehicle for communication 
between government and society; those who criticized the government first turned to 
the police. In Robinson’s own words, the police “were an accepted channel of political 
communication.”60 This particular function is not unique to the New York police, yet in 
New York (and America) this relationship was especially exhaustive and complicated. 
As further discussed in Section 1.2, it was essentially the New York police force that 
was blamed for excesses Tammany Hall was chiefly responsible for. Moreover, the 
relationship affected police–community relations, as further explored in Section 1.3. 
This special function for the police was advantageous for those in control, because 
“leaving the police to their own devices was convenient, for they could be attacked if 
they stepped outside the limits of toleration — if respectable people became victims of 
brutality or illegality — but praised for harsh treatment of the ‘dangerous class’.”61  
 As a final point, it is important to bear in mind that the police at the time were 
no more partisan than people in other jobs.
62
 Corruption was part of the spirit of the age 
and Tammany’s power reached everywhere, not just in the realm of the New York 
police. 
 
1.1.4 The New York police and the relationship between 
police culture and political climate 
An important actor in the history of police professionalization is the group of 
policemen that make up the rank and file of the New York Police Department. This 
subsection analyzes the characteristics of the nineteenth century police officer, while 
paying particular attention to the causal relationship between specific police 
characteristics and the political and social climate of the time.  
 
A ‘class of their own’: The growing gap between cops and citizens 
When the new police force was created in 1845, at first the gap between the police and 
the citizens of New York was negligible. In line with society’s ideas on policing, the 
New York policemen should have no elitist stance, but instead — as Mayor Isaac 
Varian (1839–1841) put it at the time — be “but a part of the citizens.”63 Whereas the 
London police came from a different social class and were imported from out of the 
city, New York policemen were ‘homegrown’ working-class men who worked in the 
same area as where they lived.
64
 However, soon after the Police Department’s creation, 
the connection between the force and the public weakened, resulting both in 
estrangement — as Walker put it, it is a romantic myth that policemen actually knew 
the residents on their beat intimately — and in hostility.65  
A reason for the widening gap between patrolmen and citizens can be found in 
the gradual change of class status for policemen. Becoming a police officer meant a 
step up in the world, especially for immigrants.
66
 Lardner and Reppetto point out that 
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although the New York police were originally ‘working class’ they were growing into 
a class of their own.
67
  
Ethnicity was another important factor. Police recruits, most of them with an 
Irish background, were hostile and prejudiced towards immigrants who had arrived 
after the Irish. Richardson points out:  
 
“Most of the immigrants who arrived after the Civil War moved into slums formerly 
dominated by the Irish. Italians, Jews, Chinese, and Negroes found that to the Irish 
beating up newcomers was a kind of sport. Too often the predominantly Irish police 
force arrested the victim rather than the aggressor or joined in on the Irish side.”68 
 
While the Irish influence remained strong in the force, the policemen’s connection to 
the Irish themselves faded somewhat as time progressed. At some points in nineteenth 
century history, the police and the Irish were even pitted against each other in conflicts 
— both in word and in action.69  
Other factors that contributed to the separation of policemen and public 
included a high turnover rate, as well as family and age differences.
70
 The high moving 
rate of officers also added to the decline of the relationship between police and 
citizens. Shortly after the force’s creation, policemen were allowed — and obliged — 
to move from ward to ward.
71
 
As a final point, the extensive amount of criticism, hostility and disrespect that 
the police officers received from different groups in society also played a part in the 
decline of the relationship between police and citizens. In fact, the policemen’s 
hostility — further discussed in Section 1.3 — was partly a form of self-protection 
against those who were equally hostile to them. In general terms, the police did not 
trust civilians, no matter where they came from. Lardner and Reppetto point out that 
the New York police believed that “however loudly they [the public] might cheer at a 
police parade, at heart they neither understood nor sympathized with the police.”72 
Likewise, the policemen also distrusted their own bosses, whom they — accurately or 
not — saw as hostile and oppressive.73  
 
The department’s ethos: Early signs of police culture and the ‘blue wall of silence’ 
As the distance between police and public grew, the internal ties became much 
stronger. The NYPD’s ethos became characterized by a strong homogeneity in the 
lower echelons of the departmental hierarchy, i.e. amongst the patrolmen. The informal 
processes, unwritten and unarticulated rules described in Subsection 1.1.2, nourished 
this development, since they allowed for ‘semi-secret’ informal traditions that were 
passed on from the elder officers to the rookies.
74
 In fact, the informal structure of the 
police heavily influenced the establishment of a strong police community. As there was 
no real training, and police work by nature is mostly ‘hands on’, policemen received 
their real training in the streets.  
 In a fraternity style initiation, rookies had to swear never to reveal 
departmental secrets.
75
 Because the police did not trust the outside world — “only 
another cop could be relied upon for support” — and moreover, as the work itself 
could be dangerous, cops expected complete support from each other.
76
 




“The worst name a policeman could bestow was that of informer. To be even 
suspected of it made a cop a pariah. A veteran advising a rookie about how to get along 
on the job would tell him to express no opinions on religion or politics, take his hazing 
like a man, never ‘peach’ on his comrades, and — the key to acceptance — rush 
forward with club swinging, no question asked — to back up another cop who was in 
trouble.”77  
 
This excerpt from Lardner and Reppetto’s analysis of the force’s ethos describes how 
policemen were supposed to act. The solidarity amongst police officers has also been 
typified as a ‘blue wall of silence’, and there is evidence that this wall was ubiquitous 
in the early years of the New York police.
78
 
The first police commanders impacted the development of such a subculture, 
as they did not try to mold their subordinates yet, as later police chiefs have done. A 
good example of such a reluctant chief is NYPD’s first commander George Matsell, 
who kept the controversial reward system in place to ‘reward’ his subordinates as well 
as himself.
 79
 The strong police culture became even more intense in the second 
generation of the department — the post-1870 municipal period. By then, police 
officers could share a collective past, and a collective pride in certain events, such as 
their performance in suppressing the draft riots.
80
 Moreover, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the professionalization movement emerged, with far-reaching 
consequences for the Police Department’s inner life. As the policemen saw this 
movement from its inception as a personal assault, the police retreated even more into 




Insistence on respect 
One of the issues that runs through the nineteenth century as a continuous thread is the 
police officers’ insistence on respect, not only from the outside world but also from 
their own bosses. Of all those scholars that researched the NYPD, Richardson probably 
provides the most extensive analysis on this. In his analysis of the force’s ethos, 
Richardson typifies this insistence as “pathological”: Police officers felt they did not 
receive the respect they deserved, and violence was even considered a legitimate tool 
to deal with those who did not show the proper amount of respect.
82
 Richardson points 
out, “they had so internalized this justification of force for respect that they spoke 
freely of it to an outsider without realizing that he might be shocked.”83 Similarly, 
Lardner and Reppetto point out that while many policemen at first felt that respect was 
something an individual officer had to establish for himself, in their analysis they also 
show that those who did criticize the police could not count on much cooperation.
84
 In 
fact, the police even used violence against critics.  
The police’s demand for respect correlated with the negative attitude towards 
anyone who criticized the police — ranging from professionalization movement 
reformers to ‘muckrakers’ (reform-minded journalists with a tradition of investigative 
journalism) and disgruntled citizens who wanted to file a complaint. Or phrased 
differently, the police thwarted debates on police performance, because they felt all 
criticism was a personal insult. In Section 1.2 this attitude will be examined in relation 
to the public debates that were held in the nineteenth century. Ironically, the more the 
police demanded respect, the less they actually received it. This process will be further 




Ingrained conservatism  
Another cultural characteristic was the police’s ‘innately’ conservative character, 
which predominated in the force’s early days.85 Astor explains: “As the ultimate force 
behind the law, the police support the status quo. The nature of their job inevitably pits 
them against change.”86 He also expounds on this conservatism, while connecting it to 
the unprofessional nature of the force and the consequential informal learning 
experience of rookie officers:  
 
“No one who knew the police disputed the importance of past practice and attitudes 
upon the performance of contemporary policemen. The socialization of the rookie by 
the veterans, the practice of promoting from within which ensured that police 
commanders had years of experience in the ranks, and the atmosphere of the station 
house all put a premium on doing things as they had always been done, on preserving 
existing practices and relationships.”87  
 
This conformity and conservative character of the force pitted individual policemen 
against those who opposed ‘order and law’, like strikers, protesters, communists, and 
anarchists. By the end of the nineteenth century, when protests against the formal order 
began to crystallize, anarchism became the focal point of police vigilance. Policemen 
were ingrained with a strong aversion to public disorder. Suppressing the draft riots 
during the Civil War was considered a highlight in the historical experience. 
Richardson illustrates: 
 
“The department exhibited a strong collective pride in the way it exercised this 
responsibility, regarding itself as the savior of the city from anarchy, rampant 
property destruction, and mindless violence. The police commissioners noted 
that many members of the force ‘were of the same nationality, political and 
religious faith of the riotous mob’.”88  
 
Order was a key word for policemen who had to deal with excessive work schedules. 
For this reason both commissioners and the rank and file could not sympathize with 
strikes and strikers. They supported employers invariably, and protected strikebreakers 
from assaults. A striker was often denounced as a ‘communist’, or depicted in a 
derogatory way, for example like “a miserable loafer who prefers living on [sic] his 
family to working.”89 Vice versa, the strikers, protesters and communists did not have 
much respect for the police, whom they often accused of police violence. What this 
tense relationship implied for police–community relations in the nineteenth century 
will be discussed in Section 1.3. 
 
Police morale 
Police morale was generally low amongst police officers in the nineteenth century and 
declined further as time progressed. The main reason for this lack and decline of spirit 
can be found in the insistence on respect and the lack of respect received, both factors 
touched upon throughout this chapter. Furthermore, the police felt that their work was 
often thwarted by the judiciary system. Richardson explains, “If the police were 
subjected to divided counsels on proper law enforcement, so too were the courts, and 
when the courts undid the work of the police, morale inevitably suffered.”90 For 
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example, “the alderman could still free prisoners between the time of arrest and 
appearance before a magistrate. This practice seriously lowered police morale.”91  
The professionalization movement that started taking form by the end of the 
nineteenth century had a detrimental effect on the already low morale. As Walker 
notes, “One of the tragedies of the professionalization movement would be that, in 
their zeal to elevate the police as an institution, the reformers often lost sight of the 
human material with which they had to work.”92 This, in turn, affected the spirits of the 
police, a development that will be further explained in the next chapter. 
 
The protracted emergence of a professional consciousness  
Given that the existing police culture was strong, a logical consequence would seem to 
be the existence of an equally powerful collective consciousness of police officers. 
However, this was not the case in New York. On the contrary, the rank and file had a 
low level of professional consciousness that mostly prohibited the development of an 
organized police culture, but did stimulate an elusive subculture, with unarticulated 
traditions and rules.
93
 As muckraking journalist Lincoln Steffens wrote towards the end 
of the nineteenth century: 
 
“There walk the ghosts of men notorious in their time — whom the town has forgotten 
absolutely, and the stories about them affect the manner of grip with which the 
policeman swings his club, or the temper in which he blackmails disorderly women.”94  
 
Only by the turn of the century, in a development parallel to the professionalization 
movement, did the police self-identity start to grow.  
 
1.1.5 Police problems in the nineteenth century 
The track record of the New York Police was rather troublesome in the first decades of 
the force’s existence. In fact, problems were so structural that historians consequently 
speak of a ‘police problem’ that existed in nineteenth century New York.95  
The causes for these problems can be found in the conflicting feelings on 
police authority that had created the New York police in the first place. As Walker 
observes in general terms, “the crux of the American police problem has long been the 
fact that the legitimacy of the police is so often challenged rather than accepted.”96 
Miller similarly observes that the police problem in New York “was one of 
democracy’s necessary prices.”97 The decentralization of the force, the relatively weak 
position of the commissioner, the department's lack of power and the omnipresent 
political favoritism weakened the department's discipline, resulted in the non-
enforcement of the laws, and created the base for widespread corruption and police-
violence practices.
98
 Moreover, the discretionary power resulted in excesses, since “the 
New York police could exercise many powers freely”, yet did so “irresponsibly.”99 In 
short, as Richardson observes, the New York police was a logical consequence of 
society’s ideas on policing: 
 
“The police arrangements of New York cannot be considered apart from the social and 
political structure of the city, and if tension and antagonism marked this structure, it is 




Two of these problems, the common practices of corruption and the police violence, 
will now be briefly examined. 
 
An appetite for steak and more: Graft practices in New York 
The complex relationship between Tammany Hall and the police made the latter 
corrupt in many aspects, from the preferential treatment of some citizens over others, 
to the swindling admission practices. Yet the most visible manifestation of corruption 
was the grafting, i.e. the corrupt practice of demanding and accepting hush-money, that 
was common practice amongst nearly all patrolmen in New York at the time.
101
 Graft 
practices, as Astor argues, were “persisting ailments” that plagued New York, resulting 
“in the systematic looting of the city.”102 
Not much prohibited a patrolman from accepting graft. Since supervision of 
the patrolmen was practically non-existent, and the prostitution and the liquor 
businesses were thriving, officers could get away with fraudulent behavior without 
being sanctioned. Moreover, due to the rather weak liquor laws that could be enforced 
selectively, in combination with the resistance of the public to these laws, corruption 
was in fact booming. 
 The pervasiveness of the graft in New York is probably best shown by one of 
‘Clubber’ Williams’ famous remarks: “All my life I have never had anything but chuck 
steak. Now I am gonna get me some Tenderloin.”103 Williams wasn’t talking about his 
request for lunch as one might expect, but was referring to the Tenderloin district in 
New York where a police officer could make tons of money. This infamous district 
was an area where prostitution, liquor and gambling were omnipresent and 
consequently, the practice of grafting was too. When Williams’ remark was widely 
published by Harper’s magazine, he defended himself by saying he really had been 
talking about steak after all. True or not, this story illustrates the many temptations the 




 Even if a police officer wanted to refuse graft, it was made almost impossible 
by Tammany Hall. The political machine not only gently warned the police not to 
interfere with the liquor joints, but also to keep away from the numerous bordellos in 
town. This might seem contradictory: Why didn’t Tammany Hall abolish the liquor 
laws in the first place? The answer to this discrepancy can be found in the awkward yet 
‘democratic’ political climate the New Yorkers longed for. Lardner and Reppetto 
explain: “With the city divided between the immigrant majority and a significant 
Protestant elite, they [Tammany Hall] had to play an elaborate game of make-believe, 
enforcing the law enough to satisfy the minority but not so much as to alienate the 
majority.”105 Thus, corruption served important social and political ends, and 
moreover, the system fitted perfectly into the corrupt society of the late nineteenth 
century. 
 
The honorary title of ‘clubber’: Police aggression and physical prowess in a 
violence-ridden society 
There is enough evidence to suggest that police violence was both widespread and 
extensive in the nineteenth century.
106
 The infamous ‘Clubber’ Williams epitomizes 
this violence, both in name and in actions. His name was so notorious in late nineteenth 
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century New York, that his alleged remark “I am so well-known here […] that even 
horses nod to me mornings,” was certainly not out of place.107 On the first day on the 
job Williams ostensibly had already made his presence clear: “He picked a fight with 
the two toughest thugs in the neighborhood, clubbed them unconscious, and pitched 
them through the plate-glass window of a saloon, bringing forth six of their buddies, 
who met the same fate.”108  
At first glance, Williams’ role in the NYPD might seem insignificant, as he 
was only an individual patrolman, a small part of an extensive history of New York 
policing. However, historians see Williams as a symbol of the character of the 
nineteenth century New York police. As Richardson explains, “In his size, his physical 
courage, his corruption, and his brutality, Williams epitomized the New York 
police.”109 Reppetto similarly observes that “Williams was only the beat cop writ 
large”, indicating that Williams was certainly not the only cop renowned for his use of 
force.
110
 The scholars referred to in this research, also those who focused on the 
general history of law enforcement in the United States, mention Williams’ violent 
career almost without exception.
111
  
The affluent amount of references to police violence found in scholarly 
literature illustrates the differences in perceptions concerning the existence of past and 
present police violence: In contrast to the disagreements between academics on the 
reality of contemporary police violence, historians do agree with each other on the 
veracity of reports of police violence in the nineteenth century. Take for example 
Andrew Cocker, who — in his illustrated children’s booklet on the NYPD — mostly 
portrays a partisan picture in favor of the NYPD and does not shy away from bringing 
up the NYPD’s violent past. Not only does he mention how patrolmen were involved 
in political and violent “street brawls” with street gangs, he also points out how 
different factions within the police were fighting each other on the streets. He added a 
woodcut of the police riot in 1845, depicting how policemen openly fought each 
other.
112
 Cocker’s candor exemplifies the unquestionable existence of excessive use of 
force in the nineteenth century.  
Rather than exploring the extent of Williams’ violence or that of the police at 
large, the following brief analysis aims to show how the violence was a consequence of 
the political and social climate at the time. Williams’ character also provides insight 
into this. To start with, the addition of ‘clubber’ to his name might seem an undesirable 
epithet for a modern day police officer; it certainly was not the case in the context of 
nineteenth century society. Reppetto explains:  
 
“The nickname was actually a tremendous boost. Physical prowess was as important to 
a successful police career of the day as it was to a career in politics. In the hard world 
of the time, where most men worked with their hands, anyone who could not back their 
words with deeds, demanded little respect and could not lead other men.”113 
 
Society thus lauded the violence used by ‘Clubber’ Williams, as New Yorkers linked 
physical prowess to success. Williams’ violence-prone behavior hence not only made 




Another frequently depicted police officer, Cornelius Willemse, who, in his 
autobiography Behind the Green Lights, similarly boasted about his violent behavior, 
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can also be seen as a symbol of both the use and acceptance of violence. He explained 
his behavior by saying that he was merely following an unwritten ‘code’.115 Although 
both Willemse and Williams might have exaggerated their violence to some extent — 
Williams supposedly was in a fight every day for four years — the exaggeration is 
illuminating in itself: Violence was something to be proud of in nineteenth century 
New York.
116
 Moreover, many New Yorkers were worried about the ‘dangerous class’ 
who appeared to be “a dangerously well-organized and pervasive alien element in 
democratic politics” against whom they expected firm action.117 The use of violence 
was thus accepted. 
The display of ‘curbside justice’ by Williams and Willemse was not the only 
type of police violence that was condoned by society. The so-called third degree 
technique — a way of obtaining confessions by using force against the defendant — 
was similarly seen as an acceptable technique to facilitate the law enforcement 
processes.
118
 In his analysis on this matter, Miller argues that “what mattered was not 
the technique of obtaining the confession but its truth.”119 Society, in other words, gave 
the police “a free hand to all manner of police ‘stratagems’ to induce confessions, as 
long as they netted the guilty.”120 Miller illustrates this by the following examples:  
 
“The Court of Appeals ruled in one case that a visibly frightened prisoner’s statement 
in a mixture of English and German was admissible as a confession, even though the 
arresting officer did not understand German. In another case the Supreme Court (New 
York’s second highest, below Appeals) ruled that a policeman’s promise of leniency, 
which induced a prisoner to tell him the location of a stolen watch, did not rule out the 
confession.”121  
 
These examples show not only how the New York police used questionable techniques 
in order to obtain confessions, but also how the whole judiciary system cooperated 
with the police: No one actually objected to the third degree methods. Thus, in a 
similar way to the display of curbside justice, the third degree methods typify the 
excessive use of force by the New York police, and moreover, they illustrate how 
violence-ridden society was in those days.  
Apart from society’s respect and demand for physical prowess and their fear of 
the ‘dangerous class’, the use of violence was also stimulated by the fact that the 
patrolmen had to compensate for the lack of institutionalized power given to the 
department, the most logical alternative being the use of force. Astor concludes that the 
New York police had a much more ‘rough and ready style’ than its British counterpart, 
because the police were given far less power.
122
 Miller less euphemistically observes:  
 
“In New York City’s ethnic riots, the physical force of military and police weaponry 
had to compensate for the police’s lack of numerical strength and moral force … the 
general climate of violence encouraged the police to respond in kind for their own 
protection. There seemed to be no rules of the game which could reduce violence.”123  
 
The lack of institutional power was thus a factor that contributed heavily to the climate 
of violence. Tied to this power vacuum is the high level of discretionary power, which 
gave the patrolmen the freedom to use an almost unencumbered amount of force. Due 
to the fact that supervision was low, police officers consequently often responded with 
physical force. “The most tragic consequence of the problematic nature of police 
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authority was the tradition of police brutality,” is what Walker concludes in his 
analysis. “There can be little doubt that brutality was widespread.”124  
The extensive use of force thus correlated to the police’s discretionary power, 
the overall distribution of power, and to the violent character of society. These factors 
in fact complemented each other: The police were free to act as they pleased and 
violence was part of this, especially as society itself was violent. Miller concludes that 
“a society careless in its control of civilians’ weapons was not likely to be too stringent 
with its policemen.”125 Astor likewise points out: “The New York cop no more grew up 
worshiping a turn-the-other-cheek viewpoint than did any other American nurtured on 
tales of the frontier, the violent Revolution, the Civil War, the body-contact sports-hero 
and his commercial equivalent, the ‘hard-nosed’ businessman.”126 Police violence for 
that matter should not be seen as a one-sided act initiated by the police. Instead, it was 
an interaction process between the police and the ‘dangerous class’ of society.  
Other factors also contributed to the violent behavior of the police in the 
nineteenth century. For example, the low degree of respect and the amount of hostility 
received by policemen, in combination with the police’s sensitivity on this matter, also 
stimulated them to use violence. Richardson points out, “knowing that he was dealing 
with men who despised him and thought him parasitical did not make the policeman 
any gentler. If he could not have respect any other way he was prone to let his club 
earn it for him.”127 Moreover, to the frustration of patrolmen, the courts often had a 
lenient attitude towards criminals. The police in turn felt it was their duty to bring 
criminals to justice. As one sergeant told a rookie once: 
 
“Now, let me tell you something. They may beat you in court, the complainant may not 
show up, they may jump their bail, politicians may interfere, there are several ways 
they can beat you, but this (and he pointed to the [prisoner’s] marks and bruises) 
they’ve got, and make no damned mistake about it.”128 
 
The sergeant’s quote illustrates both the perceived leniency of the judicial system and 
the police’s response to this. Miller argues that judicial leniency and police brutality 
share a reciprocal relationship, which fitted within the spirit of the era:  
 
“This raises the paradox of apparent judicial and public toleration of unregulated arrest 
practices along with police complaints of leniency toward offenders. Perhaps refusal to 
convict was an effort to regulate the police, although the establishment of clearly set 
forth standards, as in London, would certainly have been a more effective method.”129 
 
In sum, the use of police violence was thus a result of several factors, which, in turn, 
were all driven by the characteristics of nineteenth century society, in particular the 
distribution of power and the specific wishes of New Yorkers with regard to law 
enforcement. The interaction between these different factors is noted by different 
historians. Richardson, for example, summarizes that it was essentially “the 
combination of increased violence against the police, lax administration, and the failure 
of the courts to support the police [that] led to an increasing amount of police 
brutality.”130 One of the most dominant factors was public opinion, which demanded 
firm action from the police against the ‘dangerous class’. Consequently, it was 
essentially the lower classes in society that received the full blow: The police only 
52 
 
cared about civil liberties when the people involved had social or political status and 




This subsection discussed two nineteenth century policing problems. Both analyses 
have shown how the New York police at the time faced serious problems due to the 
specific nature and structure of nineteenth century society. Although persistent and 
pervasive, the police problems discussed in this sub-section did not automatically lead 
to a broad public and political debate. The problems discussed did not comprise top-of-
mind issues on the political and public agenda, as will be further discussed in Section 
1.2. 
 
1.1.6 External critical actors: Public opinion, reformers, and the media  
This subsection examines the external actors with whom the police debated at times in 
regard to professionalization issues and police problems in general. Before examining 
specific groups that criticized the police, this subsection will first focus on how the 
public in general perceived the police. The analysis will finish with an overview of the 
role of the media at the time.  
 
A closer look at public opinion 
Nineteenth century public opinion had a profound role in shaping the New York Police 
Department. While this chapter has already discussed how public opinion, and 
specifically the anti-professional and anti-authoritarian sentiments, shaped the New 
York police in the first place, this paragraph specifically examines how the public 
appraised the performance of the force after it had been created. More specifically, this 
brief examination looks at what exactly the nineteenth century public opinion of the 
police encompassed, why the opinion of the public can be considered ‘powerful’, how 
the police affected public opinion, and how public opinion affected the performance of 
the police.  
 First, it is important to bear in mind that public opinion is influenced by 
external factors, just as public opinion influenced the outcome of certain events, such 
as the creation of the force. The relationship between public opinion and the New York 
Police Department can be considered a two-way process, since the character of the 
Police Department affected public opinion, and vice versa. Moreover, just as public 
opinion influenced politics, politics also influenced the opinion of New York citizens. 
In his analysis of nineteenth century police, politics, and public opinion, Smith stresses 
the interdependency of these three actors, pointing out that while “in police matters it is 
not especially difficult to distinguish between the will of the electorate and that of the 
political machines, the latter have so effectively played upon the democratic prejudices 
of the public that the whole meaning of law enforcement has been thrown out of 
focus.”132 Miller similarly emphasizes the vagueness of this boundary, arguing that it is 
“hard to distinguish between partisan arguments advanced by Democratic politicians 
and journalists in their dispute with Republicans over control of the police, and the 
actual views of their working-class constituents.”133 
After the creation of the New York police, the public generally did not have 
much respect for the police as an institution, nor for the individual officers. Those 
historians who examined society’s perception of the police all agree on that. Unlike the 
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London police force, the New York Police Department was never seen as a “bulwark 
of respectability.”134 Similarly, the individual policeman was perceived as an amateur 
in comparison to the more professional London bobby. This dim opinion often resulted 




The public in fact held many stereotypes of the New York police. A common 
one was that of a drunk and a wastrel.
136
 Another was that of a cop “banging his club 
on the feet of a sleeping hobo as a signal for him to move along.”137 Frank Costello, a 
nineteenth century police historiographer and great sympathizer of the early New York 
police force, wrote in his book Our Police Protectors: 
 
“The most vulgar conception [of a policeman] is [that of] a bloated drunken ugly brutal 
fellow, who depends on graft and political influence to retain his sinecure situation and 
who perfunctorily does his ‘60 minutes’ to the hour from pay day to pay day from one 
blackmailed rum hole to another.”138 
 
While such stereotypes and negative sentiments observed by Costello and others are in 
part a reflection of the fact that police performance satisfying one group often 
antagonizes another, hence resulting in negative perceptions of some groups in society, 
the New York police in fact had most groups within society pitted against them. 
Monkkonen, for example, stresses the universality of the negative sentiments, arguing 
that people with property might appear to be more positive towards the police than the 
poor, but often still perceived the police in a condescending way.
139
 Richardson 
similarly points out that rich New Yorkers often saw policemen as servants “who were 
too often unfaithful to their duty”, while the poor and the working class were afraid of 
the power of the police.
140
  
The negative sentiments held towards the New York Police Department were 
to a degree the result of the character of the department, which has been described in 
the previous subsections. Paradoxically, the NYPD’s specific character was in turn a 
consequence of New York’s expectations, as also discussed throughout this chapter. 
These two developments resulted in a negative spiral. More specifically, starting from 
its inception, the Police Department was never given the right amount of power to 
develop from an amateur organization to a professional one in the nineteenth century. 
As individual policemen could not build on national, physical and symbolic power and, 
moreover, were tied to local, partisan politics, “they lacked much […] of the 
‘dignified’ aspect of government.”141 Consequently discipline was lax in the 
department, and corruption prevailed. As a result public perception was predominantly 
negative, Richardson points out, arguing that “workers who saw policemen spending 
their duty time in or near saloons, taking graft at every opportunity and living well 
without working in the laborers’ sense of the term could hardly have much respect for 
the police.”142 
While the existence of such negative sentiments was a direct result of the bad 
shape the NYPD was in at the time, the criticism to a degree appears to be paradoxical 
and even unfounded, as the creation of the new force was to a great extent a reflection 
of the public’s anti-professional and anti-authoritarian sentiments. In their analysis of 
the relationship between the community’s expectations and the ultimate perception of 
the police, Lardner and Reppetto underline the existence of such a paradox, arguing 
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that “a more disciplined and centralized force might have come across as a ‘standing 
army’, something that many early Americans, not just New Yorkers, had hoped to do 
without.”143 Yet while society had acquired a force that mirrored their wishes, Lardner 
and Reppetto also argue that the community was still “not impressed” with the police’s 
“slovenly appearance and slippery integrity”, and especially those “New Yorkers who 
had seen the great police forces of Europe tended to be unforgiving.”144  
 Feelings about police protection indeed were conflicting, since for too many 
people — especially the working class and the poor — the cop in the streets was still 
an “ominous intrusion upon civil liberty.”145 Thus, even though the police lacked 
power as an institution, some elements in society still saw the police as an extension of 
a suppressive government. One should bear in mind that at the time the police image 
was closely entwined with the image of the larger criminal justice system.
146
 Walker 
argues that “precisely because they were essentially a political institution, and 
perceived as such by the public, the American police did not enjoy widespread 
acceptance by the public.”147 This was particularly the case in the time when the police 
were state-controlled by Republican politicians, who established the Metropolitan 
police in New York City.
148
 New York citizens regarded the Metropolitans as an ‘alien 
force’ that enforced the much detested liquor laws and it is not surprising that hostility 
grew in this period. This was also the case during the Civil War, when many (mainly 
Irish) New York citizens detested the police because they suppressed the Draft Riots. 
In his analysis of the conflicting sentiments during the Civil War, Richardson explains:  
 
“Many of [the police’s] members were Irish, but they showed no sympathy toward 
their fellow countrymen who participated in the riots. Although the metropolitans had 
achieved stability and respectability, many working-class Democrats still regarded 
them with distaste as an imposition of the Republican legislature upon the Democratic 
city.”149  
 
The resentment against the force had vast consequences for the morale and culture of 
the rank and file, as discussed previously in this section. The police officers insistence 
on respect, distrust of the public, reticence, the code of silence and violent attitude are 
directly attributable to the ambivalent nineteenth century public opinion that desired a 
powerless police force but detested the outcome. Richardson argues:  
 
“In the United States, public pressure on the police is stronger [in comparison to 
Europe], which causes the police to band together more. This […] reduces the 
supervisor’s power and makes it harder to eliminate illegal behavior within his 
department.” The low esteem in which the public held the New York police increased 
the likelihood of those practices of corruption and brutality which the public 
condemned.”150 
 
This ambivalent attitude is reflected in the way the public perceived police violence. 
Many citizens saw the violence as an institutional failure, but still accepted it as a 
necessary evil against the dangerous class within society. As the judiciary system was 
largely ineffective at the time, the public relied on the police.
151
 
 By the same token, New Yorkers accepted violent police behavior in order to 
deal with riots, which — for many New Yorkers — only had to be suppressed, not 





 Civil liberty issues in fact were not yet on the public and 
political agenda. Only by the end of the nineteenth century did some groups in society 
moderately begin to criticize the police for their violence. The Lexow Committee, as 
will be discussed in the next section, was a turning point in this matter, although not a 
profound one. Up until then there had been no structural criticism in connection to the 
prevailing police violence.  
 
Moral crusaders and elitist professionalists 
Unlike society’s lenient acceptance of the prevalent police violence, certain groups in 
society were more reluctant to tolerate the existing graft and corruption. In fact, in the 
mid- and late-nineteenth century police corruption was an emerging issue on the public 
and political agenda. Graft was the first large problem to be tackled by reformers who 
wanted to professionalize the police and eliminate its partisan aspects. In contrast to the 
groups in society that had to endure police violence, the group of reformers was more 
powerful, but also more aware of its power.  
Police reform was an external affair rather than a movement initiated from 
within the department. Early commissioners did not mind their lack of control nor did 
they try to mold their subordinates. The true professionalization movement was still in 
its infancy: While some commissioners did try to press down a few reforms, these 
reforms were nearly always initiated by outsiders (Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt 
being an exception, yet he was seen as an outsider within the department, as will be 
discussed further on). 
Reformers of those days can be classified under two different types: The moral 
crusader who despised the vice and graft — in his eyes merely bringing ‘moral decay’ 
to the city — and the elitist protestant Republican who saw his power flee towards the 
‘dangerous class’ of society. Strong control of the police — seen as a powerful and 
manipulative instrument — was therefore regarded as vital. The members of these two 
groups overlap to some degree: The protestant Republicans were often also the ones 
who believed the city was becoming a modern ‘Sodom and Gomorrah’ and the moral 
crusaders equally disliked the ‘power of the masses’.153 Moreover, both groups 
believed — with good reason — that the heart of the problem was the partisan politics 
corrupting the city.  
The institution they despised most of all was Tammany Hall, but since the 
Police Department was its ‘string-puppet’ and moreover, as it served as a ‘vehicle for 
political communication’ being the most visible aspect of the machine’s excesses, it 
was essentially the police force that was being verbally attacked. In his analysis of the 
American police, Walker emphasizes this relationship between politics and police, 
concluding that due to the strong connection, “the ‘lawlessness’ of the police — their 
systematic corruption and non-enforcement of the laws — became one of the 
paramount issues in municipal politics during the nineteenth century.”154 Richardson 
similarly points out: “The reformers wanted to have their standards of upper-middle-
class morality enforced uniformly throughout the city and their police reorganization 
was designed to that end.”155 
Reformers in the nineteenth century thus maintained partisan motives in their 
zeal to professionalize the New York police. Reforming the police was a way to obtain 
control in a city where the reformers were a minority. Reform hence tended towards 
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state control of the police, as the Republicans held a majority in the state. Since the city 
was part of the state, the Republicans could hence overcome their minority status if the 
police (and other governmental organizations) were under state control.
156
  
Police reform was thus never a goal on its own. Instead, it was a way to gain 
(state) control over the police, and use the department as a political instrument. In other 
words, elitist professionalists and moral crusaders sought to obtain the power of 
Tammany Hall which was even more powerful. Only by the end of the nineteenth 
century did the professionalization movement become more geared towards separating 
police from politics, placing a premium on managerial efficiency to accomplish that.  
 From a communication perspective, it can be concluded that the two groups of 
reformers are powerful external actors. Only those groups that possessed a degree of 
power (due to support from society) and moreover, were aware of their powers, were 
able to bring up issues. There was hence no noteworthy public pressure group yet of 
civil libertarians fighting the police violence in New York. Consequently, police 
corruption was an emerging issue that occasionally became heated, whereas police 
violence was a latent one. The two groups of reformers will play a vital role in the 
debates that will be scrutinized in the next section.  
 
Media 
Historical research on the role of the media in relation to the New York police is 
scarce. Media are rarely discussed in historical studies on the New York police, and 
none of the historians provide an extensive and coherent analysis of the media's 
influence. Newspaper articles were only used as sources in historians’ investigations of 
the police. Nevertheless, a few observations can still be made on the functioning of the 
media.  
First, the media can be seen as an accelerator in some police reform efforts, as 
with the Mary Rogers case. The role as accelerator was mainly driven by 
sensationalism. Some media “emphasized the vivid and spectacular” side of New York 
policing, including sensational stories on police brutality and police activity in the so-
called ‘battle rows’.157 The journalistic principle ‘good news is no news’ applied as 
much to the nineteenth century as it does to our current media. Richardson points out 
that “there must have been policemen who had good relationships with the people on 
their beats, who were regarded with trust and affection, but these are not the ones 
discussed in the records and the press.”158  
What were the effects of this coverage on the public and on the police? It is 
probable that the media stimulated the public’s perception that the police were violent. 
However, police violence was not an issue yet and police use of (excessive) force was 
actually supported by many influential citizens. Historical studies do not provide 
sufficient evidence that the media tried to change this perception. In fact some media 
strongly supported the violence. The conservative Harper´s magazine, for instance, 
wrote a heroic article in 1887 on ‘Clubber’ Williams.159 The author of the article, 
Richard Wheatley, wrote about Williams’ ‘famous’ club, concluding that “its owner is 
one of the most venomously hated, frequently tried, and most valuable police officers.” 
Ironically, the article was meant to show the department's professionalism at the time. 
Wheatley approvingly nicknamed the force “Knights of the club”.160 
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It is also probable that some of the more critical news media had a negative 
effect on the police’s perception of the outside world. Vilifying articles condemned and 
ridiculed every aspect of the force. The following article fragment, for instance, is in 
sharp contrast to Wheatley's article: 
 
“Policemen are compelled to associate with vulgarians and scoundrels of all grades; 
are exposed to every species of temptation; act unfavorable on each other, and have no 
restraining influence beyond their own intelligence, which is not very great, and their 
fear of exposure, which is not probable.”161 
 
The excerpt above reinforces the stereotypes mentioned previously. The police's 
hypersensitivity to these stereotypes and criticism in general, as well as their desire for 
respect, weren’t traits that fostered warm relations with muckrakers, such as Jacob Riis 
and Lincoln Steffens, the latter of whom wrote “Many a morning when I had nothing 
else to do I stood and saw the police bring in and kick out their bandaged, bloody 
prisoners, not only strikers and foreigners, but thieves too, and others of the miserable, 
friendless, troublesome poor.”162  
 As with news media today, newspapers in the nineteenth century were 
fragmentized according to political preference. Conservative business papers tended to 
support the presence of a powerful police force. Newspapers that reached the working 
classes, such as the Herald and World had a more critical attitude towards police 
violence.
163
 This should also be seen in relation to partisan politics, since these 
Democratic-oriented papers were especially critical of police violence during the 
period when the New York police force was state-controlled by Republicans.
164
 Some 
newspapers had an ambivalent attitude towards the police, due to their political stance. 
The editors of Harper’s, for example “viewed the Tenderloin with disdain, but were 
reluctant to attack the police, who kept the city from descending into anarchy.”165 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the media began to criticize the police 
more often for their violent behavior. The Arthur Harris incident in 1901, further 




1.2 Historical patterns of debate 
This section takes a closer look at the dynamic patterns of the debate of police reform 
and professionalization, and the police debates held in the department’s early years 
concerning imminent police problems.  
The previous section already provided some insight into the dynamics of these 
debates. The fact that the NYPD’s structure, composition, tasks and level of 
professionalization did not change radically in the nineteenth century and that police 
problems prevailed during the first 60 years of the department’s existence shows that 
the dynamics of debate were slow. 
The first part of this section examines the nineteenth century reform effort 
from a historical perspective by looking at four different reform cases. The second part 
of this analysis examines and discusses — from a communication perspective — how 
this pattern of reform and professionalization relates to the organic and dynamic 
‘process of debate’ between police and critics.  
The conclusion of this section merges the findings from the previous section 
with the analysis of this section, in order to expose the causes for the stagnation of the 
reform movement/process of debate. 
 
1.2.1 The nineteenth century reform movement: A historical perspective 
This subsection specifically looks at the trends, constants and characteristics of four 
successive reform debates concerning police problems. The chosen cases make up only 
a small segment of the wider array of scandals and reform efforts that occurred within 
the allotted time frame, yet these examples have specifically been chosen, since they 
epitomize and explain best the dynamics of reform: Not only do they give insight into 
the broader patterns of communication, individually they also expose the different 
facets of the early reform effort. Focal elements in the analysis of the four cases 
include the scrutiny of ‘scandal’, ‘criticism’, ‘response’ and ‘reform’.  
 
CASE ONE — HOW COPS WERE BESTOWED THE NAME COP: A CLOSER LOOK AT 
THE UNIFORM DEBACLE 
“The great moral power of the policeman of London in preventing crimes lies in his 
coat.”166 
One of police reformer James W. Gerard’s arguments to uniform the 
New York police 
 
While the police uniform currently worn by NYPD officers is an established and 
noticeable symbol of the Police Department, in the mid-nineteenth century, the New 
York police could not yet be recognized by a uniform. The introduction of standardized 
garments to the New York police was in fact one of the first reform efforts. 
The implementation of the uniform was initiated by outsiders — mainly the 
group of ‘elitist professionalists’ — who sought to professionalize and empower the 
police in order to make them less dependent on the political machine.
167
 By improving 
police uniformity and hence efficiency, reformers believed that they could indirectly 
damage the political machine which they detested so much. Monkkonen points out 
how professionalization in fact became the key objective of the uniform movement, 
while their motivation was purely political. He argues: “The major obstacles were not 
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the issues of uniformed police versus traditional police, but conflicts over which 
established political elite would reap the benefits.”168  
 In their effort to implement the uniform, reformers not only faced resistance 
from political bosses, but also from the patrolmen and the public in general, as society 
as a whole was ingrained with anti-professional feelings, and hence vehemently 
protested against the implementation of the uniform. As one orator had proclaimed at 
the time: “No man bearing the proud title of an American desires to appear in any dress 
that should make him conspicuous among his fellows.”169 In an early attempt to 
uniform the New York police, the officers were literally booed by the public, who 
called them ‘liveried lackeys’ amongst other none too flattering designations.170  
Historians have identified several causes for this resistance. Richardson argues 
that policemen rejected the uniform because they regarded it as being “derogatory 
servants’ livery.”171 Astor similarly maintains that the policemen fought the uniform 
because they felt it gave them the look of footmen.
172
 In her book on New York City, 
Selma Berrol more generally observes that some saw the uniform as too authoritarian 
for a democratic city.
173
 Miller does not refute these analyses, but adds that “anti-
English and anti-nativist feelings may be equally important.”174 Monkkonen in turn 
mentions that the uniform “conflicted with notions of independence,” and moreover, 
“depersonalized the wearer.”175 Again, these feelings reflected the general sentiments 
discussed earlier: A uniformed police department could resemble the ‘standing army’ 
which the New Yorkers feared so much. No matter what the reason was for the 
resistance, it persisted throughout the first decades of the existence of the New York 
police: For more than ten years policemen were only recognizable by a star-shaped 
copper badge — hence the name ‘cop’ — that could be concealed if desired.176  
Unlike the patrolmen, reformers saw a great need for police uniformity and 
efficiency, and in 1853 they finally convinced the police commanders as well as the 
patrolmen to introduce the uniform.
177
 Why did the reformers eventually succeed? 
Apart from the influence of the reformers themselves, other external influences such as 
increased criminal activity, and a need for visibility and deterrence, led to the adoption 
of the uniform.
178
 Most historians believe that the uniform was the first major step 
towards professionalism, since the visible symbols gave the organization identity and 
the uniform disciplined the patrolmen.
179
 However, the uniform debate also shows the 
long road of resistance that the reformers had to face — a resistance primarily 
reinforced by anti-authoritarian thinking, but also by partisan politics. In fact, the 
uniform debate was the only noteworthy reform effort that occurred in the early 
existence of the New York police.
180
 As will be shown in the discussion of the next 
cases, the real reform impetus did not commence until the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
 
CASE TWO — TACKLING GRAFT: A REVEREND GOES UNDERCOVER 
The Rev. Charles Parkhurst can be considered the most vehement critic of the police in 
the nineteenth century. Although there had been numerous critics who had painted “a 
portrait of rampant, police-protected vice and of gangs and hooligans running amok,” 
no one had really taken notice of them until the reverend began his campaign against 
the police.
181
 Parkhurst’s approach differed from previous critics in that he was the first 
to go to the Tenderloin district to gather evidence of the vice and graft, a task that was 
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in one sense not difficult, considering corruption and vice were pervasive.
182
 
Parkhurst’s criticism of Tammany Hall and the police was severe:  
 
“[They are] a damnable pack of administrative bloodhounds that are fattening 
themselves on the ethical flesh and blood of our citizenship. […] The polluted harpies 
that […] under the pretense of governing the city, are feeding day and night on its 
quivering vitals. They are a lying, perjured rum-soaked and libidinous lot.”183  
 
This highly critical remark, directed at the graft system, was certainly not the only 
rebuke made by the reverend. An examination of his speeches shows that they 
comprised many harsh condemnations of both police and Tammany Hall.
184
  
The Rev. Parkhurst can be categorized as the ‘moral crusader’ type whose 
main aim was to make the city ‘morally clean’. Parkhurst’s main focal point, in line 
with the motives of other reformers of those days, was the eradication of corruption; in 
none of his speeches did he rail against the existing police violence. In a rather 
heartless remark on New York’s ‘ladies of the night’, whom he sought to evict from 
the ‘disorderly houses’, he succinctly summarizes both his sentiments and the purpose 
of his crusade: “I do not care whether they starve or freeze on the streets as long as 
they are starved and frozen into a healthier way of thinking.”185  
Although the Rev. Parkhurst adopted the slogan “Down with the police,” his 
actual target was thus Tammany Hall — the instigator of the vice and graft. His 
crusade hence demonstrates how the police functioned as a vehicle for political 
communication: Parkhurst understood that the police force was the helping hand of 
Tammany Hall, so he primarily targeted the police. 
 In Parkhurst’s favor, the public mood was shifting as New Yorkers were 
becoming increasingly disgruntled with the excesses of corruption and vice. Even the 
lower classes, who benefited from the ‘liberal’ enforcement of the liquor laws, 
despised the police, because — in their eyes — they earned money without actually 
working hard for it.
186
 The media were also cooperative to Parkhurst’s cause and 
functioned as a sounding-board, eagerly publishing all of his speeches.
187
  
The police responded in different ways to Parkhurst’s criticism.188 Their initial 
response was mockery, yet when the reverend’s accusations mounted, and he also 
gained proof for them, the response moved to a new phase, as both the police 
commissioner and the mayor persistently refuted all of the allegations, while trying to 
cover up the existing corruption.
189
 The police conducted a halfhearted ‘show’ clean-
up, to prove the police force was functioning at its best, and that vice was an exception 
in New York. Moreover, as an ostensibly ‘firm’ measure, some captains were 
transferred to other precincts. This decree, characterized by Richardson as “the musical 
dance of chairs”, was a complete farce, since the captains continued their misconduct 
in their new precincts.
190
 When denial and mockery had failed, the Police Department 
decided to ‘get tough’ with its critics. The third phase of response consisted of 
numerous verbal threats that were sometimes put into practice too. Captain William 
Devery, ‘Clubber’ Williams’ equally flamboyant supervisor, who, in his Lower East 
Side precinct was equally violent and corrupt, epitomized this aggression when he said 
to the bordello owners in the Tenderloin: 
 
“There is a lot of silk-stocking people coming from uptown to bulldoze you people, 




From then onwards, critics who shouted ‘Down with the police’ could expect their 
outcry to be answered with a cop’s nightstick. Parkhurst was hunted down by an angry 
mob of 500 Tammany supporters while the police stood there and laughed. The police 
deliberately and unlawfully arrested Parkhurst’s crusade companion, Private Detective 
Gardner. These are but a few examples of the aggression that Parkhurst and his 
supporters encountered.
192
 Even on the eve of the ensuing Lexow Committee — the 
formal investigative attempt to unveil and change police misconduct — the New York 
governor proclaimed that “No city has a lower crime rate,” and that the Lexow 
Committee was a “junketing committee.”193 
In short, the Police Department as well as Tammany Hall took profound 
measures to thwart Parkhurst’s efforts to reveal the corruption. As will be discussed in 
the next case, the Lexow Commission proceedings showed a similar pattern. 
 
CASE THREE — ‘CLUBBER’ WILLIAMS’ MYSTERIOUS PROPERTY IN JAPAN: THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEXOW COMMITTEE  
When, after two years of Parkhurst’s crusade, the police were still not inclined to 
implement any significant reform measures, Senator Thomas Collier Platt decided to 
take the matter up more seriously. On January 31, 1894, he realized the appointment of 
an investigative committee headed by Senator Lexow. In a nine-month hearing of over 
700 witnesses — comprising not only police officers but also civilians such as saloon 
keepers and prostitutes — 10,000 pages of testimony and 30,000 subpoenas, the truth 
concerning the extent of police corruption taking place in the city became painfully 
apparent. In his analysis, Richardson stresses how meticulously the board had 
scrutinized the different facets of police misconduct, in his words “demonstrating a 
systematic and pervasive pattern of police corruption, brutality, election fraud, payoffs 
for appointments and promotions, political interference in transfers and assignments, 
police involvement in confidence frauds and the police conception that they were 
above the law.”194  
 The committee was a joint effort between the ‘moral crusaders’ — of whom 
Parkhurst was the head representative — and the Republican ‘elitist professionalists’, 
who sought to diminish the power of their opponents. Although their conclusions 
reflect the truth — the police force was indeed corrupted and partisan at the time — 
contemporary researchers have pointed out how partisan these groups were in their 
efforts to criticize the police. Put differently, the ambitions of the board members were 
just as slanted and one-sided as that of Tammany Hall. The committee’s aim was not 
necessarily to make New York a better city. Instead, its ‘partisan’ purpose was, as 
Reppetto points out, “embarrassing Tammany and promoting individual reformers.”195 
Not without reason were the investigations halted by the end of 1894 “when it began to 
come too close to Republican politicians.”196 Richardson similarly observes that the 
committee “operated along partisan lines — emphasizing Tammany’s sins and passing 
over similar Republican peccadilloes.”197 Other evidence also demonstrates that both 
groups were partisan and that they used the police as a vehicle to gain power.
198
 Thus, 
with the purpose of dismantling Tammany Hall, the reformers again targeted the New 
York police. 
 Both the apparent and more hidden issues of debate — i.e. corruption and 
partisan ties — did not differ much from those identified in the previous cases, nor did 
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the presented solution: a more independent and professional police force. The only 
difference is that up until then there had been no structural criticism concerning the 
prevailing police violence in the city. The Lexow Committee was a turning point in 
this matter, although not a major one. While the bulk of criticism still focused on the 
existing graft, the police were also to a certain extent criticized for excessive use of 
force.
199
 Of the more than nine months spent on hearings, the Lexow Committee 
dedicated only one full day to police violence. The witnesses, of whom some “bore the 
evidence of their scars in the form of welts, scars, cracked ribs, or broken noses,” told a 
chilling story of the excruciating police violence they had been subjected to.
200
 
Strikingly, the accused officers did not try to cover up their violent activities. This was 
also the case for ‘Clubber’ Williams, who was obviously a prime subject. Lardner and 
Repetto point out that although the latter “seemed to revel in his reputation for 
violence, proudly stating that he was in a fight every day, [he] went to extreme lengths 
to absolve himself of the charge of grafting.”201  
It was only a small group of reformers who took up the cause of the lower 
classes who were assaulted by patrolmen and they did this primarily to make the police 
and Tammany look bad. Moreover, as Astor points out, the primary reason for the 
specific Lexow hearings on police violence was to decrease the police assaults of 
“respectable citizens.”202 
 Both Tammany bosses and the rank and file responded with an enormous 
degree of hostility towards the board: Their counter-attack entailed numerous attempts 
to hinder the proceedings. Moreover, they often openly expressed their vexation with 
the entire process. Police Inspector Thomas Byrnes, for instance, had told the press that 
the agents of the Lexow Committee were “‘blackmailers’ who, by paying people to 
commit acts of entrapment, ‘fomented’ the evils they professed to expose.”203 In 
addition, Byrnes tried to thwart the whole judicial process, by treating the cooperative 
witnesses mercilessly, and suspending one of the captains after admitting the graft 
practices in his precinct.
204
 His actions can be understood by his function as a satellite 
of the political machine. Another explanation for his behavior has been brought up by 
Lardner and Reppetto, who maintain that Byrnes was not the only leader who “fell into 
a pattern common to many leaders facing corruption probes.”205  
Policemen themselves also tried to hinder the proceedings of the hearing. First 
of all, those accused officers who were able to flee town evidently did so. Astor 
ironically points out how many of the key suspects disappeared from town. In his 
words, “Chicago became a nesting ground for specialists in vice and Europe supplied 
an investigation-free haven for police and high officials.”206 Those officers who 
weren’t able to escape, strenuously denied any involvement in graft activities. 
‘Clubber’ Williams was one of them. He was accused of having a ‘permissive attitude’ 
in the Tenderloin district where he was precinct commander at the time. During the 
hearings an avalanche of complaints had mounted up against him. One witness — a 
local pastor in the Tenderloin — had proclaimed that “every building on the block 
other than the church was a whore house” and he insisted that Williams was the chief 
person responsible for this.
207
 Williams’ mysterious wealth might have worked against 
him: He had a personal fortune of $300,000 plus an enormous estate complete with a 
private steam yacht.
208
 On the questions of whether he had personally participated in 
the graft, and how he was able to possess such huge amounts of money — being a 
police officer with only a modest paycheck — he had claimed that his wealth was 
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based upon real estate speculations in Japan, an area that was “as remote as the moon” 
at the time. Other accused officers came up with similar excuses.
209
 Their non-
cooperative behavior made it extremely difficult for the investigators to obtain 
confessions. To make matters worse, those officers who were not accused themselves 
but who were brought in front of the board to testify against others, went to extreme 
lengths to defend their colleagues, because they were bred on a code of silence typical 
to a police culture.
210
 This lack of cooperation was compensated by an abundant 
amount of civilian testimonies, which made the police’s cover-up even more painfully 
obvious. 
  The verdict of the Lexow Committee was devastating, yet the reform efforts 
that emanated from the verdict did not have much impact.
211
 The reason for this can be 
found perhaps in the way reform was intended at the time. Astor observes:  
 
“No one expected, as in modern investigations, that legislation would prevent 
corruption. Instead the aim was merely to expose malfeasance and get the rascals 
replaced by more honest men. ”212 
 
The Committee’s only real accomplishment was the formation of a bipartisan board of 
police commissioners headed by Theodore Roosevelt, who was known as a venomous 
critic of the police. His efforts to reform the police will be discussed in the following 
case study. 
 
CASE FOUR — WELL, WELL, WELL, REFORM HAS GONE TO HELL: ROOSEVELT’S  
FAILURE TO REFORM THE POLICE 
“I have the most important and the most corrupt department on my hands,” Roosevelt 
wrote to his wife when he began his career as New York Police Commissioner in 
1894.
213
 In contrast to previous commissioners, Roosevelt was serious about reforming 
the police. He had vowed to tackle the graft rather than participate in it, making him 
the first actual reform commissioner of the New York police.  
 In his four years in office, Roosevelt vigorously tried to reform the department, 
not only by attempting to make the force corruption free, but also by trying to raise the 
quality of patrol supervision. Another objective was to diminish the ties between 
Tammany Hall and the police. Roosevelt was the first to make an effort to 
professionalize the police on a structural basis. His primary focus was to upgrade the 
rank-and-file policemen from amateurs to qualified and apt patrolmen. His objective 
was thus not different from those discussed in previous cases, although Roosevelt 
applied more thorough methods than his predecessors to achieve his goal.  
Whereas Roosevelt made a serious effort to root out almost every aspect of the 
police’s misconduct that had come to light during the Lexow Committee, he 
structurally neglected one of them: the problem of police violence within the force. He 
even reinforced the police’s violent-prone behavior by reintroducing the nightstick — 
which had been dispensed with for a short period of time — since it improved the 
“fighting efficiency” of the force.214 Speaking on behalf of most New Yorkers, he once 
said “we did not possess a particle of that maudlin sympathy for the criminal, 




To accomplish his goal of professionalizing the force, he employed some new 
and definitely creative techniques, of which his hands-on approach concerning patrol 
supervision is definitely the most striking one: “Operating as his own shoo-fly squad, 
Roosevelt sallied forth at night in a black cloak, a wide brim hat pulled down over his 
face. In the summer a black sash replaced his vest. Thus disguised, he lurked in the 
streets, hoping to catch somnolent, socializing, and dishonest cops.”216 This was only 
one of the many professionalization measures Roosevelt had taken up, his main target 
being the group of patrolmen.  
Roosevelt’s attempts to reform the police should be seen as part of the broader 
progressive movement that was passing through the United States. One of the less 
attractive elements of this movement, also reflected in Roosevelt’s reform, was the 
rather elitist stance taken by the reformers. Walker links Roosevelt’s reform efforts to 
“the often jingoistic militarism, the soaring and self-righteous idealism, an implicit but 
deeply rooted contempt for the mass of humanity, and an excessive emphasis on 
rhetoric and imagery.”217 Thus, Roosevelt belonged to the ‘elitist professionalists’, for 
whom reform was mainly an attempt to break the power of the working class. As part 
of this group, Roosevelt paradoxically remained an external element within the force 
and was seen as an outsider. Lardner and Reppetto: “Over the years, [Roosevelt] 
gained the affection of everyone from cowboys to coal miners; but he never seemed to 
inspire much loyalty amongst New York cops.”218 Consequently, Walker points out, 
the then-to-be president “had little effective control over policemen on the beat.”219 
Lardner and Reppetto argue that the reason for this failure is “what the NYPD has 
demonstrated time and again — that its appointed leaders are no match for what more 
prescient observers called its ‘inner life’.”220  
The appraisals regarding the effects of Roosevelt’s reforms are mixed. 
Richardson’s verdict is relatively mild, concluding that Roosevelt “was able to 
generate a great deal of noise and some action.”221 Yet others are less positive and see 
Roosevelt’s administration as being the typical “frustration of reform.”222 It is not the 
measures themselves that made historians characterize Roosevelt’s administration a 
failure, but the fact that his measures were so short-lived and that they evaporated as 
soon as Tammany Hall came back into power.
223
 Astor concludes that “New York’s 
first real flirtation with respectability ended with an angry divorce” and that none of his 
measures lasted for a long time.
224
 Indeed, Roosevelt’s relationship with the police was 
an ‘unhappy marriage’: In November 1897 Tammany Hall was restored to power and 
the openly corrupt Devery was assigned to be the new police commissioner. 
Roosevelt’s new measures were rapidly undone and the police’s excesses that had 
scourged the city soon became common practice again. Devery — once quoted to be 
the most ‘lovable villain’ by reporter Lincoln Steffens —made no effort to disguise his 
motives: “If there is any graftin’ to be done, I’ll do it. Leave it to me!”225  
Social reformer and journalist Jacob Riis pessimistically observed at the time 
how “honest government did not suit New York [since] it deliberately voted the 
dishonest crew back with vastly increased powers for mischief.”226 The dishonest crew 
members themselves were exalted after their victory: the Democratic Party “snake-
danced” triumphantly through the streets, shouting: “Well, well, well, reform has gone 




1.2.2 Reform from a communication perspective: From professionalization 
patterns to debating processes 
Tammany Hall’s triumphant snake-dance epitomizes the tragic failure of the reform 
movement, since, in spite of years of struggle between the police and reformers, the 
progress of the movement was back to where it had initially started, with the openly 
corrupt Devery in power and the amateurish patrolmen participating in their usual 
partisan and corrupt activities. This snake-dance was not the only visible sign of failed 
reform efforts: The four cases that have been examined in the preceding subsection 
systematically show that the entire process of professionalization was very slow — 
even decades after the birth of the force.  
This subsection analyzes how the professionalization patterns revealed in the 
four case studies give insight into the historical patterns of communication that took 
place in the formal arena of debate. As pointed out in the introduction to Part I, this 
arena relates not just to the visible debate in which the different groups are 
diametrically opposed, such as during the Lexow Committee hearings where the 
different groups openly confront each other, and moreover, where issues are openly 
discussed. Instead, such a visible debate is a segment of a much broader process, which 
the term ‘arena of debate’ also refers to in an historical context. More specifically, the 
term alludes to the broader pattern of criticism and reform that surrounds these visible 
debates. In this context, cases such as the reform period of Roosevelt and the ‘uniform 
question’ that surfaced in the 1850s, are not debates in the narrow sense of the word, 
but, similar to the proceedings of the Lexow Committee, they were struggles between 
groups in society who brought up issues and those that opposed them.  
The following analysis looks first at the pattern of successive debates, followed 
by an examination of the patterns that occur during specific debates.  
 
The dynamic pattern of successive debates 
The four cases discussed in the previous subsection show that reform efforts in the 
nineteenth century were erratic; although corruption and violence were ongoing 
phenomena, only some incidents incited groups within society to demand immediate 
reform. In other words, emerging issues only sporadically became imminent ones. 
Reformers themselves — by the same token — were usually lone voices at the time — 
only occasionally could they count on the support of the public. Or viewed from a 
communication perspective: Reformers were only powerful and active at irregular 
intervals. 
In general, reform was not successful in the nineteenth century. By looking at 
the pattern of ensuing debates, it becomes clear that reforms were often temporary, and 
moreover, rarely implied much more than a management shift from Tammany Hall’s 
rule to that of Republicans, or vice versa. In fact, it did not really matter by whom the 
police were ruled —the lack of professionalism and the amount of police problems 
remained the same. Smith argues that “as often as not, law enforcement reformers have 
succeeded only in replacing one set of corrupt or incompetent officials with another set 
of the same or similar stripe.”228 The process of criticism and reform became a 
pendular business, since both criticism and response, as well as the communication 




“The result in the 1870s was a series of power struggles between various mayors and 
police boards. The methods employed consisted of repeated charges and counter-
charges, angry letters published in the press before they could be delivered to the 
recipient, and proceedings which can be described only as comic.”229 
 
In short, the ingredients for structural and lasting police reform were not present in the 
nineteenth century. Richardson argues that the early history of the New York police 
shows how “structural changes alone could not accomplish much and that social and 
political homogeneity are necessary bases for general community guidance of and 
satisfaction with police performance.”230  
 The ‘pendular business’ of criticism and reform is closely related to the 
dynamic patterns of debate. More specifically, the nineteenth century debate was 
clearly unsuccessful, as the process of communication was tedious and the issues never 
came to closure, but rather kept resurfacing. The group of reformers did not realize 
their objectives of debate, nor did Tammany Hall or the police, since the latter were not 
able to prevent fallout issues from resurfacing.  
 
The dynamic pattern of specific debates 
In the four cases discussed earlier in this section, certain aspects either stimulate or 
hamper the process of debate. To start with, an increase in crime in New York often 
stimulated reform efforts. The Mary Rogers murder was the immediate cause of the 
creation of the New York police. Yet it was the worsening crime situation in New York 
that gave rise to the Police Department’s inception. Similarly, the creation of the 
Metropolitan state-controlled force was a consequence of a worsening crime 
situation.
231
 Other factors that led to the creation of the Metropolitan police force 
include well-founded complaints from politicians, ongoing rural-urban friction on 
issues such as prohibition, and change of party hegemony between city and state 
governments.
232
 It is striking how mostly external factors eventually led to reform.  
There was also a set of reoccurring factors that hampered the process of debate. 
The discussion of the four cases shows how not only criticism and reform repeated 
itself, but also the methods that were used by the different actors. While critics had a 
second agenda in all cases, the force’s hostile and non-cooperative response to 
Roosevelt’s reforms was similar to the police protest against the uniform as well as the 
force’s mockery and contempt of Dr. Parkhurst, and the techniques used to thwart the 
Lexow Committee.  
These methods had a negative effect on the process of debate. First, the Police 
Department was continuously attacked by the group of ‘moral crusaders’ and ‘elitist 
professionalists’ for acts Tammany Hall was mainly responsible for. This tactic can be 
considered as the most visible debating strategy applied by those groups in society who 
bring up issues. However, as a consequence, this strategy actually thwarted the process 
debate, because Tammany Hall was not directly attacked. Second, by putting the 
characteristics of the four cases side by side, a pattern of hostility and cover-up by 
those groups in society who oppose issues becomes apparent, in which mockery, denial 
and aggression play an important role. Other elements include sabotage and the 
reversal of previously made decisions. With this combination of tactics, these groups 
aimed at thwarting the adoption of reforms in any kind of way. “I got no use for them 
reformers” — a contemptuous snort made by a patrolman at the time — accurately 
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represented the attitudes of most policemen.
233
 The following chart summarizes these 
debate characteristics: 
 




2. Issues they brought up  
Implementation of the uniform 
Eradication of corruption and vice   
Professionalizing the patrolmen 
Improving efficiency  
 
3. Their motivation for bringing up those issues 
Elitist professionalists: Ousting Tammany Hall 
Moral crusaders: Making the city morally clean and Tammany free 
 
4. Their method of bringing up those issues (communication strategies) 
Use of ‘target incongruity’: Tarnishing the power of Tammany by vehemently criticizing the 
police 
Use of media and investigative committees to reveal police misconduct 
Use of harsh rhetorical strategies such as ridicule and severe criticism (‘Down with the police’) 
 
5. Groups opposing those issues 
Tammany Hall 
Police commissioners 
Police officers  
 
6. Their motivation for opposing those issues 
Tammany Hall:  Fear for a loss of power; support of constituents’ wishes; dislike of 
groups bringing up these issues 
Commissioners:  Satellites of Tammany Hall; fear for sanctions; dislike of 
professional element; dislike of those groups criticizing the police 
Police officers: Fear for a loss of power; fear for sanctions; dislike of professional 
image; dislike of those groups criticizing the police 
 
7. Their method of opposing those issues (communication strategies) 
Tammany Hall  Mockery, denial, aggression, sabotage, reversal of 
Commissioners  previously made decisions  
Police officers  (the latter does not apply to the patrolmen) 
 
8. Results  
The police did not professionalize, due to the specific strategies used by powerful actors 
 
 
1.2.3 Interim conclusions 
While the four cases discussed in this section show that the process of 
professionalization was slow and that reform was hard to accomplish, on their own 
they provide only limited insight into the deep-seated causes of the stagnation of 
reform and communication. For a better comprehension of these causes, the 
conclusions of Sections 1.1 and 1.2 will now be merged.  
 First, the integration of different sections gives insight into the beginning of 
public and political debates, revealing why some nineteenth century problems 
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discussed in Section 1.1 did reach the formal arena of debate, as described in Section 
1.2, while others did not. The integrated analysis shows that the status of an issue and 
the status of the group in society supporting that issue bear a causal relationship in this 
matter: Since the general public was not concerned about the problem of police 
violence, and moreover, those exposed to the violence were powerless and accepted the 
violence as a part of their lives, the overzealous behavior of patrolmen was not an issue 
which the police as an institution were obliged to be concerned about. In other words, 
police violence was not an issue of consequence because the conditions for the 
inception and growth of an issue were not met: When a group has no power, or is 
unaware of its power, it will not have the authority or ability to bring up any issues in 
the formal arena of debate. Existing problems did not turn into full-blown issues as a 
result of this. Professionalization and police corruption intermittently became full-
blown issues for the same reason police violence did not. Unlike the neglected problem 
of overzealous use of force, the issues of corruption and professionalization were 
brought up (only intermittently) by powerful and organized groups in society who had 
joined their efforts on an irregular basis, to actively criticize the corrupt and amateurish 
police in the debating arena.  
The parallel increase of the status of issue and actor is thus a condition for the 
inception and intensification of public and political debates. Moreover, both forces 
functioned as the engine that kept the debate in motion. If a reform group lost power, 
for instance, after Roosevelt’s retreat, then the debate automatically lost intensity.  
The integrated analysis also provides insight into the deeper-seated causes for 
the overall process and character debate, and that of the specific cases. What is at first 
striking in Section 1.2 is how the complexity of the guilt question (and not the question 
itself), leads to an overall slow process of debate. There are two causes for this 
complexity. First of all, the distorted power distribution between Tammany Hall and 
the police blurred the question of guilt. Second, and as a consequence, the relationship 
between the critics’ objectives and their target was skewed: Groups in society took up 
issues which were not primary issues to them, believing this was the method to 
accomplish their objectives (in this case the demise of Tammany Hall). Take for 
example the group of elitist professionalists, whose foremost desire was to uniform the 
police in order to impair Tammany’s power. Similarly, the Parkhurst crusade and the 
ensuing Lexow Committee were attempts to bring down the political machine that 
governed the city, yet the Police Department was the main target in that debate. The 
police were consequently blamed for activities for which they were not chiefly 
responsible. Of course, they participated in the graft activities, but they merely acted 
this way because Tammany had created an institutionalized climate of misconduct, in 
which patrolmen were not only seduced but almost forced to commit these acts. The 
visibility of both the police as an institution, as well as the activities partaken by its 
employees, had put the police in a precarious position. Yet critics were only able to use 
the police as “a channel for political communication”, because the power distribution 
was distorted.
234
 In other words, while this function was utilized by police reformers, it 
was created by Tammany Hall and the police. 
In general terms, if the power distribution is distorted between those groups in 
the arena of debate that are being criticized, an equally distorted perception can emerge 
of the group that is held accountable for the issues brought up by other groups, and the 
group that is chiefly responsible for these same issues. This incongruity had stagnated 
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the debate on corruption in the nineteenth century, because the police force itself had 
no power to reform: Tammany was not directly attacked, and it had enough power to 
thwart reform.  
The process of debate was also thwarted by those groups criticized by the 
reformers. The distorted power balance, again, was the main cause for these groups to 
succeed in their obstruction of the debating process: Not only did it empower these 
actors to accomplish their goal, i.e. to thwart the reform efforts; it had also given them 
the desire to do so. Both observations will be further explained below. 
One of the aspects of the power distortion was the huge amount of 
discretionary power granted to the patrolmen, and the development of a strong police 
culture as a result of it. Both had a huge impact on the progress of the debate. In fact, 
the lack of rules within the department — a direct result of New York’s anti-
authoritarian and anti-professional feelings — was the prerequisite both for the 
existence of reform efforts and their tragic failure. To be more precise, the low level of 
supervision had incited the police to engage in corrupt activities in the first place, 
spurring critics to demand reform, but it had also triggered the development of a strong 
police culture, which prohibited the reform’s success. 
 The influence of this culture on the debate is multidimensional. First of all, its 
existence influenced various aspects of the reform process: It did not only thwart the 
discussion that usually preceded the implementation of reform, it also hindered the 
entire process of implementation itself, thus frustrating reform efforts in the late 
nineteenth century.  
Police culture in fact obstructed the reform movement in several ways. To 
begin with, the conservative sentiments that predominated within the force pitted the 
police against change and criticism, making them hostile towards those who 
disapproved of the police or those who incited reform. Second, the culture of solidarity, 
under which whistleblowers were looked upon with disdain, prohibited innocent 
officers from ‘ratting on other cops’, making it harder for investigators to prove that 
corruption was common practice within the force. This characteristic — better known 
as the ‘blue wall of silence’ — came to light during the hearings of the Lexow 
Committee. As a final point, the elusive character of the force’s ethos prohibited 
anyone from getting a grip on the patrolmen, including charismatic leaders such as the 
then-to-be President Roosevelt.  
 Mockery, denial, aggression, reversal and sabotage were the key elements of 
the counter-offensive instigated against the Rev. Parkhurst, and in addition, they also 
comprised the main ingredients in the police response to both the ensuing Lexow 
Committee and to the reform period of Roosevelt’s tenure of office. The police thus 
hindered reform efforts on a structural basis in the nineteenth century. 
The Police Department was primarily successful in its attempt to thwart 
professionalization efforts, because the members themselves were granted 
discretionary powers, which had made them powerful actors. Not only did the rank and 
file effectively use their powers to prevent the execution of reforms, they also 
functioned as the mouthpiece of the New York police during debating sessions. They 
were able to do this, because their supervisors were not able to reprimand them: The 
commissioner himself was a satellite of both Tammany and his own theoretical 
subordinates. Even those commissioners who were not tied to the political machine, 
such as Roosevelt, did not succeed in subduing the authority of the patrolmen.  
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Combined, the two developments discussed in this subsection’s analysis 
neutralize each other: On one side of the arena of debate two different reform-minded 
groups tried to combat police corruption and elevate the police into a more professional 
state, for the mere reason of getting even with their political enemies. On the other side 
of the arena, a powerful group of policemen, together with an even more dominant 
group of Tammany bosses, were successful in thwarting both criticism as well as actual 
reform efforts.  
 The tedious interaction between these opposing groups not only had far-
reaching consequences for the professional status of the policemen, who remained 
amateurish, corrupt and partisan; it also stagnated the entire process of debate, and as a 
result the dialogue between the groups seemed to be lingering on aimlessly.  
In short, a pattern of neutralization began to take concrete contours by the 
1890s, which led to an unfavorable debating climate, of which stagnation was a key 
characteristic. This subsection has further demonstrated that: 
 
1.  The parallel increase of the status of issue and actor is a precondition for the start 
and intensification of a debate. 
2.  If the power distribution is distorted between those groups that are being criticized 
(Tammany Hall and the police), an equally distorted perception can emerge of the 
group that is held accountable for the issues and the group that is chiefly 
responsible for these same issues. 
3.  The distorted power distribution and the skewed relation between the critics’ 
objectives (e.g. to diminish the powers of Tammany Hall) and their target (the 
NYPD) resulted in a complex debate in which the question of guilt was hazy. In 
turn, these developments hampered the debates. 
4.  The lack of rules in the department, the high level of discretion and the 
consequential subculture resulted in a highly defensive and powerful debating 
strategy applied by those groups who disagreed with the criticism and opposed 
change. 
5.  The pattern of neutralization that began to take concrete contours by the 1890s led 




1.3 Police–community relations 
As discussed in the introduction to Part I, the state and quality of police–community 
relations is researched in this study by scrutinizing the mutual expectations and 
conceptions of police and citizens.  
To a degree, these aspects have already been independently touched upon 
throughout the analysis of this chapter. When combining the paragraphs on public 
opinion and the police’s attitude towards the public, a pattern of mutual distrust and 
hostility develops, especially between the ‘dangerous class’ and the police. Both 
groups were easily provoked and violent in their behavior. As Richardson points out in 
his analysis, “the provocation may often have been severe, but the New York police do 
not seem to have been exceptional for their patience and their forbearance.”235  
Distrust towards and from the police were not merely passive activities; those 
groups in society that were in direct contact with the police actively showed their 
disrespect, but also vice versa. For instance, gangs often taunted the police and threw 
rocks at them.
236
 Just like those who disrespected the police and consequently used 
violence against them, the patrolmen themselves resorted to violence to gain respect.
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Police and the ‘dangerous class’ (but also the working class) were sometimes literally 
pitted against each other, for instance during encounters in the so-called ‘battle rows’ 
(the toughest beats in New York), but also during riots.  
The discussion throughout this chapter has shown that the police’s distrust of 
the outside world was caused by an almost abnormal desire for respect, which was not 
granted to them. The following excerpt from Richardson’s study succinctly shows how 
the police and the community got entwined in a negative spiral of perceptions: 
 
“The uniform […] was not regarded by many as a legitimate symbol of authority. […] 
For their part the police adopted a tough approach as the only way to control difficult 
situations. This did not raise their standing among the poor, whose opinion of the 
police was low indeed. In reaction, policemen developed an almost pathological 
insistence of respect, considering violence as a legitimate and even morally necessary 
way of dealing with those who did not exhibit the deference toward them.”238 
 
It was mainly the separation between society and police that stimulated this mutual 
antagonism. After 1857, when control shifted from city to state authorities, the 
relationship between police and public consequently deteriorated. 
 The described pattern of mutual hostility did not result in a ‘police–community 
issue’. Because both the expectations and perceptions of the police were low, there was 
as yet no discrepancy between these two notions, which in turn implies there was as yet 
no real issue. Walker argues: 
 
“Police–community relations, as sociologists have demonstrated, is an interaction 
process […] much of it depends upon the expectations of each side. Since police 
brutality was so pervasive, large segments of the public accepted it; they had no 
standard of fair and impartial public service against which to measure it.”239  
 
In other words, police violence was not yet a problem of any consequence because 
society’s expectations and perceptions of the police came to the status quo. And even if 
the police violence was a problem to some, there was no active and powerful group in 
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society that could elevate the unnoticed ‘problem’ into a ‘hot issue’ on the political and 
public agenda. On the contrary, civil liberties were not an issue at the time and 
violence was actually stimulated by influential elements in society. Moreover, people 
in the ‘dangerous class’ perceived the violence as a normal aspect of their lives, and 
reacted by displaying the same amount of violence.  
 Conversely, the balance between the New York police’s perception and 
expectation of society results in a slightly different outcome. The expectation of the 
police was much higher than that of citizens, since they insisted heavily on respect. 
Thus, while there was no discrepancy yet between society’s perception and 
expectation, such an incongruity did exist for the police. This resulted mainly in an 
aggressive counter-attack, as well as the growth of a police culture of solidarity, and 
moreover, a culture that was hostile to ‘the outside enemy’. Although the patrolmen 
perceived the disrespect as a ‘problem’, it never became an issue at the time, since the 
rank and file were neither organized nor aware of their powers as a group. 
 As a final point, it is striking that the police used the same harmful debating 
techniques in their communication with citizens as they did in the political debates. 
The complainant had a rather weak position, as commissioners in general always 
believed the patrolmen rather than the complainant, and often gave “indignities to 
people with complaints.”240 Those who filed a complaint in fact could count on more 
physical violence used against them. Miller points out that dealing with complaints was 
called “trying the complainant”241 As a result, complainants often did not testify out of 
fear of police reprisals.
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 By the end of the nineteenth century, when the concept of the dangerous class 
began to disintegrate, police violence became more of an issue, although still a 
relatively small one:  
  
“The police focus on criminal offenders, rather than on the whole ‘dangerous class’ 
meant that the victims of police injustice would be more random and less targeted 
groups than before. That this happened accounts for the growing issue of police 
malfeasance with urban reformers, as early as 1894 with the Lexow Committee in New 
York, and more pronounced in the first two decades of the twentieth century.”243 
 
Monkkonen further explains that now the focus of the police had moved away from the 
‘dangerous class’, policemen used violence more often on other groups within society: 
“The secure pool of potential arrestees became more vague and diffuse for the 
police.”244 Parallel to this development is the aforementioned focus on mere crime 
control. The positive effects of ‘management of the dangerous class’ thus also started 
to disappear. Monkkonen points out:  
 
“People who would have been at risk to be labeled as members of the ‘dangerous 
class’ twenty-five years earlier interacted with the police only negatively by the early 
twentieth century. Thus the growth of the black urban population in the post-class-
control era meant that black people never experienced the benefits of police lodging as 
had many of the earlier urban migrants. This also meant that the police bureaucracies 
only dealt with black people through coercive means and that the relationship between 
post-1890s urban migrants and the police, although theoretically more just than for 




In conclusion, police–community relations were not an issue yet in the nineteenth 
century. However, as Richardson observes, “seething resentment could build up 







1.4 Conclusion: The fragile pattern of neutralization 
Frank Moss:   “But why do you men take this dirty money?” 
Veteran police Captain:  “Wouldn’t we be fools if we didn’t? […] Everybody in New York 
    works his job, even the ministers.” 
Frank Moss:    “But the money was so dirty!”  
Captain:    “We fumigate it. […] It’s clean after we get it.”247  
 
This excerpt from a conversation between Frank Moss — who was one of the few 
reformists within the department just after Roosevelt had left — and an anonymous 
captain unabashedly admitting the graft, shows the persistence of the graft problem in 
the New York Police Department in spite of the numerous reform attempts made in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
How can a fear of power hamper communication processes? 
Initially, public expectations were low. People desired an unprofessional and powerless 
police department. These expectations were met, and the police as an institution 
became powerless and unprofessional. A high level of discretionary power for the 
patrolmen, and an even larger amount of power for Tammany Hall, compensated the 
power vacuum that had emerged for the New York Police Department. The lack of 
power given to the police also had far-reaching consequences for the development of 
power lines — the NYPD was tied to Tammany Hall — and for the level of 
‘awareness’: The rank and file were not aware of their power as a group. The lack of 
power and the lack of professional status also affected the patrolmen’s collective 
character, as officers grew into a hostile elusive, heterogeneous and conservative 
subculture, in which a ‘code of silence’ was prevalent.  
 These developments had far-reaching consequences for the emergence and 
growth of issues and groups in society attacking the police. Those groups in society 
that opposed Tammany Hall as well as the corruption and prostitution that the machine 
was responsible for, targeted the police instead. They were able to do this due to the 
distorted power distribution and the police’s function as a channel for political 
communication.  
 Together, these elements predetermined the outcome of the professionalization 
process. Because the powerful group of patrolmen used harmful communication skills, 
and moreover, the group of moral crusaders and elitist professionalists — who were 
powerful groups because they enjoyed a degree of support from certain segments 
within society — used the technique of ‘target incongruity’, the debate on 
professionalization became very slow.  
 The development of the informal debates between individuals and the police 
was slightly different. Police–community relations were far from excellent at the time, 
but they can’t be considered an issue, as there was no powerful, aware, group whose 
level of expectations of the police was higher than its level of perception, to bring up 
the issue. While this discrepancy did not exist for those groups in society who 
encountered police violence, it did for the patrolmen who encountered negative 
reactions from the public. The already strong police culture that probably caused this 
discrepancy in the first place was intensified as a result of this. Yet the discrepancy that 
existed for the patrolmen was not brought up as an issue either, because the patrolmen 
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were not organized and not aware of their powers. Instead, the frustration manifested 
itself in the communication skills of the patrolmen, skills that were used for a multitude 
of different debates, not only political ones, but also debates held with the public.  
In conclusion, the expectations and negative perceptions of both society and 
the police, the power distribution with its inherent power lines between those groups 
involved, and the skewed relation between the critics’ objectives and target, are all 
elements that contribute to the dynamics of informal debates between citizens and the 
police in the nineteenth century, and to formal political debates. Together, these 
elements resulted in a pattern of neutralization.  
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Chapter 2: The fight against professionalization 
1900–1950: Police debates in the progressive and post-progressive era 
 
In the fifty years that stood between the creation of the force and the turn of the 
twentieth century, the city’s problems did not diminish, nor had the New York Police 
substantially professionalized itself. New York society was still violent, Tammany Hall 
continued to dominate New York, and the Police Department, similar to other public 
agencies, was still infested with corruption.  
However, the turn of the century proved to be a turning point in New York 
history, as both the city and the police force entered an era of tremendous change. 
Major reform movements aimed at changing both the police and society. Moreover, 
new groups of actors, such as Communists and minorities, began to criticize the police, 
mainly for police–community relations issues, in the first decades of the twentieth 
century, although these debates only occasionally took place in the formal arena of 
debate during this period. 
This chapter examines how the historical stage and the landscape of actors 
changed in the first half of the twentieth century and whether and how this affected the 
debates unfolding between critics and the police. In this chapter, a distinction is made 
between the dynamics of police reform and those of police–community relations 
during this period. Within these two different sections, the analysis is structured in a 
similar way to that of the first chapter. After a general discussion of the historical 
developments and the actors involved in the debates, each section focuses on the 
debates that have been held. While issues related to police–community relations in the 
formal arena of debate are treated in a similar fashion as the historical dynamics of 
police reform, the relations in the informal arena will be treated in a manner 
comparable to that used in the previous chapter. The last section specifically looks at 




2.1 Police reform 
The period 1900–1950 was marked by two major reform waves, each of which 
impacted the New York Police. While scholars have distinguished different time 
frames for these two waves, most agree that the year 1930 was a gradual turning point.
1
 
Historians have used similar labels to characterize the two main reform groups active 
in these periods. This study adopts those chosen by Gene E. Carte and Elaine H. Carte, 
who label the first group ‘moral reformers’, and the second ‘civic reformers’.2 The 
moral reformers particularly stood up against vice and corruption during the first wave 
of reform. The civic reformers advocated police efficiency and independence mainly 
during the second wave. However, this is not a rigid delineation, as both types of 
reformers have been active throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The 
following subsections scrutinize the new reformers’ authority, expectations, objectives, 
(communication) strategies and efforts to reform the police.  
 
2.1.1 The historical stage of police reform: Developments and actors 
By the turn of the century, public expectations concerning the government and public 
institutions were changing, due not only to the continuous influx of new immigrants, 
but also as a result of the industrial revolution’s impact on society.3 The public had 
grown tired of the big-city problems that continued to plague New York, including 
poverty, crime, and poor housing and working conditions. Moreover, the Anglo-Saxon 
protestant ideal was directly threatened by the growth of cities such as New York, and 
by the new immigrants with their alien ideas. Middle-class America realized — in a 
broader sense — that in order to stop the problems and retain their power, the power of 
the political machines had to be thwarted and the public services had to 
professionalize.  
By 1900, New York was thus ready for reform. The Progressive Movement, as 
the most influential reform development that swept the United States in the early 1900s 
was called, was the mainstream answer to more radical attempts to change society. The 
movement comprised a variety of factions, the mixture of which shifted as different 
issues were at stake.
4
 In this movement, which according to John Whiteclay Chambers 
and Vincent P Carosso was an “evolution, not revolution”, moderate reformers sought 
to “achieve important, but not radical change.”5 The Progressive initiative was 
nevertheless a powerful impulse, since the “mixture of pragmatic, piecemeal reform 
and an idealistic, quasireligious vision of democracy — inspired millions of middle-
class Americans to social activism.”6 The changes that took place in the late nineteenth 
century, as well as the reform that followed in the early twentieth, were so sweeping, 
that, as Chambers and Carosso put it, “many Americans felt themselves in the grip of a 
tyranny of change.”7  
The need to reform also concerned the New York Police Department. When 
European law enforcement professionals visited the international police conventions 
that took place in New York City in the first decades of the twentieth century, they 
were rather disappointed, as the New York Police could only offer them a “frisking 
tour”, a gun-hunting raid with plenty of “blackjack action” and the ritual trip to China 
Town.
8
 These contradicting interests of European and American law enforcement 
professionals exemplify the broad schism that had developed between the rapidly 
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professionalizing European police forces, and the unprofessional, practical-oriented 
New York Police. Although the NYPD’s main function was to fight and prevent crime, 
the department, similar to other American police departments, also functioned as a 
wastebasket for miscellaneous tasks that other public organizations could or would not 
handle, such as “first aid, rescuing cats, helping ladies, and the like”.9 In addition, 
problems persisted and weak spots remained, including police graft, Tammany Hall’s 
negative influence on the police, the weak position of the commissioner, and the low 
status of the patrolmen.  
Yet, unlike 50 years earlier, these problems had become unbearable for many 
New Yorkers. Police reform was in the air and by the turn of the twentieth century, the 
movement to reform the police had become a force to be reckoned with. Lardner and 
Reppetto: “By now, police reform was no longer just a spasmodic impulse; it had 
become an industry — the seemingly permanent livelihood of an interlocking 
directorate of citizen activists and advocacy groups.”10  
 
2.1.2 First wave of reform: A new type of reformer 1900–1930 
Ever since the New York police’s inception, reformers have attempted to improve its 
functioning. Yet while the first efforts lacked sufficient power, the movement that 
emerged in the early 1900s had much more clout, as reformers were now backed by 
influential and rich New Yorkers willing to fund the campaign. Moreover, these moral 
reformers were now also supported by a growing group of middle-class citizens 
demanding a more powerful police force. In addition, the new group of reformers 
could also count on the support of State authorities, which were not as infested with 
Tammany Hall politics as New York City was, but instead were dominated by 
Protestant Republicans for whom big-city corruption was a menace. The moral 
reformers themselves belonged to a “native Protestant elite”, with a “long pedigree”, a 
“special standing in the community” and a “strong inclination to exploit it.”11 
 Yet despite these differences, there were also many resemblances between the 
first wave of reform in the twentieth century and the reform efforts in the nineteenth 
century. First, the new impetus of reform remained almost exclusively external, as 
police commissioners were still not powerful enough to initiate reform, and moreover, 
often were not interested in doing so, and nor were the patrolmen. Instead, reform 
continued to be supported and led by external organizations, now including the 
chamber of commerce, ministerial alliances, church federations, newspapers, 
universities, and municipal leagues. Although the IACP — the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police — and idealist law enforcement professionals who 
were ahead of their time supported the new reform movement, their influence was felt 
much more in the second wave of reform.
12
  
Second, the new reformers’ motives showed several resemblances to those of 
their predecessors. Not only was Tammany Hall again the reformers’ ultimate target, 
and not the police, the moral reformers’ objective again comprised the protection of 
upper-class dominion, and not merely the transformation of the police into an efficient, 
corruption-free organization. Carte and Carte: “Moral reformers not merely rejected 
the machine and its allies, including the police, but also the values that underlay them. 
In attacking the police for failing to enforce vice laws, they were implicitly attacking 
the large constituencies that did not wish these laws enforced.”13  
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While the moral reformers’ motives were similar to those of the moral 
crusaders and elitist professionalists in the nineteenth century, the new reformers 
communicated their motives more delicately and elaborately, positioning themselves as 
non-partisan, objective, and genuinely concerned with the department’s future. Walker 
observes that this non-partisan positioning was self-serving, as “it cloaked a more 
specific set of assumptions that had important political ramifications […] and was but 
an elaborate rationale for an intensely partisan struggle for control of the police.”14 
Fogelson likewise observes that police reform was “an essential feature of a long-
standing effort to redeem the public service”, as well as “an integral component of a 
long-term campaign to destroy the political machine” and “an essential feature of an 
ongoing crusade to wipe out deviant behavior.”15  
The reformers’ motives fit within the broader ideals of the progressive 
movement. Fogelson summarizes these broader ideals into three main points (the 
implications for the New York police have been added in italics): 
 
1. Social mobility is an economic, private, and individual process, as opposed to a 
political, public and collective one. Success should be a result of industry, 
frugality, integrity and occasional good luck (the New York Police should thus not 
be used as a platform for social mobility for lower-classes). 
2. Political legitimacy should be a function of the public interest, the common 
objectives of the entire community, and not of the parochial interest of particular 
neighborhoods, ethnic groups and social classes (Tammany Hall and its allies — 
such as the police — should not be able to stimulate local political control of 
ethnic lower-class groups in society). 
3. American morality should be based on a commitment to abstinence and 
respectability, an abhorrence of self-indulgence and deviance, and a willingness to 
employ the criminal sanction to distinguish the one from the other (The New York 
Police should enforce ‘unpopular’ liquor, gambling and prostitution laws, and be 




These three ideals were in direct conflict with those of the lower classes: 
 
1. Public service is a means of social mobility (thus the New York Police could be 
used as a vehicle for social mobility). 
2. Local control is a source of political legitimacy (Tammany Hall and its allies 
should stay in power). 
3. Ethnic lifestyles are an expression of American culture (and thus the police should 




Fogelson’s analysis shows in which ways the interests of the upper and lower classes 
conflict with each other. It also shows how reform was driven by a moralistic view of 
society. The implications in italics show not only that the debate about the police is 
part of the broader Progressive movement, but also give some insights into why 
reformers focused particularly on the police, rather than on other institutions. In this 




“Police departments were but one of the municipal bureaucracies that were responsible 
for discouraging and deterring deviant behavior. […] [Yet, the police] had a symbolic 
significance out of all proportion to their actual effectiveness. […] As far as these 
Americans were concerned, the practices of the police departments served as a better 
guide than the activities of the schools, courts, and other public agencies to whether the 
authorities were trying hard to stamp out vice.”18  
 
In addition to the reformers’ understanding of the police’s symbolic significance, they 
also knew that their attacking the police would indirectly thwart their political enemies.  
 The group of moral reformers that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth 
century was thus a powerful, external and aware group that was at least partly 
motivated by a desire to professionalize the police in order to damage Tammany Hall 
and break the power of the lower class. The next paragraph discusses the reformers’ 
strategies and communication.  
 
The military analogy and the war on crime 1900–1930 
“Crime has reached a pinnacle of appalling heights […] It lives next door to us. It rubs 
elbows with us. Its blood-caked hands touch ours […] No American home is free of 
this shadow […] The American home and every person in it is today in a state of siege.  
 
[…] This army of crime is larger than any unified force in history. If this tremendous 
body of evil-doers could be welded into a unit of conquest, America would fall before 
it not in a month, not in a day, but in a few hours.”19 
 
J. Edgar Hoover, former director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 
J. Edgar Hoover’s war-on-crime rhetoric illustrated in the quote above fits within the 
so-called military analogy — a framework that the reformers in the first decades of the 
twentieth century were especially drawn to. This military analogy implied that America 
was engaged in a war that “raged day and night, extended from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific, and was no less terrifying for being a domestic affair.”20 Within this analogy, 
the police could stop that war, yet in order to do so the organization required thorough 
transformation. In cities across the United States, the new reformers used three 
strategies to make the police resemble an effective military organization: 
centralization, the upgrade of personnel, and the narrowing of the police function.
21
 
Walker observes that these measures were mainly partisan and affected not only the 
police, as they “struck at the heart of the power of blue collar-based political 
machines.”22  
Reformers throughout the United States used similar techniques to press 
through their reforms. Besides conventional techniques such as the lobby activities 
towards the press and State authorities, the new reformers also employed new 
strategies. Investigative commissions — of which the Lexow Committee was in fact a 
pioneer — were the main instruments used by the moral reformers to investigate and 
attack the police after corruption scandals. The crime commission and crime reports 
were the most common modi operandi of civic reformers. 
The investigative commission was an instrument used by moral reformers after 
a scandal had occurred within the department. These commissions were deliberately 
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installed by the reformers in order to discredit the department by exposing abuses such 
as corruption and excessive use of force.
23
 Since the proceedings of such commissions 
could take quite some time, the period in which the police were scandalized also 
lingered on. The reform-minded press fully capitalized on both the proceedings and the 
outcome of the commissions’ research, further tainting the image of the police. Thus, 
the investigative commissions were powerful tools that could influence public opinion 
by demonstrating abuses within the department.  
 The crime commissions were not so much abuse-oriented as geared towards 
reforming the department. The New York Bureau of Municipal Research played a 
pioneer role in advocating reform, not only in New York, but in the whole of the 
United States. In the 1920s many American cities hosted such crime commissions. Yet 
regardless of the different forms the crime commissions took in the United States, their 
goal and raison d’être were very similar. All were initiated by affluent groups in 
society who had become dissatisfied with the police, or as Carte and Carte describe it, 
the commissions were a “crusade of organized business against organized crime.”24  
Historians point out that these crime commissions were a symptom of the 
Progressive Movement, rather than a remedy for the police problems in that era. 
Walker, for instance, maintains that the reports produced by these commissions were 
carbon copies of previous reports, which did not produce any new ideas in police 
administration.
25
 Nathan Douthit similarly argues that the remedies prescribed by the 
commissions were often the same. They, in fact, gave meaning to the idea of a war 
against crime, and produced a recurring prescription of efficiency and centralization, to 
fight in this war.
26
 The crime commissions were a prelude to the second wave of 
reform, in which efficiency was even more a key concept, and the civic reformers 
gained more power. 
The commissions had an air of impartiality, but as Walker points out, this was 
merely a thin layer of veneer: “Whereas investigations of different agencies, 
particularly the police, had been blatantly partisan in the nineteenth century, the 
twentieth century approach was to camouflage partisan interests behind a façade of 
nonpartisanship.”27 Thus, like other reform measures, the crime commission was part 
of the broader goal to attack machine politics.  
The moral reformers, and later the civic reformers, had an air of self-
righteousness which is also reflected in their rhetoric. The reformers did not take no for 
an answer, and there was little leeway for discussion. Moreover, they enlarged and 
exaggerated police abuses to induce public opinion. When reformers looked back on 
the nineteenth century police force, they concluded that the force was very insufficient, 
unprofessional, and corrupt. In their rhetoric, they did not mention the positive aspects 
of the force at that time, such as the sheltering of vagrants, and the function of the 
police of keeping order in a personal (yet unprofessional) way. As Vollmer put it, the 
nineteenth century was an “era of incivility, ignorance, brutality and graft.”28 Bruce 
Smith, one of the other key reformers at the time, similarly asked himself: “Are 
American police in a position of hopeless inferiority, with little prospect of 
improvement?”29  
In short, the reformers desired to centralize the departments, upgrade 
personnel, and narrow down the function of policing. In order to achieve their goals, 
the reformers set up investigative commissions and crime commissions, in addition to 
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more mainstream techniques such as political lobby and manipulation of the press. In 
the debates that ensued, the reformers used aggressive and exaggerating rhetoric to 
induce public opinion. The reformers’ entire strategy was aimed at indirectly affecting 
their political enemies, using the police as a vehicle for political communication.  
 
2.1.3 Tammany Hall and the mayor 1900–1930 
As the reign of Tammany Hall was still dominant by 1900, its influence was felt in 
both public services and the private domain, including the New York Police 
Department. In spite of occasional defeats, Tammany Hall was able to dominate city 
and at times State politics during the first decades of the twentieth century. Tammany 
Hall bosses such as Charles F. Murphy, who led the machine from 1902–1924, held a 
tight grip on the city. The list of New York mayors below shows that most were 
Democrats and had won the elections on a Tammany Hall ticket. The few 
Republican/Fusion mayors did not last long in office:  
 
Robert A. Van Wyck, 1898–1901, Democrat 
Seth Low, 1902–1903, Republican/Citizens Union Party 
George B. McClellan Jr., 1904–1909, Democrat 
William Jay Gaynor, 1910–1913, Democrat 
Ardolph Loges Kline, 1913, Republican 
John Purroy Mitchel, 1914–1917, Fusion 
John F. Hylan, 1918–1925, Democrat 
James J. Walker, 1926–1932, Democrat 
 
Tammany Hall remained an influential actor in the police reform debate in the first 
decades of the twentieth century.
30
 Its supporters did not welcome the reformers’ 
attempts to professionalize the police, as it would lead to the decline of the political 
machine’s power. They refuted the reformers’ allegations in Tammany-Hall-associated 
newspapers. Moreover, they had a tight control over the mayor, who was able to 
prevent or turn-around reform initiatives. Tammany Hall also expected that the 
commissioner should criticize reformers and stall the full implementation of the reform 
efforts. The patrolmen, in turn, were expected to disregard reform efforts as much as 
possible. Tammany Hall cohorts were positioned in strategic positions such as the head 
of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association. Thus, similar to the civic and moral 
reformers, Tammany Hall used the Police Department as a vehicle for political 
communication.  
Tammany Hall was thus invisibly pulling the strings, while the Police 
Department and the mayor were made cat’s paws of the machine. While Tammany 
Hall bosses emphatically denied all allegations, most of the communication in the 
police debate was taken care of by either the police or the mayor, who used equally 




2.1.4 The rank and file and the New York Police as an institution 
1900–1930 
During the first decades of the twentieth century, the rank and file continued to play an 
important role in the debates that were being held about the police. This subsection 
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analyzes how the patrolmen’s characteristics developed after the turn of the century, 
and how their conscience and power grew.  
 
Motives and power: Tammany Hall as supporter and inspirer 
By the turn of the twentieth century, rank-and-file officers were still tied to the ward 
bosses and precinct captains and not to the police commissioner, due to a lack of 
discipline and leadership, and as a result of a power vacuum that had emerged at the 
top of the hierarchical pyramid of the New York Police. The patrolmen, consequently, 
often followed the ‘paths of least resistance’ by conforming to Tammany Hall’s 
demands, which still resulted in lawlessness and graft practices.
32
 The patrolmen did 
not object to this situation, because they still possessed a vast amount of discretionary 
power, and moreover, they could share in the graft profits. 
A lot was at stake for the patrolmen when the moral and civic reformers 
entered the political arena of debate. They did not believe the reformers’ plans and 
motives were sincere, as they regarded the reformers as overly idealistic moralists who 
did not intend to better their position at all.
33
 Moreover, it was in the patrolmen’s 
interest to prevent professionalization and keep the commissioner powerless. As one 
officer once put it, the police commissioner should be “a nice honest gentleman who 
does not know he is alive. He makes a good front […] while the insiders do the 
business behind his back.”34  
 
Police culture 
The police officers increasingly cultivated their own character that stood apart from 
Tammany Hall’s reign. This police culture became more intense and ingrained in the 
mindset of the patrolmen, whose conscience and power were growing steadfastly as the 
twentieth century progressed. Fogelson describes this more independent police culture: 
 
“As some recruits already knew and as others eventually found out, the training 
academies could not have taught them the ground rules which applied in the force and 
on the street anyway. The instructors could not have disclosed that the patrolmen were 
expected not to enforce the law, keep the peace, and serve the public but to decide 
which laws to enforce, whose peace to keep, and which public to serve. Nor could they 
have revealed that the officers were rewarded not for the alacrity to obey instructions 
from headquarters but for their capacity to stay on the good side of the precinct 
captains and ward leaders. Most rookies learned these ground rules sooner or later.”35 
 
The police school was looked upon with distrust, as it represented the reform that the 
police officers fought against. “College cops were not warmly welcomed” is what 
Carte and Carte argue in reference to August Vollmer, who reformed the Berkeley 
police force and is considered the national founder of the professionalization 
movement. As Carte and Carte point out, “Two things you didn’t say, one was you 
didn’t emphasize you were from Berkeley, and you certainly didn’t emphasize that you 
went to the university.”36 
Overall, the professionalization movement negatively impacted the police’s 
ethos. The reformers’ second agenda — in combination with the applied 
communication techniques — did not improve police morale and the patrolman’s view 
of the outside world. The patrolmen became increasingly frustrated with the 
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condescending investigations, the continuous accusations and ridicule they received, 
and the efforts to thwart their power.
37
 The police felt mistreated and as a consequence 
their insistence on respect grew. The patrolmen also felt they had to enforce laws that 
could not be enforced, such as vice and liquor laws that were so important to moral 
reformers.  
Reform measures intended to upgrade the patrolmen unintentionally stimulated 
police culture. For instance, with the abolition of station reserve, the rank-and-file 
officers had more spare time, Lardner and Reppetto point out, “and department lore 
was increasingly passed along in cop bars rather than section rooms.”38  
Police culture was thus intensified in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
In turn, the specific traits of this culture, including hostility towards the outside world, 
an elusive character, a code of silence, conservatism, insistence on respect, and a lack 
of morale, were retained or even intensified. The Department’s motto — “Faithful until 
death” — epitomizes this culture.39  
 
Conservatism 
Historian Gerald Astor points out that the growing conservatism pitted the police 
against progressive elements in society, arguing that “in a sense, the organism that is 
the NYC Police Department exerts enormous pressure towards conformity.”40 Not only 
the organization itself, but also the recruited officers were pitted against change, a 
development which became more apparent when reformers pushed for reform 
measures, but also when the patrolmen were pitted against progressive elements in 
society, such as Communists and minorities. In Walker’s view, “There is no question 
that […] the police were major antagonists of the burgeoning labor movement.”41 
Scholar Marilynn S. Johnson similarly argues that “police officers had developed […] 
a reservoir of resentment toward Communist Protesters.”42 The ACLU reported at the 
time that the New York rank and file “were unsympathetic to labor and considered 
radicals to be ‘crackpots’,” while ACLU director Robert Baldwin once said that “the 
police have come to regard Communists as their natural enemy and treat them as 
such.”43 Astor: “Civil dissent, whether that of the economically depressed, the radically 
oppressed, or the politically disenchanted threatens the social system. To the police, 
who see themselves as the first and last bastions of the social order, dissent directly 
threatens their own existence.”44 The police force was thus by nature an organization 
pitted against any change or reform, not particularly distinguishing between the groups 
that initiated the reform.  
 
Police communication 
The patrolmen did not yet have a significant role in the formal arena of debate. 
Although the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association had started to advocate their 
interests, this organization was not very powerful yet, as will be discussed later. 
While the rank-and-file group were not an actor in the formal arena of debate, 
their role in the debate concerning police reform should not be underestimated. In the 
investigative commissions, for instance, the police steadfastly refuted accusations of 
abuses, positioning themselves as victims rather than as culprits.
45
 This communication 
technique is in line with the overall hostile, defensive police culture, in which the 
patrolmen strongly insisted on respect. Second, the patrolmen often disregarded 
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reforms, or enforced them in a halfhearted fashion.
46
 The patrolmen played a more 
visible role in the police–community relations debates that took place in this informal 
arena of debate, as will be discussed in Section 2.2.  
 
2.1.5 The police commissioner 1900–1930 
The police commissioner’s positioning in the reform debate depended on the political 
party that sponsored him. Democrat commissioners steadfastly refuted reform efforts 
because Tammany Hall urged them to do so. In addition, their positioning was affected 
by the prevalent police culture, which they were also part of. Fogelson points out that 
across the country, police officers, but especially police commissioners, had a 
“frenzied reaction to criticism from outside” and maintained “that everyone was out to 
embarrass the local police.”47 Ironically, this reaction fitted within the war-on-crime 
rhetoric. Fogelson continues: “Assuming that the police forces were military units, 
operating in a hostile setting, they adopted the martial logic that anyone who was not 
for them was against them.”48  
 
2.1.6 Police debates and results 1900–1930 
The previous subsections have shown how the developments that caused and shaped 
police debates in the nineteenth century had changed. This subsection examines how 
these changes affected police debates between 1900 and 1930. 
Debates concerning police professionalism between 1900 and 1930 were 
characterized by repetition and protraction. In the first thirty years of the twentieth 
century, scandals of corruption or other abuses were first expatiated upon in the press, 
and then followed by protracted investigative procedures held by temporary, case-by-
case commissions that were installed after these scandals (see discussion in Subsection 
2.1.2). Their reform suggestions were subsequently brushed aside, implemented and 
enforced halfheartedly, or reversed within years, only for a new scandal to come up. 
Most reform efforts were thus not endorsed. Moreover, the reform efforts that 
were implemented were often short-lived. Reform-minded police chiefs simply did not 
have enough time to leave a lasting legacy. Between 1901 and 1918 the New York 
Police Department saw eleven different commissioners come and go. Ironically, only 
those police commissioners who were Tammany Hall cohorts, such as Richard Enright, 
remained in office for a long time.
49
 Tammany Hall was never out of power for more 
than one administration, and thus reform-minded commissioners were always followed 
by machine-oriented commissioners “who re-established business as usual in the police 
department.”50 Walker concludes: “The traditional system of corrupt politics might 
suffer occasional setbacks, but in the long run it had an enormous staying power.”51 
 This protracted process of debate resembled to a certain extent that of the 
nineteenth century, with one difference: Whereas scandal and reform neutralized each 
other in the nineteenth century, these elements now negatively impacted the actors who 
participated in the debate. Not only did they lead to frustration, they also negatively 
influenced the actors’ communication strategies, as further explained below.  
 The first reform wave was a failure. The three objectives — to centralize the 
departments, to upgrade the personnel, and to narrow the function of policing — were 
only marginally met. First, the reformers were not able to change the historical pattern 
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of local control. The commissioner remained powerless, while the captains dealt 
almost directly with the ward leaders. Second, the New York patrolmen remained 
unprofessional and corrupt, and did not regard themselves as soldiers, but instead were 
still geared towards a civilian orientation. The reformers did not manage to change the 
ethnic makeup of the force either, for it remained predominantly white and Irish. 
Equally important is that the reformers could not prevent the patrolmen from using the 
force as a platform for social mobility and their ties with Tammany Hall were not 
weakened either. As long as the patrolmen regarded the ward leaders’ demands, they 
could do as they pleased. Third, the police remained responsible for a ragbag of ad-hoc 
activities. The core function of the police was compounded by a set of miscellaneous 
tasks, making the force less effective than it ought to be. The only reform efforts that 
were successful were the ones that were favorable to both the force and Tammany 
Hall, or that were not considered harmful, such as the deployment of special squads, 
pay rises, and more.
52
  
In short, there were no significant and lasting changes, and the effort to reform 
the police can be considered a failure. Hence the reformers’ second agenda was not 
met either. Fogelson points out, “the first wave of reform fell short of its principal 
objectives. Despite many changes, the big-city police still served as a vital avenue of 
mobility for the newcomers, reinforced the pervasive decentralization of municipal 
government, and sanctioned the prevailing pluralism of urban life.”53 
 There are several reasons why the reformers were unsuccessful. First, they 
faced a powerful political machine which had infiltrated the force and controlled the 
mayor, the commissioner and the patrolmen. Because all three groups were powerful 
enough to hold back reforms and could operate from within the organization, they were 
successful in thwarting reform efforts or reversing them after they had been made.
54
 
When reform efforts were irreversible, the force simply undermined the “efficacy by 
ignoring or implementing in a half-hearted way.”55  
 By looking at the motives and communication techniques used by different 
actors, more causes for the protracted process of debate become apparent. The 
reformers’ second-agenda motives, in conjunction with their harsh rhetoric and the “ill-
conceived” reform efforts themselves, ignited antagonistic feelings within all levels of 
the force.
56
 The patrolmen felt harassed on a continuous basis by reformers, the press, 
and by the public in general. They saw the reformers as “misguided idealists” who 
targeted them for social evils that they were not chiefly responsible for.
57
 Moreover, 
due to the second agenda and harsh rhetoric, the New York Police increasingly became 
an organization that was pitted against any kind of change. The patrolmen and 
commissioner felt victimized and developed a strong conservative police culture that 
reacted to any kind of criticism in a highly emotional and defensive way. Thus, they 
were not solely against reform because they were tied to Tammany Hall, but 
increasingly because they did not want to change themselves.  
 While the police succeeded in hampering reform efforts, they too, can be 
considered losers in the debate. As Chambers and Carosso point out, the Progressives 
were “more successful at arousing indignation” than in actually pushing through 
reform.
58
 Fogelson similarly asserts that the “machines could not prevent the reformers 
from making the most of these scandals.”59 The aforementioned defensive positioning, 
strong police culture, and distrust were all a direct result of the reformers’ methods to 
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malign the police. Thus, reform was a frustrating process not only for the reformers, 
but also for the police.  
 Some scholars argue that the reformers’ influence on public opinion is in fact 
the true legacy of the reform movement in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Walker asserts that although “police reform […] remained more an idea than an 
accomplishment, […] the reformers [still] succeeded in making the most important 
breakthrough: They established the intellectual and organizational base for continued 
reform efforts in subsequent decades.”60 In other words: “The most important single 
achievement of the reformers was an ideological one. They succeeded in establishing 
the idea that the old system was inadequate and that professionalism was necessary.”61 
From a broader perspective, Fogelson points out that the reformers’ main success was 
that they “transformed the quintessential principles of the Progressive Movement into 
the conventional wisdom of the American people”, implying that the reformers had 
established a consensus of their own about the big-city police which denied that public 
service was a means of social mobility, that local control was a source of political 




2.1.7 A second wave of reform 1930–1950 
The year 1930 is in many ways a turning point in American history. Problems had 
reached a boiling point due to the depression that swept America. Relief came when 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt became president and pushed for reform on a national level. 
The political climate changed drastically, both on a national and a municipal level.  
Regarding the professionalization of the New York Police, this turning point 
appears to be less drastic. While a new group of reformers now criticized the police, 
their objectives to centralize the departments, upgrade the personnel, and narrow the 
function of policing remained the same.  
 
2.1.8 A new group of reformers: An impulse from within the department  
1930–1950 
While most early twentieth century New York police commissioners and other high-
ranking law enforcement officials remained Tammany Hall marionettes, a small 
segment of the law enforcement community gradually became more reform-minded as 
the century progressed, due to a growing sense of awareness, a rise in expectations and 
a gradual detachment from the political machine. These developments resulted in a 
larger concern for the police’s public image. Law enforcement officials became 
annoyed that the police were ridiculed on a continuous basis by the press and also in 
cinematic works such as the Keystone Cops, in which the patrolmen were invariably 
portrayed “at best as well-meaning imbeciles, incapable of carrying out the simplest 
order, and at worst as out-and-out grafters, ready to fleece everybody in sight.”63 The 
new breed of reformers recognized that “they had a PR problem with the general 
public, and that they had not been good at selling themselves to the community.”64 The 
only way to stop the mockery was to reform and improve the department, the law 
enforcement officials concluded.  
Police commissioners also began to realize that the only way to strengthen 
their position and thus gain power was to reform the department. In New York, Police 
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Commissioner Arthur Woods (1914–1918) and later Police Commissioner Lewis J. 
Valentine (1934–1945) turned away from the military analogy (Woods was somewhat 
ahead of his time), and looked at ways to professionalize the police and strip the force 
of abuses such as corruption. Both served under reform-minded mayors, John Purroy 
Mitchel and Fiorello La Guardia. The second wave of reform thus came from the law 
enforcement community itself. More than their predecessors, this second generation of 
reformers was backed by a strong political force, and supported by a group of external 
civic reformers, philanthropic foundations, newspapers, universities and research 
institutes.
65
 It was not the entire law enforcement community that suddenly changed in 
favor of reform. Instead, Fogelson points out, the reform movement was only backed 
by a “small but rapidly growing, fairly articulate, and as the years passed, extremely 
influential segment of the rank and file.”66 This group wanted to raise the status of their 
profession as well as their working conditions, and was fed up with the interference of 
ward politicians, just like the reform-minded senior officers.  
 
From a military analogy to professionalism 
Whereas the first wave of reform had a moral undertone, the second one was led by 
‘civic’ reformers who had pragmatic reasons to reform the police. And whereas the 
first group of reformers wished to make the police resemble a military institution, the 
second group was more enamored by the professional model, in which the modus 
operandi of highly esteemed professions was the standard by which New York Police 
should measure itself. Law enforcement indeed felt a sense of inferiority towards other 
professions. Chief C. G. Kizer of the Norfolk police in Virginia already argued in 1915 
that the time had come “that police chiefs may no longer continue the only 
organization of any consequence from able seamen to zoologists — running the entire 
length of the alphabet — which does not have its official organ.”67 Reformers now 
maintained that the police should “obtain the same degree of autonomy as other 
professions”, “bring [its] rank and file up to the same level as architects, professors, 
and other professionals” and “develop the same degree of proficiency as engineering, 
accounting, and the other professions.”68 Moreover, the new group of reformers 
maintained that “the managerial style of the modern corporation, with its emphasis on 
efficiency and the ability to demonstrate results, was the proper model for the police.”69 
Organization was a key concept within the professionalization framework. “Organize 
or perish” was the thought that prevailed in the reform-minded law enforcement 
community.
70
 Concerns about public opinion also influenced the reformers’ focus on 
professionalism. Walker: “One of the major functions of professional associations is to 
serve as spokesman for and protector of the image of the occupational group.”71  
Although the new reform impulse technically comprised three pillars — to 
centralize the departments, upgrade the personnel, and narrow the function of policing 
— reformers focused strongly on the second one. To August Vollmer, the founder of 
the professionalization movement, professionalism was more a person than an idea, 
and his model “centered upon the concept of an idealized policeman who was a skilled 
and dedicated crime fighter, rigorously trained to perform a difficult job; who was 
aggressive in using science and technology in all phases of policing; and who was 
deeply involved in the community he served.”72 In other words, “the patrolman did not 
merely work within a professional organization; he was a complete professional in 
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himself.”73 Much was thus expected of the patrolman, and the reformers put a lot of 
pressure on the rank and file. Not only did reformers try to tighten the recruitment 
requirements, raise salaries, revamp training facilities, and modernize promotional 
procedures, they also had high expectations of the patrolmen themselves to act and 
behave as professionals. Reformers attempted to tighten disciplinary procedures and 
install internal bodies to examine abuses.  
The reformers set their standards extremely high. “Each police officer would 
need the mind of a law professor, the agility of a professional athlete, the patience and 
restraint of a Sunday School superintendent and the technical ability of a graduate 
engineer.”74 Vollmer in fact dreamt of a minimum BA requirement for all police 
recruits, which nowadays seems both unfeasible and impractical.
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 The first pillar of the reform movement — to centralize the department — in 
many ways was in conflict with the patrolmen’s interests. Measures included the 
reinforcement of the chief’s tenure, the disbandment of precincts, the creation of 
special squads and units that answered directly to the chief, the reorganization of the 
department as other professional organizations were organized — along functional and 
not territorial lines — and the cutback of senior officers who were directly accountable 
to the commissioner. These measures were aimed at creating a smoothly operating and 
well structured, but also impersonal force, in which there was not much space for the 
needs of the patrolmen, which appeared to conflict with the measures in the second 
pillar of reform. Yet the focus on the patrolmen was never really in the interest of the 
patrolmen themselves. Walker: “Little attention was given to the needs and perceptions 
of the rank-and-file patrolman. Indeed, the patrolman was regarded as clay, to be 
molded by the police executive.”76 The patrolmen’s needs were often disregarded. In a 
sense, the reformers focus on the patrolmen’s professionalization and the department’s 
centralization was thus also led by a second agenda, in which power played an 
important role.  
The reform prescription in the second wave of reform had a strong PR 
component, because the reformers believed that professionalism was the cure for the 
police’s bad reputation. One of the PR measures was the organization of the so-called 
“Junior Police” under Arthur Woods. In this program around 6,000 boys between 11 
and 16 were ‘employed’ and organized into Junior Police Squads. This program was 
aimed at changing the attitude of poor youths towards the police. Woods: “The boy 
comes to feel that the policeman whom he has considered his natural enemy is really a 
man whom he can look to for help in doing the things that he most likes to do. We 




The rhetoric used by the civic reformers resembled to a certain extent that of their 
predecessors. With a similar sense of self-righteousness, the law enforcement agencies 
used a war-on-crime rhetoric, in which there was not much leeway for discussion. 
While the military analogy was on the wane, the war on crime was not, and lingered on 
after 1930. At a conference, President Roosevelt showed his concern for the crime 
situation of that time, in which “officers of the law are forced to engage in drawn 
battles on public highways, in railroad stations, and elsewhere, armed with the 
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desperate implements of modern warfare.”78 To him, the police were like “the soldiers 
and sailors who represent us in time of war.”79 
 Yet the notion of professionalism remained elusive, Carte and Carte point out: 
“Underlying the vagueness of the modern concept of professionalism is the larger 
ambiguity of American policing itself, an ambiguity which persists despite the efforts 
of Vollmer and others to bring unity and coherence to the police function.”80 
Professionalization thus served as a rhetorical structuring device for reformers.  
 
2.1.9 Tammany Hall and the mayor 1930–1950 
While Tammany Hall had been very powerful in the first decades of the twentieth 
century, its power weakened after 1930. It received a severe blow when Mayor James 
J. Walker had to leave the office in 1932 after a corruption scandal. Meanwhile the 
professionalization initiatives were beginning to pay off, and President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt stripped Tammany Hall of its federal patronage. Shortly after this, the 
reform-minded Fiorello La Guardia became mayor of New York on a 
Fusion/Republican ticket. Tammany Hall never fully recovered and only briefly 
rebounded in 1946. By then, the mayor had become much more independent and was 
less willing to listen to Tammany Hall’s demands. The patrolmen were also less 
inclined to support Tammany Hall. Moreover, it became more difficult to obtain 
electoral majorities, since second generation newcomers had moved up in society, and 
did not need the support of a political machine. Consequently, Tammany Hall was no 
longer able to choose recruits, had no influence over salaries or promotions, and finally 
lost control over the discipline of the force.
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 Fogelson concludes that from that point 
on “politicians had little to say about which laws would be enforced, whose peace 
would be kept, and which public would be served […] most departmental policies were 
made at headquarters or at the mayor’s office, at the bargaining table outside the orbit 
of the local politicians.”82  
 When Tammany Hall’s power diminished in the 1930–1950 period, the 
organization did not play an important role in the debates between the police and its 
critics anymore. A side effect of this decline in power was that other stakeholders 
could fill the power vacuum that Tammany Hall had left behind.  
 
2.1.10 The rank and file 1930–1950 
Tammany Hall’s declining power resulted in much uncertainty for the patrolmen, while 
the benefits which they received from the political machine were rapidly diminishing. 
Fogelson: “The machines were [still] strong enough to influence the department’s 
deliberations, but not to dictate its decisions, and powerful enough to intimidate the 
rank and file, but not to protect them from reformers.”83 The patrolmen tried to 
compensate for this loss by attempting to unionize themselves.  
 
From Tammany Hall to benevolent association — the patrolman’s quest for 
power 
As a result of the reformers’ efforts to professionalize the police, a growing sense of 
occupational identity gripped the rank and file in New York as well as in other cities in 
the United States. Patrolmen became more involved with their career, and were less 
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inclined to accept existing problems. Their initial view that nothing really mattered 
since they would be fired anyway after the next elections hence gradually changed.
84
 
Not only did the rank and file learn how to play Tammany Hall out against the 
reformers — conveniently siding with either one of them, depending on the issue and 
what was in it for them — they were also becoming more politically active 
themselves.
85
 With their rise of expectations and awareness, the need for an official 
body representing the needs of the patrolmen grew rapidly. Not only in New York, but 
in the whole of America, benevolent associations had already emerged by the turn of 
the century, and grew more powerful after 1930. Officially, these associations had a 
mandate to bargain for provisions such as widows’ pensions and other benefits. 
However, unofficially, they functioned as political pressure groups, the role of which 




 Although now often called unions, police benevolent associations were in fact 
different from official unions. First, these associations were strictly local. It was 
forbidden for them to unite into a national organization. Second, the associations’ role 
and amount of power remained elusive. Although the organizations acted like a union, 
people were reluctant to label them as such. Americans not only feared unionization in 
general, they also believed that the police as an organization was particularly unfit for 
this. President Woodrow Wilson epitomized these national feelings when he called 
police strikes “a crime against civilization.”87 Reformers were particularly wary of 
police unionization, as this movement could hamper their own efforts to control the 
police.  
Like other occupation groups, the American rank and file tried to unionize 
themselves on several occasions. In the periods 1918–1919 and 1943–1947, America 
witnessed a number of police strikes. The first period of police strikes was a direct 
result of the wartime inflation, the decrease of salaries, and the general progressive 
impulse and upsurge of the American Labor movement. The second period of police 
strikes was similarly brought upon by the depression, the war and the New Deal.
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Due to negative sentiments, police unionization proved to be quite 
unsuccessful in the first half of the twentieth century. In all instances, the authorities 
acted swiftly, putting down the strikes, and in some cases firing all of the policemen 
involved. Since the courts supported the authorities, the unions had no option but to 
cease their efforts.  
 After the successful suppression of police unionization in both 1918–1919 and 
1943–1947, the rank-and-file officers in all American cities retreated in defeat. As a 
consequence, the police did not have any institutional voice, apart from the unofficial 
‘voices’ of the benevolent associations. This development did not leave the rank and 
file’s morale unaffected. Carte and Carte argue that the “justice of the policeman’s 
grievances was undeniable,” as “no one was listening to their plea.”89 Walker similarly 
points out that the defeat of unionism was a thorn in the flesh for the patrolmen, and 
intensified the police culture. He wonders:  
 
“The defeat of police unionism in 1919 presents one of the great imponderables of 
American police history: How different the development of the police might have been 




While reformers and authorities opposed police unionization, they were less concerned 
about existing police benevolent organizations, mainly because of their informal 
character, but also because they raised the morale of the patrolmen, they were mostly 
engaged in salary issues, and — seemingly — they did not have much power yet.91 
However, from its inception in 1890 onwards, the New York Patrolmen’s Benevolent 
Association has strengthened the position of the rank and file by behind-the-scenes 
lobbying for their rights.
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 Of all the patrolmen’s organizations in the United States, the 
New York PBA was the most active.
93
 The PBA successfully rallied against the new 
measures proposed by the reformers that would affect the working conditions and limit 
the amount of (discretionary) power that the rank and file had at the time. Already in 
1907 the organization convinced State legislature to turn down a proposal endorsed by 
Commissioner Bingham and others in which the commissioner would be granted more 
authority.
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 Another proposal by the reform-minded Mayor John P. Mitchel in 1914 to 
change disciplinary procedures was also successfully suppressed by the PBA.
95
 PBA 
leader Richard Enright was the “department’s first outspoken leader of rank-and-file 
opinion, inaugurating a long, intermittent tradition of acrimony between the various 
benevolent associations, on the one hand, and the various mayors and commissioners 
on the other.”96  
After 1930, the PBA’s power grew increasingly, in fact usurping both 
Tammany Hall’s authority and function. Astor points out: “Ever since Fiorello La 
Guardia became mayor in 1933 the cliché has been to ‘keep politics out of the police 
department’. What has been ignored is the obverse, the police role in politics.”97 
Scholar Theodore J. Lowi goes one step further in his analysis, showing the benevolent 
organizations as being the successors to the political machines, since both 
organizations represented the needs of patrolmen in the political spectrum.
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 Paradoxically, the professionalization movement itself set off the impulse to 
(politically) organize the police in benevolent associations, which — in turn — 
hampered that same professionalization movement. The PBA proved to be an apt 
vehicle by which the rank and file could turn the police reform debate to their 
advantage. The PBA did not use its authority yet in other issues or debates, such as 
those with minorities, because these issues were not yet threatening enough for the 
position of the rank and file. Moreover, the consciousness of the rank and file had not 
yet grown to its maximum capacity, as it did in the second half of the twentieth 
century, when the PBA became a more powerful force.  
 
Increasing conservatism, distrust and lack of morale 
After the decline of Tammany Hall’s power, the police were not pressured anymore by 
the political machine to oppose reform. However, the rank and file continued to fight 
reforms, now at their own instigation. Although a small segment of the rank and file 
supported reform measures, they were considered outsiders. The police culture that had 
been developing since the force’s inception proved powerful enough to withstand 
progressive sentiments. The reform movement in fact further widened the schism 
between the rank and file and the higher echelons of the force, and left the rank and file 
in a difficult position. The patrolmen were more frustrated than ever by the 
investigations and the continuous accusations and ridicule, as well as by the efforts to 
thwart their power. As Fogelson argues, “most officers objected to the reform 
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campaign not because they were content with the low status of the big-city police but 
because they were reluctant to pay so high a price for it.”99 The practice to use the 
police as a vehicle for political communication was also felt by both patrolmen and 
commissioners. Lardner and Reppetto point out, “Tales of cops made scapegoats for 
politicians and gangsters were part of the department’s folklore.”100  
A direct and negative result of the first professionalization wave was a growing 
insistence on respect and also a lack of morale by the patrolmen. Fogelson even speaks 
of “occupational paranoia”, the symptoms of which include a deep strain of nostalgia, a 
strong sense of alienation and a deep feeling of persecution.
101
 He asserts that halfway 
through the twentieth century, many patrolmen “perceived the antipathy to the police 
as a sign of a pervasive breakdown of civic consciousness and a symbol of the apathy, 
as opposed to the animosity, that gripped millions of otherwise ordinary Americans.”102 
 
Police communication 
Feelings of distrust and lack of morale affected the rank and file’s positioning, which 
was protective, and communication, which was often emotional, exaggerating and 
defensive. Their communication also included a polarized representation of reality, in 
which the police were glorified and the outside world vilified. Fogelson:  
 
“If their indictments of inept prosecutors, shyster lawyers, corrupt judges, soft-headed 
prison officials, idealistic patrol boards, unscrupulous politicians and apathetic citizens 
were to be believed, no one but the patrolman was doing his bit in the war of crime.”103  
 
Their positioning and communication was also characterized by self-victimization. 
Fogelson:  
 
“Another symptom was the frenzied reaction to criticism from outside. If their charges 
that newspapers printed only the worst abuses of the police departments and that radio 
stations and film studios glorified the criminals and ridiculed the officers were to be 
credited, everyone was out to embarrass the local police.”104  
 
On a national level, J. Edgar Hoover cautioned the IACP that the police force was the 
target of “the Communists, the hatemongers, the pseudoliberals and others who would 
destroy the very foundations of this great Republic.”105 
 
2.1.11 Reform debates and results 1930–1950 
In the period 1930–1950, the ingredients that caused and shaped police debates 
changed again. This subsection examines how this affected the dynamics and outcome 
of the debates that were held between 1930 and 1950.  
The second group of reformers had been dealt a better set of cards than their 
predecessors. First, the group that led the reform operated from within the 
organization, and had more authority to initiate change. Second, Tammany Hall had 
disappeared from the political arena of debate. Similar to their predecessors, reformers 
enjoyed external support. The professional model was in line with the earlier 
Progressive ideas, and thus satisfied not only the law enforcement professionals, but 





At first glance, their campaign appears to be moderately successful. The 
Department’s autonomy improved, and so did that of the police commissioner. 
Tammany Hall disappeared from the political arena, and the department was able to 
make its own decisions. This makes the first objective of the reform campaign — to 
centralize the department and make it more independent — a success.  
However, the reformers’ second objective — the upgrade of patrolmen — was 
only marginally successful. Although the reformers tried hard to mold the patrolmen 
into professionals, and moreover, put them under their control, they did not succeed. 
While the professional status of the patrolmen did improve, and the mid-twentieth 
century patrolmen were overall more qualified than their predecessors, true 
professionalization did not occur. Walker: “If anything, it was the police chiefs who 
were professionalizing, and doing so at the expense of the rank and file.”107 As a result, 
the patrolmen remained unapproachable and uncontrollable to the police chiefs.  
The movement to reform the police also had some counter-productive 
effects.
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 The continuous exposure of scandals and the reformers’ constant pressure on 
the patrolmen resulted in an alienated rank and file who felt attacked on a continuous 
basis and who responded in a highly defensive manner towards those groups that 
criticized the police. 
The reform movement, aimed at reforming the rank and file, in fact made them 
more hostile towards reform efforts as well as towards those who proposed these 
efforts. The patrolmen themselves vehemently protested almost any reform that was 
proposed. Of course, some resistance is a normal phenomenon that occurs in many 
employee–employer situations. However, the antagonism of the rank and file reached 
such proportions that it became a worrisome development, since the resentment, fueled 
by the developments just described, turned out to have a suffocating effect on reform 
efforts to come. The police response became permanently defensive, no matter what 
the issue was. Everyone who criticized the police was labeled an enemy.  
Although the process of professionalization had been unsuccessful in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, the professional mindset that emerged by the 1930s 
also reached the rank-and-file officers, the commissioner, and the New York Police as 
an organization. Ironically, during the second wave of reform, law enforcement used 
its professional status as an excuse to deflect both internal and external pressures to 
reform. Because the patrolmen were becoming more and more politically active, they 
were able to thwart reforms in the formal arena of debate.  
Not only did the reformers’ strategies negatively impact the police, the 
successful centralization of the police also resulted in a highly bureaucratic apparatus. 
Police reformer Raymond Fosdick observed that “in the endeavor to guard against 
abuse of authority, it frequently is carried to such extremes that rigidity takes the place 
of flexibility in administration.”109 Contemporary scholar Eli Silverman likewise points 
out:  
 
“What began as a means of improving the functioning of the police transformed the 
NYPD into an insular, self-protective organization typified by a smooth but less 
creative routine. Structural change was wrought, but much of it led, unintentionally, to 
less effective crime control. Expanded centralization, rigidity, division, and stagnation 




Walker similarly observes that reformers had been too optimistic about 
bureaucratization: “Bureaucratic centralization resulted in police organizations that 
were both resistant to further change but also isolated from the public.”111 
Thus, the combination of the heavily bureaucratized structure of the force, 
together with an alienated and hostile group of patrolmen, whose power and awareness 
were steadfastly growing, resulted in an entire organization that was innately pitted 
against change.  
 
2.1.12 Conclusion 
In the period 1900–1950 the overall dynamics of reform had changed to a certain 
extent. While reform processes in the nineteenth century formed a pattern of 
neutralization, the pattern of scandal and reform was much more vehement in the first 
half of the twentieth century: Not only did the frequency of scandal and reform 
increase, the debates themselves were more vehement too, resulting in police 
victimization. The pattern of neutralization had thus gradually changed into a pattern of 
stagnation and frustration, with scandal and reform negatively affecting the morale and 
communication strategies of actors involved in the debate. In other words, not only did 
the actors that took part in the debates affect the dynamics and outcome of those 
debates, the debates themselves also affected the actors. This resulted in an overall 
downward spiral.  
Even the second wave of reform was only a partial success, and moreover, 
negatively impacted on the character, communication techniques, and rhetoric used by 
the actors in the debate. This becomes clear by looking at the overall dynamics of 
debate. The overall process was very protracted, because reform efforts were 
structurally hampered. Moreover, scandals on corruption and other abuses kept 




2.2 Police–community relations 
On a hot day in August, 1900, police officer Robert Thorpe tried to arrest a black 
woman, May Enoch, for alleged prostitution in the Tenderloin district. Her husband, 
Arthur Harris — outraged by the arrest and the insinuation directed at his wife — 
started an argument with Thorpe. A fight between the two men ensued, in which 
Officer Thorpe was eventually killed.  
 The ensuing riot epitomizes the difference between police–community 
relations in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth 
century. During the second period, police–community relations evolved into an issue 
that heated numerous debates between the police and its critics in the informal as well 
as in the formal arenas of debate. This section discusses which new actors emerged in 
both these arenas of debate, how they can be characterized, which issues they brought 
up, and how other actors responded. The quality of police–community relations is 
appraised by looking at the expectations and perceptions of both the police and the 
community.  
 
2.2.1 New critics 
Life had been relatively tranquil for the nineteenth century police officer. New York 
patrolmen had only been criticized by one single group of reformers, and criticism was 
sporadic. As the twentieth century progressed, however, police criticism not only 
became a constant factor, it also became more diversified, as new actors raised new 
issues in the formal arena of debate. The two most influential new groups of critics in 
the period 1900–1950 were minority rights activists and labor/Communist activists. 
Their objectives differed decisively from the moral and civic reformers, as they 
strongly opposed certain demands endorsed by the reformers. Johnson argues in her 
book on police violence in New York that “[moral and civic] reformers largely ignored 
the problem of police violence. In fact, reform campaigns often encouraged aggressive 
and violent tactics in the interest of efficient crime fighting.”112 In the context of this 
research, civic and moral reformers thus scarcely brought up the issue of police 
violence, and thus new groups had to emerge in order to discuss the issue in the formal 
arena of debate.  
 
2.2.2 Minorities in New York 
New York is the immigrant city of America, maybe even of the world. Within this 
context, the term ‘minorities’ serves as a container, as a multitude of different minority 
groups live in this city. Whereas in the nineteenth century the word mainly referred to 
the group of Irish immigrants and to a lesser extent to the Germans, a whole variety of 
nationalities landed in New York by the turn of the century. Yet the term ‘minorities’ 
had also become more racial, now referring to the stream of African Americans who 
came from the South and moved to Harlem or other ghetto communities, as well as to 
the group of Hispanic immigrants, who also migrated to New York. In this study, the 
term ‘minorities’ mainly refers to these last two groups, as in particular the former 
group has criticized police conduct frequently in the public debate.  
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In the first decades of the twentieth century, the number of African Americans 
in New York increased tremendously, due to migration from the south. Fleeing bad 
living conditions and persisting racial tensions, they established their own community 
in Harlem. Their expectations were increasingly growing, partly due to the liberating 
force of the progressive era, and their participation in WWI and WWII. This broad 
development also affected the group’s expectations of the police, of whom they were 
less willing to accept violence. Similar to the development of the patrolmen, African 
Americans felt they were both attacked and discriminated by the outside world.  
Meanwhile, African-American perceptions of the police diminished. This 
development was partly the result of the widening gap between the police and minority 
members, which led to a pattern of mutual resentment. There are a few causes of this 
growing gap. First, the New York Police was an organization that remained highly 
inaccessible to African Americans. Despite the steadfast growth of the black 
population, the New York Police remained predominantly white.
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 Samuel Battle — 
who joined the force in 1911 — and the few other African Americans who followed 
him, were exceptions.  
Complaints were on the rise, especially after the 1930s, when the police 
increasingly professionalized. Lardner and Reppetto point out that in the third decade, 
the ghetto inhabitants began to regard the New York Police more and more as “an 
army of occupation; they did not provide sufficient protection; they were corrupt; they 
stopped and searched people with abandon.”114 Fogelson takes this argument one step 
further, arguing that towards the 1950s, the group had even stronger doubts about the 
effects of the professionalization movement. He points out: “Half a century of 
centralization, bureaucratization, and professionalization was enough, they [African 
Americans and other minorities] argued, now was the time for a move to administrative 
decentralization, political accountability, and citizen participation.”115 
 Thus a discrepancy developed between the perceptions and expectations of 
minority group members, resulting in dissatisfaction and in a decline of police–
community relations. This decline — contrary to the situation in the nineteenth century 
— was becoming both a problem and an issue. Due to this discrepancy between 
perceptions and expectations, in combination with a growing sense of awareness, 
African Americans and other minorities consequently began to organize themselves 
into pressure groups that had the ability to venture into the formal arena of debate. This 
development should not be overestimated, since the organization of these political 
pressure groups was still in its infancy in the first half of the twentieth century. The 
true impetus came in the 1960s.  
Apart from these minority pressure groups, the early decades of the twentieth 
century also marked the birth of human rights organizations such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union, which fought against infringements of minority rights. Police violence 
was an important issue to the ACLU. Although the organization prides itself in being 
completely neutral, defending the rights of both Communists and the Ku Klux Klan, 
“the ACLU is no more free from partisanship than the Republican and Democratic 
Parties”, historian William A. Donohue maintains, as “The ACLU cannot help but 
expose its values whenever it takes a stand on a civil liberties issue; everything from its 
lobbying efforts to its policy decisions is reflective of its value priorities. Those values 
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— egalitarianism, rationalism, secularism, optimism, and antitraditionalism — are 
what motivates the ACLU.”116  
 These new critics focused on police–community relations issues, in particular 
the use of force. Johnson: “Police brutality has been understood largely as a racial 
issue, figuring prominently on the civil rights agenda.”117 The new pressure groups 
protested against riot control activities, and to a lesser extent against more common 
day-to-day police-violence acts against blacks in New York.  
The new pressure groups lacked clout, as they were not backed by an 
influential and wealthy rich elite, such as moral and civic reformers were. Moreover, 
they could not count on quite as much support from the press, universities, civic 
groups, and the general public. Only by the end of the 1940s, did upper-class 
Americans begin to share the concerns of minorities.
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Their lack of power was partly the result of the effort to professionalize the 
police. The only real power minorities could assert was by influencing local politicians. 
Yet due to the professionalization movement, these politicians did not have any power 
themselves anymore. From a national perspective, Fogelson: “by insulating the big-city 
police from the ward politicians, the reform campaign undermined the historic localism 
that had long been a major source of power for the lower- and lower-middle-class first 
and second generation immigrants.”119  
 The professionalization of the New York Police was not the main cause of the 
deprived conditions that minority groups had to face. Not only the police, but all other 
municipal organizations, loosened their ties with political machines, and consequently 
“no longer eased social mobility, reinforced political decentralization, fostered cultural 
pluralism or otherwise promoted the interests of lower- and lower-middle-class 
newcomers.”120 Yet the police force was still their main target. Fogelson asserts that 
“most of these [other] institutions aroused less animosity than the police, though it is 
hard to see why.”121 
 
Minority rhetoric and communication tactics 
The rhetoric used by minorities grew more vehement and emotional as the twentieth 
century progressed, both in the informal arena of debate — in which several riots 
occurred — and in the formal arena of debate, in which the New York patrolmen were 
so often labeled as extremely racist, dumb and coarse, as Subsection 2.2.5 will further 
discuss. Their vehement emotions were the result of a society in which African 
Americans and other minorities were discriminated against, and moreover in which 
they scarcely had political power. Their only weapon was their own ‘voice’, which 
consequently grew louder and more vehement, at times exaggerating the misconduct of 
the Police Department to make their plight heard. The character and use of this rhetoric 
will be further examined in the discussion of various debates in Subsections 2.2.5 and 
2.2.6.  
 
In conclusion, due to dissatisfaction with general social conditions, the widening gap 
between police and minorities, and a growing discrepancy between perceptions and 
expectations, new pressure groups started the dialogue in both the informal and formal 
arenas of debate, using emotional and vehement rhetoric, and communication strategies 





Another new actor that emerged in the first decades of the twentieth century was a 
group of Communists, which, just as the Progressives, sought to better the condition of 
lower-class citizens. However, they wanted to accomplish this by instigating a 
revolution and thus radically changing society, whereas the Progressives only desired 
evolutionary and moderate change. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the Progressives 
who desired to professionalize the police, the Communists wished to seriously 
diminish — even abolish — the function of the police. They believed that “the 
capitalist State employed the police to accelerate the accumulation of capital by 
increasing the degree of exploitation of labor” while “the police institution provides a 
measure of discipline and control over the working class that permits a wider measure 
of exploitation through the labor process — that is, more work with less resistance.”122 
Communists thus regarded the police as an “instrument of the bourgeoisie”, just like 
the civic reformers regarded the police as an instrument of Tammany Hall.
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 Yet while 
Communists believed that the elite controlled the police to suppress the lower classes, 
civic reformers feared for minority control of the police.  
 In short, the Communists maintained that the police were a “hired gun” that 
kept the order between the antagonistic classes, and had a mediating function in the 
class struggle.
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 Thus, by criticizing the police, the government could be thwarted — 
the Communists argued — bringing the revolution one step closer. In other words, 
similar to previous groups, the Communists used the police as a vehicle for political 
communication to accomplish their ultimate goals. As will be further discussed in 
Subsection 2.2.5, the Communists took up the specific issue of police violence to 
criticize the police. Police violence — they argued — was not only a means to disperse 
labor strikes, but the violence was much broader, suppressing the lower classes on a 
continuous basis.  
 
Communist rhetoric and communication techniques 
From the start, the police were used as a vehicle for political communication. Johnson 
explains, the Communist Party discovered that “police brutality […] was a resonant 
issue for many working-class New Yorkers — one that could be deployed on behalf of 
the revolution.”125  
Yet the working class was not the Communists’ single audience. In exposing 
police-violence issues, Communists teamed up with African-American pressure 
groups. Johnson: “Although Communists interpreted police violence as a class issue 
rather than a racial one, the party’s recognition of the problem and its more general 
embrace of black leaders and issues attracted new African-American members.”126 
The Communists’ rhetoric was as inflammatory and emotional as that of 
minority groups. Their lack of support in society was compensated by a hostile and 
violent communication strategy. How the Communists operated in both the formal and 




2.2.4 The police 
This subsection examines the police’s perceptions and expectations concerning those 
groups that criticized them in debates on police–community relations, and also looks at 
how the police traits discussed previously led to specific communication techniques 
used in these debates.  
 
The police and minority groups 
The police’s composition reflected the segregated American society at the time. 
Especially in the first few decades of the twentieth century, very few African 
Americans were actually accepted into the force, similar to other minorities such as the 
Chinese.
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 While New York’s ethnic complexity grew steadfastly in the first decades 
of the twentieth century, the New York Police remained predominantly white and Irish. 
This division became mostly explicit in the segregated ghettoes, Lardner and Reppetto 
point out, as black citizens were pitted against white patrolmen, “of which some had 
been sent there for punishment.”128  
The wide gap that had emerged between the police and minorities resulted in a 
strong ‘us-versus-them’ feeling perceived by both groups. The police often 
nostalgically looked back on the past, when — as one officer put it — “there were not 
so many races up against you.”129 The police perceived both minorities and 
Communists as hostile groups that were out to get them, similar to the civic and moral 
reformers, the press, and the public in general.  
 
Defensive positioning and communication strategies 
Comparable to their positioning in the professionalization debate, the police took a 
defensive positioning in the debate concerning police–community relations issues, and 
communicated in a defensive way. The lack of police statistics and sources 
documenting cases of police violence epitomizes their defensiveness. As Johnson 
discusses the sources for her study on the New York Police, she points out that “while 
the voices of antibrutality activists are well documented in this study, the police 
perspective is more elusive, reflected primarily through the mayor’s office and the 
press.”130 Johnson nevertheless observed a pattern of police officers supporting each 
other’s accounts, and refuting the suspect’s charges, while the police commissioners — 
characterized by the press as ‘club-blind’ — backed their officers.131  
 
Tolerant of all but “thugs, gorillas and assassins” 
The police were not only defensive, they also used war-on-crime rhetoric. Police 
Commissioner Roosevelt’s late nineteenth century idea that “police were to walk softly 
and courteously among respectable citizens, but carry a big stick to deal with criminals 
and thugs” stood as an example for the years to come, as it reflected the war-on-crime 
rhetoric.
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 Examples of this rhetoric are plentiful:  
 
Mayor Mitchel: “I hope the police will use their clubs on every gunman on whom 
they can lay their hands.”133  
 
Police Commissioner Woods: “You know that you cannot do detective work in a high 
hat and kid gloves. […] There is too much snappy talk about the rights of the crook. 
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He is an outlaw and defies the authorities. Where do his rights come in? If people spent 
less time talking about the dear criminals and more time helping the police to run them 
down we would have fewer criminals.”134 
 
Police Commissioner Valentine: “When you meet men like this [pointing at a 
criminal who has just been taken in], don’t be afraid to muss ’em up. Men like him 
should be mussed up. Blood should be smeared all over that velvet collar. Instead, he 
looks as though he just came out of a barber shop.”135 
 
Police Commissioner Valentine after a fatal police shooting: “Just another dead 
criminal, a small loss.”136 
 
Idealist views regarding public expectations 
August Vollmer once wrote: “What possible objection could law-abiding citizens have 
to measures that would permit the police to fight everybody’s enemy — the 
criminal?”137 He also maintained that:  
 
“The public must drop its childish attitude of hostility and learn to appreciate this 
friendly, reassuring helpfulness, unceasing vigilance and other services that the 
professionally trained policeman stands ready to give to all the people, high and low, 
rich and poor.”138 
 
Professionalization, in other words, was believed to improve relations with the public 
in general, including minority groups. Carte and Carte point out: “The fact that a 
professional crime fighter would be called upon to exercise his skills to a greater 
degree in a poor or a minority community than in middle-class and wealthy ones was 
not seen as a fundamental problem. What American would not come to respect a 
skilled professional?”139 Moreover, “the demonstration of professional expertise was 
the surest way to gain the respect of these alienated segments of the community.”140 
Both police reformers and the police themselves were insufficiently aware that 
public expectations, in particular those of African Americans and other minorities, 
were rising. Walker:  
 
“The decade of the twenties, then, was most important not because of the problems of 
enforcing prohibition, the most obvious law enforcement issue of the times. After all, 
the urban police had long before lerned [sic] how to deal with the unenforceable laws 
that tried to regulate human behavior. Rather, the period was most important for the 
subtle but profound shift in public expectations about the police role. Police experts 
such as August Vollmer, proud of their accomplishments in dealing with past 
problems, failed to notice the sweeping changes that were developing as the world 
changed around them.”141  
 
Thus, the police felt that because they always had the best intentions in mind to serve 
society — including minority groups — these groups consequently had no reason to be 
hostile to them. This idealistic presumption in fact intensified their negative feelings 




2.2.5 Riots: A gauge for police–community relations 
The first decades of the twentieth century saw a chain of violent encounters between 
the police and dissatisfied groups in society. Although these riots were not a new 
phenomenon, their character differed from previous ones. Not only were they aimed 
directly at the police, the immediate cause was often a police incident that had occurred 
just prior to the riot. In addition, whereas in the nineteenth century blacks were often 
the victims of the riots, they now often sought confrontation with the police after 
incidents had occurred. Another new element was the post-riot investigating 
commission which steadfastly took place after each of the riots.  
Riots are a gauge for police–community relations and for social 
transformation.
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 Walker asserts that the riots and broader violence that took place in 
the first decades of the twentieth century should hence be seen in the context of ‘social 
transformations’ such as the Great Migration, the development of the modern black 
ghetto and the growth of expectations by the black community. Walker: “Violence […] 
resulted from sudden changes in the racial status quo,” and more broadly: the status 
quo in general.
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 This subsection examines the confrontations both between minority 
groups and the police and between Communists and the police.  
 
The Arthur Harris incident  
Although the violent encounter between Arthur Harris and Officer Thorpe was the 
direct cause of the riot, historians argue that the deeper-seated origins for the 
insurrection that took place can be found in the steadfast deterioration of racial 
relations since 1900.
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 The incident, according to Walker, was an “ominous portent of 
things to come over the next two decades.”145  
 The riots started when rumor spread that a white officer had been killed by a 
black man. Lardner and Reppetto depict: “Soon white toughs from the Kitchen began 
congregating. By some accounts, there were more than ten thousand of them stretching 
for a mile up and down Eighth Avenue, and they rampaged through the west 
Tenderloin, pursuing and beating blacks at random.”146 The violence, similar to the 
riots in the nineteenth century, was still directed against blacks. Lardner and Reppetto 
observe that “the police responded in force, but they intervened, in most cases, on 
behalf of the attackers. From the victims’ perspective, indeed, some white citizens 
seemed more helpful than the cops.”147 Walker similarly observes: “Not a single white 
person was arrested while many blacks were, and some of those complained of further 
police brutality in the station houses.”148 However, contrary to Johnson, who regards 
the riots as evidence for the structural pattern of police violence directed at the lower 
classes in New York, both Walker and Lardner and Reppetto provide a more nuanced 
picture. The latter maintain that “the department’s appalling performance was probably 
due more to its leadership than to the character of the rank and file. In riot situations, 
cops worked under the direct supervision of their ranking officers. Thirty-seven years 
earlier, under the Metropolitan board, the police had vigorously protected blacks from 
Irish draft rioters.”149 In other words, the low level of professionalization not only led 
to corruption, but also to mismanagement in riots.  
 The riot was heavily criticized in the press. The Herald typified the uprising as 
a “police riot” and the Tribune spoke of “The unskillful and treacherous conduct of the 
police.”150 Although they are probably a realistic reflection of reality, these negative 
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reports — which mainly came from Republican newspapers — were definitely 
partisan, aimed at damaging Tammany Hall.
151
 In their reporting, the violence was 
linked to other police malpractices, such as immorality, corruption, and lax 
discipline.
152
 The Herald hardly tried to cover its partisanship, writing that “the 
ambition to club the life out of a nigger is cherished among the Tammany pets who 
wield the locust.”153 
 The overall political response was equally partisan. Republican politicians 
used the black community’s grievances to damage Tammany Hall. Frank Moss — who 
led the partisan Lexow investigations a few years prior to the riot — now teamed up 
with black community leaders and formed a Citizens’ Protective League. The 
organization published a listing of 78 acts of police brutality. Frank Moss also 
published a book — Story of the Riot — in which the witnesses’ accounts were 
collected.  
The black community’s communication was more explicit and emotional than 
before. One group argued that many members of the New York Police had been 
recruited from the “coarsest and most ignorant individuals of the Irish race.”154 In her 
analysis of the riot, Johnson observes that black community members and their leaders 
not only condemned the violence, but also typified the riot and the official reactions 
that followed the riot as blatantly racist. Johnson also points out that this view was not 
shared by Frank Moss, who noted that “the police commissioners’ failure to take action 
against abusive officers during the riot was typical of their general handling of all 
citizens’ complaints.”155 This difference in opinion epitomizes how blacks felt more 
and more singled out by the police for racial reasons, while the police in fact grew 
increasingly more hostile towards any group who criticized the police.  
 The critics’ communication resembled the ‘war of crime’ rhetoric used by the 
reformers. Take for instance Communist Party Leader Mason Webster’s response: 
 
“When the humblest citizen is not safe the most exalted is in danger. This wanton 
outrage is the affair of every person in the State of New York and of every person in 
the nation. It appeals as much to the residents of Fifth Avenue as it does to those of the 
Twentieth Precinct. When your life and your property can be taken without due 
process of law, anarchy is not far off, and anarchy is the death of law.”156 
 
Johnson analyzes: “At a time when the white middle-class lived in fear of bomb-
throwing anarchists, Webster depicted brutal policemen as the moral equivalent of 
foreign revolutionaries’ intent on destroying American liberty.”157 
 The police denied all accusations. Chief Devery maintained that “the colored 
people who live in this precinct are a bad class. […] Most of them are from the South, 
and they came here with very peculiar ideas as to freedom of action.”158 While 
referring to African Americans as “savages”, Captain Cooney denied the use of 
excessive force, and maintained that the police had been heavily outnumbered. Police 
Commissioner Bernard York simply argued that “If a man gets clubbed, it’s proof that 
he’s where he has no business […] If the Negro doesn’t want to get clubbed, let him 
keep out of disorderly crowds.”159 Whether or not the police actually had applied 




 Finally Mayor Robert van Wyck — who was pressured by the press, the black 
pressure groups and Republican politicians — called for an independent commission to 
investigate the riots. Yet the investigations were partly led by Commissioner Bernard 
York, which illustrates how biased this commission in fact was. Not only did he refuse 
cross-examinations of officers and subpoenas for additional witnesses, he also treated 
the witnesses as extremely hostile, while the police, according to an account of the 
Communist Party, “were carefully nursed and led by him.”160  
Furthermore, he maintained that only individual rank-and-file officers could be 
put on trial, and not their supervisors. This made any convictions impossible, as it was 
impossible for witnesses to identify individual officers in a crowd so large. Johnson 
concludes that York “presented himself as a defender of the department rather than an 
impartial judge of police behavior.”161 Not surprisingly, the investigative commission 
fully exonerated the New York Police. Magistrate Henry A. Brann, maintained that the 
“officer’s actions were justifiable and black witnesses vindictive and bitter.”162 
Overall, the investigation can be considered a partisan cover up. As the New 
York Herald (which was also partisan) wrote: “A one-sided affair that was neither a 
judicial inquiry nor a serious investigation […] It was a farce.”163 
 
Communist riots  
Friction between Communists and the police was not an exception in the first half of 
the twentieth century. The continuously tense relationship frequently led to outbursts. 
It was a turbulent time in which Communists provoked the police on numerous 
occasions. One of the most vehement outbursts of violence was the Union Square Riot 
in 1930. What started as a peaceful demonstration against unemployment soon changed 
into a violent battle between the police and Communist protesters. Communist Leader 
William Foster insisted on marching to City Hall, ignoring police orders that prohibited 
this march.
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 A Time Magazine excerpt: 
 
Said Commissioner Grover Whalen to Communist Foster: “You have not made the 
routine application for a parade permit. If we allow you to pass down Broadway it will 
cost the innocent merchants along that thoroughfare thousands of dollars. You will 
never accomplish anything by force of numbers. I will give you a police car and will 
myself accompany you to City Hall and I will tell the Mayor that you are a committee 
representing 50,000 or more individuals.”  
 
Shouted Communist Foster from a platform: “They won’t let us march, will you stand 
for that?” The crowd growled, began to seethe. Communist Foster and his aides 





A bloody encounter ensued, resulting in 100 injuries and 13 arrests. Commissioner 
Whalen —probably foreseeing much criticism — asked film companies not to 
broadcast their footage. Yet this did not discourage the press. Journalists — most of 
whom had been at the scene of the riot — were harsh on both the Communists and the 
police, calling the latter “bloodthirsty lunatics”.166  
The war-on-crime rhetoric prevailed in the communication by law enforcement 
officials. Commissioner Whalen announced an all-out attack on the Communists: “I 
have notified some of the largest corporations in New York City that Communist 
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organizers are boring from within their organizations, but the police secret service is 
boring from within the Communist organization as well as the Reds are trying to bore 
from within the institutions of America.”167 Second, the police took a defensive 
positioning, not only in this riot, but in any confrontation between the police and 
strikers. Johnson points out that the NYPD dismissed brutality charges on a continuous 
basis, “arguing that strikers had perpetrated violence, violated anti-picketing 
injunctions, or were unable to identify the officers who beat them.”168 
The Communists’ rhetoric was inflammatory and aggressive. They also used 
the police as a vehicle for political communication. Take for example the Needle 
Trades Workers Industrial Union, which filed complaints with Mayor Walker, calling 
the police “Tammany Cossacks”. Johnson explains that such remarks combined 
“traditional ethnic appeals against anti-Semitism with Progressive anti-political 
machine slogans.”169 Not only the Communists used such rhetoric. Johnson: “Although 
disavowing the Communists and their tactics, the ACLU likewise protested Whalen’s 
“Czarist methods”.170  
 Another communication tactic was the installation of a Labor Jury, where 
working-class witnesses could give their version of police brutality cases. Again, the 
police were used as a vehicle for political communication. Johnson explains: 
“Exploiting the emotionally charged issue of police brutality, the Communist Party 
used the Labor Jury as a propaganda weapon in the fight against capitalist oppression 
of workers and the unemployed.”171 The latter connection becomes even more apparent 
when the Communists suggested that police salaries should go to the unemployed.
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 Communist–police relations remained tense, even when the reform-minded 
Fiorello La Guardia became mayor in New York. Take for example the New York 
demonstration for a rape case in Alabama that had escalated into violence and the 
police had to use tear gas to disperse the crowd. La Guardia ordered Valentine to 
investigate police use of force in this particular incident. Disciplinary charges were 
taken and the press was allowed to attend the hearings. The ACLU was satisfied with 
La Guardia’s non-defensive approach. However, the Communist Party was not, and 
started a protest march, during which slurs were uttered such as “Down with Fascist 
police brutality”. During another march they used slogans such as “Blackjacks or 
relief?” and “We want jobs, not police clubs”, illustrating the protests’ partisan 
character, and the police being a prime target in a broader discussion about issues that 
the police were not responsible for. As Johnson points out, “The Communist Party 
tapped black outrage over police violence to try to recruit a following for its larger 
anticapitalist agenda.”173  
 
The Kress riot 
On March 19, 1935, Lino Rivera, a 16-year-old black youth, tried to steal a pocket 
knife in the S. H. Kress department store located in Harlem. While customers looked 
on, Rivera was chased and finally caught by the manager of the store. The atmosphere 
soon turned violent. Rivera bit at least one shop employee. The store manager took the 
boy into a separate office, and finally let him go through a back exit. Rumor, however, 
soon spread that Rivera was brought to the back office to get beaten. An angry crowd 
congregated in front of the store.
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 From then on, the line between fact and fiction 
started to blur further. Lardner and Reppetto: “According to the tale now passing from 
115 
 
one onlooker to another, a 10-year-old boy, arrested for stealing a candy bar, had been 
beaten to death by the police.”175 The false rumors were spread particularly by a group 
of black Communists who called themselves the Young Liberators. They had put up a 
picket line, and handed out leaflets, reading “CHILD BRUTALLY BEATEN … 
NEAR DEATH.” Unfortunately, the police — who quickly reached the scene — did 
not inform the crowd what had actually happened. And when a hearse inadvertently 
drove by, a woman yelled “There’s the hearse to pick up the boy’s body out of the 
store.” An angry mob started to storm the Kress store, as well as the surrounding shops 
on 125
th
 street. Soon the riot turned even more explosive when the rioters spread to 
other blocks, and it took the police the entire night to suppress the riot. What began as 
a minor incident eventually mounted into an explosive riot, in which three men were 
killed, more than a hundred wounded and 250 store windows smashed.
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 The riot’s deeper causes resembled those of previous ones. Although the direct 
cause of the riot was the Kress store incident, it was the “festering resentments over 




 Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, generally known as a liberal mayor and regarded 
as a “master in ethnic politics”, set up an investigative commission. Concluding that 
the uprising was the result of the conditions in the ghetto area, the commission referred 
to the “scathing exposés of Harlem housing, health care, education, recreation, 
employment and relief.” 178 The report also criticized the New York Police’s handling 
of the riot and recommended a civilian advisory group to monitor and discuss police 
complaints. La Guardia, like previous mayors, tried to suppress the report, yet it partly 
leaked out anyway.  
 In the aftermath of the riot, black leaders linked the police’s handling of the 
riot to racism, using harsh and inflammatory rhetoric to condemn the NYPD. The 
police’s response was again defensive. Police Commissioner Valentine — generally 
known as a liberal and honest man — systematically rebutted the commission’s 
critique. According to him, the hearings were biased. Moreover, the criticism had been 
fuelled by Communist dissenters. He argued that most Harlem residents were content 
with the police and that “any resentment which does exist is borne by the lawless 
element because of the police activity directed against them.”179  
 Black community members felt that their complaints were a cry in the desert. 
Paradoxically, the report’s only outcome was the growth of a broad-based leftwing 




The Braddock incident 
Only a few years after the Kress riot, in 1943, a new riot took place that showed 
remarkable similarities both with the Kress and Arthur Harris riots. This time, a young 
black woman had been arrested by patrolman James Collins in the Braddock Hotel in 
Harlem for alleged disorderly conduct. Another woman and her son Robert Bandy — a 
soldier who was on furlough — intervened on her behalf. The argument that ensued 
turned into a fight, in which Collins eventually shot Bandy, after he had allegedly 
grabbed the patrolman’s nightstick. Bandy’s version of the story was that he had only 
tried to defend his mother. All three were taken to hospital. Meanwhile, the rumor 
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spread that a white cop had killed a black soldier for defending his mother. Riots soon 
started and lasted the entire night, resulting in 6 deaths, 185 injuries and 550 arrests.
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 Again, the incident was only an immediate cause for the riot to take place. 
Living conditions had not changed much for black community members and racial 
relations were tense. New York scholar Selma Berrol argues that housing grievances 
were definitely one of the origins of the uprising: “The riot was caused, in part by 
resentment toward the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, which, although it had 
received tax concessions and other kinds of help from the city, refused to rent 
Stuyvesant Town apartments to blacks.”182 
In addition, African Americans also felt that they were not rewarded enough 
for partaking in WWII. As Johnson points out, “The larger national context — 
especially the plight of black servicemen down South — played a critical role in 
perceptions of police brutality in New York and their potential to spark violence.”183 
The report of a Harlem newspaper — which described Bandy as “A symbol of all the 
injustices our boys in uniform suffer” — epitomizes Johnson’s point.184 
 Although mainstream critics widely applauded La Guardia’s handling of the 
riot — he had ordered the police only to use teargas as a last resort, and he toured the 
riot area together with community leaders to refute rumors — the mayor still received 
criticism from the right side of the political spectrum. According to these people, the 
police had been “handcuffed” and that La Guardia “coddled Negro criminals.”185 
 
In sum, the consecutive events that led to the riots in the first five decades of the 
twentieth century, as well as the events that followed the riots, show striking 
resemblances. In most ethnic riots a confrontation between a patrolman and a black 
community member escalated into a widespread confrontation between the police and 
the African-American community. The rumor of the initial confrontation quickly 
spread through the community and was often exaggerated, sparking vehement 
sentiments among the members of the community. Due to a number of crucial 
communication blunders by the police, the riots escalated even further, diametrically 
pitting the police against the rioters in the black community.  
Communist riots also show similarities. Communists often challenged the 
temper of the testy patrolmen, by ignoring police orders in demonstrations. The protest 
marches quickly turned into a bloody battle between the police and the Communists.  
After Communist or minority riots had taken place, a post-riot committee was installed 
to investigate claims of police brutality. Police commissioners used war-on-crime 
rhetoric and took a defensive positioning, while minority groups and Communists used 
harsh, inflammatory and oft-exaggerated rhetoric in their condemnation of the police. 
While activity in the formal arena of debate soon diminished after these incidents, the 
findings of each commission were either covered up or forgotten, the recommendations 
were never implemented, and the tense relations in the informal arena grew worse. 
Johnson describes this pattern of events as “a mutual and self-perpetuating cycle of 
violence and hostility”.186 This pattern can be explained by the origins of each group’s 
positioning and communication: the communication between the police and minorities 
was troublesome, because both groups were both sensitive and defensive, both groups 
in fact felt victimized, and both groups used harmful rhetoric and communication 
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means. In her analysis, Johnson shows how both types of rhetoric in fact reinforce each 
other:  
 
“Because political figures and movements have at times exploited the emotional value 
of police brutality incidents to further their agenda’s or careers, police advocates have 
generally dismissed them as demagogues who deliberately distort the police record.”187  
 
Emotional, exaggerating and inflammatory rhetoric thus reinforced defensive 
positioning and vice versa. The Telegram wrote at the time that the police “did exactly 
what the Communists wanted them to do, namely, give them a righteous sense of 
martyrdom.”188 The ACLU wrote after the Union Square riot “it is the Communists’ 
business to be provocative, and it is the business of the police not to be provoked.” 189 
Yet their remark was not a reflection of reality, as Communists and minority groups on 
the one side and the police on the other were provoked by each other.  
The riots that occurred between 1900–1950 serve as a gauge for police–
community relations. Walker: “It is important to recognize, however, that changes in 
police practices had little to do with either the rise or disappearance of racial conflict. If 
anything, police conduct may actually have improved somewhat between 1900 and the 
1960s. But the police were judged by the ever-rising levels of public expectations.”190 
In other words, police–community relations had become an issue, because the balance 
between minorities’ expectations and their perceptions had shifted.  
 
2.2.6 The third degree 
During the first half of the twentieth century, police departments where often accused 
of third-degree punishment, which “encompassed a variety of questionable police 
interrogation practices including physical violence and torture, prolonged grilling, food 
and sleep deprivation, and psychological coercion.”191 Although most scholars now 
agree that before WWII, the use of the third degree was widespread, accurate 
information is scarce, due to the elusive character of third-degree methods. As Walker 
points out, “the police could be expected to deny accusations and victims would be 
prone to exaggerate.”192 Johnson similarly observes that the third-degree court cases 
“usually [were] a swearing contest between defendants who claimed abuse and police 
who denied it.”193 These two observations give insight into the rhetoric and 
communication strategies used by actors in the debate about the third degree, which 
comprised exaggeration and denial as well as a high level of emotion displayed by both 
parties.  
Criticism of third-degree methods had already started in the nineteenth century, 
during the Lexow Committee proceedings, and grew in the twentieth century, when the 
third-degree became less accepted, and pressure groups gained ground. Human rights 
organizations such as the ACLU, in conjunction with the legal aid community and the 
press, exposed third-degree cases and brought them to court. Exaggeration, as Walker 
points out, was an important aspect of these accusations: “Public attention focused on 
the scandal of police misconduct and ignored the more mundane areas of recruitment, 
training and records where considerable progress had been made […] While the abuses 
surrounding police misconduct are not to be denied, the ensuing publicity obscured the 
progress the police have made in the previous two decades.”194 Walker further points 
out that exaggeration led to the police’s frenzied response: “Publicity threw the police 
118 
 
on the defensive.”195 Walker argues that the police applied a three-step approach, first 
denying the existence of third-degree methods (‘the term third degree was coined in a 
newspaper office’), after which they started to maintain that only others — such as 
private detectives — were the guilty ones, and, finally euphemizing its existence, by 
using phrases such as “all this belongs to the past […] and we hear of such things no 
more.”196 Walker calls this a “scattershot defense.” His observation is illustrated by the 
proceedings of the 1910 IACP convention, where delegates adopted a resolution stating 
that “there has been recent unjust criticism of the police in the United States in a 
revival of the oft-repeated allegation that there prevails a practice of maltreating 
prisoners for the purpose of securing admissions of guilt.”197 
 In her analysis of third-degree practices in New York, Johnson shows that 
police commissioners similarly denied the third-degree methods regardless of the 
evidence. For instance, police commissioners William Baker and Theodore Bingham 
simply said that the third degree was an “invention of the press” after an amount of 
alarming editorials appeared in leading newspapers on the use of third-degree methods. 
Police Commissioner Mulrooney strongly criticized Emanuel Lavine — a veteran 
police reporter — for his book The Third Degree: A Detailed and Appalling Exposé of 
Police Brutality.
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 The mayor and district attorneys used similar communication 
techniques. Individual officers never admitted the use of the third degree on record, 
but, as Johnson points out, they privately thought the third degree “was an important 
tool used only against hardened criminals.”199 The police also felt that “attempts to 
limit the use of force would invite civil lawsuits, make police reluctant to take on 
criminals, and irreparably damage the department’s efficiency and morale.”200 The 
remarks of Manhattan district attorney Thomas F. Kane epitomize this general 
sentiment: After police had allegedly deployed third-degree methods after a shootout in 
Harlem where young children were injured — he said “What are we to do — give our 
baby killers ice cream?”201  
In the 1930s, the growing national concern about police misconduct in general 
and the so-called third degree in particular culminated in a national investigation — 
initiated by President Roosevelt. The resulting Wickersham report concluded that “the 
third degree — the inflicting of pain, physical or mental, to extract confessions or 
statements — is widespread throughout the country.”202 
The IACP made a strong effort to rebut the Wickersham Commission’s report 
on the third degree, by setting up a special committee that refuted the accusations.
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Both police chiefs and the rank and file were highly critical of the report. Carte and 
Carte: “Police chides denounced the lawlessness volume of the Wickersham Report, 
either denying its facts or arguing in private that policemen could not solve crimes 
without the use of some police intimidation.”204 As one police chief from Pasadena put 
it: “Public opinion in the United States is against the police officer who is actually 
engaged in bringing criminals to justice.”205 In his view, the Wickersham report only 
encouraged the public stereotype of the police officer as “a man with a thick neck, 
rather low mentality, but possessed of a remarkable degree of physical strength and 
animal courage.”206 
 Similarly, both the New York Police and New York City officials refuted the 
conclusions of the report. Moreover, they maintained that defense lawyers merely 
brought up the cases for lucrative reasons, and that the authors of the report were in 
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fact helping and assisting criminals with this publication.
207
 Police Commissioner 
Mulrooney issued a special statement together with the district attorneys of all five 
boroughs, in which he denied that third-degree methods were deployed in New York, 





In sum, the third-degree debate was a protracted communication process that lingered 
for decades. Exaggeration and denial were key ingredients. These elements can be 
explained by the roots of the stakeholders’ communication. As a consequence of the 
prevalent police culture, in which a code of silence, conservatism, distrust and 
alienation were key ingredients, the patrolmen as well as the police commissioner 
refuted criticism in an emotional fashion. Allegations were difficult to prove, because 
the patrolmen backed each other’s accounts, and the commissioner supported the rank 
and file.  
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2.3 The police as a vehicle for political communication 
This chapter has shown how both Tammany Hall and reformers have used the police as 
a vehicle for political communication in order to diminish their opponents’ power and 
strengthen their own. While this also happened in the nineteenth century, this practice 
became less blatantly visible in the first decades of the twentieth century, although in 
fact its frequency increased, as the practice was also used by Communists and minority 
groups.  
This is illustrated by the character of the riots in the twentieth century, scholar 
Cyril D. Robinson points out. While violence in the nineteenth century was accepted as 
a common means of communication, and those who attacked the police never protested 
against the violence, the riots in the twentieth century were of a different kind, as they 
were in fact protests against police violence. While rioters still used violence to make 
their point clear, they now also protested police violence. In other words, the police 
were still used as a vehicle for political communication, yet now they had also become 
the issue of complaint.
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In the nineteenth century, communication with the police was an accepted way 
to show one’s feelings on political issues, irrespective of in which debate — either 
formal or informal — the dialogue was taking place. This practice was made possible 
by the visibly distorted distribution of power in the nineteenth century: Everyone knew 
that by attacking the police, Tammany Hall was indirectly damaged too. Yet in the 
twentieth century, the visibility of these power lines was disappearing as the police as 
an institution appeared to grow more independent from politics. Robinson explains:  
 
“The governing class sank into obscurity. For the police, on the contrary, visibility at 
the scene of turbulence became its most prominent characteristic. The government 
dissociated itself from the police, which became ‘independent’ and dealt directly with 
the discontented, leaving the government blameless and without responsibility for 
consequences of police operations.”210  
 
The ties between the mayor and the police were thus becoming less visible, while the 
mayor’s office was in fact increasing its control over the police. Lardner and Reppetto 
similarly observe that by the turn of the century reform measures already seemingly 
gave the commissioner more power, but he in fact “served at the pleasure of the mayor 
[…] when told to leave, he did so; wise commissioners understood, as foolish ones 
discovered, that the mayor could slash their budgets, publicly embarrass them, and 
even put them on trial for offenses real or imagined.”211 The disappearance of the 
power lines between government and the police had two important implications. First, 
it allowed certain groups in society — such as minority groups — to use the police 
seemingly as the primary issue of complaint. Second, it allowed the mayor to distance 
himself from the police at times, and it allowed the police to claim their independent 
status.
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2.4 Conclusion: A downward spiral  
An integrated analysis  
 
 “Some day we’ll have to wear white gloves in making arrests. That’s what it’s coming 
to.”213 
New York patrolman William Sherry 
 
As the twentieth century progressed, new groups of police critics emerged, ranging 
from moral and civic reformers to Communist and minority groups. Although each 
group held different motives to criticize the police, they used similar inflammatory, 
exaggerating, and often emotional rhetoric, used similar communication strategies and 
used the police as a vehicle for political communication. Minority and Communist 
groups were able to criticize the police, because their power and awareness was 
growing. Moreover, the balance between perception and expectations had turned 
negative for minority groups, making police–community relations not only a problem, 
but also an issue that was discussed in both arenas of debate.  
 Meanwhile, a shift was taking place on the other side of the arena. First, the 
power distribution between the different actors in the debate was changing. In the first 
decades Tammany Hall’s dominance was still omnipresent. While the power of the 
political machine diminished after 1930, the power vacuum was soon filled by a group 
of ‘independent’ law enforcement officials, including the commissioner, and by a 
group of patrolmen whose awareness and political clout were steadfastly increasing. In 
fact, while politics intruded in the realm of the police in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, the rank and file started to venture in the political realm as the 
twentieth century progressed.  
 Not only did the power distribution change, the visibility of the power lines 
between the different actors diminished. While the New York Police was attached to 
Tammany Hall in the first three decades, the police obtained an independent status 
afterwards. This independence was overemphasized by both the police and external 
groups.  
 The character, rhetoric, and communication methods of the police 
commissioner, the rank and file, and the department as a whole changed too. Due to the 
discretionary powers attributed to the patrolmen in the nineteenth century, in 
combination with the ridicule that the patrolmen often faced, a strong unorganized and 
elusive police culture had developed, that was characterized by a hostility towards the 
outside world, a code of silence, conservatism, insistence on respect, and a lack of 
morale. These traits were intensified in the twentieth century, when critics began an 
all-out attack on the power that had first been given to the patrolmen. The patrolmen 
felt harassed by the outside world, and — especially after the 1930s — also by their 
leaders. In the first three decades, this resulted in a defensive, emotional and also often 
exaggerating rhetoric expressed by both the commissioner and the patrolmen, and in 
harmful communication techniques intended to cover up, deny, or euphemize any kind 
of criticism and deflect reform efforts by not implementing them or enforcing them in a 
half-hearted fashion. The Department did not distinguish between the groups 
criticizing the police. After the 1930s, patrolmen continued to use communication 
techniques and rhetoric to deflect reform initiated by progressive commissioners and 
other law enforcement officials. Moreover, the department as a whole used its 
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independent status now to deflect external criticism. The New York Police, in short, 
had become an organization innately pitted against change.  
 These changes impacted the dynamic processes in both the informal and the 
formal arenas of debate: 
 
In the formal arena of debate, harmful rhetoric and communication techniques, 
including the practice of using the police as a vehicle for political 
communication, intensified the harmful communication techniques and 
rhetoric of the police, and vice versa. This caused debates on both police 
professionalization and police–community relations to stagnate and aggravate. 
The rank and file were slowly beginning to raise their voice in the formal arena 
of debate, and becoming increasingly successful in further deflecting reform 
efforts and thwarting the process of debate.  
 
In the informal arena of debate, a hostile and cynical rank and file, who felt 
betrayed by the outside world, were pitted against an equally hostile and 
cynical public of minorities. These feelings were further aggravated by harmful 
communication techniques and rhetoric used by both groups, which reinforced 
each other. As issues were not resolved, resentment grew stronger, causing a 
downward spiral of decreasing mutual respect and understanding.  
 
Hence, the pattern of neutralization that characterized the nineteenth century debates 
had changed into a downward spiral, in which the scandals that occurred, and the 
communication that took place afterwards, intensified the harmful communication 
techniques and rhetoric of the actors involved in the debate. The macro patterns of 
debate show how unsuccessful that communication was. Reform efforts occurred on a 
regular basis. Scandals occurred on a regular basis. Police-violence incidences 
occurred on a regular basis. Riots occurred on a regular basis. In other words, the 
patterns of scandal and reform continued and issues were never resolved. The next 
chapter will examine whether and how this downward spiral changed in the second 
half of the twentieth century.  
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Chapter 3: A power equilibrium 
1950–2006: Police debates in an era of professionalization, unionization and 
civil rights 
 
Around the 1950s, the societal, political and debating landscape had changed 
considerably. By then, the political role of Tammany Hall was officially played out, 
while other stakeholders — who had played only a modest role in debates before the 
1950s — now became vociferous, powerful players who started to carve out a strategic 
position for themselves in the arena of debate. These stakeholders include minorities 
(in particular African Americans), civil rights groups, and police unions.  
While the police continued to be the focal point of discussion, the debate 
changed remarkably in character, now focusing increasingly on a variety of police–
community relations issues, such as police violence, aggressive use of force, and 
civilian review. The debates on police professionalization and corruption also 
continued. 
This chapter examines the debates held in the second half of the twentieth 
century and the beginning of the twenty-first, roughly up until the shooting of Sean 
Bell in 2006 (although certain events following the shooting are briefly discussed, 
when relevant). Sources for this chapter include historical studies, but also 
sociological, journalistic and other relevant studies and reports. In this chapter, police–
community relations are examined primarily as a discussion between different 
stakeholders in the formal arena of debate, yet the quality of police–community 
relations, is also touched upon in different sections, for example by looking at the 
interactions between police and citizens in the informal arena, and at mutual 
perceptions held by these groups. 
The first sections of this chapter examine how the different stakeholders in 
these debates were affected by new and continuing developments including 
professionalization, bureaucratization, unionization, ‘diversity politics’, and the civil 
rights movement. In Sections 3.9 and 3.10, the development of the debates on police 






This section takes a closer overall look at the societal context in which debates on 
police problems take place. Subsection 3.1.2 discusses society’s perceptions of the 
police. Society’s overall relationship with and expectations of the police will be 
discussed in Subsection 3.1.3.  
 
3.1.1 General dynamics 
In the second half of the twentieth century, American cities such as New York grew 
more violent. This included a trend towards vengeance and retributive punishment.
1
 
The extent of the violence, as well as its effect on the NYPD, is illustrated by the 
findings of a comparative study on police mortality rates in London and New York: 
While, in New York, 290 police officers were killed in the twentieth century by 
intentional gunshot wounds, only 14 London Bobbies died this way. Moreover, in New 
York, gunshot wounds (intentional and unintentional) were the most common cause 
(51.6%) of occupational police deaths, leading to more deaths than all other factors 
combined, while in London, police officers were mostly killed by motor vehicle 
collisions (47.5%).
2
 Although the authors of this study did not find a correlation 
between general homicide rates and those related to the police, they do believe that the 
widespread availability and use of firearms in the United States negatively impacts the 
number of occupational police deaths by gunshot wounds.  
Another dominant feature of American post-war society is that of inequality. 
Historian Michael B. Katz describes how the distribution of wealth and opportunities, 
as well as the access to public services in American cities, has become increasingly 
unbalanced. For example, the percentage of 26- to 30-year-old black men out of work 
grew from about 9% in 1940 to 30% in 2000. The percentage of those incarcerated also 
grew extensively, up to 82% during the 1990s; 49% of prisoners compared to 13% of 
the overall population was black. Katz: “On any given day, one of three 20- to 29-year-
old black men was either in jail or on probation or parole.”3  
The 1960s civil rights riots were a result of this growing inequality and 
violence. Yet while after this period there have been — and still are — plenty of 
reasons for cities to ignite — ranging from “poverty, inequality, chronic joblessness, 
segregation, police violence, ethnic transition, [and] a frayed safety net” — Katz 
argues that an explosion of this “combustible ensemble of elements” has not occurred 
since the 1960s, an exception being the Rodney King beating in 1992.
4
 
One of the reasons for the absence of riots is society’s ability to “manage 
marginalization.” Katz identifies five aspects of such management — selective 
incorporation, mimetic reform, indirect rule, consumption, repression, and surveillance 
— which together “set in motion a process of de-politicization that undercuts the 
capacity for collective action.”5 These elements give insight into the evolving character 
of American society since the 1960s, in which progressive urban reforms often turn out 
to be only superficial; African-American elected city officials in fact only have limited 
power, yet are still responsible for city problems; and both whites and African 
Americans — the latter disillusioned with the civil rights movement — become 
blinded by the endless possibilities offered by the American “Consumers’ Republic”, 
hence losing inclination toward (political) activism.
6
 Due to consumerism, inequality in 
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fact became increasingly less visible, Katz argues, as it was now hidden under “a 
blanket of inexpensive clothes, jewelry, and electronics, available to nearly everyone 
through the magic of credit.”7 This trend of decline in political activism contrasts with 
the typical ‘diversity politics’ trend in New York, a development which will be 
explained in the next section.  
The debate central to this study takes place within the context sketched above: 
A society in which violence, retribution and inequality are growing, reform is cosmetic 
and superficial, overall political involvement is decreasing and discrimination is 
becoming obscured.  
 
3.1.2 Society’s perceptions of the police 
“The policeman is a “Rorschach” in uniform as he patrols his beat. His occupational 
accouterments — shield, nightstick, gun, and summons book — clothe him in a mantle 
of symbolism that stimulates fantasy and projection. Children identify with him in the 
perennial game of ‘cops and robbers.’ Teenagers in autos stiffen with compulsive rage 
or anxiety at the sight of the patrol car. To people in trouble the police officer is a 
savior. In another metamorphosis the patrolman becomes a fierce ogre that mothers 
conjure up to frighten their disobedient youngsters. At one moment the policeman is 
hero, the next, monster.”8 
Arthur Niederhoffer 
 
Perceptions of the police do not necessarily reflect reality, especially as mediated 
images are often the main source of information and hence heavily influence public 
perceptions.
9
 Yet these perceptions can still have a great impact on police–community 
relations. In an analysis of the 1960s riots, Fogelson observes that the negative 
perceptions of the police held by the black population “whether correct or not, are 
crucial because, like most people, they act on what they believe to be 
true.”10 Niederhoffer’s classic study, conducted in the same period (1967), identifies 
several stereotypes held by society in regard to the police, such as that of “the grafting 
cop”, “the sadistic cop”, “the dumb cop”, “the chiseling cop”, and “the thick-brogued 
cop”, all of which do not fully reflect, yet nevertheless influence our reality, and can 
lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, as discussed in 3.10.1.
11
  
As a result of an increase in scholarly attention, much more is known about 
current attitudes towards the police than about those occurring in the historical periods 
discussed in the previous two chapters. Research has shown that most people are 
generally satisfied with police performance.
12
 However, this general positive attitude 
masks critical views on law enforcement, in particular held by minority members 
regarding e.g. aggressive policing.
13
 Scholars have also identified a number of public-
opinion predictors concerning the police. Demographic factors such as class, gender, 
age and in particular race impact public attitudes towards law enforcement.
14
 Other 
robust factors influencing public opinion include the execution of particular policing 
practices, personal contact with the police and media exposure. Lastly, ecological 
factors also affect public opinion on law enforcement.
15
 There is no consensus as to 
(the combination of) which factors impact these perceptions the most.
16
 Moreover, 
most of the existing research is based on single-year survey data, and hence does not 





 This subsection examines some of these predictors, as well as the perceptions 
of the police held by citizens.  
 
Occupational prestige 
Historically, the ranking of the police’s occupation in America has never been very 
high, especially in comparison to that in Europe. This did not change in the second half 
of the twentieth century. A 1947 national poll on the prestige of 90 professions 
revealed that that Americans ranked the police profession fifty-fifth. A replication of 
that study in 1963 found that the profession now ranked forty-seventh. At this time, 
police salaries were lower than those of semiskilled laborers.
18
 In their discussion of 
the public attitudes towards the police in the 1960s, Hahn and Jeffries conclude that 
“popular respect for those responsible for law enforcement was not a marked feature of 
U.S. culture. […] the public was apparently unwilling to grant police forces respect and 
resources commensurate with their powers to regulate social conduct.”19 Although the 
profession’s prestige has improved somewhat over the past decades, it still falls 




Differences in attitudes amongst blacks and whites 
Black and white perceptions of the police differ vastly. Lundman and Kaufman: 
“beliefs in the legitimacy and propriety of police actions are framed by a polarity 
between blacks and whites.”21 In general, African Americans are more inclined to hold 
negative views of the police than whites.
22
 Not only are blacks considerably less 
supportive of the police, they are also more likely to perceive police misconduct as a 
problem and to support police reform. Whites, conversely, are more supportive of 
aggressive law enforcement practices, while oftentimes dismissive of critical voices.
23
 
Less is known about Hispanic opinions of law enforcement, which probably lie 
somewhere in between those of blacks and whites, although there is no consensus on 
this matter and systematic comparative analyses between the three groups are scarce.
24
 
While these findings are based on single-year survey data, they do suggest that 
attitudes have not changed over the past 40 years.
25
  
A study by Weitzer and Tuch in 1999 has shown that 44.5% of African 
Americans compared to 10.5% of white citizens believe that racist police practices are 
“very common.”26 A later study by the same scholars has shown that whites tend “to 
deny the existence of police misconduct,” while African Americans and Hispanics 
“may see the entire police department as rotten.”27 Another study by these scholars has 
shown that more African Americans (81.6%) than whites (60.2%) believe that racial 
profiling by the police is widespread. African Americans are also more likely to be 
negatively influenced by highly publicized cases of police misconduct.
28
  
The racial divide discussed above is part of a broader polarization between 
black and white views concerning the criminal justice system, as both groups have 
disparate “cognitive landscapes” or “sensibilities” concerning racial bias in this 
system.
29
 These different attitudes pertain to issues including the death penalty and the 
question of why blacks are disproportionately arrested and jailed. Blacks and whites 
also have different views regarding the notion of fairness in the system. Weitzer: “A 
person’s support for the principle of equal justice does not mean that he or she believes 
the system actually dispenses unequal justice. Surveys consistently show, for example, 
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that whites are less inclined than blacks to believe that police discriminate against 
minorities.”30 Even more broadly, researchers have repeatedly found a link between 
positive/negative attitudes towards the police and a feeling of inclusion/negative 
attitudes and trust/distrust towards the government.
31
 In their review of existing 
literature, Bridenball and Jesilow point out that this “relationship between public 
perception of the police and the level of support for the legal and political order” is 
hardly surprising, considering the police are “the most visible embodiment of the 
government’s exercise of control and authority.”32  
 
Ecological factors  
There is some evidence that ecological factors such as concentrated economic 
disadvantage (CED) impact police attitudes, although not all studies support this 
conclusion. Some studies have found that neighborhood aspects, such as perceptible 
signs of crime and disorder, have a negative impact on police perceptions, yet overall 
the literature is inconclusive on this. Those living in poor neighborhoods do appear to 




Perceptions of police contact and aggressive police practices  
Police–citizen contacts, ranging from phone calls to street encounters, impact 
perceptions regarding the police. In fact, citizen attitudes are more strongly influenced 
by police treatment during an encounter, and specifically by the “procedural justice” 
done, than by the outcome of the encounter itself, unpleasant experiences having a 
stronger impact than positive ones.
34
  
A 2005 study based on a national survey found that particularly “vicarious 
experiences” with the police influence white and black attitudes negatively.35 Other 
research has also shown that when the police treat people impolitely, unfairly, or in a 
rough manner, this impacts on people’s appraisal of the immediate experience, as well 
as their overall opinion of the police.
36
 Such perceptions can influence those held by 
family members, relatives, friends, neighbors, community members, possibly 
“reinforcing neighborhood or subcultural beliefs.”37 Blacks are more inclined than 
whites to perceive treatment to be negative and unfair.
38




 A 2003 study of New York youths regarding their attitudes toward adults in 
positions of authority provides more detailed insight into the relation between the 
perceptions of these youths and their encounters with the police. The study found that 
negative interactions with the police left the youths — mostly blacks and Hispanics — 
with feelings of betrayal and powerlessness, while alienating them from public 
institutions and adult society in general. More than half of the respondents said they 
did not feel safe when the police were in their neighborhood. In addition, just under 
half of the respondents feared “being arrested very much or all of the time.” Moreover, 
one in three said that the police use abusive language against youth. The authors 
suggest that ultimately everyday “micro-aggressions” — not only by the police but by 
other adults in positions of authority — may result in “a less cohesive community, and 
a generation of youth who feel vulnerable and unwilling to seek assistance from adults 
and unable to grieve or challenge such treatment.”40 
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The practice of racial profiling is an example of perceived procedural 
injustice.
41
 It is assumed that racial profiling has a negative impact on attitudes towards 
the police, and creates particular distrust and resentment amongst minority populations. 
Those who have experienced racially profiling feel both harassed and alienated.
42
  
The general discrepancy between African-American and white perceptions 
concerning racial profiling is reflected in a recent series of studies on the New York 
police.
43
 These studies have found that Hispanics and blacks perceived widespread bias 
by the police. Another finding was that those in favor of the NYPD believed racial 
profiling was not widespread and thought the practice was justified. Conversely, those 
who had negative experiences with the police, generally also believed racial profiling 
practices were widespread. One of these studies, conducted in 2005 by Rice and 
Piquero, found that blacks in New York City perceived racial profiling to be pervasive 
yet unjustified three times more often than non-blacks.
44
 An equal number of blacks 
had personally experienced racial profiling themselves. Rice, Reitzel and Piquero 
found that black Hispanics were more likely than non-black Hispanics to believe that 
racial profiling was widespread, unjustified, and that they had been racially profiled. 
The authors suggest “that racial self-identification may play a galvanizing role in 
shaping perceptions toward racial profiling.”45 
New York Times polls conducted in 1997, 1999 and 2000 indicate that a 
growing percentage of New Yorkers believe that the aggressive policies of Mayor 
Giuliani’s administration had “caused police brutality to increase.” Yet while the 
increase was observed for all racial groups, many more African Americans (49, 67, and 
82%, respectively) and Hispanics (33, 49, and 69%, respectively) took this view than 
whites (18, 30, and 38%, respectively).
46
  
This racial divide is also reflected in a more recent New York Times poll (2012) 
on law enforcement practices. While most white New Yorkers (55%) believe that the 
NYPD’s current stop-and-frisk tactics are acceptable, most blacks (56%) take the view 
that these tactics are harassing. Similarly, while only a minority of whites (43%) 
believe that the New York police treat them more fairly than blacks, a vast majority of 




Perceptions of police misconduct 
Incidents of police violence have led to an erosion of satisfaction with the police.
48
 In 
general, those who read or hear frequently about police-violence incidents, especially 
African Americans and to a lesser extent Hispanics, are more likely to believe that 
police violence is widespread.
49
 After the Rodney King beating in 1991 in Los 
Angeles, citizens’ attitudes sharply declined, especially amongst African Americans, as 
shown in a study examining the attitudes of South Central Los Angeles citizens in the 
four months following the incident.
50
 A later study examining a series of police 
violence incidents in Los Angeles, including the Rodney King beating, found that the 
well-publicized cases were followed by a decline in police support, both locally and 
nationally, and influenced attitudes regarding police violence and the overall 
performance of the police. The long-term effects were greater on the attitudes of 
African Americans and Hispanics than on those of whites.
51
  
In the 1990s, police misconduct cases in New York, such as the sexual assault 
on Abner Louima and shootings of Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond, ignited 
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reactions ranging from riots to public indictments, particularly amongst African 
Americans.
52
 These three cases negatively influenced public attitudes towards the 
NYPD at the time, Weitzer found in a comparative study of attitudes in the wake of 
these incidents.
53
 He conclude that “at almost every point in the time series, incidents 
were followed by increasing unfavorable ratings” in regard to police use of excessive 
force, although the attitudinal change was much more pronounced for African 
Americans than for whites.
54
 Moreover, the cases also affected the overall police 
appraisal by African Americans and Hispanics. He believes this divide can be 
explained by white citizens’ support of Mayor Giuliani’s crackdown on minor crimes 
and quality-of-life offences and its effects on city safety, while blacks and Hispanics 
were significantly “less impressed.”55 
Weitzer suggests that these incidents might result in “some long-term, diffuse 
damage to public confidence”, and can become part of “the cultural repertoire with 
which African Americans conceive of the police,” contributing to “a full-fledged 
oppositional subculture toward the police.”56 Skogan similarly fears that that these 
incidents can reverse occasional improvements in public opinion, hence hampering the 
progress made in police–community relations.57 Overall, public attitudes on police 
misconduct are heavily determined by race. Weitzer and Tuch:  
 
“Whites tend to be favorably disposed toward the police and inclined to deny the 
existence of police misconduct, an attitude reflected by the very high percentages who 
say the police are never or only occasionally involved in corruption, excessive force, 
verbal abuse, and unwarranted stops of citizens. blacks and Hispanics are more 
inclined to believe that these abuses occur frequently, and to subscribe to the view that 
police misconduct is very common in their city and in their residential 
neighborhood.”58  
 
An explanation for this racial divide might be that media reports on police 
mistreatment usually involve African Americans.
59
 More generally, and from a 
theoretical perspective, the racial differences in attitudes towards police misconduct 
can be explained by the racial group-position model (further explained in Subsection 
3.2.2). Weitzer and Tuch:  
 
“Allegations of police wrongdoing, often made by leaders within the minority 
community, may be perceived as interfering with the pursuit of law and order and, 
thus, as a threat to whites’ group interest in maximizing crime control. Blacks and 
Hispanics, by contrast, are more inclined to believe that police misconduct is common 
[…]. While most blacks and Hispanics share with whites a desire for more law 
enforcement and crime control […], they are at the same time interested in ensuring 
that police minimize abuses of citizens, and particularly of minority citizens, who are 
disproportionately the recipients of mistreatment. Thus, blacks and Hispanics may well 
believe that their group interests would be advanced by greater controls on police.”60 
 
Communications following police-violence incidents also impact public opinion. Many 
New Yorkers believed that Mayor Giuliani’s statements after the Diallo shooting had 
“made things worse”, with 47% of white residents, 61% of Hispanic residents and 79% 
of black residents holding this view. Similarly, after the Dorismond shooting, the 
mayor’s actions were heavily criticized. At the time, the mayor had released the 
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victim’s juvenile and arrest records. Polls have shown that 67% of whites, 94% of 




Perceptions of reform 
While there has been general public support for specific reform initiatives, blacks and 
Hispanics are more inclined to favor police reform than whites, Weitzer and Tuch point 
out in their research on perceptions in relation to the three current main vehicles of 
reform, i.e. proportional representation, external oversight and sensitive policing 
practices such as police–community relations. Besides race, they found two important 
non-demographic predictors: repeated exposure to media reports on police abuse and 
the belief that police misconduct is widespread in the neighborhood.
62
 
In regard to civilian overview, most Americans believe that police are “too 
lenient” in their internal investigation of police officers. A national poll has shown that 
58% of white citizens and 75% of African Americans deemed external oversight 
necessary.
63
 Concerning the issue of proportional representation, a poll in 1999 has 
shown that there is much support in New York City for hiring more minority officers 
in order to bring the composition of the police force in line with that of the city. While 
police diversification is supported by more African Americans (73%) and Hispanics 
(60%) than whites (57%), still a majority of the latter group believed that 
diversification was a good idea.
64
 Also, people appear to support community policing.
65
 
While there is no clear consensus amongst researchers concerning the attitudinal 
effects of community policing, a study based on a national survey did show that 




In general, it is assumed that reform after incidents does have a positive effect 
on attitudes towards the police. Tuch and Weitzer suggest that the “attitudinal 
recovery” of African Americans after the Rodney King beating — rising from 14% 
approval in 1991 to 61% just 3 years after the incident — may have been accelerated 




Impact of perceptions 
Perceptions of the police can influence the success of law-enforcement practices. 
People with negative perceptions of the police are, for example, less willing to 
cooperate with the police and less inclined to accept police authority.
68
 More broadly, 
negative perceptions influence police–community relations and the overall legitimacy 
of the police.
69
 When police misconduct scandals are followed by protracted media 
coverage and intense public debate, the advancements made in developing police–
community relations may be repealed. Moreover, after such incidents, police 





3.1.3 Society’s overall relationship with and expectations of the police 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the distance between the public and the 
police grew. While the police became increasingly insulated due to technology 
advancements and professionalization initiatives, this led to a decline in the belief that 
the police were handling problems correctly. In particular minority groups became 
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more alienated. Reiss: “The patrol officer in his air-conditioned and heated car no 
longer got out of the police vehicle to do preventive patrol or to learn more about the 
community being policed.”71 In an early sociological article published in 1953, 
Westley wrote that “The policeman finds his most pressing problems in his 
relationships to the public,” because he is criticized for being corrupt and inefficient 
and often treated in a hostile manner.
72
 
Society continued to present the police with incompatible demands, including 
the enforcement of certain laws and eradication of objectionable behaviors only when 
they did not interfere with personal activities.
73
 In the past decades, society has put 
tremendous pressure on the police to implement measures and to be accountable, but 
also to be responsible for a variety of different tasks. In addition, the public expected 
the police to professionalize in the same manner as the private sector.
74
 
Society’s often conflicting demands impacted on the police in several ways. 
First, they increased levels of cynicism amongst the police and, according to some 
scholars, led to police violence.
75
 Society’s unwillingness to grant the police respect 
resulted in the policemen’s (unsuccessful) quest to improving their status in the 
community (see Section 3.5). Their conflicting demands have also had a dampening 
effect on reform. For example, society’s taken-for-granted expectations in regard to 
professionalization of the police, as well as their pressure on the police to implement 
measures and to be accountable, have resulted in much talk and quick fixes, yet less 
structural, long-lasting reforms (see Section 3.9).
76
 Yet paradoxically, the public have 
also often been unwilling to collaborate in and accept police reform proposed by the 
police. Skogan gives several explanations for this. First, the two groups do not have a 
history of getting along, and the public do not see the police as potential partners. 
Second, the public, who are unprepared for new approaches and does not necessarily 
understand them, can be skeptical towards and afraid of their effects. In this context, 
Skogan draws parallels between the public’s and police’s conservative stance towards 
law enforcement, arguing that “Like police themselves, uninformed citizens are likely 
to define their expectations of policing in traditional terms, expecting more patrols, fast 
response times, and arrests to solve their problems for them.” Third, minorities and/or 
people with low incomes are often only interested in civilian oversight measures. 






The societal context in which debates on police problems take place has been 
characterized by growing violence (up until the 1990s), retribution and inequality. 
However, these ingredients have not led to many riots after the 1960s, as political 
involvement decreased and discrimination and inequality became obscured. Overall, 
societal reform has been cosmetic and superficial. 
While most people have generally been satisfied with police performance, 
society continues to hold many stereotypes regarding the police and the profession’s 
prestige has only marginally improved over the years. Moreover, the overall positive 
public opinion masks critical views on law enforcement, in particular held by African 
Americans, who have less confidence in the police than whites, and have different 
perceptions concerning police encounters, police (mis)conduct, reform efforts and the 
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question of whether the police and police practices are racist and too aggressive. These 
perceptions most probably have not significantly changed over the past decades.  
This racial divide is in line with the broader divergent cognitive landscapes 
held by African Americans and whites concerning racial bias and fairness in the 
criminal justice system, as well as feelings of inclusion in the political system and trust 
towards the government, a correlation that can be explained by the police’s specific 
function in society to enforce laws and governmental policies.  
Besides race, there are other predictors concerning perceptions of the police. In 
particular, incidents of police violence lead to an erosion of satisfaction with the police 
and to reactions such as protest marches, public indictments and riots. Those living in 
poor neighborhoods appear to be more negative about the police than those living in 
middle-class neighborhoods. Procedural injustices (such as racial profiling) during 
police encounters impact not only citizens’ appraisal of the immediate experience but 
also their overall opinion of the police. In this respect, it striking that the citizens’ 
attitudes are more strongly influenced by police treatment than by the outcome of an 
encounter.  
It is assumed that reform does have a positive effect on attitudes towards the 
police. Media exposure, as well as statements made by the police and the mayor can 
have a negative effect on public opinion — and in particular the opinion of African 
Americans — regarding the police and police violence.  
 Negative perceptions can lead to overall feelings of alienation, resentment and 
powerlessness and can reinforce neighborhood or subcultural beliefs, ultimately 
becoming part of the (African-American) cultural repertoire and contributing to an 
oppositional subculture toward the police. This can cause prolonged damage to public 
opinion and police–community relations. Moreover, negative perceptions of the police 
can influence the success of law enforcement practices, reform initiatives and the 
overall legitimacy of the police.  
Perceptions of the police are a reflection of society’s overall relationship with 
and expectations of the police. In the second half of the twentieth century, the distance 
between the public and the police grew, and minority groups, in particular, became 
increasingly alienated. Public expectations of the police also grew steadfastly and 
society has put tremendous pressure on the police. These expectations were often 
conflicting, unbalanced and taken-for-granted, leading to the rank and file’s increased 
level of cynicism and demand for respect. Moreover, society’s expectations have had a 
dampening effect on reform and the professionalization movement, resulting in quick 
fixes and cosmetic reform efforts. Reform has also been hampered by society’s 
unwillingness to cooperate with the police, as well as by citizens’ lack of knowledge, 
skepticism, and fear. In this context, society’s conservative stance and expectations do 




3.2 Minority and civil rights groups 
From its inception onwards, the NYPD had been criticized consecutively by moral 
reformers, civic reformers, and internally by police reformers, and later also by 
minority (mainly African American) and civil rights groups, although their role was 
initially modest. This changed by the 1950s, when they became the police’s most 
fervent critics.  
 
3.2.1 Power 
Minority groups have been critical of the police for a long time, yet were initially not 
powerful enough to initiate and take part in public debate on policing issues. Their 
power and awareness increased in the first half of twentieth century. In the 1960s, this 
process intensified as a consequence of the civil rights movement. Niederhoffer:  
 
“The degree of tension generated by [police-violence incidents] is an index of the 
power and alienation of the minority group. An apathetic response indicates high 
alienation and low power. As a result of the civil rights movement, a sense of 
militancy heightened by the slow pace of integration is easily converted to force under 
provocation.”78 
 
Niederhoffer thus argues that growing political power and awareness combined with 
feelings of victimization can lead to vehement responses against the police. The civil 
rights riots hence served as a climax, in which underlying sentiments came to an 
explosion, evidenced by many hostile physical encounters in both the informal and 
formal arenas of debate. Throughout this period, Fogelson points out, “the police were 
among the principal targets.”79 The civil rights movement’s strong focus on the police 
encouraged them to find ways to improve their image, for example by hiring public 
information officers, who function as liaison intermediaries with the press.
80
  
While growing inequality and deprivation did not lead to major uprisings after 
the civil rights riots, minorities’ dissatisfaction, criticism and strong positioning in the 
public debate on police–minority issues persisted. In this light, the “lack of political 
activism” described by Katz does not pertain to the debate on police–community 
relations. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, many community 
groups in minority neighborhoods actively criticized the NYPD. As these groups were 
relatively small and lacked financial resources, they often bundled forces with larger 




While minority groups’ growing awareness and power led to their initiating 
and taking part in public debates involving policing issues, incidents of police 
misconduct, vice versa, have also stimulated minority groups to become more self-
aware and politically active, regarding issues not solely related to the police. For 
example, Berg argues that the Abner Louima case resulted in a growing self-awareness 
amongst the Haitian community, enabling the community to politically mobilize itself. 
After the Haitian American Alliance successfully organized a protest march for 
Louima in 1997, which was attended by more than ten thousand people, a year later the 
Alliance started to focus on different issues, ranging from housing conditions to lack of 
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business development, and held an intensive campaign to identify and mobilize the 
Haitian electorate in support for a Haitian candidate in the State Assembly.
82
  
While minority and civil rights groups’ pressure was felt by the police and 
noticed by the media, it often did not lead to immediate change, or even an open 
discussion. Simmons argues that community groups have vainly tried to become a 
dialogue partner in the consent decree processes that have taken place in several cities 
in the United States in relation to police departments’ conduct. Instead, the dialogues 
mostly involved the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and local law 
enforcement agencies. In Los Angeles, “The proposed intervenors were distrustful of 
the negotiation process and complained that DOJ engaged in ‘secret’ negotiations with 
the city officials. The proposed intervenors also criticized the length of time that had 
passed between the City’s approval of the consent decree and entry of the order, noting 
that neither the City nor DOJ attempted to accelerate the process.”83 Overall, Simmons 
points out, community and minority groups, similar to the rank and file, have not been 
successful in obtaining a place at the negotiation table, resulting in overall 
dissatisfaction:  
 
“Notwithstanding the practical benefits of negotiating reforms for local law 
enforcement agencies, DOJ’s negotiation process runs contrary to the established 
democratic theory that those affected by governmental policies should have an 
opportunity to participate in the development of those Policies. […] The agreements 
resulting from DOJ’s pattern or practice legislation have far-reaching ramifications for 
both the police officers performing everyday policing tasks as well as for the 
community members that the local law enforcement agencies serve. For the most part, 
however, DOJ’s process of fashioning the negotiated agreements has excluded these 
important stakeholders. The discontent arising from such exclusion undermines the 
legitimacy of DOJ’s reform efforts, thereby threatening the successful implementation 
and permanence of the reforms.”84 
 
Even in reform programs such as community policing there has been a lack of citizen 
involvement.
85
 Minorities’ lack of power to initiate reform might have changed 
somewhat in recent years, some scholars have observed (see Section 3.10). Yet 
whether this trend is substantial and lasting is unclear.  
 
3.2.2 Views and positioning 
African Americans have more negative attitudes towards the police than whites, as 
discussed in Section 3.1. Their views are reflected in their positioning in the formal 
arena of debate, where they, together with other minorities and civil rights groups, have 
brought up several, partly overlapping issues. These issues include (incidents of) police 
misconduct and use of excessive force, as well as, more broadly, aggressive policing 
tactics, civilian review, and the need for diversification of the force (see Section 3.10). 
The new police critics have also been concerned about the police unionization 
movement, and in particular its influence on accountability.
86
 Police commissioners 
have often been criticized by these groups too, indiscriminate of their race. Benjamin 
Ward’s appointment as police commissioner, for example, which made him the first 
African American to hold that position in the NYPD, was criticized by the American 
Civil Liberties Union, because Ward, according to the organization, had given the civil 
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liberties movement a cold shoulder when he was still a corrections commissioner.
87
 
Mayors, too, have been criticized for their handling of police issues, even those who 
tried to maintain an open discussion with their critics (see discussion in Section 3.7.1). 
Berg argues that while the issue of police brutality “is part of a much broader 
view on the part of some minorities that they are treated with constant suspicion and 
disrespect by the NYPD,” the latter assertion is probably “the most visible example of 
minority groups in the city claiming unequal treatment by the city’s service delivery 
bureaucracy.”88 These broader issues are part of even larger ones concerning criminal 
justice and equality (see discussion in Subsection 3.1.2).  
Some police critics refer themselves to the linkage between policing issues and 
broader ones. In the foreword of the anthology Zero Tolerance. Quality of Life and the 
New Police Brutality in New York City, police critic Paul Chevigny puts the issue of 
aggressive policing tactics in a broader frame: “Here the police are again the lightning 
rod, they are getting blamed for enforcing policies that are not theirs but are those of 
the politicians who run the city.” Similarly, the fight for accountability does not stand 
on its own: “Perhaps the police are right, by their lights, to be leery of accountability 
because it is, as they fear a proxy for control. Those who want accountability want 
change.
89
 In the same anthology, Andrea McArdle connects police shootings to 
politics: “The 41 shots fired at Amadou Diallo have helped to generate what may be a 
near-consensus that the city’s culture of policing, and the political culture that produces 
it, do not respect human rights.”90 More broadly, Chevigny also observes:  
 
“For a great many people — the poor and the dispossessed, the minorities, immigrants 
and the thousands of others who are victims of crime, violators of city ordinances, as 
well as perpetrators of crime — the police are the cutting edge of government. They 
are the government agents who give orders in the street, divide people into those who 
are acceptable or suspicious based on their behavior and sometimes their appearance, 
and, as every child knows, have the power to make their orders stick, by force if 
necessary. […] It is little wonder that people who for one reason or another are treated 
by society as pariahs […] are sometimes infuriated by the incursions of the police.”91  
 
In other excerpts from the anthology, the connection made between police criticism 
and politics/governmental power structures extends well beyond the issue of policing. 
McArdle, for example, also connects NYPD practices to broader economic and societal 
issues: “The zeal with which some NYPD officers have embraced Quality of Life 
policing and more confrontational anticrime strategies is a symptom of a much 
broader, and deeper, social pathology manifested in an indifference to poverty, the 
exploitation of labor, and the devaluing — and demonizing — of racial, ethnic, and 
sexual minorities.”92 More broadly, McArdle also asserts: 
 
“This anthology hopes to show that police brutality and the policing function more 
generally are part of the deep structure of a globalized, neoliberal society. 
Contemporary New York City typifies the move toward redevelopment, 
internationalization, deregulation, and privatization that marks this new politico-





The civil rights riots in the 1960s reveal in particular how aggression, anger and 
mistrust against the police are a product of inequality and broader feelings of mistrust 
against the government concerning a variety issues. As the President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice observed in 1967:  
 
“Examination of the crimes that are committed during rebellions and of the conditions 
of life in the places where riots break out leads to the conclusion that the only enduring 
guarantee that riots will not occur is to answer the cry of ‘Help!’ that Negroes have 
been uttering for many years, and that can be heard clearly even amid the destruction 
and bloodshed of a riot.”94 
 
The minority groups’ focus on the police during the civil rights riots put police officers 
in a difficult position, as they were not empowered to improve such conditions (see 
discussion in Subsection 3.5.1). 
 
Roots and causes for the new police critics’ positioning and views  
Within a literary context, the African-American writer James Baldwin has tried to 
capture and explain the resentment of African Americans towards the police:  
 
“None of Commissioner Kennedy’s policemen, even with the best will in the world, 
have any way of understanding the lives led by the people they swagger about in two’s 
and three’s controlling. Their very presence is an insult, and it would be, even if they 
spent the entire day feeding gum-drops to children. They represent the force of the 
white world. […] It is hard, on the other hand, to blame the policeman, blank, good-
natured, thoughtless, and insuperably innocent, for being such a perfect representative 
of the people he serves. He, too, believes in good intentions and is astounded and 
offended when they are not taken for the deed. He has never, himself, done anything 
for which to be hated — which of us has? — and yet he is facing, daily and nightly, 
people who would gladly see him dead, and he knows it. There is no way for him not 
to know it: there are few things under Heaven more unnerving than the silent, 
accumulating contempt and hatred of a people.”95 
 
Baldwin’s analysis reflects the sociological and historical literature on this topic. 
Within the field of sociology, scholars have theorized the relationship between 
minority and dominant groups at large, and minorities and the police in particular. The 
group-position model of race relations holds that “racial animus not merely [is] […] a 
consequence of negative feelings between members of different racial groups but, more 
centrally, […] a reflection of group competition and conflict over material rewards, 
power, and status in a multiracial society”, “prejudice is rooted in a collective ‘sense of 
group position’, […] group interest is the driving force underlying contentious 
intergroup relations”, and “the subordinate group […] is motivated by a sense of 
unfair, exclusionary treatment by the dominant group, and by an interest in securing a 
greater share of the dominant group’s advantages.”96 Within this broader struggle 
characterized by prejudicial views and driven by group interest, the police are 
perceived differently by dominant and subordinate groups. Weitzer and Tuch:  
 
“Our extension of the group-position thesis holds that views of social institutions will 
be influenced by group interests and perceived threats. Dominant groups should 
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perceive the police as an institution allied with their interests, whereas minorities 
should be more inclined to view the police as contributing to their subordination.”97  
 
The group-position thesis thus gives an explanation of why the police are a primary 
target in the public debate: Police control is detrimental to minorities’ quest for status, 
power and material rewards in society and contributes to their subordination. In 
addition, the group-position model shows how minorities’ views on the police are 
intensified by the police’s function in society and their link to government. Other 
sociological studies have resulted in similar conclusions. In their study on the inception 
of riots, for example, Lieberson and Silverman point out that: “police activities reflect 
the policies, sympathies, and attitudes of the local municipal government. One often-
cited factor in race riots is the lack of Negro policemen.”98 Niederhoffer: “The 
policeman’s role of guardian and enforcer inevitably involves him in incidents that 
may be interpreted as police brutality. The solution to this problem is far more complex 
than some superficial modification of police personnel and procedure.”99 
Historians have made several observations that are in line with the conclusions 
above, in particular concerning the group-position theory. First, historians argue that 
the relationship between the police and minorities is characterized by a schism between 
‘us’ and ‘them’. Lardner and Reppetto: “In the minority neighborhoods of New York 
and other cities, the police were often perceived as a mechanized army of occupation, 
an image troubling to many people inside as well as outside the profession.”100 Second, 
historians interpret the battle between minority groups and the police as part of a 
broader struggle for equal rights.
101
 Third, and also in line with the group-position 
thesis, is the theory that police criticism fits within the specific American tradition of 
‘diversity politics’ during and after the civil rights era. Chevigny:  
 
“The police are a political lighting rod, especially for the sort of politics, so highly 
developed in the United States, through which a group carves out a place for itself in 
the system by recognizing its difference from others, while at the same time organizing 
to attack discrimination against it.”102  
 
This form of politics has been particularly pronounced in New York. Berg:  
 
“It is unclear what impact the death of the melting pot had on New York City. As a 
gateway city for immigrants, New York had always experienced a level of 
racial/ethnic diversity and identity seen in few other cities. This was supported by the 
city’s political culture, which had traditionally sought to politically mobilize ethnic and 
racial groups, thereby supporting a level of ethnic identity and isolation. Some would 
question whether the melting pot myth was ever accepted in New York City’s political 
culture during the period of time when it was receiving support throughout the national 
political culture.”103 
 
Lastly, historians have also pointed out that minorities’ perceptions of the police are a 
reflection of a struggle for status and feelings of victimization. Fogelson argues that 
African Americans’ resentment towards the police has a strong historical component: 
 
“The Negroes left the South with a long and sorrowful history of police mistreatment; 
to them the patrolman was the principal agent in perpetuating racial subordination and 
segregation. Once in the North […] the Negroes are just as anxious about their status 
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as the police; a racial (indeed, in America the racial) minority, they, too, are touched 
by an acute and sometimes undue sensitivity” 
 
[…] “The Negroes’ resentment of the police did not develop in the nineteen-sixties; 
nor did the grievances underlying it.”104  
 
Overall, the positioning of the new police critics had a cynical undertone and 
comprised elements of victimization and alienation, which were fueled by police 
practice, incidents and the police’s response to their criticism.105 Rigid policing 
programs such as Compstat not only led to a highly inflexible, rigid organization that 
isolated the police even more from communities, it also further alienated minority 
groups and aggravated these bitter sentiments.
106
 Police critics’ cynicism also increased 
as a consequence of defensive police communication strategies, such as the 




The new police critics’ victimization, bitterness and alienation has been channeled in 
different ways. Debates between the police and minority groups often took place in the 
informal arena of debate, during street encounters in which the police, too, received 
physical and verbal violence, Niederhoffer points out: “New York’s policemen have 
been subjected to unparalleled physical and verbal attack, especially from members of 
minority groups.”108 The new police critics were also active in the formal arena of 
debate. Here, community leaders and civil rights activists took up issues ranging from 
controversial police shootings to broader topics, such as aggressive police tactics and 
the need for diversification of the force. 
The Rev. Al Sharpton, an influential, outspoken and at times controversial 
police critic, has taken the lead in many discussions involving the police. Appraisals of 
Sharpton’s performance have been mixed. Kirtzman compares the role of Al Sharpton 
to that of a lawyer, who makes “his arguments in front of cameras, not courts” and to 
that of “an activist-for-hire who didn’t charge a fee.” He points out that Sharpton’s role 
in debates is perceived by many people as that of “a racial arsonist.”109 In particular, 
his role in the Tawana Brawley case was controversial. Al Sharpton supported Ms. 
Brawley, a then 15-year-old who had allegedly been raped by a gang of white men, 
some of whom were police officers. However, these allegations turned out to be false.  
The police critics’ strategies often entailed lobbying, picketing and litigation, 
similar to those of police unions.
110
 One of their methods, used by Rev. Al Sharpton in 
particular, is that of themed marches such as sit-ins, or ‘days of outrage’.111 While the 
police were often the prime target during such rallies, at times broader issues came to 
the surface. Protest marches against the former mayor had an “undercurrent of racial 
resentment.”112 Moreover, protest slogans such as ‘jobs not jails’ mixed criminal 
justice issues with economic ones.
113
  
Certain aspects of the new police critics’ communication negatively impacted 
the process of debate. Niederhoffer, for example, argues that the negative focus on ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, driven by alienation and victimization, has had a negative influence on 




“It is incontestable that for better relations with minority groups the police must 
constantly improve their record in civil rights. But such improvement, though 
necessary, may not be sufficient. Rapprochement must come from two sides and 
requires an ideological shift by the minority group. As long as the Negroes comprise 
an alienated ghetto society, the police will symbolize to them all that is detestable in an 
oppressive white social system.”114  
 
The remedy to improve police–minority relations, according to Niederhoffer, hence 
should include a radical modification of the minorities’ perceptions of the police, and 
government at large. From a group-position theory perspective, Weitzer and Tuch 
similarly observe that the rigid views communicated by community leaders, who often 
serve as catalysts, can cause misunderstanding on the actual issue of debate:  
 
“It is less a question […] of whether racial group interests objectively differ, than a 
matter of whether their interests are perceived as conflicting. These perceptions are 
strongly influenced by the claims made by a group’s leadership (Blumer 1958). 
Minority leaders’ public castigation of the police may reinforce whites’ impressions 
that minorities are opponents of the police, and that their demands might interfere with 
the pursuit of law and order.”115 
 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
By the second half of the twentieth century, minority groups and civil rights groups 
became the police’s most fervent critics. Their growing power, awareness and feelings 
of victimization, bitterness and alienation, resulted in vehement responses towards the 
police in both arenas of debate. Vice versa, incidents of police misconduct have also 
stimulated minority groups to become more self-aware and politically active regarding 
issues not solely related to the police.  
During the civil rights era, the police were often the critics’ prime target. After 
the 1960s, the new police critics continued to be dominant actors in the public debate 
regarding police conduct. In this debate, minority and civil rights groups have brought 
up issues including (incidents of) police misconduct and use of excessive force, as well 
as, more broadly, concerns regarding aggressive policing tactics, civilian review, and 
the need for diversification of the force. They have also criticized the role of the police 
commissioner and the mayor, as well as the negative effects of police unionization. 
These public discussions were initiated and led by community leaders such as the Rev. 
Al Sharpton. His communication has been zealous and agenda-setting, and at times 
opportunistic. Strategies included lobbying, picketing and litigation, similar to the 
strategies used by police unions.  
The positioning of these new critics comprises a strong ‘us-versus-them’ 
component, in which the police, as Baldwin puts it, “represent the white world.” The 
critics’ ‘us-versus-them’ positioning is a product of a long history of (perceived) police 
mistreatment, but also of a broader battle for equal rights, the American tradition of 
‘diversity politics’, and feelings of victimization and alienation.  
Within the group-position theory, the critics’ focus on the police can be 
understood by looking at the police’s role and mandate, which are believed to be 
detrimental to the minorities’ quest for status, power and material rewards in society. 
Moreover, the police are a very visible representation of government. In this context, 
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the issues brought up by minority groups together comprise the most visible element 
within a broader set of concerns held by these groups regarding the criminal justice 
system and government at large, not only concerning policing but also racial inequality 
in general. The police are in this sense a lightning rod, in the center of a broad struggle 
between dominant and subordinate groups. In this struggle, characterized by prejudicial 
views and driven by group interest, the police are criticized for policies created by the 
government, while the agenda-setting of police issues is done as a strategic means to 
gain broader control.  
While the criticism conveyed by minorities had an agenda-setting effect and 
the police indeed tried to improve their image after the civil rights riots, the criticism 
only sporadically led to immediate change, or even to an open dialogue. The negative 
focus on ‘us’ and ‘them’ has had a negative influence on police–community relations. 
Moreover, the use of the police as a vehicle for political communication for broader 
issues, a direct consequence of the police’s function as a lightning rod, has put the 




3.3 The police as an organization 
Police departments are influenced by organizational and environmental contexts, each 
of which has a historical dimension.
116
 Changes in these contexts have consequences 
for the police’s internal organization, as well as their power and positioning, Reiss 
argues. He elaborates on the environmental context, pointing out that “all organizations 
engage in transactions with their environment and are vulnerable to its penetration of 
their integrity. But the police seem especially so.” He maintains that many police 
characteristics can be understood in terms of this environmental penetration.
117
 In this 
context, the police’s focus on secrecy is a way to insulate the organization from such 
penetration (see Subsection 3.2.2). Reiss and Bordua argue that these contexts provide 
“an unusual opportunity to develop and apply a transaction view of organizations”, 
considering that “on the one hand, police departments have clearly defined boundaries, 
and yet, on the other, they must continually engage in the management of highly 
contingent relationships that arise outside them.
118
 This section looks at how these 
environmental and organizational contexts have influenced police departments, in 
particular the NYPD, in the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
3.3.1 Organizational changes in the twentieth century 
“As the twentieth century wanes, it has become clear that the transactions of police 
organizations with their environment are substantially determined by the goals and 
means of a legalistic and technocratic bureaucracy.”119 
Albert Reiss 
 
At present, the police landscape in America, still local and fragmented, comprises a 
multitude of organizations with overlapping jurisdiction.
120
 In this respect, the 
American police’s organizational structure has barely changed over the years, 
remaining distinctly different from European ones. Similarly, American police 
departments remain more local, distinct, open, uncoordinated systems that are more 
prone to conflict, in comparison to their European counterparts. Instead, the current 
American system still distinguishes itself by temporary arrangements, but also by 
jurisdictional ambiguity and informal, personal communication lines.
121
 In addition, the 
organizations are still characterized by “familial and/or ethnic inheritance of 
occupation”, and internal promotion procedures.122 
However, over the past decades, individual police departments did encounter 
change. Looking back at the developments in the twentieth century, there have been 
alterations to the mobilization, organization, work, professional basis, technology and 
information systems of the police.
123
 The NYPD has been a pioneer in this respect: a 
“flagship police agency” that sets the example for other departments.124  
Yet in New York, organizational change was an evolutionary process, rather 
than a revolutionary one. Silverman: “It took 80 years for police departments to 
reconfigure from the decentralized, politically dominated social service agencies that 
they were at the turn of the century and to become today’s bureaucratic, professional, 
more centralized and exclusively law enforcement organizations.”125 Certain existing 
processes, some set into motion as early as the 1850s, continued in the second half of 
the twentieth century. Together with the professionalization movement, the NYPD’s 
shift towards a civil service bureaucracy — a concept coined by Max Weber as the 
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establishment of relations between a legally constituted and legitimate authority and its 
subordinate officials — was one of the major dynamics in the twentieth century.126 
Their seeds were planted in the first decades as part of the second wave of reform led 
by law enforcement leaders, as discussed in the previous chapter, and these processes 




The professionalization and bureaucratization processes, initiated to combat 
problematic police behavior, isolate the police from political ties, and reduce the 
vulnerable position of police chiefs, were marked by the development of a hierarchical 
system of command and control aimed at excluding political influences. Reiss argues 
that neutralization of political powers was first obtained by transforming the quasi-
military bureaucracy into a “legalistic and technocratic” bureaucracy, “whose members 
are committed to an occupational community with norms of subordination and service 
that set it apart from the community that it policed.” Thus the police were held 
accountable to bureaucratic instead of political powers. After this, bureaucracy was 
further consolidated by territorial centralization, made possible by technological 
inventions. These measures further enlarged the distance between police and 
public. For police departments, probably the two largest social and organizational 
changes resulting from these inventions comprised the shift from foot to motor patrol 
and the closing of police stations. Still, police departments have increased their 
workforces considerably, considering a centralized bureaucracy requires “at least twice 
as many police officers per capita.”128  
In the second half of the twentieth century, bureaucratization and 
professionalization further shielded police organizations from penetration by their 
environment, although local bureaucracies were less isolated than state or federal ones. 
Still, certain barriers to full bureaucratization and professionalization remained, such as 
the rank and file’s discretionary powers, which continued to have a tampering effect on 
reform in general. In particular, corruption remained hard to combat (see Subsection 
3.9.2).
129
 Moreover, due to these processes, the NYPD, like other police organizations, 
continued to grow more institutionally rigid and conservative with little space for 
opinion, innovation, and initiative.
130
 Paradoxically, this lack of initiative to innovate 
and reform was also a result of society’s high expectations of the police. Sherman: 
 
“To experiment is to admit ignorance, but […] the public image law enforcement 
officials generally prefer is omniscience rather than ignorance, certainty rather than 
questioning. Here again there are increasingly frequent exceptions among police 
executives. But until the general public allows the police to liberate themselves from 
the rhetoric of total competence, it will remain difficult for police officials to admit the 
lack of knowledge and to undertake widespread clinical experimentation on the scale 
of, say, the nation’s health establishment.”131 
 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the NYPD, like other departments, 
attempted to change its organizational structure and culture, for example by 
implementing community policing and problem-oriented policing.
132
 In 1992, Reiss 
predicts that the police departments are standing at a crossroads:  
 
“The dilemma of modern policing seems to lie in determining whether to continue 
opting for rational, bureaucratic administration centering on crime events and their 
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control or, rather, to transform policing into a bureaucracy centered on community and 
social problems that is accountable to localized groups.”133  
 
Initiatives such as community policing, which focus on the community and its 
problems rather than on efficiency, are responses to the centralization, 
bureaucratization and professionalization efforts up until the 1970s.
134
 Their roots can 
be found “in a wish to fundamentally transform that traditional, rigid, overtly 
centralized, machine bureaucracy into a flexible institution.”135 However, these 
attempts were often superficial, also in New York, where in fact the “professional-
bureaucratic authoritarian model” ruled.136 In this respect, police departments remained 
short of self-awareness and inventiveness.
137
 Silverman: “The NYPD is not a learning 
organization, proactively searching for fundamental improvement. Change was 
unplanned and adaptive — designed to deflect external pressures.”138 Not all 
researchers agree with this. Bayley asserts that American police management does — 
to a degree — accept specific outside innovation and reformers, which makes the 
American system unique in this respect.
139
 
 By the turn of the century the NYPD’s organization altered after the 
implementation of the Compstat program — an organizational management tool for 
police departments with a strong focus on accountability and crime statistics. While the 
police changed its style from ‘service-oriented’ to ‘legalistic-orientated’, the rank and 
file shifted from ‘service and the beat cop’ to ‘crime and commanding officers.’140 This 
program, ironically, transformed the NYPD even more into a conservative, rigid 
organization. Cowper:  
 
“This style of leadership (not even a true representation of leadership by boot camp 
drill instructors) has done within policing exactly what its critics decry: created 
organizations that are centrally controlled and highly inflexible, characterized by top-
down order transmission and bottom-up reporting; less creative and more intellectually 
rigid individual officers bound to tradition and regulations, unable to deal effectively 
with both the dynamics of modern policing theories and the communities they serve; 
and a more combat enforcement oriented force, with a resulting increase in isolation 
from and hostility between police and citizens.”141 
 
3.3.2 The NYPD’s role in public debates 
This subsection examines how the organizational changes discussed in the previous 
subsection, as well as other environmental and organizational developments in the 




Police power has both an environmental and internal component. From an 
environmental perspective, policing in the second half of the twentieth century 
continued to be (seen as) an inherently political activity, even though external political 
influences were banned. While police officers are representatives of the state, the 
police as an organization remains a reflection of (municipal) government.
142
 Hence the 
police functioned as a political lightning rod (also see Section 3.2.2).  
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The professionalization and bureaucratization processes affected the NYPD’s 
power in different ways. First, police departments, as bureaucracies, were able to 
insulate themselves to a certain degree from public opinion, although the push for 
civilian review that gained momentum in the second half of the twentieth century was 
aimed at diminishing the police’s power to insulate itself.143 Second, while police 
departments in the United States still depend on external political mechanisms that 
hold the police accountable, and while some researchers point out that external forces 
have led to policy changes in some instances, more researchers believe that the police 
remain unaffected to reform, except after highly-publicized scandals and much 
political pressure.
144
 Silverman: “The essential components of the professional-
bureaucratic model have traditionally produced the organizational armor used to ward 
off attacks by reformers.”145  
From an environmental perspective, police departments have also influenced 
other stakeholders. For example, the police organization has a strong impact on media, 
in particular on the way the police are represented (see Subsection 3.8.1). The police 
organization and its actions also affected the actions and views of police critics (see 
Subsection 3.2.2). Its influence on police reform and police–community relations will 
be discussed in Sections 3.9 and 3.10. 
From an internal perspective, police organizations increasingly became sights 
of strife between police management and the rank and file, each group having different 
interests, views, and objectives.
146
 The power of the police chiefs and police 
management in general increased due to bureaucratization and professionalization 
processes.
147
 In New York, later on, due to some decentralization measures, precinct 
commanders’ authority increased. However, their accountability increased as well, 
which had negative effects.
148
 The police chief’s position, which is not tied to civil 
service arrangements, as he is appointed by the mayor and indirectly dependent of 
electoral voting and public opinion, also remains vulnerable.
149
 Internally, the 
bureaucratization and professionalization processes also affected the development of 
the rank and file and its distinct culture. These developments will be discussion in the 
sections ahead.  
 
Positioning and communication 
Police departments’ official positioning is determined by the police chiefs and their 
spokespeople (see Section 3.4). It is important to note that the NYPD’s official 
positioning and communication on certain topics (such as police professionalization) 
and in response to certain incidents (for example regarding police violence and 




From an organizational perspective, the NYPD’s rigid and conservative 
organization, in which there was little space for opinion, innovation, and initiative, led 
to an equally rigid and conservative positioning on certain issues. For example, police 
departments have been strong advocates of law-and-order politics, Hill argues, as 
police organizations spoke out “against the ‘procedural revolution’ of the Warren 
Court with each major Supreme Court decision, so that by the 1966 ‘Miranda’ ruling, 
the phrase ‘handcuffing the police’ was already commonplace.”151 This feeling of 
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“handcuffing” is shared by police management, unions, and the rank and file, as 
discussed in the following sections.  
The NYPD’s rigid and conservative character is also reflected in its response 
to proposed reform measures, which has often been cosmetic, while reform was often 
thwarted. Silverman and Della-Giustina: “When critics maintain that administrative 
inflexibilities inhibit police from focusing on citizen concerns, departments react 
predictably with adaptive devices that effect superficial fixes.”152 The NYPD’s rigid 
and conservative organization is also reflected in the overall reticent way the 
organization interacted with others. However, in response to the 1960s riots, American 
police departments developed to a certain extent into more open organizations, for 
example by allowing more access to scholars.
153
 In this respect “self-protectionism” 
and “distrust of all things sociological” made way for “a more positive assessment of 
the benefits to policing policy and practice that rigorous research has to offer.”154 Yet 
secrecy still remained a core component of the police organization, Reiss argues: 
“Modern police organizations seem to want closed systems while searching for means 
to penetrate other systems that, to a growing degree, are closed to them in democratic 
societies.”155 More generally, all bureaucracies — presuming to be shielded from 
political pressures — are wary of interference and often consider it unwarranted.156 
Such interference can range from public opinion to the filing of complaints. The police 
departments’ reticent image was further intensified by the actions of police unions, 






While the professionalization and bureaucratization processes further consolidated in 
the twentieth century, barriers remained and problems persisted. Moreover, these 
processes, in combination with society’s high expectations, and the police’s mandate 
and organization itself, resulted in rigid and conservative police organizations, with 
equally rigid and conservative positioning on certain issues and reform initiatives. 
Superficially implemented initiatives such as community policing did not have a 
significant impact on the professional-bureaucratic authoritarian model. After the 
implementation of the Compstat program, the organization became even more rigid 
and conservative.  
Internally, the police organizations increasingly became scenes of strife 
between police management and the rank and file. Externally, the processes further 
widened the gap between police and public. Police departments were able to insulate 
themselves not only from political influences, but also to a certain degree from public 
opinion and reform initiatives. Yet while external political influences on the Police 
Department were reduced, policing continued to be seen as an inherently political 
activity, as the police are representatives of the state and the police as an organization 




3.4 Police commissioners 
Police commissioners are not only the first official in the chain of police command, 
they are, together with their team of official spokespersons/public information officers, 
also the organization’s mouthpiece. This section examines their development in the 
second half of the twentieth century, by examining how the police commissioners dealt 
with stakeholders both internally and externally, how they tried to secure their 
vulnerable position, and how they positioned themselves. The last paragraph looks at 
the development of public information officers during the same period. 
 
3.4.1 Police commissioners’ power 
The police chief’s powers have traditionally been limited. In Weber’s typology of a 
bureaucracy, the American police commissioner is a “patrimonial bureaucrat” whose 
appointment and tenure depends on the mayor’s approval.158 His position is hence 
insecure, as he has to deal with external pressures, and he is accountable to the mayor, 
an elected official himself. The mayor can also take credit for successful NYPD 




Yet while the police commissioner depends on mayoral approval and support, 
he often has to deal with problems on his own. In their classic study on New York 
politics, Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman wrote: “The police commissioner — 
isolated from the mayor and other elected officials, from the party leaders, and from 
other agencies, and confronted by an unstructured, fragmented constituency — is […] 
cut off from effective external alliances and thrust back upon his own limited resources 
in attempting to lead and direct the police bureaucracy.”160 In an interesting essay on 
the interaction between the mayor and the police, sociologist Cyril Robinson explains 
that the mayor and the police “should be seen as the description of two teams, subject 
to periodic substitutions, playing a (usually) friendly game of catch, the ball being 
responsible for tackling the city’s problems.”161 He argues that a fictional gap had 
grown between the police commissioner and the government, which facilitated the 
function of the police as a vehicle for political communication (see discussion in 
Subsection 3.7.1). 
When policing became increasingly politicized in the 1960s in New York, 
police commissioners had to juggle between satisfying the rank and file — who were 
becoming more powerful and organized in this period — and making concessions to 
the political turmoil of that era. Both developments further undermined the police 
commissioners’ already unstable position.162 Bordua and Reiss:  
 
“Internal solidarities create special barriers to the effective exercise of command over 
and above the features of task organization […]. They become particularly significant 
in attempts at modernization or reform. The police commander ignores this internal 
culture at his peril. It can confront him with an opposition united from top to 
bottom.”163  
 
In particular, the police unions became powerful stakeholders, often pitted against the 
police commissioner, while holding both formal and informal powers over the police 
chiefs, such as the casting of a rhetorical vote of no confidence.
164
 This power has been 
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recognized by police commissioners themselves, too. Anthony V. Bouza, former Chief 
of the Minneapolis Police Department: “The battle for control of the police agency, and 
for the imposition of the reforms needed to maximize its effectiveness, is increasingly 
fought between the chief and the union.”165  
In the second half of the twentieth century, New York police chiefs continued 
their efforts to diminish the vulnerability of their position. In general, these police 
chiefs sought organizational ways to hold their staff accountable, by bureaucratizing 
the police and by professionalizing the rank and file.
166
 In the mid-1950s, Police 
Commissioner Francis William Holbrooke Adams said that the NYPD was “a military 
organization that must be run by the commissioner alone.”167 However, up to that 
point, the delineation between politics and police administration was still blurred. His 
successor, Steve Kennedy, a career cop and reformer, took measures to change this. 
Another reform commissioner was Patrick Murphy, who was appointed after the 
Knapp Commission hearings in 1970, with a mission to eradicate the pervasive 
corruption.
168
 When Murphy died in 2011, New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly 
wrote that Murphy “was the visionary embodiment of police reform.”169 While his 
tenure was — according to Lardner and Reppetto — probably “the most fertile 
moment in the saga of the NYPD’s management from the mid-1940s until the early 
1990s”, not all of his reforms were lasting and success was in fact limited.170 
Silverman: “Murphy’s administration […] demonstrates that the NYPD is like a 
massive ocean liner, its course is extremely difficult to change. […] Murphy’s record 
graphically portrays the Police Department’s broad institutional capacity to either 
block or absorb reform.”171 While reform commissioners were, in the main, rather 
unsuccessful due to this resistance, they were also thwarted by reports on weak police 
performance, public outcries with regard to crime, and the succession of a reform 
mayor by one who is focused on crime reduction.
172
 
Reform commissioners were rare in the NYPD. As one officer once said: 
“Murphy made his presence known, that was unusual for a police commissioner.”173 
This could be the result of the culture of the department. While the police chief’s 
charisma can effectuate change, reform commissioners, in particular, faced much 
resistance from the rank and file.
174
 Both Steve Kennedy and Patrick Murphy were 
unpopular for initiating reforms.
175
 Similarly, Lee Brown, who received many 
invitations for speaking opportunities in the country, was mockingly called ‘Out-of-
Town Brown’ by his colleagues for never being in the city.176 
At times, police commissioners faced criticism from both civil liberties groups 
and rank-and-file officers, concerning the same actions, yet for opposite reasons. When 
Ward was appointed police commissioner in 1984, this was heavily criticized by the 
New York chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, “which felt that Ward had 
been insufficiently responsive to civil liberties concerns as corrections 
commissioner.”177 However, the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) was 
equally apprehensive, still remembering Ward’s role in the Harlem mosque incident 
more than a decade before. Ward, who was deputy commissioner for community 
affairs at the time, had publicly apologized for the incident and had stated that the 






3.4.2 Police commissioners’ views and positioning 
“I’m very, very liberal when it comes to race relations, but when it comes to law 
enforcement, I am very, very conservative. I certainly believe the bad guys belong in 
jail.”179 
Police Commissioner Ward 
 
The police commissioners’ views and positioning have often been much in line with 
that of rank-and-file officers. For example, with regard to the existence of crime in the 
1970s and 1980s, police chiefs, akin to police officers, believed that crime in New 
York was pervasive and that New York likened “a Third World city” where crime 
could not be suppressed, only contained.
180
 Similarly, police chiefs have often 
denounced both criticism and the groups expressing this criticism. The media, for 
example, are regarded as superficial and in possession of a “Watergate mentality” (see 
Subsection 3.8.2). Moreover, both police chiefs and the rank and file traditionally hold 
negative views towards civilian oversight, which they consider an infringement of 
police authority. Their preference goes out to internal investigations over external 
accountability mechanisms.
181
 This view is slowly changing amongst police chiefs, yet 
they still express much caution.  
In regard to other issues, the commissioner and the rank and file are often 
pitted against each other. In particular, police chiefs have expressed their concern about 
police unionism, which they see as an infringement of the police chiefs’ authority and, 
often, as conflicting with the function of the police.
182
 Police chiefs often complained 
that police unions and collective bargaining agreements stymied reform.
183
 However, 
police chiefs endorsed police unions when their activities resulted in large 
appropriations.
184
 In a paper for the 64th Annual Conference of the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police held in 1957, Col. Carl E. Heustis, Chief of Police in 
the City of Louisville, wrote: “It is impossible for a police officer to remain free of 
favoritism or bias, when he is required at all times to bear true and faithful allegiance 
to the labor movement” and “the best interests of a police department would not be 
served by affiliation with a police labor union.”185 He further asserted that unionization 
was a passing fact and predicted that unions would cease to exist by 1963. His vision 
did not materialize. In 1990 former Minneapolis Police Commissioner Bouza wrote: 
“The struggle has involved role confusion, in which the union has, inappropriately, 
tried to manage the operation.”186  
 The police commissioner’s positioning in regard to police problems and issues 
has regularly been in line with that of the mayor. This is not surprising, as the mayor 
appoints the police commissioner. In this context, Police Commissioner Safir and 
Mayor Giuliani shared their positioning on aggressive policing tactics, while his 
successor, in line with Mayor Bloomberg, was “more concerned with community 
acceptance and internal acceptance.”187  
 
3.4.3 Police commissioners’ communication 
“I think I have done a damn good job of protecting the commissioner against the 
onslaughts of outside agencies.”188 




In the second half of the twentieth century, the police commissioners’ communication 
towards their critics continued to be strongly defensive. Police chiefs tended to insulate 
themselves from external criticism, yet when they were forced to respond, they 
generally denied allegations. Niederhoffer harshly coins this response “the principle of 
equilibrium”, i.e. “the organizational imperative that requires the negation of any and 
all criticism.” He identifies two techniques to accomplish this: “to pile up a mass of 
exculpatory statistics in the next report; or to attack the reputation or motives of the 
critic and thus by an argument ad hominem to nullify both the critic and the 
criticism.”189 Examples of these and other techniques have been noted by other 
scholars, too. For example, Soffer points out that in response to several “stories of 
horrifying abuses of power”, Benjamin Ward disseminated statistics with an analysis 
stating that “the NYPD’s fatal police shootings per 100 officers [and per citizen] is the 
model for the nation.”190 This communication strategy used by several police 
commissioners has resulted in police critics’ wariness towards police statistics (see 
Subsection 3.2.1). The ad hominem strategy mentioned by Niederhoffer comes to light 
in a paper presented by Michael J. Murphy — New York police commissioner from 
1961 to 1965 — at the Conference of the National District Attorneys’ Association. 
During his presentation, the then police chief addresses police criticism and discusses 
the image of law enforcement in general. His paper also gives insight into the 
defensive attitude and positioning of the Police Department towards such criticism. 
Some excerpts:  
 
Unfortunately, the true image of law enforcement […] is being unfairly distorted and 
smeared today as never before in our history. At a time when the need for justice 
under law was never more apparent or necessary, those who enforce and administer the 
law find themselves the targets of ridicule and contempt. The serious consequences 
of this type of attack cannot be overestimated. It strikes at the very foundation of our 
democratic process and could, if successful, so weaken the structure of our 
government that the rights of all citizens to the pursuit of life and liberty would be 
jeopardized. 
 
Although part of the distortion is being created by certain groups determined to 
weaken the democratic process, a greater proportion unconsciously emanates 
from a lack of knowledge of the role and attitude of law enforcement officers. In a 
way we are to blame for the latter, for a failure to drive home our message that the vast 
majority of men in the police and law enforcement professions are honest and 
devoted public servants, dedicated only to the public welfare. 
 
The distortions become the smears. Sadly enough, those who are responsible for 
providing the material for the smears are the small number of men within the police 
ranks who have betrayed their trust out of greed, unconcern for their oath of office and 
the public welfare, and with cynical disregard for the fine records established by 
thousands and thousands of devoted police officers. 
 
[…] Most of the lack of confidence and respect is based on a lack of knowledge.  
 
[…] In this city they have won mixed notices — some raves; some boos. They have 
been praised in most quarters for their impartial attitude and restraint under fire. They 
have been criticized and condemned in other quarters as bullies and brutes and 
have become the principal target of a misdirected hatred born of frustration. The 
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small group of critics, however, are more vocal and vociferous than the police 
supporters, so that the first impression is one of widespread condemnation of 
police. This is not true, but the campaign of vilification has left policemen puzzled, 
bitter, and deeply resentful. 
 
[…]Too often, people seem to forget that the policeman places his life on the line 
almost every time he encounters a violation of law.  
 
[…] This attitude, unfortunately, is reflected by children and adolescents who observe 
and hear the disparaging remarks of their parents. The police officer does not mind 
being regarded as the enemy by the criminal — because this is his enemy and our 
enemy — but he is puzzled when the people he is trying to protect side with the 




These excerpts show how Murphy perceives criticism to be both harsh (‘targets of 
ridicule and contempt’, ‘bullies and brutes’, ‘campaign of vilification’) and rather 
imbalanced (‘unfairly distorted and smeared today as never before in our history’). 
Moreover, he believes that the critics’ motives are unfair (‘misdirected hatred born of 
frustration’, ‘certain groups determined to weaken the democratic process’). The 
perceived negative image is further distorted due to the public’s ignorance (‘Most of 
the lack of confidence and respect is based on a lack of knowledge’, ‘people seem to 
forget’, ‘a lack of knowledge of the role and attitude of law enforcement officers’). 
According to Murphy, the harsh criticism by a ‘small’ yet ‘vocal and vociferous’ group 
of critics leads to police victimization (‘principal target’, ‘[this] has left policemen 
puzzled, bitter, and deeply resentful’) of those who are already vulnerable (‘the 
policeman places his life on the line almost every time he encounters a violation of 
law’). Moreover, this criticism can have an overall detrimental effect on democratic 
and judicial processes (‘weaken the structure of our government’).  
Besides this defensive communication style, the New York police 
commissioners’ communications approach overall has not been marked by delicacy. 
One of the more blunt commissioners, Benjamin Ward, often made outrageous 
statements which he called “Wardisms.” He excused himself by saying “I’m blunt and 
I’m black.” In a meeting with a Hispanic group, the commissioner had said “Tell your 
relatives to be careful where they buy their drugs — we don’t want to confiscate their 
cars.” In a second meeting with the same group, Ward responded to a question of why 
are there so few Hispanics in high positions in the force by saying that it reminded him 
of a “story among whites in South Africa […] Don’t give the Zulu white bread, give 
them black bread, because if you give the Zulu white bread, tomorrow they will want 
butter too.” When he banned the hog-tying of prisoners after a prisoner died in custody 
while tied up, Phil Caruso, head of the PBA, insisted on the right to hog-tie suspects. 
Ward publicly asserted that the union leader needed to “be brought up short to let him 
know that he is not running the Police Department.” 192 
In line with this upfront communication approach, the police commissioners’ 
communication has also been characterized by a get-tough vocabulary. When Police 
Commissioner William Bratton spoke of his plan to get rid of the squeegee men in 
New York, he said: “They should get off the booze, get off drugs, and get off their 
asses. […] If they’re committing other crimes, we’ll be more than happy to lock ’em 
up, and then they don’t have to worry about washing windows — they can do it in 
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Sing.” Similarly, he said about his campaign to rid the streets of the homeless: “We’re 
going to flush the homeless people off the street in the same successful manner in 
which we flushed them out of the subway system.”193 More generally, Bratton’s 
communication — both internally and externally — was characterized by a ‘gotcha’ 
approach, by which officers were also reprimanded. His successor Raymond Kelly was 
more attuned to stakeholders’ needs.194 
 
The public information officer (PIO) 
The police department’s relationship with the media has traditionally been an informal 
one. Surette and Richard: “Within criminal justice agencies, interaction with the media 
was often an ad hoc, case specific, idiosyncratic process and crime news information 
flow was more likely to be based on personal relationships than on formal 
organizational linkages.” This changed after the 1980s, when criminal justice agencies 
started “to channel information to the media through […] specialized organizational 
slots.”195 From this point onwards, the police commissioner was supported by a 
growing team of public information officers (PIOs), who serve as the link between the 
police, community, and the media. Criminal justice PIOs are “ubiquitous, crime-and-
justice news gatekeeping agents,” gatekeepers being “checkpoints in the dissemination 
of symbolic reality information.”196 Sworn PIOs generally are men who have a 
background in criminal justice, little media-experience and are less satisfied with their 
role than the civilian PIOs, who are typically female and have a background and 
education in media relations and communication.
 
 
A recent study by Motschall and Cao on PIOs in America has shown that PIOs 
particularly identified their role with media relations, as opposed to a role as 
communication manager, technician and liaison. This role was highly positively 
correlated with actions comprising the dissemination of information to the media, such 
as the writing of press releases, forging formal and informal contacts with the media, 
and staging events.
197
 While 92% of the interviewees said they approached situations 
reactively, almost two in three also conducted certain proactive activities, a strategy 
characterized as “get the good stories out first,” “keep media informed of events,” and 
“keep ahead of the game by having good relationship with the media.”198 Other 
research shows that PIOs perceive their work mainly as reactive and often non-PIO 
related.
199
 Scholars generally believe that the PIOs’ role fits within the public 
information model of police behavior, being “reactive, media relations-focused, and 
illustrative of a one-way flow of information.”200 However, some do believe that the 
police are moving to a two-way model of public relations behavior. Motschall and Cao: 
“The police PIO position has emerged as an important symbol and instrument of law 
enforcement’s move from a closed system (paramilitary) to a more open system 





In the second half of the twentieth century, the police chief’s traditionally limited 
powers were put under extra pressure by the growing power and consciousness of the 
rank and file. While police commissioners often faced criticism from both civil 
liberties groups and rank-and-file officers, they had to deal with problems on their 
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own, as the visible power link between the government and the police continued to 
fade.  
Several reform commissioners tried to diminish the vulnerability of their 
position and press for reforms, yet their efforts were mainly unsuccessful due to 
internal resistance, reports on weak police performance, public outcries in regard to 
crime (fueled by the media’s focus on a crime wave) and the succession of a reform 
mayor by one that is focused on crime reduction. 
The police commissioners’ views and positioning on policing issues, such as 
the existence of crime and also civilian oversight, were often in line with that of rank-
and-file officers. However, in regard to other issues, in particular related to working 
conditions and unionization, the commissioner and the rank and file have often been 
pitted against each other. The police commissioner’s positioning has often been in line 
with that of the mayor, too.  
In line with their defensive positioning, the police commissioners’ 
communication towards those critical of the police also continued to be strongly 
defensive. While they have argued that criticism is often harsh and unbalanced, the 
critics’ motives are often considered to be unfair and based on ignorance, ultimately 
leading to police victimization, while having a negative impact on democratic and 
judicial processes. Responses to misconduct cases were defensive. Specific tactics 
included use of exculpatory statistics and attacks on the reputation or motives of the 
critic. Some commissioners’ approaches were also marked by bluntness and a get-
tough vocabulary.  
While the department’s relationship with the media has traditionally been an 
informal one, this changed after the 1980s, since when the police commissioner has 
been supported by a growing team of PIOs who, as news gatekeeping agents, channel 
information and serve as the link between the police, community, and the media. Their 
work mainly involves a one-way flow of information, yet some believe that there are 





3.5 The rank and file 
Being a police officer is a “defining identity”, compared by some to that of a religious 
calling, by others to that of a position within a close family.
202
 While many popular 
beliefs exist in regard to the rank and file’s character, the latter’s complexity obscures 
understanding into the roots, interactions, and effects of the police function, position in 
society, behavior, attitudes, traits and culture. First, the modern patrolman’s moral 
order is compound and convoluted and can shift from the individual to the 
collective.
203
 Second, while the rank and file’s characteristics are shaped by both 




This section first looks at how the rank and file’s occupational basis and 
position in society have evolved and how they have affected the officer’s character. 
Subsection 3.5.2 examines which other factors have impacted the rank and file’s 
behavior, attitudes, traits and culture. Subsection 3.5.3 explores the rank and file’s role 
in debates on police problems/reform. The last subsection specifically looks at the 
group of African-American police officers.  
 
3.5.1 The rank and file’s evolving function, occupational basis, and  
relationship with the public 
“Whether it involves protection against an undesired imposition, caring for those who 
cannot care for themselves, attempting to solve a crime, helping to save a life, abating 
a nuisance or settling an explosive dispute, police intervention means above all making 
use of the capacity and authority to overpower resistance.”205 
Police scientist Egon Bittner 
 
Similar to that of police organizations, police officers’ behavior is influenced by both 
organizational and environmental contexts, each of which has a historical dimension. 
Within the organizational context, the rank and file’s specific function in the force 
influences behavioral aspects that are of interest to this research. First, the police have 
the unique capacity to use force, which can result in misconduct (and consequential 
debate).
206
 More broadly, Reiss argues, police organizations are “organized around 
transactions with people and organizations in their environment” and hence officers 
“occupy boundary-spanning roles.”207 This relationship between the police and their 
environment can also lead to misconduct and consequential debate.
208
 Other, less 
obvious, behavior can result from the police function. For example, one of the causes 
of the widening gulf between public and police, as will be discussed further on, is the 
police function’s focus on secrecy and dealing with problem citizens. 
Contemporary scholars have struggled to understand how the organizational 
context influences police culture and police officers’ behavior. Several theories exist. 
Herbert defines six primary normative orders, i.e. “sets of rules and practices centered 
around a primary value” to understand contemporary police culture: law, bureaucratic 
control, adventure/machismo, safety, competence, and morality.
209
 Each of these orders 
both enables and constrains officers and “structure the world view of the police and 
infuse it with emotive significance.”210 Herbert argues that the function of policing 




“The existence of these six normative orders are understandable given the occupational 
mandate handed to officers. The importance of the law is obvious, given that the police 
obtain their basic set of powers and obligations through legal dictates. Bureaucratic 
control is significant in any large organization where management seeks to structure 
and regulate the work of subordinates. Adventure/machismo and safety arise from the 
possibility of unpredictable danger that lurks constantly in the consciousness of most 
officers. Concerns of competence are hardly unique to police officers, but still 
crucially shape how officers view their work. And the potent sense of morality officers 
evince grows from the fact that they must act swiftly in ambiguous circumstances, 
often with recourse to coercive force.”211  
 
The relationship between organization, police function and environment is dynamic. 
Looking back at the developments in the twentieth century, there have been substantial 
alterations to the mobilization, organization, work and professional basis of the police, 
Reiss argues: While, by the turn of the twentieth century, most police were sworn 
patrolmen organized in brotherhoods, most of the departments were not under civil 
service, there was no collective bargaining, and police strikes were common, by the 
end of the century the workforce had become much more diverse, civilian employees 
had been introduced to the force, and unionization collective bargaining had ‘replaced’ 
police strikes as a political tool.
212
 The professionalization only had a limited effect on 
the rank and file: While the Police Department became increasingly professionalized, 
its members — who saw their discretionary powers dwindle — did not.213  
Within the environmental context, the rank and file’s function as a vehicle for 
communication continued in the second half of the twentieth century. During the 
1960s, the police were the prime target in the civil rights riots, both in the context of 
physical aggression and reform demands, partly because they were the principle 
representatives of white society and “white oppression” in ghetto communities.214 
More generally, policing remained an inherently political activity, considering that “the 
action of every police officer is expressive of the state at work in its most concrete 
form and these actions profoundly affect the lives of all citizens.”215 This has put the 
police in an exceptionally difficult position, Hahn and Jeffries point out: “The 
emergence of racial conflict and violence presented police officers with a critical 
challenge that seemingly could be resolved only by improving social and economic 
conditions in urban communities.”216 However, the police officers do not have the 
mandate and power to solve these broader issues. 
The distance between public and police continued to increase in the second 
half of the twentieth century. This process was fuelled by new technological 
advancements and command centralization.
217
 In New York, for example, the 
implementation of the 911 system in the 1970s, ironically seen as one of Mayor 
Lindsay’s main law enforcement achievements, had not only made the police more 
reactive but also less visible in neighborhoods, while in fact, people had not even 
demanded less response time.
218
 The gap between the public and the police was also 
increased by reform efforts aimed at holding police officers accountable to police 
management and protecting them from their environment, in order to diminish political 
influence and weed out police corruption and other misconduct, Reiss argues. 
Community policing reform may have narrowed the gap to a certain degree, ironically 
at the expense of political neutrality (see also Subsection 3.9.3). Distance also grew as 
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a result of changes in neighborhoods’ ethnic composition.219 More generally, the 
distance is continuously enforced by the nature of police work, including its focus on 
secrecy, as well as its core activity of dealing with problem citizens and hostile 
situations.
220
 Police–citizen contact seemed both increasingly superfluous and difficult, 
as the police were becoming progressively more self-reliant and specialized; they were 





3.5.2 Police culture, behavior, attitudes, and traits  
Environmental and organizational contexts also influence the development of police 
culture, behavior, attitudes and traits. As the police’s moral order can shift from the 
individual to the collective, the boundaries between police culture and individual 
attitudes, behavior and traits are vague. Rather than scrutinizing these boundaries, this 
subsection looks more globally at specific cultural, behavioral and attitudinal 
characteristics that can affect the process of debate.  
 
Police culture 
“The brotherhood that ran all through the Police Department was very deep, and 
caused by a number of things, but one of them was this, that it bound all of us up in the 
lives we had in this city.”222  
 
Robert Daley, deputy police commissioner for public relations under 
Police Commissioner Murphy 
 
Police subculture remains an important feature of the police in the second half of the 
twentieth century, influencing police behavior, attitudes and communication.
223
 While 
many scholars refer to its existence, sociologists particularly point out that more 
research is needed and that police culture is probably not as homogeneous, static and 
insulated from external and internal influence as past scholars were led to believe.
224
 
Moreover, police culture theory has become more sophisticated, as the discussion of 
Herbert’s normative orders in the previous subsection has shown. 
Police culture is influenced by police function, police organization and the 
environment surrounding the police, including actors operating in that environment.
225
 
From an organizational perspective, the evolution of the police function, which has 
grown more distant from the public, intensified kinship bonds.
226
 Local recruitment and 
employee promotion have resulted in a multidimensional spread, while bureaucracy 
and civil service consolidated police culture. Bordua and Reiss: “A rather rigid formal, 
legal shell is erected around occupational and organizational cultures in a way that 
makes the exercise of command from the top even more difficult.”227 It is probable that 




Police culture is also shaped by the police’s environment. As a survival 
strategy in response to an often inhospitable public, it can provide the police officer 
with a sense of honor, which he feels society is not willing to grant him.
229
 More 
generally, police culture is influenced by local values and politics of the community 
that provide the financial and political basis for the police’s existence.230 Social 
scientists have also pinpointed independent environmental factors that impact police 
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culture. Klinger’s theory of negotiated order, for example, assumes that police 
vigor/police leniency varies depending on police organizational structure and existence 
of district crime, its norms developing and existing autonomously by division.
231
 Some 
have critiqued this view, though.
232
 
To a degree, proportional representation and the hiring of African Americans 
into the police force affected police culture. Especially in the past four decades, the 
NYPD, like many other departments in the United States, has transformed from a 
monolithic workforce to a much more socially complex and diverse one. Some police 
scientists believe that this reform movement has changed the police culture. Sklansky 
and Marks: “The notion of police departments as insular, homogeneous bastions of 
unchallenged patriarchy, racism, and authoritarianism may be increasingly 
oversimplified. Police departments today are more socially complex, more open to 
debate and disagreement, and more representative of the divisions in the communities 
they serve.”233 They argue that this could have led to a decline in police solidarity and 
insularity. Others argue that even though police forces have diversified, certain aspects 
of police culture certainly remain monolithic, as research has shown how ‘black’ 
officers become ‘blue’ the longer they are in the force.234 While there is no consensus 
amongst scholars in regard to the degrees of insularity and solidarity of the police 
culture, they are still frequently mentioned as characteristics of this.  
 
A preoccupation with respect 
The police see themselves as “the thin blue line” between civilized and unruly 
elements in society.
235
 They feel they have both a moral mandate and the right to 
protect the former against the latter. Failure to maintaining control is seen as an 
embarrassment.
236
 Their appraisal of performance and ranking of their occupation has 
been remarkably higher than the views held by society on these matters.
237
 While 
honor lies at the heart of the police virtues, and can be seen as a logical consequence of 
competence and machismo as normative orders, society has been unaccommodating in 
this respect, Bordua and Reiss argue:  
 
“The morale and public-relations problems of the American police can be more clearly 
understood as an attempt to substitute public prestige sought in an occupational 
performance market for the Weberian status regard sought and validated in the “honor 
market.” The American police are denied both, for the public seems unwilling to 
accord the police status either in the European sense of status honor as representatives 
of the State or in the more typically American sense of prestige based on a claim to 
occupational competence.”238  
 
The police’s preoccupation with respect, combined with a general sense of distrust 
towards others, result in cynical beliefs: the public are less willing to cooperate and the 
courts are too lenient, while criminals are more active and public disorder more 
difficult to control. The police believe that they can only obtain due respect, by 
asserting authority and intensifying control. This demand for respect can arise during 
street encounters, when even ‘a request for explanation’ can be interpreted as a 
challenge to authority.
239 
The police’s demand for respect can also result in vehement 




Resistance to change 
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, police officers remained resistant 
to change, partly due to their conservatism and inclination to the right, both politically 
and morally.
240
 The roots for this conservatism can be found in the nature of police 
work.
241
 In addition, they can be found in the normative orders of morality, machismo, 
bureaucracy, and law. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s the police held “anti-civil 
libertarian beliefs.”242 Sklansky and Marks argue that the police “were almost 
uniformly white, male, and politically reactionary.”243 While the rank and file became 
more organized at the time, this took on frightening forms, in line with the reactionary 
character of the police’s political inclination, both scholars further assert.  
 Niederhoffer’s study amongst New York rank-and-file officers found that of all 
categories disliked by the officers, homosexuals were second on the list, outranking 
criminals and drug dealers, and only superseded by cop haters. Niederhoffer also points 




Rank-and-file officers often resisted police reform, as it conflicted with their 
conservative views and traditional hands-on mentality. Niederhoffer’s research has 
shown that a majority of seasoned police officers believed academy training “cannot 
overcome the contradictions between theory and fact,” while most police recruits 
thought they would have to learn everything over again once they started work.
245
 




Vice versa, police conservatism was also a product of the reform movement 
and its inherent power struggle, as the police fought to defend their powers, 
automatically pitting them against change. Ironically, the reform effort itself promoted 
conservative attitudes. For example, the rigid Compstat program implemented in New 
York also affected the character of the rank and file, making them less creative and 





Code of silence 
Question: Were you ever afraid that one of your fellow officers would turn you in? 
Answer: Never. 
Question: Why not? 
Answer: Because it was the Blue Wall of Silence. Cops don’t tell on cops. And if they 
did tell on them, just say if a cop decided to tell on me, his career’s ruined. He’s going 
to be labeled as a rat. So if he’s got fifteen more years to go on the job, he’s going to 
be miserable because it follows you wherever you go. And he could be in a precinct 
he’s going to have nobody to work with. And chances are if it comes down to it, 
they’re going to let him get hurt.248 
 
Excerpt from the testimony of a New York police officer at the Mollen Commission hearings 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the code of silence remained a distinct 
feature of police culture.
249
 It has been described as a “normative injunction”, similar to 
criminal law, but then an unwritten one, which demands loyalty towards fellow officers 
as well as mutual support, even in the case of misconduct.
250
 The sense of loyalty 
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emerges in Police Academies, where bonds of loyalty are formed, and intensifies 
throughout officers’ careers.251 While loyalty has been documented within other 
occupational groups, the police code remains unique, partly as a result of the dangerous 
nature of police work, the shared aim of fighting crime and the rank and file’s common 
views toward the public.
252
  
Research has shown how this code is widely accepted in police forces, as one 
in four officers believes “whistle blowing is not worth it”, more than half of the 
officers maintain that it is common to “turn a blind eye” to misconduct, and two thirds 
argue that officers often get a “cold shoulder” after reporting an incident. Weisburd et 
al.: “These findings suggest that the culture of silence that has continually plagued the 
reform of American policing continues.”253 One of New York’s most famous 
whistleblowers, Frank Serpico — whose revelations eventually led to the installation of 
the Knapp Commission, as well as the well-known movie Serpico — had been shunned 
by colleagues for being “a potential rat” already early in his career.254  
The blue wall of silence is both part of the organization’s and the officers’ 
culture, which in fact intensify each other. For example, police are pressurized not to 
talk to outsiders about their police work, in particular media and scholars.
255
 In the 
aftermath of the police’s handling of the Harlem Mosque Incident (1972), in which an 
officer responding to a fake 911 call, Phillip Cardillo, was fatally shot, the grand jury 
spoke of a “concerted and orchestrated effort by members and former members of the 
Police Department to impede” the investigation.256 Walker suggests that police unions 
can also have a detrimental effect on the code of silence, by “(1) negotiating a contract 
that inhibits thorough investigations of misconduct; (2) providing tangible support for 
accused officers in the form of experienced legal representation; (3) providing moral 
support for accused officers through organized group solidarity.”257 However, more 
research is needed to validate these claims.  
The code’s persistence is recognized both by scholars and several commissions 
initiated after police scandals occurring throughout the country, such as the Knapp 
(1973) and Mollen (1994) Commissions in New York and the Christopher Commission 
in Los Angeles (1991), which documented structural evidence of the code of silence 
and pinpointed the code as an important factor impeding inquiries into police 
corruption and excessive force.
258
 Scholars have noted that the code can impede 
scholarly research too.
259
 Highly-publicized scandals such as those of Abner Louima 
have also exposed the code’s existence (see Subsection 3.10.4). 
 
Police cynicism, alienation, and decline in morale  




“I have seventeen years, four months, two weeks, and three days to go until 
retirement.”261 
 





“I think the job is trying to foster on us propaganda that police work is a profession. 
It’s not a profession because nobody has the incentive — nobody has the desire. But 
they say you are a professional. I would rather have the money.”262 
An anonymous officer 
 
The police in America are commonly depicted as a skeptical, cynical, distrustful and 
isolated group.
263
 This stereotypical image is conveyed not only by researchers, 
observers, and the public in general, but also by the police themselves.
264
 “The only 
organization I’ve ever seen that comes close to the Police Department is Mother 
Russia”, was one of the favorite expressions of Bobby Evers, a New York police 
officer and loyal PBA delegate of Lithuanian descent. Evers: “We have our own trial 
room where you can get hung. We have our own gulags. We have our own group of 
psychiatrists that’ll find you nuts.”265 
The importance of understanding the determinants of police cynicism has been 
recognized by both recent and anterior scholars. “Cynicism is at the very core of police 
problems”, Niederhoffer wrote in his classic study on police cynicism.266 Sobol more 
recently asserts that cynicism can be an early signal of undesirable police behavior. He 
has identified independent ecological factors that impact police cynicism.
267
  
In the second half of the twentieth century, police cynicism was fueled by 
longstanding causes — already touched upon in previous chapters — and by several 
new developments, both in and outside the Police Department. Niederhoffer argues 
that the roots for police cynicism can be found in at least four sources within the 
department: The socialization process, subculture, existence of occupational anomie 
and police personalities.
268
 These sources largely overlap with those discussed in the 
previous chapters. New internal developments within the department intensified the 
already existing sentiments. For example, work itself became increasingly less 
interesting for the rank and file, as the police introduced more specialized units.
269
 In 
New York, the 1970s were a particularly bleak era due to the fiscal crisis that resulted 
in lay-offs and more sober working conditions. In a single year, the workforce 
dwindled from 31,000 to 26,000. This undermined trust in an organization always seen 
as a job-security stronghold.
270
 
The professionalization movement, primarily a top-down internal process, 
continued to leave its mark on the rank and file, who saw the measures as 
infringements of their beliefs, ethics and autonomy.
271
 When Wilson conducted a study 
in the late 1960s on the outcomes of the reforms he initiated in Chicago, he expected to 
find a positive correlation between reform and professionalization, yet instead found 
that the police were just as cynical as before.
272
 Niederhoffer more negatively observed 
that reform efforts have led to the rank and file’s self-defensive opposition and their 
retreat into a “subculture of cynicism.”273 In New York, reform measures aimed at 
further restricting the powers of the rank and file were interpreted as both a motion of 
no confidence and as an indirect message “thou shall not police.”274  
Alex argues that police morale was also affected by proportional 
representation, one of the reforms following the 1960s riots. He found that white 
officers in New York oftentimes complained about a decline in standards, due to new, 
‘incompetent’ officers. As one officer said: “All the signs say ‘New York’s finest.’ 
And we are letting in the worst.”275 Alex concludes that “the repeated references to a 
decline in standards reflect the feeling that the integration of blacks and Puerto Ricans 
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into police ranks threatens the virtual monopoly and cloistered autonomy of the white 
policeman’s job.” Moreover, it “reflects an overall hostility to the Police Department’s 
administration and former mayor Lindsay. […] A vast number of policemen have 
intense hatred for Lindsay and most of his appointees to the police administration.”276 
The new reform waves that hit police departments after the civil rights era 
impacted police morale and cynicism in different ways. While community policing — 
a police strategy promoting “police–community partnerships to encourage crime 
prevention and reciprocity between police departments and community members” — 
resulted in a higher degree of job satisfaction, police cynicism could be triggered by 
new police functions that are part of community policing, such as police–citizen 
contact.
277
 Other reform efforts such as the implementation of Compstat in New York 
negatively impacted police morale. Eterno and Silverman describe how “fear was 
observed as a central aspect of Compstat in New York City”, that “officers below the 
executive rank were frequently subjected to a top-down management style and 
alienated by Compstat,” and that “members are embroiled in an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and demoralization,” although captains particularly took the brunt.278 
Exclusion from the reform process has also negatively impacted rank-and-file 
officers. For example, after the Pittsburgh consent decree with the federal government 
in April 1997 to improve police conduct, many officers in that city noted that they 




 Some scholars have noted the positive influence that police chiefs can have on 
police morale. Particularly charismatic leaders enhance the morale of the rank and file, 
a group that is more susceptible to internal relations than employees in other civic 
institutions.
280
 Conversely, unpopular measures taken by police chiefs, such as budget 
cuts and redundancies, have proven to backfire. When NYPD Police Commissioner 
McGuire, in the late 1970s, rehired officers that had been fired a few years before, 
these officers were hostile and cynical, both regarding the redundancies and the more 
sober working conditions that were in place after their return.
281
  
Society itself was another source of cynicism and alienation. The situation in 
the 1960s, documented by Fogelson, involved a group of rank-and-file officers that felt 
increasingly isolated from an apathetic, often hostile and uncooperative society that 
had given them a very responsible job, yet not the power to do it nor the deference the 
job deserved. He argues that this is particularly the case in ghetto communities, where 
people are even more hostile, critical and distrustful of the police.
282
  
Overall, the police held a dim view of society. Niederhoffer’s study found that 
more than half of the New York rank-and-file officers and 78% of their superiors 
believed that the public usually had “to be forced to cooperate with police officers.”283 
More generally, police saw citizens as “corrupt beings”, whose weaknesses the police 
attempted to tolerate to some extent.
284
 Niederhoffer speaks of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: “A high arrest record reinforces the cynicism that inspired it in the first 
place, while often establishing a policeman’s reputation for initiative and 
efficiency.”285 The cynical attitude was intensified by a lack of institutional rules with 
regard to the exercise of police power.
286
 Niederhoffer: “The policeman learns to 




The existing negative sentiments towards society were exacerbated by societal 
violence in general. Sobol has found evidence that district crime levels influence police 
cynicism.
288
 Historians, in turn, link the dwindling police morale to the growing 
violence against the police in New York, which reached a peak in the 1970s. At that 
time, not only criminals, but also terrorists and black extremist groups and rioters 
posed a substantial threat to the police.
289
 Police Commissioner Murphy, speaking in 
retrospect about the situation: “Literally dozens of police officers had been shot, and 
many of them were narcotics undercover officers. Indeed, for some time in the early 
1970s it was practically open season on police officers.”290 While reality was more 
nuanced than the police thought it was at that time, the violence (both actual and 
perceived) further demoralized police officers. They were particularly embittered by 
Mayor Lindsay’s soft response, in which he played down the idea that the police were 
being targeted by Black Panthers and failed to denounce rioters, and on some occasions 
even showed sympathy for their frustrations and concerns.
291
 Perhaps equally 
frustrating to the New York police at the time was the response by the openly anti-
police African-American newspaper the Amsterdam News, who ran an article titled 
“Why Kill Black Cops?”, which concluded:  
 
“Black residents of Brooklyn and Harlem are reacting negatively to the second 
assassination within ten months of a black police officer on the streets of Manhattan 
[…]While some of the scores of persons interviewed on the street were willing to 
accept the idea of assassinations with regard to white police, reporters encountered 
total rejection of the assassination of black police.”292  
 
Police morale was also affected by the emergence and growth of the public debate on 
accountability mechanisms, in particular civilian review, a mechanism which rank-and-
file officers saw as a breach of their autonomy.
293
 Yet in fact the entire process of 
handling civilian complaints left the police embittered. A poll amongst New York 
patrol officers found that 63% thought “the department’s handling of civilian 
complaints” was not fair.294 Moreover, 54% thought “disciplinary action in the 
department” was unfair.295  
During the constitutional era, police power was further diminished by court 
decisions, which the rank and file saw as a direct attack on their professional 
autonomy, similar to that of the professionalization movement. Niederhoffer argues: 
“[…] the real threat is not the shackling of law enforcement, but the probable 
reinforcement of cynicism among policemen. Each new reversal of hallowed legal 
principles upon which the code of police work rests, strips some of the majesty from 
the body of the law until at last the law becomes an emperor without clothes.”296 
All of these factors intensified the alienation, victimization and cynicism 
amongst patrolmen, who became more isolated and resistant to change. Niederhoffer 
found that cynicism was directed at both society and the police as an organization, and 
reached its peak after seven to ten years.
297
 After this, officers either decided to accept 
police realities or leave, a trend illustrated by NYPD mantra “Twenty and out.”298  
While current sociologists and police scientists still believe that cynicism 
remains a critical issue that should be dealt with, there is no consensus amongst 
sociologists and police scientists as to (the combination of) which factors impact 
cynicism most.
299
 These scholars have also criticized fellow researchers for taking the 
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stereotypical picture of a cynical cop for granted, and moreover, for not adopting a 
longitudinal approach to cynicism.
300
 Yet, from within a different research discipline, 
such longitudinal approach has been adopted by historians, who have not only 
identified cynicism as a continuous theme in the history of the NYPD and that of the 
American police at large, they have also shown how an accumulation of factors 
impacting morale, alienation and levels of cynicism can lead to a climax of frustration. 
Take for example Cannato’s analysis of the police wildcat strike in 1971 under the 
Lindsay administration, in which he pinpoints the strike’s deeper-laying causes:  
 
“Policemen, angry about both the increasing danger of policing the streets and the 
accusations of corruption tainting the department, undertook a six- day wildcat strike 
in January 1971. An estimated 85% of the force refused to show up for work. […] 
Officially the strike was billed as a dispute over parity in pay between patrolmen and 
sergeants, including two years of back pay in salary increases. But police were striking 
over more than just pay. The wildcat strike was an expression of frustration by New 
York’s police against a mayor they did not like and against the humiliation and anger 
they felt at the social changes around them. They were angry at being called pigs, at 
the wholesale assumption of corruption on the force, at the leniency of the court 
system, and at the attitude of liberals who assumed that policemen were guilty until 
proven innocent.”301 
 
From the same longitudinal perspective, other scholars have made similar remarks. 
Niederhoffer:  
 
“To the police the struggle over the Civilian Review Board and the recent trend of the 
Supreme Court decisions are proof of the breakdown of respect for law and order and 




“White policemen are a besieged and aggrieved group. They are under sharp attack by 
the department, the public, the press, the courts, and their black colleagues for using 
methods that they feel are needed to carry out the special and valuable duties for which 
they are responsible. They feel abandoned by a liberal, reform-minded administration 
and by a budget minded but ‘political’ or ‘regular’ administration that they believe 
have both compromised their law enforcement functions to satisfy the political 
pressures of minority groups.”303 
 
Theses analyses not only reveal the multiple roots for police cynicism, they also show 
how the rank and file’s accumulated frustration leads to harsh communication 
strategies and overall positioning in the arena of public debate, as will be further 
discussed in Subsection 3.5.3.  
 
An ‘us-versus-them’ mentality 
Many contemporary scholars point out that a distinct element of modern police culture 
remains their ‘us-versus-them’ mentality.304 Several historical developments fuelled 
this mentality, such as the widening gap between the public and the police and the 
growing sense of loyalty. Another cause for the ‘us-versus-them’ sentiments is the 
nature of police work, which involves a degree of suspicion towards citizens and 
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focuses on dealing with problem citizens as well as hostile situations.
305
 “Let’s go face 
the enemy” was a cry often heard in locker rooms prior to a new shift.306 
The rank and file held grudges against numerous groups and people in society, 
of whom probably the most pronounced denominator is a display of criticism and/or 
hostility towards the police. It is in this light unsurprising that ‘cop fighters’ are ranked 
in first place on the list of groups disliked most by the New York police officers, 
Niederhoffer found. Rank-and-file officers also hold negative views on the press. 
Niederhoffer found that 72% viewed the press as hostile.
307
 More broadly, natural 
enemies of the police comprised those interfering with the (discretionary) powers of 
the rank and file and the police at large. While all bureaucracies have a tendency to see 
demands from outside actors as unwarranted interference, history has shown this is 
especially the case for the police, Fogelson asserts. He describes how the NYPD in the 
past had charged civilians filing complaints with criminal libel, while at the time of his 
research, police departments still had several mechanisms to discourage people from 
doing so.
308
 Historically the police have also been pitted against actors in the legal 
sector, ranging from local judicial actors to the Supreme Court, which the police felt 
was “slowly but surely dismantling the hallowed foundation of law enforcement.”309 
The Knapp Commission was seen as a “public theater, designed only to overdramatize 
police cunning, connivance, and corruption.”310 Internal enemies also posed a threat to 
rank-and-file autonomy. Reform commissioners, such as career-cop Steve Kennedy 
were generally not popular with the rank and file.
311
 The civilian deputy commissioner 
for internal affairs, Walter Mack, seen by others “as a zealot, an elite, white-shoe 
prosecutor, who represented ‘them,’” has described himself as being an “alien to the 
NYPD.”312 
 
3.5.3 The rank and file’s role in public debates 
This subsection explores the rank and file’s role in debates on police problems/reform. 
Some aspects of this role are a direct reflection of the police’s (dynamic) attitudes, 
behavior and overall role.  
 
The rank and file’s positioning: a rigid, ‘us-versus-them’ stance 
Police culture and police positioning are connected. Police often rejected the criticism 
and arguments made by those considered ‘them’, which is in line with their ‘us-versus-
them’ mentality, their resistance to change, their preoccupation with respect, and their 
cynical attitudes. For example, when African Americans criticized the police in the 
1960s for not policing their neighborhoods as vigorously as white ones, deep-seated 
police pride resulted in vehement denial.
313
 Contemporary reform demands are 
similarly regarded as unfounded, often politically driven, initiatives.
314
 The rank and 
file’s perceived “minority status” in society, as coined by Niederhoffer, has also 
affected positioning, Skolnick points out: “Because they also see themselves as an 
abused and misunderstood minority, they are particularly sensitive to what they 
perceive as challenges to ‘their’ system of criminal justice — whether by unruly Black 




The rank and file’s power and communication strategy in debates 
“The point of course, is that the ‘new paradigm’ of the police as oppressed victim is a 
subspecies of the old paradigm of the police as ‘oppressor’. As Russell Baker reminds us, 
yesterday’s victimizer becomes today’s victim, and today’s victim is usually tomorrow’s 
noble victimizer!”316  
Nicholas Alex 
 
Police power is a multilayered phenomenon. While policing is an inherently political 
activity, Herbert points out, “police organizations are sites of political struggles to 
define and trumpet different normative orders, struggles that fundamentally shape the 
daily practices of officers, the overall orientations of departments, and the state of 
police–community relations.”317 These struggles oftentimes concerned conditions of 
service. Speaking of a deeper police problem of “a public-service bureaucracy with the 
ethos of blue-color factory workers” Bayley argues that the police “never lose track of 
what the organization owes them for their effort in terms of days off, vacation, meal 
breaks, sick leave, and overtime payments.”318  
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, rank-and-file officers 
have often voiced their concern that their powers were slowly taken away by police 
management, the courts, and (hostile groups within) society pushing for reforms. 
Indeed, police reformers have tried to diminish the rank and file’s discretionary powers 
by adopting centralization and accountability measures.
319
 The police have not readily 
accepted this criticism, and have been successful in thwarting these attacks.
320
 While 
formally, the rank and file’s influence on police reform has been minimal, as police 
management and reformers mostly keep patrolmen out of the decision-making process, 
the rank and file in fact had a dampening effect on reform efforts (see Section 3.9).
 321
  
In public debates, the rank and file’s power has grown tremendously in the past 
decades. While individual officers do not play a visible role in debates on police 
problems, they are represented by police unions, a process set into motion in the 1960s. 
As rank-and-file representatives, these unions have played a role in shaping the rank 
and file’s public image as actor in debates, which often appears to be both aggressive 
and defensive in response to management initiatives or demands by the community.
322
 
Conversely, the aggressive aspects of unionization in the 1960s were also a reflection 
of the rank and file’s conservative stance.  
The rank and file’s power also manifested itself in less visible forms. Police 
culture played an important role in this. For example, the officer’s prevalent attitude of 
seeing rules and regulations mainly as guides, impeded reform aimed at curtailing 
discretionary powers.
323
 Police culture, in particular the code of silence, also subverted 
police misconduct investigations.
324
 Police cynicism has also been used as a 
communication tool. Niederhoffer: “When a group feels that it is being threatened, or 
treated unfairly, it falls back on its code of values. Cynicism is an ideological plank 




While the rank and file do not often communicate directly in the arena of debate, their 
positioning and views are reflected by the unions as well as their communication 
conveyed in different venues.  
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Police jargon has been recognized as a distinct feature of police culture, 
adopted by all ranks within the force.
326
 In a provocative article on prevalent labels in 
police communication, Van Maanen identified three types of citizens: ‘suspicious 
persons’, ‘assholes’, and ‘know nothings’.327 While the latter serves as a label for 
ignorant yet harmless ‘average’ citizens, the second one refers to those who fail to meet 
police expectations either in street encounters, or more broadly, those groups who are 
“out to get” the police, i.e. to control or limit their legitimacy, ranging from minority 
groups to reporters, researchers, and so forth, who are most probably “fixed […] as a 
sort of permanent asshole grouping.”328 Van Maanen: “The asshole — creep, 
bigmouth, bastard, animal, mope, rough, jerkoff, clown, scumbag, wise guy, phony, 
idiot, shithead, bum, fool, or any of a number of anatomical, oral, or incestuous terms 
— is a part of every policeman’s world.”329 The policeman’s verdict of this group is 
harsh: “Assholes […] as their title implies, are not granted status as worthy human 
beings. Their actions are viewed by the police as stupid or senseless and their feelings 
as incomprehensible (if they can even be said to have feelings).”330 The police also 
hold “heroic self-perceptions”:  
 
“Nothing characterizes policing in America more than the widespread belief on the 
part of the police themselves that they are primarily law enforcers — perpetually 
engaged in a struggle with those who would disobey, disrupt, do harm, agitate, or 
otherwise upset the just order of the regime. And, that as policemen, they and they 
alone are the most capable of sensing right from wrong; determining who is and who is 
not respectable; and, most critically, deciding what is to be done about it (if 
anything).”331  
 
Both the ‘asshole’ label and the heroic self-perceptions epitomize the rank and file’s 
‘us-versus-them’ positioning, as well as the occupational and personal concerns shared 
by virtually all policemen, the police’s moral mandate, and the prevalent police culture, 
as also pointed out by other scholars.
332
  
This positioning can have far-reaching consequences. Van Maanen maintains 
that those labeled ‘assholes’ are most likely to get street justice. From a communication 
perspective, these groups are most likely to receive verbal attacks in street encounters, 
or be verbally criticized in the formal arena of debate in a similar manner, for example 
by police unions (see Section 3.10).
333
 Moreover, while the labels do not necessarily 
reflect reality, they can become a “self-fulfilling prophecy” and can have a detrimental 




3.5.4 African-American rank and file 
In the 1960s many police departments started to hire black officers more frequently, 
initially as a method of dealing with the race riots during that turbulent era.
335
 From 
then onwards, scholarly interest into the history, behavior and attitudes of black 
officers also increased.
336
 This subsection briefly looks at the development of this sub-
group within the New York rank and file.  
  In line with national trends, the NYPD hired many African-American officers 
in response to the Harlem riot in 1964. Another affirmative action entailed the historic 
appointment of Lloyd Sealy — a Brooklyn-born officer of Afro-Caribbean descent — 
as captain of Harlem’s 28th precinct, and NYPD’s first black precinct commander. 
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While the need for this appointment had already become clear after the riot that ensued 
after the Lino Rivera incident in 1935, it took the NYPD 29 years to take this historic 
measure.
337
 Both measures only had limited effect on the existing police culture. Most 
black officers were placed in low ranking positions, and moreover, were segregated 
from white ones, as they were often placed in precincts located in black communities, 
partly due to the demands from these communities.
338
 Moreover, Sealy, as a single 
commander, was not in power to effectuate structural change, in spite of his change-
auguring slogan “Lock ’em up, don’t beat ’em up.”339  
 
Treatment, attitudes and behavior 
Alex’s classic study (1969) on the behavior of black officers in the NYPD recognizes 
two different categories: Those who primarily identify themselves with being a police 
officer, and those who above all see themselves as black Americans. The first group 
does not hesitate to enforce the law forcefully in black communities in order to gain 
sympathy and respect from fellow officers. Conversely, the latter group is much more 
sympathetic towards black citizens and their struggle for equality. They are hostile to 
fellow white officers, the department and civil service in general. According to Alex, 
those who attempt to combine their racial and professional roles face a “double 
marginality” by not being accepted by both white officers and black citizens.340 In New 
York, Sealy was seen as such a conciliator. He faced resentment by some community 
members who would scream at him “Take off your black mask and show us your white 
face.”341 In the same vein, black NYPD patrolmen have been called “turncoats,” 
“lackeys” and “Uncle Toms.”342 Skolnick more recently (2008) observes:  
 
“Paradoxically, this [police] identity may even be even more powerful for police who 
are of a racial, religious, or gender minority. In some circles, a black police officer is 
considered a race traitor. Black police understand this potential, and meet it with 
different reactions. Some view themselves mainly as police, or professional police. 
Others, like the NYPD’s ‘100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care’ and the ‘Latino 
Officers Association’ identify themselves as champions of minority rights, and 
publicly and actively make reform demands on the higher authorities to take various 
actions, especially to affirmatively promote minorities. Some turn against the job, 
leave, and develop counter identities, as antipolice.”343 
 
Similarly, Thompsons’ recent study of black law enforcement officers in supervisory, 
command and executive positions concludes that these officers often feel they are a 
minority in the department, and that their experience does not differ much from those 
in the 1960s, considering they:  
 
“1. Experienced strained social and working relations with white officers; 2. Felt that 
agencies treated them differently and trusted them less than white officers; 3. Incurred 
rejection and isolation from members of both the black and white civilian 
communities, and; 4. Sensed a lack of fairness not only in the application of 
performance evaluation criteria, but in the promotions process as well.”344  
 
However, there were also some inconsistencies with earlier studies, Thompson points 
out. For example, there was no evidence that black officers had strained relationships 




“On a positive note the profession seems to have made considerable progress since the 
early days of integration when black officers were only given ‘shit’ details, not 
allowed to work anywhere outside of ghetto neighborhoods, and served as moving 
‘targets’ for white officers who tried to run them over with patrol cars as they 
attempted to cross the street on foot. On a less encouraging note, the profession clearly 
has room to improve many of its unwritten policies and informal practices believed to 
be responsible for sustaining an oftentimes palpable tension between officers of the 
two races. In fact, these very tensions have the potential to weaken the profession to 
such a point that the greatest threat to its long-term stability as a provider of critical 
public services stems not from a common outside enemy of any sort but, rather, from 
racial animosity between its own rank-and-file membership.”345 
 
In contrast to the findings above, some other researchers argue that most black officers 
have lost their racial identity over the years, and are now more ‘blue’ than ‘black’, 
partly due to an intense socialization process starting from the police academy, but also 
to the resentment by and consequential alienation from black communities.
346
 These 
scholars agree that black officers’ behavior and treatment of both white and black 
citizens is hence quite similar to those of white officers. Some have even noted that 
black police treat blacks in poor communities harsher than their white counterparts, 
because they receive more hostility.
347
 However, a recent study has also shown that 
black officers partake in more coercive and supportive actions in black neighborhoods 
and hence “decisions to perform traditional law enforcement functions […] seem to be 
congruent with the blue cop identity whereas decisions to perform supportive activities 
are congruent with identities that show concern about their community.”348  
While the behavior of black and white officers might be similar, African-
American patrolmen still have different views on policing, especially in regard to the 
use of force. According to a Police Foundation survey conducted in 2000, most black 
officers (51.3%) believed that the police were prone to treat whites fairer than blacks, 
while only 17% of all officers believed this was true. The survey found similarly 
diverging views in regard to the treatment of poor and rich citizens. Moreover, while 
most black officers (57.1%) believed that the police were more likely to use force 
against blacks than against whites, only 1 in 20 white officers held this view. Black 
officers also appear to be less cynical in regard to (specific groups in) society and their 
demands. The same study showed that black officers (just under 70%) are not only 
more positive than white officers (33.3%) about civilian review mechanisms’ impact 
on decreasing police misconduct, black officers (65%) are also more inclined than 
white officers (49.2%) to believe that community policing could reduce the number of 
police-violence incidents. These diverging perceptions are in line with the racial divide 
regarding perceptions of law enforcement and the criminal justice system. African-
American officers are also more critical about management and the traditional white-
dominated police union.
349
 However, in other regards perceptions are quite similar, for 





The rank and file’s moral order, which can shift from the individual to the collective, is 
shaped by both ecological and organizational contexts, each of which has vastly 
changed over the past decades. Within both contexts, the rank and file’s dynamical 
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function influences their attitudes and positioning in public debates both directly and 
indirectly. The boundary-spanning roles of officers, their mandate to use force and 
their role as a channel for communication place the police in a vulnerable and central 
position in public debates. The growing distance between public and police hampers 
the communication processes between the two. In addition, the rank and file’s function 
as a political tool can affect police morale and their positioning in public debates. More 
broadly, the police function’s impact on the normative orders that shape police culture, 
attitudes and behavior can hence also affect police positioning and communication.  
Police culture has also been intensified by police unions; consolidated by 
bureaucracy and the civil service; spread by local recruitment and employee 
promotion; and shaped by, but also a response to, the police’s often hostile 
environment, as well as the rigid professionalization measures. Police culture 
characteristics remain unchanged and include conservatism, insularity, solidarity, 
cynicism, a focus on respect, resistance towards change, an ‘us-versus-them’ attitude, a 
strong code of silence, and the adoption of jargon. Yet proportional representation 
reforms may have led to a decline in police solidarity and insularity. 
The rank and file’s role, culture, frustration and perceived minority status has 
led to a rigid ‘us-versus-them’ positioning in the public debate, including a strong 
focus on conditions of service and a rejection of reform and criticism. The ‘them’ 
component comprises those that are critical, hostile, and/or interfering with police 
(discretionary) powers.  
While police reformers indeed have tried to diminish the rank and file’s vast 
discretionary powers by adopting centralization and accountability reforms, and 
formally, the rank and file’s influence on police reform has been minimal, they have 
had a dampening effect on reform efforts, and consequently the Police Department 
professionalized, yet the officers did not. Apart from already existing powers such as 
personal interpretation of rules and the code of silence and cynicism as a powerful 
communication tool, the rank and file’s power grew tremendously in the past decades, 
as a consequence of police unionization.  
Unionization has been a reflection of the rank and file’s views and positioning. 
Their hard-liner communication style also impacted the rank and file’s public image in 
debates. Police perceptions, culture and positioning are also reflected in police jargon, 
including the label ‘asshole’ on the one hand and heroic self-perceptions on the other, 
which together can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 African-American officers still encounter inequality and hostility in their work, 
but also contempt from both black and white communities, hence facing a ‘double 
marginality’. While there is evidence that black officers’ behavior becomes ‘blue’ over 
time, they do have different opinions in regard to topics that are central in the public 
debate on the NYPD. From a different perspective, the group’s ‘double marginality’ 
could make the officers extra vulnerable to cynicism and victimization, which can have 





3.6 Police unions 
Police unionization took off dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century in 
America. Especially after the 1960s, police unions gained much formal, political 
power, while collective bargaining replaced police strikes as a political tool.
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Whereas police unions are now widely regarded as important actors, research into their 
actual impact is scarce. Not only is this impact most probably underestimated due to a 
lack of research, existing research often characterizes unions in a similar stereotypical 





3.6.1 Police unions’ power, positioning and strategies 
Police unions, including the New York PBA, have grown into powerful organizations 
with much political clout and ample financial resources.
353
 The police union movement 
that gained power in the 1960s and 1970s should not merely be seen in the broader 
context of other public-sector union efforts during that period, but also in that of a 
vehement public debate on police legitimacy in the United States.
354
 In particular, 
police unionization was a defensive response to the civil rights movement and its 
criticism of the police. In addition, the movement should be seen in the context of the 
professionalization movement, which, now more vehemently, attempted to eliminate 
the tradition of political influence over policing: The professionalization’s highly 
authoritarian character not only resulted in resentment amongst rank-and-file officers, 




Internally, the battle for control of the police has become essentially a power 
struggle between union and management.
356
 In both private and public spheres, police 
unionism “represents a form of shared governance, with employees, acting through 
their union, having some voice in some but not all areas of management.”357 As there 
are multiple police unions covering different ranks, their accumulated powers can pose 
serious limitations to police management ambitions.
358
  
The sudden growth of police unions came as an unpleasant surprise to police 
chiefs and reformers, who had not expected this organized form of resistance and 
feared reform efforts would suffer.
359
 Over the years, police management has been 
particularly worried about those policy positions taken by police unions that conflict 
with those of the Police Department, and with the “competition for authority on the 
part of the union as a political and economic institution.”360 Indeed, positions of unions 
and police management have often been conflicting. Juris points out how the PBA 
often “charged political interference with the operation of the department, warned of 
gaps in police protection, called for 100% enforcement of the law by officers 
regardless of signals from the commissioner and the mayor, and warned the public 
about changes in hiring standards for officers.”361  
More broadly, unions’ primary focus on conditions of service not only puts 
them in an adversarial relationship with police management, but also with large 
segments of society.
362
 Externally, the unions are pitted against civil rights groups, as 
well as other actors critical of the unions. The unions’ powers are recognized not only 
by researchers, but also by police chiefs, reformers, politicians and civil rights activists, 
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all of whom have frequently expressed their concern about the unions’ negative 
influences on reform efforts, discipline, and accountability measures.
363
  
Most studies conclude that police unions’ impact on professionalization, 
reform and innovation and police–community relations has been overall negative.364 In 
particular, the unions have strongly influenced the accountability debate, as will be 
further discussed in Subsection 3.10.6.  
 
Positioning 
Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, the unions were characterized by a militant and 
radical positioning.
365
 Alex points out that the PBA’s leader at the time, John Cassese, 
mostly known for his successful campaign to stop Mayor Lindsay’s plans for a civilian 
complaint review board, personified the “tough cop” in his negotiations with city 
leaders, and to liberals “exemplified the worst kind of old-guard sentiment, and the 
worst kind of old-line union man.” The leader also fostered ‘us-versus-them’ 
sentiments amongst the PBA’s members. Alex: “To the extent that the success of a 
union leader depends on his ability to help the rank and file identify their enemy, John 
Cassese was very successful.”366 After the 1970s, police unions became less radical, 
and one of the most well-organized union branches in the country. Yet the police 
unions’ radical reputation did not vanish.367 In fact, in a recent study on the variety of 
police union models worldwide, the American model is still characterized as 
‘reactionary’, as opposed to the more liberal and progressive model (e.g. in the 
Netherlands) the watchdog model (e.g. South Africa), and the reformed model (e.g. 
United Kingdom). In the authors’ view, this reactionary model is “based on traditional 
police culture, on conservative views on criminal justice issues, on battling civilian 
review, and opposing special commissions to investigate police deviance.”368  
 Conservatism and unionization may appear to be contradictory. In this respect, 
the police and unions are “strange bedfellows”, considering that the police have been 
deployed to suppress union strikes in the past, while rank-and-file officers themselves 
often have the same working-class background as the protesters.
369
 In many respects, 
police unions do not mirror the socialist values of other unions, but reflect the rank and 
file’s conservative views. They are typically tight knit and secretive. They defy being 
investigated and they resist change.
370
 The unions’ conservative, rigid, ‘us-versus-
them’ positioning has been described by Hill:  
 
“The association between ‘tough’ masculinity, punitive law enforcement policy and 
working-class culture is not new, but the campaigns of the PBA and Council 82 in the 
1970s and 1980s legitimized this ethos within the organized labor movement — just as 
they were being challenged by the civil rights movement. In addition to national 
campaigns of the New Right, police and prison-guard activism successfully redefined 
the working class through the war on crime. Instead of defining class in terms of 
relations of production, police and prison guards located their class allies in segregated 
white working class neighborhoods and identified the class enemy as an alliance of the 
‘boss’ (the federal government) and the ‘inmate’ (the criminal ‘underclass’).”371  
 
Particularly in response to the issues concerning the use of (excessive) force, the PBA 
has adopted a hardliner approach.
372
 Police unions overtly and uncompromisingly have 
defended officers accused of police misconduct, Walker points out. Moreover, they 
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have fought publication of officers’ disciplinary records. Resistance against civilian 
review has been particularly strong. More recently, police unions have been defending 
racial profiling practices rigorously. Unions have also objected to many affirmative 
action initiatives taken in response to the civil rights movement, such as the 
requirement that officers show name or badge numbers.
373
 The PBA has also 
condemned management approaches to contain the civil rights disturbances in the 
1960s with minimum amounts of force.
374
 In these and other cases, police union 
positioning is predominantly driven by their primary focus on conditions of service. 
For example, Feuille and Juris conclude that unions will only support 
professionalization measures if there are clear benefits for their members.
375
  
Not all American police unions are the same. A fifth, separate model 
comprising unions for special interest/minority groups also exists in the United States, 
reflecting the diversification in police departments.
376
 In New York, police fraternities 
such as the ‘100 Blacks in Law Enforcement who Care’ and ‘the Guardians’ are 
examples of such organizations, which often respond very differently from mainstream 
unions to delicate policing issues.
377
 For example, while the PBA supported the 
police’s handling of the Harlem Mosque Incident in 1972, Henry Nelson, the president 
of the National Council of Police — an organization of black policemen — and 
Howard Sheffey, the president of the Guardians — a group of black New York 
policemen — issued their own statement on the mosque incident: “We strongly deplore 
the actions of the members of the New York City Police Department who invaded the 
sanctity of Mohammed’s Temple.”378 This divergent positioning is in line with the 




“Prosecuting police with their stable of PBA lawyers is like prosecuting the Mafia, 
with their lawyers.”379 
William Burmeister, former head of the Official Corruption Unit (OCU) of 
 Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau 
 
American police unions are known for their hardliner approach. Particularly in the 
1960s, police unions used militant and radical strategies, including violence against 
protesters and attacks on black militants, as well as membership in far-right 
organizations.
380
 While unions became more conventional by the end of the 1970s, 
their former militancy had a lasting impact on reformers, who were reluctant to listen 
to and cooperate with the rank and file and their representatives.  
The PBA has been particularly effective due to membership involvement, 
internal democracy, and a strategic mixture of collective bargaining, public relations, 
and legislative action.
381
 Collective bargaining, the unions’ main activity, has proven to 
be successful. Union contracts give police unions the power to influence personnel 
standards, assignment of officers and innovation.
382
 Under these contracts, the PBA has 
negotiated powerful contractual provisions for its members.
383
 Other powerful 
strategies include political lobbying, and use of judicial possibilities, such as the 
initiation of cases and court interventions.
384
 Police unions have often supported or 
opposed political candidates, as well as ordinances or referenda, and discussion of 
budgetary topics. Political preferences, in particular in favor of law-and-order 
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candidates, have been communicated very openly: One time, police protesters shouted 
in front of city hall, “We want Daley [Deputy Commissioner of the New York City 
Police Department]; Lindsay must go.”385 Less formal strategies include the purely 
rhetorical, yet powerful ‘vote of no confidence’ to police chiefs.386 Similarly, even a 
“blatantly ludicrous claim” that a certain reform measure should be negotiated 
collectively first, can impede its implementation.
387
 Informal strategies include those 
aimed at decreasing productivity (calling in sick with “the blue-flu”, writing out less 
traffic tickets) as well as “issue and candidate electoral politics.”388  
History has shown how police unions have aptly used the many political tools 
at their disposal in management disputes concerning working conditions. In the 1970s, 
the PBA used militant tactics to fight the budget cuts due to the financial crisis.
389
 
When Commissioner Ward banned the hog-tying of prisoners after a prisoner died, the 




The unions also used these strategies in debates on controversial police issues, 
including civilian review and on individual cases of police misconduct, such as those 
of Abner Louima, Amadou Diallo, Patrick Dorismond and Sean Bell.
391
 Feuille and 
Juris point out how unions typically respond to corruption scandals “by insisting upon 
due process for and providing legal services to accused officers, mounting a public 
relations campaign to proclaim the honesty of the vast majority of police officers, and 
engaging in tangible efforts to halt or limit a corruption investigation.”392 The latter 
was the case after the installation of the Knapp Commission in New York, when the 
PBA filed suit in order to block the investigation. In the past, the PBA has also 
opposed proportional representation measures by rebuking the lowering of hiring 
standards and by successfully filing reverse discrimination suits against specific 
affirmative action programs. In 1971 Mayor Lindsay proposed a special police 
examination that was only open to residents of three low-income, primarily black and 
Puerto Rican neighborhoods. The PBA quickly responded by filing suit in state court 
on the premise that the examinations violate the state constitution’s basic civil-service 
requirements. The court decision in favor of the union illustrates the PBA’s power to 
impede change: The mayor, the police commissioner, and many community groups 
supported the special examination.
393
  
The unions’ protest against civilian review has been an enduring one. The PBA 
successfully thwarted the installation of a civilian review board in 1967 (see 
Subsection 3.10.6). After the installation of a civilian oversight agency, strategies have 
comprised the dissuasion of rank-and-file assistance in investigations, the contesting of 
requirements in court, and attempts aimed at the reversal of the installations.
394
 
Ironically, the police unions’ goals and tactics have shown many resemblances with 
those of groups in society that the unions were fighting against. Walker: “‘Blue power’ 
was the response to ‘black power.’”395  
 While the police unions’ strategies are similar to those in other professions, 
they do not lead to actual professionalization of the police, Feuille and Juris point 
out, as “these attempts also tend to place the police in an adversary relationship 
with minority groups, and this conflict does not strengthen the occupation's claim 
to professional status.”396 Also on the negative side, Sklansky and Marks assert, is 
that “the reactionary and defensive posture of police unions may owe something to 
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the way in which rank-and-file officers have been frozen out of departmental 
decision making.”397 Alex argues that the unions increased alienation towards police 
management.
398
 More positively, unions negotiated significantly higher salaries as 
well as other benefits for its members, Walker points out. As representatives of the 
rank and file, unions not only shape their public image to the outside world, but they 
also influence particular cultural aspects, such as group solidarity, ‘us-versus-them’ 
positioning, and the code of silence. The police unions also contributed to the police 
image of being closed and secretive, for example by disputing the publication of 
disciplinary records. However, from a different angle, these cultural aspects can be 





In the second half of the twentieth century, police unions gained much political power, 
in line with the development of the broader public-sector unionization movement, but 
also as a consequence of both the police professionalization and civil rights movement.  
Police unions, different in nature from unions in other work fields, reflect the 
rank and file’s conservative views, and are typically tight knit, secretive, conservative 
and resistant to change. These unions have opposed many affirmative actions and 
reforms proposed by civil rights groups, in particular civilian review. Their views have 
often not been shared by black police fraternities such as the ‘100 Blacks in Law 
Enforcement who Care’ and ‘the Guardians’ which respond to delicate policing issues 
very differently from mainstream unions. This divergent positioning is in line with the 
divide between ‘blue’ and ‘black’ African-American officers.  
Police union positioning is often driven by their primary focus on conditions of 
service. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, the unions used militant and radical 
strategies, including violence against protesters and attacks on black militants, as well 
as membership in far-right organizations. More generally, unions have successfully 
used a strategic mixture of collective bargaining, political lobby, public relations, and 
legislative action, as well as less formal strategies, such as the dissuasion of rank-and-
file assistance in investigations. Ironically, the police unions’ goals and tactics have 
shown many resemblances with those of groups in society that the unions were fighting 
against.  
Their positioning has put unions in an adversarial relationship with both police 
management and large segments in society, while their accumulated powers have 
posed serious limitations both to police management ambitions and the demands of 
critical external groups. Overall, the PBA’s influence on professionalization, reform, 
innovation and police–community relations has been negative. Unions have also 
impacted police culture and police alienation, while contributing to the rank and file’s 
negative external image and the reluctance of others to listen to and cooperate with 
them. Thus, while the police unions have been successful in representing police 






“I’ve got to get this city to stop thinking in categories, to stop thinking of black and 
white and Hispanic, and gay and heterosexual, and get us to start thinking about 
people. […] I’ve got to get New York to stop thinking about all this symbolism.”400 
Rudolph Giuliani 
 
Mr. Giuliani’s appeasing statement — by some perceived as being rather ironic in the 
light of his communication and policies which, in their eyes, contributed to the racial 
divide in the city — epitomizes New York’s current societal reality of a myriad 
different (ethnic) stakeholder groups, which operate in the political arena and which a 
mayor is typically confronted with.
401
 This section examines the mayor’s evolving role, 
character, power and communication in an era of growing political power for and 
awareness of these stakeholders.  
 
3.7.1 The mayor’s power, role, views and communication 
A modern-day New York mayor has various powers that are of relevance in the debate 
central to this research. First, the mayor has the authority to appoint most public 
officials, including the police commissioner, for whom the mayor carries 
responsibility. He can also exercise a great deal of pressure on the police 
commissioner, and claim his successes.
402
 It is said that William Bratton was forced to 
leave — officially he resigned — because Mayor Giuliani felt that he had taken too 
much credit for the crime drop in the city. From the start, the mayor was afraid that 
Bratton would be a “prima donna” who “won’t remember who’s the commissioner and 
who’s the mayor.”403 
 As noted in Chapter 2, Section 3, the visibility of the relationship between the 
mayor and the police was slowly fading, which had consequences for both actors. Cyril 
Robinson, who has researched the relationship between the mayor and the police, 
argues: “The mayor receives considerable benefits from his apparent ceding power.”404 
These advantages, according to Robinson, include the shielding “from responsibility 
for problems arising out of long-time neglect of city problems, especially those found 
in ghetto communities.”405 He explains:  
 
“The mayor gains because, when the police department commits serious errors of 
judgment, he can avoid criticism of both himself and the police by speaking of the 
important principle of freedom from political interference rather than about the 
particular incident. This does not prevent him from defending the police nor the police 
from thanking the mayor for his support.”406 
 
In particular, the mayor can absolve himself from responsibility for police aggression:  
 
“If there are problems in the city that reach a point of violence, they are not created by 
the police. In so far as blame can be assigned, it rests on those who make or influence 
policy, the legislature, the mayor, the prosecutor. But it is the police who must go into 
these ‘crime’ areas in an attempt to keep them from boiling over, and friction naturally 
develops between them and the population being policed. When they are attacked for 
their ‘brutality’ they are defended by the mayor, but he cannot intervene because that 
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would be political interference. It follows that neither the mayor nor other senior 
officials are responsible for police actions.”407  
 
Even police reform efforts proposed by the mayor can be seen as strategies to avoid 
having to deal with larger problems:  
 
“A subsidiary — but most important — benefit to the mayor is to concentrate a good 
deal of reform effort on the police in lieu either of changing the basic structure of 
society or of holding the mayor and other governmental officials accountable for police 
actions. Much reform effort goes into trying to obtain civilian review boards, police 
race relations programs etc. Since reform efforts suffer from a shortage of protagonists 
as well as of money, this diversion weakens the overall effort. […] Allowing the 
problem to reach such proportions that police action is necessary is one way of solving 
the problem: all eyes have turned on the police so that the problem becomes the police 
and the police become the problem.”408 
 
While the mayor thus is in a position not to take responsibility for police issues and 
broader problems, an important mayoral power is in fact that of agenda-setting. Berg 
argues that similar to the president, the New York mayor has a “bully pulpit” at his 
disposal, i.e. a platform from which he can advocate an agenda, which gives the mayor 
“the ability to define problems as being worthy of public/mayoral attention merely by 
informing the citizens of the city that the problem, in his or her view, exists.”409 More 
generally, he sees the mayor as an opinion leader, who can choose to focus on or 
ignore issues in his contact with the media or with citizens directly. He can also 
proactively raise issues himself.  
 In the past decades, New York has seen different mayors, who have used their 
agenda-setting powers in many different ways. While some mayors, such as Koch and 
Giuliani, came into office as law-and-order candidates, others, such as Lindsay and 
Dinkins, were more focused on bringing racial harmony to the city, the latter often 
speaking about “bringing people together.”410 In line with these disparate motivations, 
New York mayors have taken different positions on crucial police issues.  
One of these issues is that of external review. Whereas in the 1960s, Mayor 
Lindsay launched a campaign to adopt a civilian review system in New York City, and 
Mayor Dinkins, in the 1990s, sought to implement an all-civilian review board, Mayor 
Giuliani was much less in favor of external review. He disregarded the Mollen 
Commission’s recommendation to establish a permanent external corruption monitor 
with independent investigative powers, stating that “The most effective way to 
investigate police misconduct is to do it through the Police Department […] because 
they have the investigators who have the capacity to understand the Police 
Department.”411 Similarly, Giuliani rejected the recommendations of the task force 
appointed to examine police–community relations after the Abner Louima assault.412 
Other mayors, too, have used their powers to suppress reports unfavorable to the 
NYPD. In his extensive analysis of the Michael Farmer murder case (1957) — in 
which gang members ambushed and killed the 15-year-old Michael Farmer — Snyder 
points out how Mayor Wagner “worked to conceal perceptions of racial conflict and 
dissatisfaction with the police that surfaced in the Heights after the Farmer killing” for 






Mayoral powers are checked in different ways. First of all, an intricate system 
of elections in New York, including those of the mayor, the comptroller, city council 
members, and some judges of the municipal judicial system, ensures the checks-and-
balances system established in the city charter. While New York elections are 
traditionally dominated by the Democratic party, voters nevertheless have the power to 
remove unpopular politicians, including the mayor.
414
 Second, and related to the first 
point, New York mayors have had to deal with a diverse group of stakeholders within 
their electorate, whose political powers and levels of awareness were growing 
steadfastly, and who have obtained the ability to thwart mayoral initiatives, while 
tainting the mayor’s image, also on issues related to the police. In general, mayors who 
were more focused on civil rights issues, such as Lindsay and Dinkins, faced much 
resistance from the rank and file and the PBA, in particular regarding civilian review. 
Lindsay was much disliked by the rank and file. A survey amongst New York police 
officers has shown that respondents felt “that Lindsay was just like any liberal who is 
more concerned over the rights of gangs and thugs than with the policeman’s rights.”415 
Law-and-order mayors such as Giuliani, conversely, faced much resistance from civil 
rights groups and minority groups. Yet this divide is not a strict one, and mayors often 
found themselves criticized both by police and by civil rights activists, as will also be 
discussed later in this section.  
Recent history has also shown how powerful stakeholder groups in New York 
have become succesful in bringing up police-related issues, ranging from police–
community relations to fighting crime. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the public felt 
that the crime levels were out of control and that the mayor and the Police Department 
were not doing enough about this. This perception is captured in a much-quoted New 
York Post headline at the time — “Dave, Do Something” — a direct admonishment at 
the address of Mayor David Dinkins.
416 
The statement was one of the milestones in a 
series of events, some police-related, that led to Mayor Dinkins’ demise. Overall, these 
events show how the mayor is confronted with different powerful stakeholders who 
can hamper the mayor’s plans, and seriously tarnish his image, if the mayor does not 
manage to appease stakeholders while finding a balance between their often conflicting 
perceptions and needs. One of these events was the mass boycott of two Korean-owned 
groceries by black residents in Flatbush, after alleged mistreatment of a black woman 
by shop personnel.
417
 The issue lingered on for a prolonged period, for which Dinkins’ 
reluctance to intervene was to blame, critics argued. The mayor and the NYPD 
believed that mediation rather than intervention was the best way of handling the 
incident. Yet when the mayor decided to visit and show some solidarity with the shop 
owners, after eight months into the boycott, he faced criticism from a different camp of 
antagonists, amongst whom the controversial activist Sonny Carson, who called the 
mayor “a so-called black man” and “a traitor of his people” in response to his visit.418 
The mayor’s handling of the case had a prolonged effect on public opinion.419 Other 
incidents, such as the Crown Heights riots that occurred after a 7-year-old black child, 
Gavin Cato, was fatally struck by a car driven by a member of the Lubavitcher sect of 
the Jewish orthodox community, had similar effects on the perceptions of the public, as 
many believed that the mayor had instructed the police not to arrest the rioters out of 
“racial solidarity.”420 At the time, the mayor was strongly criticized by mayoral 




“I believe if I were Mayor of New York City, they would have made arrests the first 
moment that a rock was thrown through a store window, a car was burned or a person 
was beaten up because they were Jewish, or for any other reason. And I certainly […] 
would have investigated it myself and not waited 22 months.”421 
 
The shooting of Jose ‘Kiko’ Garcia by a white policeman in the summer of 1992 also 
received much criticism. While the police said that Mr. Garcia was armed and resisted 
arrest, family members denied this. Soon after the incident, Mr. Dinkins visited the 
family. He also paid for the funeral of the man, of whom some claimed he was a drug 
dealer.
422
 The following conversation between the mayor and a police officer at a 
meeting quoted in the New York Times, epitomizes the general feeling held by officers 
that Dinkins failed to support them:  
 
A New York Times excerpt from the conversation between Mayor Dinkins and a police 
officer in a meeting in the 34
th
 precinct headquarters, in the aftermath of the Jose 
‘Kiko’ Garcia shooting (1992): 
 
After walking several blocks on 181st Street in Washington Heights, talking with 
residents shortly before 5 p.m., Mr. Dinkins then addressed a roll call of police officers 
at the 34
th
 Precinct headquarters. He told the officers that he recognized how difficult 
their jobs were and commended them for standing “between good citizens and 
lawlessness.” 
 
The mayor was interrupted by Police Officer Thomas Barnett, who said, “I believe 
you’re an honest, sincere, caring man, but what you did that day still leaves a sour taste 
in our mouths.” 
[…] “This is a dangerous place, and what you did that day was bad,” the officer 
said. 
 
“What is it that I did that day that was bad?” 
 
“When you went and confronted that drug dealer’s family, you left a sour taste in 
all the officers’ mouths.” 
 




[…] A few minutes later during the 10-minute exchange, Mr. Dinkins said, “I’m older 
than I guess anybody in this room, and I’ve been around a long time. People die in 
riots, you know. Sometimes there are police officers who die in riots.” Using a 
vulgarity, he added that it was ridiculous to say that “if you comfort a family, that you 
have taken sides against the police officer.” 
 
“That’s the way it looked to us,” the officer said. 
 
The mayor, sounding quite angry, then told the officer, as he has told other police 
officers in recent months, that he had continued to expand the Police Department 
during the last two years while virtually every other city agency suffered huge budget 




[…] “Where is it that I am the enemy of the police officers?” the mayor said a 
moment later. “The one who has stood up and produced more for this Police 
Department than anybody in recent years. Now you may continue to feel the way you 
do until the day you die and the day I die, but sir, you are wrong. You are dead wrong. 
And so, I am going to continue to do what I think is right.”423 
 
The conversation reveals how the police officer frames the incident within a broader 
reality of the danger faced by police officers, which is insufficiently addressed by the 
mayor in the eyes of the police officer, who connects the perceived lack of mayoral 
support to the fact that the mayor comforted Mr. Garcia’s family. Conversely, the 
mayor perceives his actions through his own self-centered reality (‘Where is it that I 
am the enemy of the police officers?’), while connecting the notion of mayoral support 
of the police to the fact that he ‘had continued to expand the Police Department’. The 
end result is the mayor’s rigid positioning (‘dead wrong’, ‘I am going to continue to do 
what I think is right’).  
In other instances, Dinkins was more remorseful. Months after the Crown 
Heights riots, Dinkins publicly apologized: “I’ve made mistakes […] but I’ve learned 
from my mistakes, and I won’t make those mistakes again.”424 His repentant words, 
however, were to no avail. While his biographer Kirtzman argues that Dinkins did try 
to bring different (racial) groups together in New York, this strategy did not work: 
“Dinkins had given compassion a bad name.”425 Lardner and Reppetto suggest that it 
was a PBA-led City Hall police protest in September 1992 that served as the last straw. 
During this event, which “wasn’t a rally as much as a riot”, more than 10,000 off-duty 
officers and their supporters protested Dinkins’ handling of police issues.426 The New 
York Times describes how the mood at the rally quickly changed:  
 
“From there, the protest degenerated into a beer-swilling, traffic-snarling, epithet-
hurling melee that stretched from the Brooklyn Bridge to Murray Street, where several 
politicians helped stoke the emotional fires. […] Taking a phrase from Rev. Al 
Sharpton, they joined together in chants of ‘No justice. No police.’ Hand-drawn signs 
in the crowd urged: ‘Dunk the Dink’ and used sexually loaded terms to criticize the 
mayor. One man banged a pot with a spoon and shouted ‘Daryl Gates for Mayor,’ a 
reference to the former Police Chief of Los Angeles whose department was sharply 
criticized for its attitude toward minorities.”427 
 
Other mayors, too, have felt the pressure from the public in general and specific 
stakeholders in particular. Under pressure, Koch, in 1984, hired the first African-
American police commissioner, Benjamin Ward, to whose obituary writer he rather 
inelegantly said in 2002: “The fact that he was black was an extra plus.”428 Many 
people, including the editorial board of the New York Times, believed that Koch was 
“applying a double standard” to Ward. Soffer points out: “More than a few New 
Yorkers thought Koch would have fired a white police commissioner who had referred 
to African Americans or Hispanics as drug users and admonished them with Afrikaner 
proverbs.”429  
 Probably the most renowned for his communication style was Mayor Giuliani, 
whose administration was known for its aggressive pro-police communication 
approach, which often offended critics. The NYPD was an important issue to Giuliani. 
He was one of the politicians present at the infamous PBA-led rally, where he, 
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speaking to the crowd from a truck, was dismissing Dinkins’ policies as “bullshit.”430 
Later Giuliani, who was severely criticized for his presence and speech during the 
rally, defended himself to a reporter:  
 
“I believe that what the mayor is doing to the Police Department in this city is pretty 
close to criminal […] He is destroying the morale of one of the great institutions in 
America, not just in this city. It’s a police department that doesn’t want to make 
arrests. It’s a police department that doesn’t want to intervene to help, because they 
feel they’ll be second-guessed by an administration that wants to scapegoat the police 
for all the problems in New York City.”431 
 
It is commonly believed that Giuliani’s style of communication in general, and his 
behavior after police-violence incidents in particular, fueled racial tension in New 
York.
432
 The mayor, who “was clearly more comfortable among white men, and […] 
didn’t speak the language of the civil rights generation”, shunned communication with 
minority groups and their leaders.
433
 In response to criticism by Representative Charles 
B. Rangel, Giuliani told reporters that black officials were “going to have to learn how 
to discipline themselves in the way in which they speak.”434 
Polls indicate that New Yorkers believe that Giuliani’s communication after 
the Diallo and Dorismond cases had an adverse effect (see Subsection 3.10.4). His 
relationship with certain stakeholders was deplorable. Kirtzman argues that Giuliani 
did not put any effort into communicating with them, and that he did not even attempt 
to get to know New York’s councilmen. Kirtzman: “By the middle of his second term, 
Giuliani was a villain in the eyes of the black community, a fascist in the eyes of 
liberals, and a traitor to leaders of his own party.” Criticism mounted after the Diallo 
shooting: “All the powers he’d outfoxed or bullied into submission — the liberals, the 
Harlem politicians, the editorial page editors, the civil liberties crowd — were rising 
together as one to protest the fatal police shooting of an unarmed immigrant.”435  
Overall, scholars believe that the Bloomberg administration, in comparison 
with that of his predecessor, was more open in its communication and more considerate 
towards the criticism and demands of internal and external groups.
436
 Berg argues that 
the outrage after the Sean Bell shooting, a case further discussed in the second part of 
this research, was tempered not only by the mayor’s response to the shooting, but also 
due to the “effective lines of communication with the minority community”, 
established when Bloomberg came into office, “something the Giuliani administration 
had failed to do.”437  
While some mayors have been more open towards critical views, they have 
been careful in their acknowledgement and support of these. Mayor Koch, made a 
point of going to community meetings where he was unpopular, although he often had 
to leave the by backdoor.
438
 Yet in his communication he often refuted criticism of the 
police and denounced critics’ methods. At the third meeting of the Conyers hearings, a 
series of public hearings on police brutality in New York set up by Representative John 
Conyers Jr., Mayor Koch challenged Conyers to “produce so much as a scintilla of 
evidence” on police violence being systematic and widespread in New York City. He 
also said that the allegations were “a smokescreen by the guilty” and “a slander by 
inveterate critics of the police who were not present.”439 After the fatal shooting of 
Eleanor Bumpurs — a 66-year old African-American woman who was mentally ill — 
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by a police officer after she had waved a kitchen knife at officers who were trying to 
evict her from her apartment, Mayor Koch did acknowledge that “the City of New 
York accepts the responsibility because we believe that city personnel failed to comply 
with the procedures that were put into place.” However, he was reluctant to support the 
view that the police and other government officials treat white and black New Yorkers 
differently: “I know there will always be the question of whether, if she were white, 
would she have been subject to the same acts.” When members of the audience shouted 
“No, no!,” Koch continued: “We will never know.” Upon which the audience 
responded: “We know.” This interaction, according to Koch’s biographer, underlined 
“the gulf between the mayor and his audience.”440 
 
3.7.2 Conclusion  
The mayor has many powers, including the authority to appoint the police 
commissioner, put pressure on the police and claim successes, while shielding himself 
from issues caused by larger governmental policies. Even police reform efforts 
proposed by the mayor can be strategies to avoid having to deal with larger problems. 
For this, he can use his power as an opinion leader, by which he can choose to focus on 
or ignore issues in his contact with media or with citizens directly, and proactively 
raise issues himself. In the past decades, New York has seen different mayors, with 
many different views on the city and the role of the police. While some New York 
mayors have come into office as law-and-order candidates, others were more focused 
on bringing racial harmony to the city. In line with these disparate motivations, New 
York mayors have taken different positions on crucial police issues, such as external 
review. A number of mayors have used their powers to suppress reports unfavorable to 
the NYPD.  
While the mayor has broad powers to address (policing) issues or distance 
himself from them, his powers are limited by a checks-and-balances system, and by a 
diverse group of different stakeholders within his electorate, whose political powers 
and levels of awareness were growing steadfastly, and who have obtained the ability to 
thwart mayoral initiatives, and taint his image. In general, mayors who were more 
focused on civil rights issues faced much resistance from the rank and file and the 
PBA, while law-and-order mayors faced much resistance from civil rights groups and 
minority groups, Yet many mayors found themselves criticized both by police and by 
civil rights activists, even those who tried to establish an open dialogue with critics. 
While the mayors’ communication with their critics on police-misconduct-
related issues has been rarely successful, it is commonly believed that, above all, 
Mayor Giuliani’s style of communication in general, and his behavior after police-






3.8 The Media 
This section examines the power of the media, their relationship with the police and the 
nature of police coverage in general, as well as coverage of police misconduct and 
incidents in particular. 
 
3.8.1 Importance and power of news media 
In general, modern news media are seen as powerful institutions, often — 
euphemistically — referred to as the ‘fourth estate.’441 This power is also recognized 
by the police themselves. Skolnick and McCoy interviewed 25 Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF) chiefs regarding their relationship with the media. Overall, 
the police chiefs described the media as a “conduit of communication between the 
police and the community.” As the function of the police commissioner is connected to 
the mayor and depends on the support of various groups and political actors, favorable 
media coverage can improve relations and increase this support.
442
 
The media play an important role in the construction of reality, considering 
that knowledge on social institutions nowadays is obtained through the media rather 
than through direct experience.
443
 Moreover, social institutions rely on mass media to 
disseminate their “reality shaping information.”444 Lawrence: 
 
“Event-driven problem definition is an important political phenomenon in today’s 
media environment. By zooming in on certain news events they see as particularly 
newsworthy, journalists become key mediators in ongoing struggles of various social 
groups to designate problems and shape how we define those problems.”445 
 
Researchers have also noted the news media’s importance in covering police actions 
and behavior. In this light, the function of the media as a reality shaping agent and as 
watchdog also relates to that of the police. News media serve as agents with the 
theoretical ability to hold the police accountable to the public.
446
 They can do so by 
informing the public, but also by evaluating police behavior and by offering 
alternatives.
447
 This position is strategic, as the public uses the media as a source to 
form opinions about crime (fighting), but also, more generally, about police 
behavior.
448
 Take for example the headline in the New York Post, “Dave, Do 
Something,” which was both a reflection of and a catalyst for the general perception 
that the mayor and the Police Department were not doing enough (see Subsection 
3.7.1).  
Skolnick and McCoy observe that the media’s watchdog function is in theory 
more powerful than that of agents such as courts and review boards, as the media are 
not hampered by political forces in their critical analysis of the police.
449
 Moreover, 
they feed and educate other agents, such as civilian review boards, with information, in 
order for participants to “draw on a well-informed and realistic base of public opinion 




The media have a strong influence on the public in general and the shaping of 
attitudes of specific groups towards the police.
451
 While contact may be the most 
important factor, most people do not have contact with the police and the media fill in 
this gap.
452





Especially highly publicized stories, coined by Surette as “media trials” result in 
sensationalism and can have a strong impact on public understanding.
454
  
Disturbing events covered in news media influence public opinion, especially 
during or immediately after people have been exposed to such coverage, or after 
repeated exposure, even though reporting on police misconduct is patchy and 
episodic.
455
 Not only does frequent media exposure influence perceptions concerning 




To a degree, the extent to which the media influence public opinion depends 
on the race of the audience, African Americans being more receptive than whites to 
mediated images of police violence and — after seeing such images — having a 
stronger conviction that the officers are guilty of police violence. Moreover, African 
Americans consume more police misconduct stories, which negatively affects 
perceptions regarding police misconduct, as well as regarding general attitudes toward 
police, while increasing support for police reform.
457
 People who are exposed 
repeatedly to media reports on police abuse are more supportive of reform measures, 
believing that the existing problems can only be solved by accountability and police 
sensitivity measures, as well as racial diversification of the force.
458
 
Ready, White and Fisher connect the reform measures after the shooting of 
Sean Bell in 2006 to the extensive media coverage following the shooting. More 
specifically, they consider the NYPD’s commissioning of the RAND Corporation 
evaluation of NYPD practices an example of a “reflexive feedback loop”, a process in 
which the police reconsider practices after they have been criticized heavily by the 
media.
459
 More indirectly, media influence public perceptions of reform.  
 
Police influence on the media 
While the media have considerable power in holding the police accountable, this power 
is reduced by economic limitations on news production and the profitmaking goals of 
the media, forcing them to rely on easily accessible information sources. With the 
decline of newspaper consumption, cost-efficiency has become an even more dominant 
factor. The media hence rely heavily on the police in the production of news, as the 
latter is a “willing participant.”460 This relationship with the police diminishes the news 
media’s power as a police watchdog, while increasing that of the police as a 
newsmaker and news influencer. Chibnall characterizes the relationship as 
“asymmetrical”, because of “the inferior negotiation position of the reporter.”461 
Chermak diminutively depicts the role of the media as a vehicle “for free 
advertisement.” He argues that both newspapers and reporters reap the benefits from 
this arrangement. While the former can produce news in a cost-efficient manner, the 
latter’s articles are prominently placed. Chermak: “News media are not critical of what 
police sources submit as news because the stories provided are not inconsistent with 
what helps the news organization sell news.”462  
The police have demonstrated that they can use this relationship to their 
advantage.
463
 However, the police’s power and ability to influence news is often 
overlooked by the public. As the public are so familiar with the role of the police in 
patrolling the streets, Ericson observes, “We tend to forget that the police are also out 
to patrol the facts, to reproduce various symbolic orders.” Such patrolling involves the 
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“shielding, protecting and glossing” of information not only on street level, but also 
“on the administrative level of producing organizational and occupational 
ideologies.”464 The police hence play an important role in each phase of the news 
production process, providing the news media with images that are in line with media 
needs, yet also much in line with their own objectives, their goal being to reaffirm their 
status as “enforcers of the law” in the media.465  
Police departments invest their own resources either in the assistance of media 
organizations with the production of news, or in attempts to avoid publication. If the 
police do not want to involve the media, they can choose not to release a crime incident 
report. They can also request media attendance of specific events. Once a reporter 
decides to write a story, the police can emphasize or downplay certain aspects, 
ultimately affecting the coverage presented to the public. The police also hire and train 
public information officers that maintain and smoothen relations with the press, aiming 
at ensuring consistent and positive reporting. Modern police organizations typically 
offer a press room at police headquarters. Police also act as a source to the media, who 
cite the police often in their crime reporting.
466
 By doing so, the media give the police a 
platform to act as experts that are worthy of shaping public perceptions of crime.
467
 
Ericson observes that the police “strategically organize physical facilities, cultural 
sensibilities and social relations to construct silence about most of their activities. 
These same spatial, cultural, and social resources also enable the police to narrow 
publicity into acceptable channels, making it both of practical use and ideologically 
productive.”468  
The police’s influence on the media and the strategies discussed above 
particularly pertain to everyday crime reporting and positive news about the police. 
The police have been much less successful in influencing the media after scandals and 
incidents of police misconduct.
469
 Lovell argues that everyday police interaction with 
news reporters is predominately limited to crime reporting and that in regard to police 
misconduct, the police are much more defensive. Only after a scandal do the dynamics 
of police–media relations shift and do the police take measures to control their image. 
He argues that the police still do not understand the full power of the media, they steer 
away from the media believing that reporters do not understand the complexities of 
policing. This posture results in secrecy and the exclusion of negative reporters.
470
 This 
approach is underlined by Leonard Levitt, a veteran police reporter and author of the 
book NYPD Confidential, who writes at length about his frustration with the New York 
Police’s communication approach towards journalists. He observes at the beginning of 
his book: “Writing a book is never easy. Writing a book about the New York City 
Police Department — where lack of cooperation is the norm and retaliation is an 
accepted part of police culture — can be especially challenging.471 
 
3.8.2 Tension between the police and the media 
While conflict in general is natural to all societies and can be productive, there is a 
difference between healthy conflict and that which is not. Guffey extends this theory to 
the relationship between police and media, asserting that “functional, or healthy, 
conflict is necessary.” He continues: “The media must avoid a close, bonding 
relationship with the police and vice versa. Each must remain distant enough to be able 
to criticize the other when necessary, but not to allow the criticism to end 
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communication.”472 However, the relationship between the media and the police is not 
always healthy, nor is the friction always functional and productive, as the two entities 
oftentimes do not cooperate. While the relationship between the media and the police is 
“multi-beneficial” it is also regarded as “tenuous” and “undependable,” Ready, White 
and Fisher point out.
473
 Similarly, Guffey argues that the relationship between the 
media and the police is “symbiotic” yet often tense.474 He identifies different 
disagreement areas, including friction caused by the media’s role as a watchdog and 
the police and media’s difference of opinion over the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to 
a fair trial against the First Amendment’s right to a free press. One of the most 
influential court decisions concerning the First Amendment was New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This landmark case, the outcome of which 
constitutionalizes the law of libel and set the malice standard, protected the publication 
of material about public officials, in this case about the Alabama police and their 
actions against civil rights protesters in the 1960s. This case can be seen as an outburst 
of the hostile relationship between the southern police and northern media, 
demonstrating their vastly different views and objectives.
475
  
The media and the police have conflicting expectations of one another. In an 
early study on the police–media relations, Altschull observed that police expect the 
media to see them as the official channel, and that when there is a dispute about 
content, the police should be able to make the final decision.
476
 The police have been 
particularly dissatisfied with the media’s tendency towards sensationalism.477 Skolnick 
and McCoy report in their study based on interviews with police chiefs that these 
chiefs were positive on the surface about the media — even scoring their relationship 
with the media an average of 8.5 out of 10. Yet during the course of the interview, the 
chiefs did express their frustration with specific media aspects such as crime victim 
manipulation and the coverage of scandals without placing them in the proper context, 
criticizing the media for a “Watergate Mentality.” In this light, the chiefs also criticized 
reporters who did investigations without police consultation and who were insensitive 
to their reporting’s impact on the police. Skolnick and McCoy: “It was clear that there 
was an underlying distrust and tension between media institutions and police 
professionals.” The commissioners also pointed out that the media’s overzealousness 
negatively impacted rank-and-file officers, who saw the media as “outsiders” and 
“carping critics seeking out ‘warts’ that did not really exist.”478 Similarly, 
Niederhoffer’s study amongst 220 New York police officers found that 72% viewed 
the press as hostile.
 479 
The media are also critical of the police. Frequent complaints 
include lack of support, sensitivity towards criticism, secrecy (code of silence), and 
taking refuge behind the Sixth Amendment.
480
  
Guffey argues it is the “myopia” of both the police and the media that causes 
friction.
481
 This also appears to be the case in New York. While the NYPD’s 
Department of Communication and Public Information appears to be defensive, its 
relationship with the media appears to be a tense one. Levitt, who at one point had been 
banned from entering police headquarters and needed the help of civil rights advocates 
to get back in, wrote numerous times about his strained communication relationship 
with the DCPI, which he links to the overall closed and secretive nature of the NYPD. 
Responding to a fellow journalist who complained about NYPD’s inaccessibility, he 




You are not alone. DCPI stonewalls New York City’s entire press corps — even 
reporters based at Police Plaza, some of whom have been there for decades. 
 
Police departments everywhere distrust the media — sometimes with cause — and 
often resist revealing information. When that happens, the loser is the public. 
 
Under former mayor Rudolph Giuliani, the NYPD became more closed than at any 
time in its modern history. The scarcity of public information and antagonism towards 
the press became most pronounced during the four years of Police Commissioner 
Howard Safir. At a Police Foundation dinner, he introduced two New York Times 
reporters to a guest, calling them “slime.” 
 
Despite Mayor Bloomberg’s 2001 election promise of a more “transparent” police 
department, the NYPD under Commissioner Ray Kelly has become more secretive 
than even during Giuliani’s years. 
 
Perhaps symbolically, the door to the 13th floor corridor leading to DCPI has been 
locked. Only those with a building pass have access.  
 
Kelly no longer provides his public schedule. [Even President Obama and FBI Director 
Robert Mueller provide theirs.] Kelly has justified such secrecy by citing threats from 
“terrorism.” 
 
But the lack of disclosure goes deeper. Recently, the New York Post’s police bureau 
chief Murray Weiss wrote that, while investigating 100 officers suspected of mob ties, 
the newspaper “requested NYPD records normally available for inspection” at DCPI. 




The feelings of antagonism are mutual. Paul Browne, New York City Police 
Department’s deputy commissioner of public information, once said to the New York 
Times: “His self-absorbed bitterness and inaccuracy remind me of the old biddy, an 
aging malicious gossip I knew growing up in the Bronx.”483 
 
3.8.3 Media coverage 
Media coverage on the police has been historically mixed, comprising positive and 
negative articles, with a strong focus on crime fighting successes.
484
 This can be 
partially ascribed to the special relationship between the police and the media, 
discussed above, but also to the news-making process, which typically focuses on 
crimes at the trial stage, and to the media’s tendency towards sensationalism, which 
often leads to coverage of successful police action. Some scholars point out that 
coverage can be conflicting, portraying the police both as “heroic and professional 
crime fighters” and as “ineffective and incompetent” in their work.485 This can result in 
unrealistic public expectations and ultimately even lead to negative appraisals, 
especially after individuals have experience with crime or the criminal justice 
system.
486
 Thus while police images are often a “refraction of the reality”, they can still 
affect police legitimacy and thus have political significance.
487
 
Crime itself is a popular news topic.
488
 Unrealistic media representation 
distorts official knowledge about crime, but also about the police organization itself, as 
media tend to neglect the governmental aspects of the police.
489
 Police news is 
transformed into crime news, Skolnick and McCoy point out, quoting sociologist Todd 
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Gitlin: “News concerns the event, not the underlying condition; the person, not the 
group; conflict, not consensus; the fact that advances the story, not the one that 
explains it. […] In general, the archetypical news story is a crime story.”490  
 Due to the media’s asymmetrical relationship with the police, the latter are 
more frequently cited by the media than others, often being the prime information 
source. In the attribution of sources, names are rarely mentioned. Research by 
Chermak has shown that the generic “police said”, without the name of a specific 
source, was the most common reference to the police in (his selection of) police 
coverage. He cites two reasons for this: Oftentimes the “police said” is used as a 
follow-up in an article, and the name of the source is mentioned earlier. However, 
police spokesmen are often not willing to provide information, and then the reporter 





Reporting on police misconduct 
News coverage on police misconduct differs from that on crime fighting, as 
newspapers engage in more critical enquiry when police violence is concerned.
492
 
Police officers are also portrayed differently. While the police are glorified in their role 
as crime fighters, they are vilified in other ways. Lovell speaks of a “good cop/bad cop 
dichotomy of media imagery.”493  
In New York, both national and regional media have paid much attention to 
specific New York police-misconduct cases, such as that of Abner Louima, Amadou 
Diallo and Patrick Dorismond.
494
 The media have also served as a vehicle to 
disseminate unproven allegations concerning police conduct. In 1978, Tawana Brawley 
claimed she had been gang-raped by a group of six men, some of whom were 
policemen. The media reported extensively about the case and even after the 
allegations made by the teenager turned out to be false, a New York radio station gave 
her lawyers and advisor a platform to broadcast their message, granting them a four-
hour interview, in which they characterized the Brawley case as “a racist 
conspiracy.”495 
Not all coverage is sensationalized. A study by Ready, White and Fisher on the 
media representation of the use of TASER guns by the NYPD, has shown that TASER 
incidents involving vulnerable populations and the resistance by mentally-ill suspects 
do not receive more media attention and that individual cases are hence thus not 
sensationalized. Yet the study has shown that the media overplay the TASER’s 
potential lethal effects, considering that “there is only one reported NYPD case of a 
death occurring after TASER deployment (less than 1% of NYPD cases), but 31.8% of 
national media reports and 68.8% of the New York Times reports describe cases 
involving suspect death.” This study has also shown that, overall, the debate on 
TASER deployments was widely publicized and that news reports detailing incidents 
in which police officers used the weapon against children, the elderly, and public 
figures have made national headlines. While the newspaper coverage does reflect 
conflicting perspectives, the media mainly incorporate information provided by CED 
manufacturers and police agencies, on the one hand, or civil rights groups on the other. 
Ready, White and Fisher: “The findings may reflect an institutional bias in which news 
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providers are partial to sources that consistently provide news material — police 
agencies that offer reporters a steady stream of newsworthy information.”496 
In contrast to the specific coverage of TASER deployments, most of the news 
reporting of police violence is incidental, episodic and does not address patterns of 
police misconduct.
497
 Lawrence, discussing the New York Times reporting of different 
cases studies: 
 
“[…] each death was assigned a particular set of definitions in the pages of the Times, 
and each was linked, at least momentarily, with different kinds of policing problems. 
Consequently, news coverage of police misconduct was situational, contingent, even 
schizophrenic. A problem raised at least obliquely on the Times’ editorial page after 
Pereira’s death, for example, was one of inadequate civilian control of the police, yet 
that issue was never raised in regard to Garcia’s death, though it occurred just one year 
later — a year in which arguably not much greater civilian control of the NYPD had 
been established. The alleged problem of a suburban white police force was raised, 
suppressed, then raised again after the shooting of Garcia. Moreover, the Times did not 
measure these deaths by the same standards, defending police aggressiveness against 
suspected drug dealer Jose Garcia but questioning that aggressiveness against known 
drug dealer Ernest Sayon.”498  
 
Lawrence points out that very few of the reported police incidents have been succeeded 
by news reports, which may be the result of the media’s competing demands. She 
found a linear relationship between the frequency of exposure and five “story cues”:  
 
1. Whether “competing accounts” of victims or witnesses were reported;  
2. Whether a district attorney’s investigation, grand jury investigation, criminal trial, 
or civil suit was reported;  
3. Whether the suspect was identified as being from a racial or ethnic minority;  
4. Whether citizen activism (peaceful or violent) in response to the incident was 
reported;  





In this light, Lawrence, who views “the social construction of the news as part and 
parcel of larger political competitions to designate and define public problems”, 
addresses the dialectical relationship between news and official responses in police 
brutality cases:  
 
“Official concessionary responses can legitimize news attention to what is otherwise a 
difficult subject to broach. Yet when officials speak or act on the issue of brutality, 
they are usually responding to a context created by dramatic news events yielding 
other rich story cues. Still, official action remains for journalists the most powerful 
indicator of a story’s newsworthiness.”500 
 
The interaction between the media and the police thus has a catalyzing effect on news 
production. Lawrence’s research has also shown that police attempts to discourage 
critical reporting had adverse effects, often increasing the newsworthiness of the 
incident. However, she points out that the police can regain control of the news, “by 
presenting a unified front and questioning the credibility of competing accounts”, “by 
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assertively providing reporters with individualizing accounts of officers compelled to 
use force against drug-induced or drug-motivated violence”, “by reframing apparent 
problems of police aggressiveness as problems of inadequate policing and inadequate 
means of using force”, and by arguing “that critical news reporting only undermined 
officer morale and undercut police effectiveness.”501 Overall, these strategies can be 
seen as part of “a ritual of normalization”:  
 
“[…] it appears from these case studies that when abundant story cues are available, 
news organizations are likely to define a use-of force incident as a sign of a possible 
policing problem but then to hand the problem off to officials; the ritual is generally 
concluded when officials respond “appropriately.”502 
 
3.8.4 Conclusion 
In public debates, the media function both as gatekeepers that can construct and/or 
distort reality, and as watchdogs that can inform, evaluate and offer alternatives. As 
gatekeepers, the media shape the attitudes of specific groups towards the police, 
especially those of African Americans. In particular, disturbing events covered in news 
media influence public opinion in regard to misconduct, but also the beliefs about 
police bias. Refractions of reality can result in unrealistic public expectations of the 
police and can have a negative effect on public opinion, especially after individuals 
have had experience with crime or the criminal justice system. As watchdogs, the 
media’s influence has had agenda-setting effects and has led to the installation of 
commissions.  
The relationship between the media and the police is multi-beneficial and 
symbiotic yet often tense, the media’s critical attitude often conflicting with police 
expectations, lack of support and code of silence. The DCPI’s actions are defensive 
and its relationship with the media appear to be tense, too. 
While the media are not influenced by political forces, their power as a 
stakeholder in the debate is hampered by economic limitations on news production and 
the profitmaking goals of the media, forcing them into an asymmetrical relationship 
with the police. This relationship diminishes their power as a police watchdog, while 
increasing that of the police as a newsmaker and news influencer, as they provide news 
media with images that are in line with their own objectives. However, the police have 
been much less successful in influencing their representation in the media after 
scandals and incidents of police misconduct, including highly-publicized police-
violence incidents. While the media have been more critical towards such issues, the 
police have responded defensively, only reacting after a scandal. Consequently, the 
police are generally glorified as crime fighters, while vilified as aggressors, resulting in 
a mediated ‘good cop’ versus ‘bad cop’ reality. Yet ultimately, the police have the 
power to regain control of the news by a ‘ritual of normalization’.  
As news gatekeepers who have a dialectical relationship with their 
environment, the media tend to focus on news involving events, persons, conflicts and 
development. This has several consequences. First, police and citizen responses, even 
responses aimed at discouraging critical reporting, have a catalyzing effect on news 
production. Second, most of the news reporting of police violence is incidental, 
episodic and does not address patterns of police misconduct. Third, this particular 
focus has also resulted in sensationalized news and the dissemination of unproven 
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allegations concerning police conduct. Due to the asymmetrical relationship with the 
police, but also to the media’s focus on conflict, police and civil rights groups are often 




3.9 Police reform 
“Because American cities tend to have sizable populations of people of color, mayors 
and police executives have had to be responsive to the demands of those communities. 
At the same time, police executives must deal with a variety of communities who are 
sensitive to different issues. Hence, when we think about police reform, we cannot 
ignore the politics of police reform. And what may seem like reform to one group — 
like community-oriented policing (COP) — may appear to be ‘soft on crime’ to 
another. Some police executives, like some politicians, are able to finesse these 
problems. Others are not.”503  
Jerome H. Skolnick 
 
The dynamic process of reform politics has had a great impact on the inception and 
extent of success of reform initiatives in the second half of the twentieth century. So 
have the numerous scandals that occurred during this period. This section examines the 
dynamics of police reform as well as the politics of and debate on reform within this 
time period. Several, partly overlapping, reform periods can be distinguished in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Other reform efforts, such as the fight against 
corruption, have been ongoing. Some of the reforms, such as external oversight, will be 
discussed in Section 3.10, as they are linked to the police–community relations debate.  
 
3.9.1 1950s–1970s: A new wave of professionalization 
In the 1950s, a new wave of professionalization hit the Unites States, led by O.W. 
Wilson, the disciple of August Vollmer, who was the driving force behind the first 
wave of professionalization (which was in fact the second wave of reform in that era). 
This new wave, which resembled the first, was facilitated by technological 
advancements, and driven by reform-minded police chiefs and scholars, mostly 
middle-class college men, who aimed at improving the status of the police and 
coercing rank-and-file officers to adopt professional norms that were in line with their 
own middle-class ideologies, in order to decrease the vulnerability of their own 
position. Reformers increasingly implemented bureaucratization-, centralization-, 
recruitment- and training measures based on scientific models. The movement also 
comprised a major attack on corruption, abuse, and inefficiency.
504
  
The second wave of professionalization was exceedingly authoritarian, as 
reformers believed that reform could only be successful through top-down 
management. Walker: “Police professionalism was defined almost exclusively in terms 
of managerial efficiency and administrators sought to refine techniques that would 
further strengthen their hand in commanding and controlling rank-and-file 
patrolmen.”505 Hence, Walker asserts, “the history of police reform is largely the story 
of strong chiefs who unilaterally imposed professional standards in their respective 
departments.”506  
Rank-and-file officers were seen as ignorant and inept, and “needed to be 
uplifted through the imposition of higher recruitment standards, better training, and of 
course expert leadership.”507 Consequently, police management and reformers mostly 
kept patrolmen out of the decision-making process. Bayley argues that over the years, 
police management has not seen patrolmen and sergeants as valuable sparring partners, 
but rather as a source of unconstructive criticism. Moreover, the police organizations’ 
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quasi-military management style focuses on discipline rather than collaborative 
problem solving, which has hampered rank-and-file involvement, also in later reform 
efforts. In this respect, Bayley argues, it is rather ironic, but also a missed opportunity, 
that the vast amount of street-level discretionary power is not accompanied by 
participation in the decision-making process: “Increasing their involvement in setting 
organizational plans would […] ensure that directives and goals were more closely 
connected, with both serving the interests of public safety.”508  
 Rank-and-file officers have been highly skeptical of the professionalization 
movement, and more generally even about the benefits of education. Niederhoffer:  
 
“But within the ranks many of the less educated, tradition directed members of the 
force continue to fight to preserve their hegemony. […] The police’s elite’s enthusiasm 
for the benefits of education has obscured for them its negative effects: the envy and 
hostility it is spreading among the old-timers who lack the formal education to meet 
the proposed standards.”509  
 
In general, the rank and file often saw new reform efforts in the second half of the 
twentieth century as “just politics” and unrealistic yet “passing fads”, Skogan 
observes.
510
 He asserts that their negative attitude towards such reforms are partly 
shaped by police culture, with its hands-on mentality, traditional views, a resistance 
towards change in general and outside interference of any kind.  
While patrolmen have not formally played a significant role in the reform 
processes in the second half of the twentieth century, they were in fact quite successful 
in hampering reform efforts.
511
 In New York, similar to other cities, the rank and file 
tried to resist the professionalization measures with the help of their unions, which 
fought with police management over personnel regulations, but also directly attacked 
police commissioners who aimed at professionalizing the department. The PBA, for 
example, played an active role in the resignation of reform commissioner Stephen P. 
Kennedy in the 1960s, because the implementation of his professionalization program 
was considered to be too aggressive and too imperious (see Section 3.6 for more 
examples).
512
 In addition to the rank and file’s general opposition to reform, internal 
resistance also came from sergeants, or front-line supervisors, who are seen by the rank 
and file as the “real employers,” Skogan argues. Special units also resisted reform in 
general, as they often feel threatened by “by department-wide programs that require 
them to change their ways.”513 
The police force as a whole also impeded change. This is partly due to police 
structure and organization, including the transitory character of police management. 
Skogan points out that reform efforts often do not survive leadership transition, and 
police chiefs often have new ideas on reform.
514
 More broadly, the NYPD’s overall 
character remained innately pitted against change. Silverman: “The NYPD excelled at 
shaping its own reaction to external and internal demands for reform, meeting these 
pressures with predictable stages of organizational resistance.”515 In fact, the 




Although many departments claimed otherwise, the professionalization 
movement was only partly successful and by the 1970s continued to be rather a vision 
than reality. Euphemistic rhetoric indeed played an important role in the movement, 
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often serving political ends.
517
 Take for example the police’s quest to secure the 
legality of stop-and-frisk practices, by claiming that police officers’ judgments in these 
practices must be accurate, because the police are highly professionalized. This image 
presented by police management did not reflect reality, Segal points out:  
 
“By making their officers into true professionals and presenting a professional image 
to the courts, law enforcement administrators sought to win judicial approval of stop-
and-frisk practices. Simultaneously, they also sought to increase their control over the 
police rank and file. That strategy seemed to fail; police officers bucked professional 
norms and prosecutors presented flawed cases to the judiciary. But ironically the 
courts still gave administrators exactly what they wanted: The courts condoned stop-
and-frisk and, along the way, they endorsed the image of the expert police 
professional.”518 
 
In fact, the professionalization movement was in many ways unsuccessful. While many 
police problems, such as corruption, persisted, the history of police reform was 
interspersed by periodic scandals.
519
 Moreover, while the Police Department became 
increasingly professionalized, rank-and-file officers did not.
520
 In New York, too, 
reform commissioners struggled to achieve results. Even reform commissioner Patrick 
Murphy was only marginally successful in reforming the police (see discussion in 
Subsection 3.4.1). 
While the professionalization process itself was tedious and ultimately only 
successful on some accounts, the movement resulted in a few negative side effects. 
First, the professionalization process negatively impacted police–community relations, 
several commissions and scholars have pointed out.
521
 Due to centralization measures, 
the public became increasingly alienated from the police (see discussion in Subsections 
3.1.3 and 3.5.1).
522
 In fact, the civil rights riots were one of the “unanticipated 
consequences” of the professionalization movement, Walker argues.523 Second, 
amongst police officers, professionalization led to increased levels of cynicism, which 
they used as a mechanism of self-defense to deal with the (perceived) threatening 
changes.
524
 Yet the professionalization movement’s rigid character also led to a 
growing sense of consciousness amongst patrolmen to undertake organized action (see 
Subsection 3.6.1). The professionalization and unionization movement hence 
negatively impacted each other. While the rigid top-down professionalization led to 
rigid police activism, the latter “had dulled the appetite of virtually all scholars and 
police reformers for bringing workplace democracy to law enforcement.”525 
 
3.9.2 The fight against police corruption  
“There are many cultures in the New York City Police Department, but corruption is 
the strongest one.”526  
John Guido, former chief of the NYPD Internal Affairs Division 
 
The fight against corruption was one of the focal points of the professionalization 
movement. This fight continued after reform gradually changed during the second half 
of the twentieth century, yet corruption scandals kept reoccurring.  
Corruption in police forces has been an ongoing phenomenon, often explained 
from a theoretical perspective. As police organizations are “organized around 
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transactions with people and organizations in their environment” and officers “occupy 
boundary-spanning roles,” they are particularly vulnerable to corruption, i.e. “the abuse 
of public power by officers for their own private benefits.”527  
Numerous corruption scandals occurred in New York during the second half of 
the twentieth century, often followed by intense public debate and reports by 
commissions appointed to investigate the extent and nature of the corruption. The 
commissions often echoed each other’s findings. Cheng speaks of “twenty-year cycles 
of corruption, scandal, reform backslide.”528 
While corruption remained problematic during the second half of the century, 
substantial measures to control corruption have been scarce. The police responded to 
corruption mainly by bureaucratic reform measures, aimed at insulating the police from 
the public.
529
 Yet these bureaucratization measures were often ineffective, Cheng 
points out, partly due to the “uniqueness of police work and the particular subculture of 
the blue code of silence” which made “internal organizational rebuilding […] not 
sufficient to change the equilibrium of police corruption.
530
 In particular, the NYPD’s 
police culture with its ‘us-versus-them’ character and code of silence further hampered 
anti-corruption measures and investigations. Cheng:  
 
“Influenced by the perception of ‘us versus them,’ bosses of the force always want to 
‘clean their own laundry’ when corruption is detected. But, it is almost impossible for 
them to launch a real campaign against corruption within the force because of the blue 
code of silence. In this sense, it is not surprising to find that […] Commissioner 
Murphy, [a man] of great integrity, did not accept any external intervention into police 
corruption, because they were concerned how it would affect the morale of the 
force.”531  
 
Silverman argues that bureaucratic responses were often superficial and “better geared 
to quieting that day’s demand for reform than to dealing with future corruption 
problems.”532 Bureaucratic responses were also based on the rotten-apple principle, 
rather than that of a rotten barrel.
533
 Besides these bureaucratic responses, there were 
other forces hampering anti-corruption measures. Cheng, speaking about the 
installation of an external corruption investigation authority:  
 
“The first blockage is an inevitable opposition from the police force. Another blockage 
is the problem of locating the principal for the new power center: the proposed 
independent institution should certainly be independent of the police force on the one 
hand, but on the other hand, it should certainly not be independent of certain higher 
authority, such as the city hall, the city council, or the people. After all, the 
establishment of a powerful anticorruption institution is about redistributing powers 
within the whole political structure. Third, […], a true campaign against widespread 
police corruption usually does pose trouble for the current mayor, as evidenced by the 
NYC history. This shows a negative correlation between the commitment to 
anticorruption and reelectability. In fact, no mayor of NYC who has launched an 
independent investigation into a police scandal has been re-elected in the past 
century.”534 
 
It is interesting how re-electibility, part of the democratic checks-and-balance system 
in the United States, paradoxically poses challenges to the monitoring of corruption. In 




“In summary […] we find the double edges of the ‘sword’ — the mechanism of checks 
and balances in governance. On the one hand, the lack of external checks on the police 
force is conducive to widespread corruption within the force. In order to deal with this 
problem in the long run, it is necessary for reformers to rely on an external 
institutionalized power. In this sense, the pursuit of the equilibrium of police integrity 
is a pursuit of better checks and balances in government. On the other hand, this aim 
can be better achieved in a regime without an institutionalized mechanism of checks 
and balances, especially in relation to the executive branch. This is the dilemma of 
checks and balances in combating police corruption and in governance.”535  
 
One of the main corruption scandals in New York occurred in the 1970s, when, despite 
professionalization reforms, corruption was widespread, due to a “fragmented and 
dysfunctional anticorruption system.”536 In fact, the corruption was more or less 
condoned at the time, Cannato observes: “Having been beaten badly over the issue [of 
the Civilian Complaint Review Board] and fearing that any investigation into 
corruption would completely sever whatever goodwill remained with the police, 
Lindsay and his aides chose to ignore the charges of corruption.”537 Lardner and 
Reppetto: “There were no secret meetings or confidential orders given to soft-pedal 
corruption, but like so many things in the culture of the NYPD, it was ‘understood’.538 
The pervasive corruption at the time came to light after the revelations of 
whistleblower Frank Serpico, who observed widespread corruption amongst his fellow 
officers. Early in his career, he found an envelope in his locker filled with ‘his share’ of 
the collections from illegal gamblers. When he refused the content and reported the 
graft, he was labeled a ‘rat’. From that point onwards he was shunned by his 
colleagues.
539
 The Department of Investigation warned him that he could be found 
“face-down in the East River.”540 Serpico was unsuccessful in his attempts to initiate 
an internal, systematic investigation into the corruption. Cheng: “Not only was his 
request rejected again and again, but Frank Serpico himself was regarded as a ‘psycho’ 
by several high-level officers.”541 Eventually Serpico went to the New York Times in 
1970, which revealed the story under the headline: “Graft Paid to Police Here, Said to 
Run into Millions.”542 For a prolonged period of time, articles appeared in the New 
York Times, the New York Daily News, and the New York Post. The Knapp 
Commission, established in May 1970 to investigate police corruption, exposed “the 
myth of the rotten-apple doctrine.” Cheng:  
 
“According to the report, corrupt police officers in the NYPD had been described as 
falling into two basic categories: ‘meat-eaters’ and ‘grass-eaters.’ As the names 
suggest, the meat-eaters were those police-officers who aggressively abused their 
powers for personal benefits; the grass-eaters simply accepted the payoffs that the 
circumstances of police work would throw their way. Corrupt cops not only took 
‘scores’ — individual payments — but also were widely involved in ‘pads’, by which 
they collected regular bi-weekly or monthly payments from each of the gambling 
establishments in the area under their jurisdiction, and divided the dirty money in equal 
shares. The department had not eliminated this misconduct because of the wide 
acceptance of the ‘rotten-apple’ theory. The premise of the theory, believed by many 
high-ranking officers, was that corruption within the force was the exception rather 
than the rule. Even worse, the rotten-apple doctrine reinforced and gave respectability 




While the Knapp Commission recognized that their mission was not unique, stating 
that previous commissions “generated a considerable momentum for reform,” they also 
recognized that this moment was “allowed to evaporate.” Ironically, the long-term 
impact of the Knapp Commission was not much different from previous ones.
544
 Cheng 
points out that while police Commissioner Murphy “launched tremendous reforms in 
the force, including decentralizing authority and responsibility, reducing the autonomy 
of the detective branch, setting new standards of accountability for senior officers, 
instigating proactive investigatory procedures for police deviance, altering certain 
aspects of enforcement, rotating personnel, and emphasizing integrity in training” and 
“it is quite fair to conclude that the immediate effect of those reforms was promising,” 
still “negative evidence persisted” even during Murphy’s tenure.545 Old practices thus 
continued, Lardner and Reppetto also observe, and while “most cops resisted the lures 
of the drug trade, […] even among the straight ones there was a widespread readiness 
to observe the ‘blue wall of silence’, i.e. the rule against informing on crooked 
brethren.”546  
After a relatively peaceful period, another large corruption scandal occurred in 
1992: Michael Dowd, a corrupt New York Police officer, had blackmailed drug 
dealers, protected others, sold cocaine himself and led a cartel of other corrupt officers. 
Again, the department reacted defensively, Silverman points out, first denying the 
allegations, stating that “the problem is minimal.” When this did not work, the 
organization shifted its strategy, first towards damage control, by saying “We are 
looking into it” and then towards downplaying the need for an outside commission, by 
saying “We are doing something about it.” Finally, stage four comprised “desperate 
action,” such as the appointment of a new commissioner and the promotion of the 
Internal Affairs Bureau to “full bureau status.”547 Eventually Mayor Dinkins appointed 
the Mollen Commission, which again found corruption to be widespread in the force 
and moreover, found that the NYPD had purposely ignored the signs of corruption.
548
 
The police’s weak response did not satisfy the Commission, which demanded an 
independent, external anti-corruption body.
549
 Overall their findings and 
recommendations were not very original or groundbreaking, as they again pointed at 
“the police culture of silence, scandal avoidance, mutual protection, and a distant, often 
hostile ‘we versus they mindset of the NYPD.’”550  
 
3.9.3 The post-civil rights era: Gradual paradigm shifts 
The modern period of police reform, starting in 1967, was inspired by the research of 
William Westley on police violence and by Kenneth Culp Davis and Jerome Skolnick 
on police discretion. Their research had been influenced by the President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967) and the 
civil rights era in general. Reform efforts after 1967 include community policing, 
problem-oriented policing, signs-of-crime policing, hot-spots policing, mandatory 
arrest for spouse assault, enhancement of internal discipline, external oversight, 
Compstat, and increased diversity of personnel.
551
 This subsection examines the 
reforms of Community/problem-oriented policing and Compstat. External oversight 




Community and problem-oriented policing 
Community policing involves the collaboration between police and residents in regard 
to crime prevention. This type of policing, which includes police–community 
meetings, foot patrols, accessibility of police stations, and youth programs, appears to 
be more proactive and collaborative than traditional approaches.
552 
It was one of the 
first main reform impulses after the civil rights era, inspired by research carried out in 
the 1970s showing that existing strategies were not as effective as believed.
553
 
Community policing gradually came into fashion and by the end of the 1980s, the 
professionalization movement had been substituted by community policing as the 
reigning doctrine.
554
 This paradigm shift “attempted to fundamentally alter the 
structure and culture of policing.”555 It is characterized by “community-police crime 
prevention, decreased authoritarianism, and increased organizational flexibility and 
decentralization.”556 In 1991, Police Commissioner Brown introduced community 
policing in New York, under the name Community Patrol Officer Program (C-POP).
557
 
Those in favor of community policing believed that in the near future, the NYPD 
would become more proactive and officers would get to know the communities they 
patrolled.
558
A similar reform initiative was problem-oriented policing, i.e. “the 
grouping of police incidents as problems and then […] disaggregating them into their 
problem-solving elements,” which similarly was a response to the centralization 
measures taken by the Police Department.
559
  
The reforms faced much internal criticism and resistance. In New York, the 
rank and file mockingly referred to the officers involved in the program as See-Moms 
instead of C-POPs.
560
 The police’s contempt of community policing is captured by a 
quote from the of head of the LAPD at the time, Darryl Gates, who called officers 
involved in the program “a bunch of cops grinning at people and patting kids on the 
heads and handing out lollipops.”561 The rank and file were equally critical of problem-
oriented policing. Bayley:  
 
“POP, like COP, was clearly an outside-inside reform with substantial resistance from 
rank-and-file police. In fact, almost 30 years after Goldstein’s introduction of POP 
(1979), the methodology of POP is still difficult to implant, deflected by unquestioned 
faith among police in their standard operating procedures, top-down management, 
unsupportive reward systems, and clumsy and imprecise measures of achievement.”562 
 
Much resistance to community-policing also came from midlevel and top-managers, 
who saw their power diminish, as a result of decentralization efforts, and were afraid of 
terms such as ‘employee empowerment’, as they did not trust the rank and file.563 
However, in reality, such empowerment hardly occurred, as the police officers were 
still seen as “automatons.”564 Sklansky:  
 
“Encouraging patrol officers to be thoughtful and creative about their work is often 
said to be part of community policing, and even more so of problem-solving policing, 
but in practice this rarely means more than placing additional discretion in the hands of 
individual officers. There are few efforts to give officers a collective, deliberative 
voice in how policing is carried out, or to enlist police unions or identity-based police 
organizations as partners in police reform. The ‘community’ in ‘community policing’ 




Simmons similarly argues that both the police and the community were not involved in 
the reform measures, which has important consequences, considering this “is 
antithetical to the underlying rationale for community policing and precludes the 
opportunity for police officers and community members to work together to ease 
community-police tensions in their respective jurisdictions.”566 
In addition to internal resistance, broader views on the role of the police have had an 
adverse effect on reform efforts that did not focus directly on fighting crime in the first 
place, such as community and problem-oriented policing. Berry et al. point out:  
 
“One reason for this is that many officers, chiefs, and politicians continue to view 
crime control as the ‘core business’ of policing. Reforming chiefs are often stymied by 
reports of poor performance on law enforcement, by a sudden, media-led moral panic 
on crime, or by the replacement of a supportive political boss by a crime-oriented 
successor.”567 
 
Overall, researchers claim that community policing was unsuccessful, as community 
programs were never fully embraced by police departments across the United States, 
but instead were “fragmented, marginalized, and underfunded.”568 While many police 
chiefs have euphemistically claimed that their departments practice community 
policing, “most problem-oriented programs exist in name only and emphasize 
traditional crime control.”569 Community policing is a rhetorical device that provides 
“a doctrine of legitimacy for police departments experiencing loss of public 
support.”570 Community policing did not have a great impact on the NYPD as an 
organization either. Silverman: “In retrospect then, the NYPD did not have a fighting 
chance for fundamental change. Like many ambitious plans, community policing was 
foiled by the resistance of the NYPD infrastructure.”571 Lardner and Reppetto similarly 
argue that the program in New York “never progressed beyond a pilot program, 
consisting of a handful of specially trained, and mostly younger, cops in each 
precinct.”572  
Ironically, community policing also threatened police neutrality, as the police 
moved closer to the public again.
573
 On the positive side, it is believed that community 
policing reduced violence against officers.
574
 Moreover, some studies have shown that 
community policing resulted in a higher degree of job satisfaction, and cynicism is 
expected to decline. However, this cynicism may be triggered by some of the new 
police functions that are part of community policing, such as police–citizen contact.575  
 
Compstat 
By the end of the 1990s yet another reform impulse occurred. This impulse took place 
in the context of “large-scale political, social and economic changes in Western 
democratized countries,” Willis and Mastrofski observe, including “revamped 
expectations for what the state can accomplish and heightened concerns, especially 
among political elites, about the risks presented by certain populations, particularly the 
lower classes and racial and ethnic minorities.”576 In New York, an important element 
of the new reform impulse was Compstat, a strategic management system, developed 
first in the New York City Transit Police by Commissioner William Bratton and Jack 
Maple, and later implemented in the NYPD, when Bratton became police 
commissioner.
577
 Other reforms that were part of the new impulse include aggressive 
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policing tactics such as stop-and-frisk and zero tolerance. While Compstat is often 
associated with the broken-windows theory, i.e. the focus on minor quality of life 
offences and use of assertive policing methods to fight crime, it has different origins, 
and was essentially implemented as a tool to “fix” the NYPD, which was a 
“dysfunctional organization,” according to Bratton.578 Eterno and Silverman: “The fact 
that certain aspects of the program may fit with broken windows theory is merely an 
afterthought.”579  
The Compstat program, aimed at reducing crime, comprises the 
decentralization of the decision-making process to the level of precinct commanders, 
performance accountability for these commanders, and increase in capacity to pinpoint 
and respond to crime problems.
580
 Its management and technological system is based 
on four pillars, i.e. “(1) accurate, timely information made available at all levels in the 
organization; (2) the most effective tactics for specific problems; (3) rapid, focused 
deployment of resources to implement those tactics; and (4) relentless follow-up and 
assessment to learn what happened and make adjustments.” The twice-weekly ‘Crime 
Control Strategy Meeting’ shows how Compstat worked in practice:  
 
“[During these meetings] precinct commanders appear before the department’s top 
echelon to report on crime in their districts and what they are doing about it. This 
occurs in a data-saturated environment. Crime analysts collect, analyze, and map crime 
statistics to spot trends and help precinct commanders identify underlying factors that 
explain crime incidents. Top administrators use this information to quiz precinct 
commanders on the crime in their beats and to hold them responsible for solving the 
problems. Failure to provide satisfactory responses to these inquiries may lead to stern 
criticism or removal from command.”581  
 
Compstat has been lauded by many, including some police academics. Proponents 
contend that the dramatic crime drop in New York can be attributed to the program’s 
implementation. Indeed, several crimes, including homicide and burglary, dropped by 
more than 80% in this period.
582
 Some have described the program as perhaps the 
biggest innovation in policing in the second half of the twentieth century.
583
 However, 
the program has been criticized as well. The debate centers around several topics: to 
what extent the new NYPD management style actually affected crime statistics, the 
program’s effect on minority groups and police–community relations, and, although 
less profoundly discussed in the public debate, the extent to which the program was 
actually implemented, as well as the program’s effect on police personnel.584  
 Critics argue that the new management style led to a rigid organization that 
further isolated the police, alienated minority groups, and aggravated bitter 
sentiments.
585
 They also argue that it led to abuse of authority, as a result of its heavy 
focus on crime control, and return to the traditional hierarchical structure of policing, 
i.e. the military model.
586
 Research by Eterno and Silverman has shown that “officers 
who accepted the aggressive-policing paradigm are significantly more likely to violate 
the constitutional rights of citizens by conducting illegal searches and stops.”587 The 
new policing tactics only influenced the opinions of whites in a positive way.
588
 
Civilian complaints in fact increased tremendously after the implementation of 
Compstat. Anecdotal reports from New York City communities have also indicated 
that minority-group citizens particularly felt alienated. These citizens often linked the 
new, aggressive, policing style to police misconduct and police shooting incidents such 
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as those of Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo.
589
 Community members believed that 
the aggressive police policies of Mayor Giuliani’s administration had caused police 
brutality to increase. In the public debate, critics have used harsh rhetoric to criticize 
the police, stating for example that people “are locked up because of their race or their 
politics, as in Nazi Germany.”590 Some criticism was broader (also see Subsection 
3.2.2). ‘Police critic’ Andrea McArdle:  
 
“The city’s more pronounced neoliberalism under the Giuliani administration — a 
market oriented, predevelopment, antiwelfare stance — has fostered a climate that 
encourages, even rewards, aggressive law enforcement.”591 
 
Besides its detrimental effect on police–community relations, Compstat also negatively 
impacted individual police officers, making them less creative and adaptive to change, 
while more rigid and bound to traditions and rules, and hence “unable to deal 
effectively with both the dynamics of modern policing theories and the communities 
they serve.”592 Willis, Mastrofski and Weisburd:  
 
“Innovation is fraught with uncertainty, yet Compstat substantially lowered tolerance 
for the risk of failure. Strict accountability for performance was a strange and 
uncomfortable bedfellow with the sort of deliberative, collaborative, and experimental 
POP processes that presumably make Compstat effective technically, as well as 
legitimate it institutionally.”593  
 
The Compstat program also alienated New York Police officers. Eterno and Silverman:  
 
“Compstat was perceived as a legalistic-style numbers game combined with leadership 
by fear. Captains feared embarrassment during their presentations. On some occasions, 
high-level executives would berate them in public if their crime numbers were not 
decreasing. That is, commanding officers feared presenting at Compstat meetings and 
would do almost anything to escape the embarrassment of having crime statistics going 
up. In practice, fear was observed as a central aspect of Compstat in New York City. 
[…] Executives, at times, blamed the lower ranks for any increase in crime rates, to the 
point of occasionally yelling, screaming and publicly berating them at Compstat 
meetings. Additionally, executives took credit for decreasing crime rates, giving little 
or no credit to the rank and file. […] Members are embroiled in an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and demoralization.”594 
 
While the reform was mainly insider-driven, it remained determinedly top-down.
595
 
The department did not manage to motivate officers to support Compstat. They did not 
want to cooperate and to a degree thwarted the program’s success.596 In addition, 
outside pressure also prevented reform, Willis, Mastrofski and Weisburd conclude, as 
this pressure not only “impeded the kind of time-consuming analysis of crime data 
necessary to identify the underlying causes of problems, to tailor specific responses to 
these problems, and to assess the effectiveness of responses”, it also “shrank the buffer 
of good faith or will necessary for encouraging district commanders to experiment with 
new strategies.” These three scholars, who plead for societal acceptance of a more 
focused police mission instead of the current “grab-bag of ‘missions’,” argue that “in 
response to these multiple, vague, and often conflicting external demands, government 
bureaucracies, like the police, assign more importance to agreed-upon procedures than 
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uncertain outcomes, exist as loosely coupled organizational systems, and are 
characterized by decision-making practices that tend to be more ceremonial than 
substantive.”597 The reform effort hence became a cosmetic response:  
 
“Promises of an increased focus on crime, the spectacle of weekly performance 
evaluations, and impressive accounts of new computer technologies showed how each 
department was doing something to allay crime problems even though existing 
structures were fundamentally unaltered in ways that may have strengthened the 
innovation technically. The adoption of such image-relevant structures is precisely the 
response predicted for organizations operating in a strongly developed institutional 
environment. Under pressure to conform to institutional norms and procedures, these 
organizations responded by adopting those characteristics of COMPSTAT that were 
most likely to confer legitimacy.”598 
 
In other words, societal constraints on the police have impeded the police’s power to 
effectuate change.
599
 Willis, Mastrofski and Weisburd pessimistically observe that 
police reform will never be successful if society’s views on and high expectations of 
the police don’t change:  
 
“Until there are profound changes in police agencies’ technical and institutional 
environments, police departments will continue to be more concerned with 
appearances than with restructuring in response to what works most effectively. Such 
changes cannot be achieved in a few years, and if they occur at all, they will require 
many decades.”600  
 
More broadly, Subsection 3.1.3 has also shown how the public have been unwilling to 
collaborate in and accept police reform proposed by the police, as they do not have a 
history of getting along, and the public does not see the police as potential partners and 
can be both skeptical towards and afraid of the effects of new initiatives. In this matter, 
the public are as conservative as the police.  
 
3.9.4 Conclusion 
The dynamic process of reform politics had a great impact on the inception and extent 
of success of reform initiatives in the second half of the twentieth century. So did the 
numerous scandals that occurred during this period. Reforms were driven by reform-
minded police chiefs, scholars, and mayors, who implemented and/or supported 
bureaucratization, centralization, recruitment, and training measures, and commenced a 
major attack on corruption, abuse, and inefficiency. Later, a paradigm shift resulted in 
reforms such as community policing and Compstat. Both the media and several 
commissions played an important role in exposing problems and setting the reform 
agenda. Reform efforts were mostly authoritarian and top-down. The rank and file 
were seen as automatons, and regarded as ignorant and inept both in their role as 
officers and as debating partners.  
Various forces opposed and hampered reform efforts in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Within the department, the causes for problems such as corruption, 
including an ‘us-versus-them’ mentality and the code of silence, were also the causes 
for reform to stall. More generally, the rank and file, traditionally conservative, 
practical-oriented and resistant to change, were skeptical of external interference and 
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police reform which they saw as threatening, politically-driven and temporary. While 
they did not formally play a significant role in the reform processes, they were in fact 
quite successful in hampering them. Other forces in the department were also critical of 
reform. As a whole, the NYPD as an organization remained innately pitted against 
change and has often responded to it with a variety of predictable resistance, including 
denial, damage control, downplaying and desperate actions. Moreover, commissions 
installed to investigate problems have faced much resistance from the police. 
Bureaucratic reforms were often superficial, aimed at quieting reform demands and 
were also based on the rotten-apple principle. Ironically, the professionalization 
movement has equipped the organization to ward off reform efforts even better.  
Externally, reform efforts were hampered by difficulties regarding the 
redistribution of powers, and the negative correlation between the commitment to 
anticorruption and re-electability. Society thwarted reform efforts in different ways. 
Not only did society’s expectations hamper reform and the professionalization 
movement, resulting in quick fixes and cosmetic reform efforts, reform has also been 
hampered by society’s unwillingness to cooperate with the police, as well as by 
citizens’ lack of knowledge, skepticism, and fear.  
Overall, reform has been tedious and only marginally successful. Police 
problems such as corruption persisted, scandals kept occurring and commissions 
echoed each other’s findings. While the police professionalized, the rank and file did 
not. And while momentum for reform was frequently generated, it was also allowed to 
evaporate. Perhaps Compstat has been the most successful reform effort, yet it was 
never fully supported internally and moreover has made the police organization and its 
members less open to change. Reform also had other negative side effects. The 
professionalization process, but also more recent reform efforts such as Compstat, 
negatively impacted police–community relations, and the public became increasingly 
alienated from the police. Yet these reforms have also led to increased levels of police 
consciousness, cynicism and resentment. In this respect, unionization and 
professionalization negatively impacted each other. On the positive side, community 
policing can reduce violence against officers. Moreover, some studies have shown that 
community policing resulted in a higher degree of job satisfaction, and cynicism is 




3.10 Police–community relations 
This section examines the dynamics of police–community relations in the second half 
of the twentieth century, by looking at the public debate, which became more 
vehement and diverse during this period, including issues regarding the use of force 
external review and racial profiling. This section also briefly looks at the outcome and 
development of street encounters that take place in the informal arena of debate 
(Subsection 3.10.1). Yet the actions taking place in this informal arena of debate 
remains largely elusive. Only when riots occur, do street encounters become clearly 
visible. In this respect the civil rights era in the 1960s, discussed in Subsection 3.10.2, 
is particularly interesting, as it was not only a crucial turning point and climax in the 
history of police–community relations, it was also an era in which the informal arena 
of debate was frequently exposed, as the issue of civil rights was fought in both the 
formal arena of debate and the arena of the streets.  
 
3.10.1 The informal arena of debate: Some observations 
There is a body of literature that deals with factors influencing the development and 
outcome of street-encounters. Some findings of this research are relevant to this study, 
as insights into street-encounters lead to a better understanding of the informal arena of 
debate. 
Several scholars have pointed out that the development and outcomes of 
police–citizen encounters, as well as perceptions regarding these encounters, are highly 
dependent of the race of those involved. Lundman and Kaufman, for example, argue 
that the context and nature of police–minority traffic stop encounters differ from 
encounters with white citizens, irrespective of actual police behavior.
601
 First, while 
“police officers enter all of their encounters with citizens expecting that they will be 
treated with deference” and “that their government-backed authority over citizens will 
be honored,” this is not necessarily the case with African Americans and other citizens 
of color, because they “may be reluctant to extend deference and compliance because it 
risks conflating a white officer’s status as a police officer with that officer’s position in 
race and ethnic stratification systems that favor whites.”602 Second, due to a history of 
police violence, “citizens of color are […] understandably more inclined to withhold 
their best and to be suspicious of police motives during encounters with police.”603 
Third, “the pervasive racism characteristic of United States society […] may cause 
some citizens of color to view their traffic stop encounters more critically than whites 
even in the face of police actions that clearly signal equity, decency, and 
compassion.”604  
This specific volatile context has led to a vicious circle, considering that for 
many police officers, the perceived resentment and disapproval of community 
members reinforces their initial apprehensions, which are fueled by a strong ‘us-
versus-them’ police culture. Both Van Maanen, and Hahn and Jeffries speak of “a self-
fulfilling prophecy.”605 Van Maanen argues that “the fantasy may well become the 
reality as stereotypes are transformed into actualities,” as a result of mutual resentment 
and suspicion, as well as a strong demand for respect from both police officers and 
minority-group citizens.
606
 In line with Lundman and Kaufman’s argumentation, Van 
Maanen sees encounters between the police and citizens as “moral contests in which 
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the authority of the state is either confirmed, denied, or left in doubt.” Van Maanen: 
“To the patrolman, such contests are not to be taken lightly, for the authority of the 
state is also his personal authority, and is, of necessity, a matter of some concern to 
him” (also see discussion in Subsection 3.5.3 concerning the label ‘asshole’ and the 
police’s heroic self-perceptions). 607 
 
3.10.2 Racial disturbances in the 1960s  
The informal and formal arenas of debate entwined during the disturbances in the 
1960s. By then, the already hostile relationship between the police and African 
Americans had reached an all-time low. However, it was not so much that attitudes had 
changed by then, but the fact that African Americans were becoming increasingly more 
empowered and conscious at a time when police–community relations was not one of 
the police’s focal points.608 In this respect, the civil rights riots were a climax, in which 
latent sentiments came to an explosion. The police were a primary target, both in the 
public debate about civil rights and in the face-to-face confrontations with the 
rioters.
609
 Illustrative in this respect is the Black Panthers slogan “Off the pigs”, which 
came into fashion at the time.
610
  
 Racial riots in general are often precipitated by police actions, such as the 
arrest of a black man by a white officer, the breaking up of demonstrations, or offenses 
committed by white law- enforcement officials.
611
 The 1960s riots were no exception 
to this. The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) 
observed that the 1960s riots were caused by police actions that fueled and set off 
anger against the police.
612
 Moreover, police actions during the riot had an adverse 
effect, leading to more conflict, hostility, and violence.
613
  
One of the first major civil rights riots occurred in 1964 in New York, when 
James Powell, a 15-year old boy who had allegedly pursued the superintendent at his 
school with a knife, after the latter had sprayed a group of African-American students 
with a water hose, was shot and killed in Harlem by an off-duty police lieutenant.
614
 
Shortly after, riots and looting broke out in Harlem and there were many protests from 
the black community. The police were seen as the main culprit: “Save Us from Our 
Protectors,” a sign read, carried by one of the protesters during a rally the day after the 
shooting.
615
 Only after six days were the riots contained by mediation of black 
politicians and activists.
616
 This diverse group, including the NAACP, African-
American churches, labor groups, small business organizations, the Nation of Islam 
and black nationalist groups, joined forces and demanded the immediate suspension of 
Lieutenant Gilligan, as well as the hiring and promotion of minority officers.
617
 They 
also pressed for a civilian complaint review board, better training in human relations, 
better screening, and a review of certain policies.
618
 In the other riots that occurred in 
the civil rights era, the police were likewise often a main culprit.  
 
Argumentation in the formal arena of debate 
Fogelson argues that minority groups used three types of arguments to explain their 
resentment: 
 
“First, that most Negroes have long been, and indeed still are, subjected to brutality, 
harassment, and other forms of police misconduct in the North as well as in the South. 
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Second, that most Negroes are convinced that the police are corrupt and, even worse, 
that they enforce the law less rigorously in Negro ghettos than in white communities. 
And third, that most Negroes are persuaded that they have no effective way to protest, 
much less to remedy, brutality, harassment, and inadequate law enforcement.”619  
 
The police fiercely disagreed. In their view, the resentment “was due to their 
mistreatment in the South, their maladjustment in the North, and their 
misunderstanding of the police.”620 The rank and file’s views on the protests were in 
line with their overall conservatism. Skolnick argues that they have a “view of protest 
that gives little consideration to the effects of such social factors as poverty and 
discrimination and virtually ignores the possibility of legitimate social discontent.” 
Instead, the police attribute “mass protest […] to a conspiracy promulgated by 
agitators, often Communists, who mislead otherwise contented people.”621 Views were 
often polarized and rigid, Niederhoffer also observes, as he wonders: “Is it the core of 
modern police psychology to equate those who are in favor of civil rights and those 
who are members of racial minorities with those who are automatically anti-police?”622 
This was also the case with the Harlem riot. To conservatives, including the police, this 
riot was “a communist plot to weaken and discredit law enforcement.”623 This idea was 
fueled by conservative politicians such as Barry Goldwater and William F. Buckley. In 
fact, the riots were called the “Goldwater rallies” by some, who feared that “the 
violence only aided the enemies of equality.”624 Flamm:  
 
“By targeting liberalism as the ultimate source of these problems, Goldwater implicitly 
downplayed the differences between street crime, urban riots, and political 
demonstrations, blending these distinct phenomena into a single, common threat to a 
society of decency, security, and harmony — in short, to a society of ‘law and 
order.’”625 
 
Flamm argues that this strategy of lumping together issues has proven to be highly 
effective:  
 
“The critique resonated both as a social ideal and political slogan precisely because of 
its amorphous quality, its ability to represent different concerns to different people at 
different moments. Moreover, it identified a clear, if undifferentiated, set of villains 
(violent protesters, rioters, and criminals), offered a unified explanation for their 
actions (above all the doctrine of civil disobedience and the paternalism of the welfare 
state), and implied a simple yet effective response (moral leadership from the 
president, firm rulings from the judiciary, and limited government).”626  
 
This specific strategy not only worked well to discredit the protestors’ motives, but 




While the riots in the 1960s were typically precipitated by police actions, a set of 
deeper-seated causes underlay them. Fogelson argues that the riots were caused by the 
same self-fulfilling prophecy that leads to negative police–minority encounters in the 




“In the end a point was reached at which the police perceived the confrontation as a 
test of their authority and the Negroes perceived it as a challenge to their pride and 
loyalty; as a result, the triggering incidents were transformed into major disorders.”627 
 
Skolnick more broadly observes that while “the spark that set off the riot was police 
use of excessive force […] that does not mean that the conduct of the police was the 
only factor behind the riots. The America of the 1960s was indeed institutionally racist 
and sexist.”628 The riots were also fueled by an overall lack of confidence in the 
government. Lieberson and Silverman, who have researched the racial riots that 
occurred between 1913 and 1963 in the United States, observe:  
 
“Populations are predisposed or prone to riot; they are not simply neutral aggregates 
transformed into a violent mob by the agitation or charisma of individuals. Indeed, the 
immediate precipitant simply ignites prior community tensions revolving about basic 
institutional difficulties. The failure of functionaries to perform the roles expected by 
one or both of the racial groups, cross-pressures, or the absence of an institution 
capable of handling a community problem involving inter-racial relations will create 
the conditions under which riots are most likely. […] When members of the victimized 
race are dubious about the intention or capacity of relevant functionaries to achieve 
justice or a ‘fair’ solution, then the normal social controls are greatly weakened by the 
lack of faith in the community’s institutions.”629  
 
Katz points out that the 1960 riots were likewise fueled by “a sense of institutional 
failure” which “spread far beyond the streets of American cities” and included the 
revulsion against cold war politics, the Vietnam War and “the post-World War II 
growth of impersonal and bureaucratic domestic institutions.”630  
In addition to a sense of institutional failure, economic disparities, linked to 
broader societal problems, also underlay riots. Lieberson and Silverman:  
 
“Our finding that Negroes are less likely to be store owners in riot cities illustrates the 
problem arising when no social institution exists for handling the difficulties faced by 
a racial group. Small merchants require credit, skill and sophistication in operating and 
locating their stores, ability to obtain leases, and so on. To our knowledge no widely 
operating social institution is designed to achieve these goals for the disadvantaged 
Negro.”631 
 
Katz points out that this was also the case during the civil rights era, as “an official 
commitment to universal citizenship rights and equal opportunity” conflicted with a 
“widening economic inequality and continued racial disparities.”632 These findings are 
in line with the group-position theory, as discussed in Subsection 3.2.2. 
 
3.10.3 Police–community relations after the civil rights era 
While the civil rights movement brought a revolution to the United States, and indeed 
did change the police in certain ways, its actual impact on police–community relations 
was less revolutionary. In some ways, the movement was even counterproductive to 
the process of debate. This subsection examines the civil rights movement’s short- and 
long-term impact on police–community relations, while providing a brief overview of 
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the status and dynamics of police–community relations in the second half of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first.  
 As a response to the events in the 1960s — in particular to the negative media 
exposure and public outcry regarding police tactics used to control riots at the time, as 
well as to the recommendations by several commissions following the riots — the 
police attempted to enhance police–community relations by implementing reform 
measures and by introducing communication and public relations activities, such as the 
hiring of PIOs.
633
 In this sense, the riots served as an agenda-setting tool for the 
protesters’ demands. Also in the long run, the movement set the agenda. Take for 
example the fact that commissions started to extend their focus from corruption to 
police violence. In 1985, the Zuccotti Committee was established to investigate the 
department’s management, recruitment and training procedures. Silverman: 
 
“The Zuccotti Committee’s multiple assignments reflected more than just political 
fallout from recent events. The origins of police reform are typically complex. This 
was especially true of the period from 1984 to 1994 when corruption and misconduct 
reemerged. During this time, the public’s reactions to the police were still colored by 
the events from the 1960s. The violence connected with the civil rights movement, and 
the urban disturbances of that era, often ignited by seemingly routine encounters 
between white officers and minority citizens, spurred a long period of inquiry 
(including two presidential commissions) into police behavior.”634  
 
Yet while the civil rights movement served as an agenda-setting tool, it did not 
radically improve police–community relations. Police reforms that followed were often 
limited, and so were their effects, both short- and long-term. After the Harlem riots, 
Lieutenant Gilligan was cleared, which led to much anger amongst civil rights groups. 
Also, the installation of a civilian complaint review board, one of the protesters’ 
demands, did not materialize. Many police officers found the idea threatening, and 
Police Commissioner Murphy advised against it.
635
 While the NYPD did hire many 
African-American officers in response to the riot and appointed Sealy as police chief, 
these reforms only had a limited effect on the existing police culture (see discussion in 
Subsection 3.5.4). 
 Years later, the police did introduce more structural reforms such as 
community policing and civilian review, both aimed at improving police–community 
relations. Also, the NYPD took measures to diversify the force.
636
 Yet the overall 
police–community relations reform process was much protracted. This was partly due 
to the fact that these reforms were often reactive, cosmetic and short-lived.
637
 In their 
attempt to improve police–community relations, the police strongly focused on PR and 
communication strategies, in order “to deal more effectively with the media and to 
appear more open with the public in communicating information.”638 To a certain 
extent, these strategies have helped the police develop into more open organizations, 
for example by allowing more access to scholars.
639
 However, overall, their effects 
were limited. Motschall and Cao: “Although police reform efforts and accreditation 
mandates have attempted to professionalize the police, widespread media attention to 
local- and national-level events involving questionable police tactics continues to have 
a negative effect on the overall image of law enforcement.”640 This is partly due to the 
police’s narrow focus on good publicity. Motschall and Cao: “Law enforcement 
professionals equate good publicity with a positive public image. They believe it will 
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help to reduce citizen complaints and encourage taxpayers to vote in favor of revenue 
measures designed to benefit law enforcement agencies.”641 Yet good publicity is no 
guarantee for good police–community relations. Callanan and Rosenberger 
pessimistically argue that “no amount of publicity will likely raise confidence in the 
police among ethnic minorities.”642 
More structural reforms were often hampered. Both the police and the mayor 
had the ability to resist reform. Even if police officials were willing to improve police–
community relations, these efforts were resisted internally, not only by police officers, 
but also by the organizational structure itself. Jiao and Silverman argue that while there 
has been “a stronger emphasis for community relations in recent years” in the NYPD, 
it “seems to be the only area that does not fit the traditional police structure and 
operations and may therefore be a greater challenge for the police to confront.” Both 
scholars also speak of a gap between police management and street officers, who “may 
not see community relations as a straightforward process as they often view fighting 
crime and enforcing the law as incompatible with the concept of service and treating 
the public with respect […] and some officers may choose simply to do less to avoid 
complaints.”643 
The civil rights movement, in particular the riots, also negatively impacted 
police–community relations in certain ways. Take for example the outcome of the 
Harlem riot. Flamm:  
 
“The Harlem Riot cast a long and wide shadow. As the first major riot of the 1960s, it 
assured that ‘police brutality’ — with racial overtones — would have a prominent 
place in the public vocabulary. It also made riot prevention or causation a central 
theme in the debate over the civilian review board, whose necessity was now beyond 
doubt according to black leaders such as James Farmer, who contended that the riot 
was at bottom ‘a war between the citizens of Harlem and the police.’ But white liberals 
were divided. On the one hand, they were uncertain whether the denial of civil 
liberties, economic opportunity, or racial equality was the root cause. On the other, 
they were uncertain whether the creation of a civilian review board would hinder or 
encourage future disorders.”644  
 
Thus, not only did the Harlem riot intensify negative perceptions in regard to the 
police, further antagonizing minority groups, and radicalizing certain activists, it also 
gave those in defense of the police ammunition to ward off reforms, such as civilian 
review. The Harlem riot thus led to polarization and stagnation. Overall, the civil rights 
riots, protests and criticism also led to an increased sense of victimization amongst 
police officers. Skolnick observes that while the police officer is forced into “the 
almost impossible position of repressing deeply felt demands for social and political 
change”, he felt “unappreciated and at times despised” in this role.645 As a 
consequence, Alex asserts, the police not only responded defensively to allegations, but 
“they have also begun to fight back against what they contend to be an impossible 
situation and the feeling that they are not getting enough consideration from the 
public.”646 The police and their unions indeed grew more militant due to the 1960s 
riots. Skolnick:  
 
“Given their social role, the police have become increasingly frustrated, alienated, and 
angry. These emotions are being expressed in a growing militancy and political 
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activism. The police are protesting. Police slowdowns and other forms of strike 
activity, usually of questionable legality, have been to gain greater material benefits or 
changes in governmental policy (such as the ‘unleashing of the police’). Direct police 
challenges to departmental and civic authority have followed recent urban disorders, 
and criticisms of the judiciary have escalated to ‘court-watching’ by police.”647 
 
The unions typically opposed the proposed reforms following civil rights 
demonstrations.
648
 Their strategies resembled those of the civil rights activists in many 
ways. There is a general consensus that over the years, the unions have continued to 
impact police–community relations in a very negative way, relations with African-
American communities in particular.
649
 Other developments, too, had a negative effect. 
Several commissions have pointed out that professionalization contributed to the 
police–community problem.650 
 The recent history of police–community relations has featured some positive 
episodes. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, for example, temporarily had a positive effect 
on police–community relations. Not only did the bravery of the police harvest much 
respect, Levin and Amster point out, but also “the department’s changing composition 
[lent] itself to enhanced public acceptance, as the agency became more diverse and 
reflective of the city that it serves.” However, in the main, history has been marked by 
debates on police use of force, racial profiling and external review in the formal arena 
of debate, while the nature of street level interactions, according to Levin and Amster, 
remained “cast in the subtext of the racial differences between officers and residents of 
various ethnic neighborhoods.”651 
 
3.10.4 Use of force 
“Brutality and the third degree have been identified with the municipal police of the 
United States since their inauguration in 1844. These aspects of police activity have 
been subject to exaggeration, repeated exposure, and virulent criticism.”652 
William A. Westley 
 
While the amount and vehemence of force used by the police most probably decreased 
rather than increased during the century, expectations changed dramatically during and 
after the civil rights era.
653
 From the 1960s onwards, police departments throughout the 
United States have been criticized for using too much force and/or using it 
inappropriately. This subsection explores this ongoing debate, which encompasses a 
broad array of topics. In particular, this subsection looks at incidents of police violence, 
aggressive policing tactics, and riot containment. It examines how these incidents have 
sparked intense debate, and how stakeholders have operated in the formal arena of this 
debate.  
 
From incident to debate 
Many complaints of police violence went unnoticed and did not receive any media 
attention. However, some led to intense public debate. One of these is the assault on 
Abner Louima on August 9, 1997, perhaps one of the most gruesome and highly-
publicized police-violence cases to take place in New York. Skolnick provides a 




“The story begins with the assault on Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant. A police 
officer, Justin Volpe, had been struck while trying to subdue a crowd, and believed 
that Mr. Louima had hit him. On the way to the 70th precinct for booking, four police 
officers administered street justice. They took Louima out of the car and beat him, 
presumably to teach him a lesson of compliance. This part of the Louima incident, 
which suggests a more usual retaliation (called, among officers a ‘tune-up’) than the 
one Justin Volpe was to administer, has not played a prominent part of the story 
because of the later sadistic violence to which Mr. Louima was subjected. Later that 
night, after Louima was booked in the 70th precinct house, officers did not protest 
when they saw him being marched to a holding cell with his pants down. Nor did they 
protest when, after another officer and Volpe took Louima to the precinct bathroom, 
Officer Volpe brandished a broken broomstick with blood and feces and shouted ‘I 
took a man down today.’ Louima was hospitalized to prevent his death, and the story 
of his brutal assault began to appear in the media. Several demonstrations, involving 
thousands of protestors, were held outside the 70th precinct.”654  
 
The assault on Louima led to much media coverage, both local and national, as well as 
intense public debate.
655
 In response to the incident, several demonstrations, attended 
by thousands of protestors, were held in front of the 70th precinct.
656
 The Haitian 
American Alliance successfully organized a protest march for Louima in 1997, which 
was attended by more than ten thousand people.
657
 Yet not all New Yorkers were 
equally affected. While the overall confidence amongst African Americans and 




A scandal of equal magnitude occurred in 1999, when four Street Crime Unit 
(SCU) officers fired 41 shots at Amadou Diallo, an unarmed African immigrant 
mistaken by the police for a rape suspect. Nineteen of these bullets struck Diallo, who 
was standing in front of an apartment building and had just pulled out his wallet, which 
the plain-clothes officers mistook for a gun. The Diallo case attracted national media 
coverage. A poll conducted one month after the shooting found that 69% of whites, 
79% of blacks, and 68% of Hispanics had been following the case ‘closely.’659 The 
incident led to vehement outrage regarding the apparently unjustifiable response of the 
officers, and, more broadly, to the way the SCU operates.
660
 Both the incident itself 
and the official response following the incident were perceived negatively by many 
New Yorkers. Many minority residents saw the Diallo case as the final straw.
661
  
The shooting of Patrick Dorismond shortly thereafter, on March 16, 2000, also 
led to vehement reactions.
662
 Dorismond, a 26-year-old unarmed black security guard, 
had been offered drugs by an undercover police officer, yet refused, and a fight ensued, 
during which he was fatally shot by another officer in the vicinity.
663
 While there are 
no data available regarding New Yorkers’ awareness of this case, the extensive media 
coverage most probably “generated similarly high levels of familiarity among New 
Yorkers” in comparison with the Diallo and Louima cases.664 Dorismond’s funeral was 
attended by more than three thousand people, some of whom shouted anti-Giuliani 
slogans and clashed with the police.
665
 Yet again, the shooting did not affect all New 
Yorkers in the same way. A study by Weitzer has shown that minorities’ confidence in 






In the past decades, there have been other cases that did not involve direct 
police violence, but rather aggressive police tactics, such as the Harlem mosque 
incident in 1972. Soffer provides an overview of the events:  
 
“On April 14, 1972, someone phoned in a false ‘10-13’ call to the precinct, meaning an 
officer was in need of immediate assistance, perhaps having suffered serious injury. 
Police rushed to a building on East 116th Street, unaware that it was the well-known 
mosque of the Nation of Islam, where Malcolm X had preached. Mayor Lindsay had 
previously agreed to prohibit the police from entering the mosque without permission, 
so the police failure to identify the building suggests that the officers involved lacked 
familiarity with Harlem. A few officers entered and encountered approximately twenty 
armed men. Two officers were wounded, and one was shot dead at point-blank range. 
Police arrested two men from the mosque; one had allegedly been standing over the 
body of the officer who had died. Ward and Chief of Detectives Albert Seedman 
arrived soon after. So did Louis Farrakhan, the minister of the mosque, and 
Representative Charles Rangel, who urged the police to release the two men who had 
been arrested and warned that widespread violence might ensue if they were not 
released.”667  
 
Like the shootings discussed above, the Mosque incident resulted in vehement 
coverage and much criticism and protest, led by community leaders such as Charles 
Rangel.  
Riots, often an immediate consequence of police actions, led to more 
complaints concerning the use of force, and further sparked the debate.
668
 The 
Tompkins Square Park riot in 1988 started after police captain Gerald F. McNamara 
tried to enforce a 1 a.m. curfew and someone responded by throwing a bottle at the 
officers. From then on, the situation escalated. While the crowd continued to throw 
bottles, the police responded with force. The New York Times reported: “Officers, on 
foot and horseback, repeatedly massed, advanced, retreated and then charged into the 
crowds, often running past superiors who called vainly for them to stay back.”669 
Earlier, police had been seen taking off their badges or hiding their badge numbers 
with black tape, in order to prevent identification. The Civilian Complaint Board 
received more than a hundred complaints. Some of the victims were journalists, which 
led to much media attention. Yet while police actions precipitated the Tompkins 
Square Park riot, deeper-seated causes underlay them, including the tensions between 
gentrifiers that had moved in the neighborhood and the local musicians, artists, and 
poor inhabitants. Before the start of the riot, demonstrators held up signs reading 
“Gentrification Is Class War.”670  
Combined, these and other cases of police violence and aggressive use of force 
in New York form a pattern of scandals that have led to intense reactions ranging from 
riots to public indictments of police practice.
671
 In the public debate after police 
misconduct cases, reoccurring questions have been raised, including whether incidents 
involve isolated cases or are part of a broader problem; whether the police treat people 
from minority groups differently; and which actions should be taken to constrain the 
police.
672
 Commissions and human rights organizations published many reports on 
police-violence incidents. Amnesty International’s report in 1996 concluded that 
“police brutality and unjustifiable force” is a “widespread problem” in black, Hispanic, 
and Asian neighborhoods in New York.
673
 Minority groups, in particular, have been 
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critical of how the criminal justice system has handled police misconduct incidents, as 
will be further discussed below.  
 
Group of critics  
Incidents of police violence, both in New York and nationally, have led to an erosion 
of satisfaction with the police, in particular amongst African Americans. Moreover, the 
long-term influence of incidents is greater in regard to the perceptions held by African 
Americans and Hispanics than those of whites (see discussion in Subsection 3.1.2). 
Indeed, African Americans were perhaps the most fervent critics of police use of force. 
To a degree, criticism on police-violence incidents is a product of a lack of 
communication and an overall distrust of the police accountability system. In this 
context, there is not much nationwide information about police violence, Paul 
Chevigny points out:  
 
“The belief that each local scandal is the absolute worst is fed by the fact that systems 
of accountability, in New York City as in most other cities, are quite inadequate. We 
are free to draw our own conclusions about the prevalence of police abuses because we 
cannot have faith in the decisions on cases of abuses by individual officers, and we 
cannot get reliable statistics about groups of cases.”674 
 
Yet police critics’ perceptions and demands were also driven by political views. 
Flamm describes how in the 1960s different factions have different views in regard to 
issues surrounding the police:  
 
“For radicals like Eldridge Cleaver, civilian review provided a rallying point for the 
black bourgeoisie only, disguising how the police were merely the instrument of those 
who waged social, economic, and political brutality against minorities in America and 
Vietnam. And for conservatives, the main threat was violent crime, which affected 
minorities the most and warranted better policing, harsher sentences, and more black 
officers. “There is police brutality,” declared the chairman of the Harlem NAACP’s 
anticrime committee, “but that isn’t what makes people afraid to walk the streets at 
night.”675 
 
The communication style of those criticizing police use of force has often been zealous 
and expressive, focusing on the extreme character of the incident. After the Diallo 
shooting, the American singer Bruce Springsteen wrote a song about the shooting 
called “American Skin.” The song, which he sang at Madison Square Garden, 
mentioned the words ‘41 shots’ nine times. The New Yorker published a cartoon of 
police officers firing 41 shots at a shooting gallery and even the New York Post, a 
medium considered more pro-police, published front-page headlines such as “In Cold 
Blood,” “Justice Must Be Done,” and “We Are All Crying.”676 These headlines and 
song lyrics illustrate the critics’ focus on the amount of shots fired, the need for justice 
and the widely-felt victimization. They also illustrate the vigor and passion of the 
critics’ communication. The protest marches held after the Diallo shooting were 
equally vigorous and passionate in nature. Levitt:  
 
“The demonstrations quickly assumed the stature of civil rights protests. Black 
political leaders from former mayor Dinkins to Congressman Charles Rangel to Jesse 
Jackson appeared. The protests were meticulously orchestrated. After marching 
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outside on the plaza, small groups attempted to enter headquarters, disregarded orders 
to halt, and got themselves arrested. As Rangel’s chief of staff James Capel said of the 
congressman’s planned arrest, “Unless there’s snow or rain that will give him 
pneumonia, he is likely to commit some acts of civil disobedience.” […] The NYPD’s 
former deputy commissioner for community affairs Wilhemina Holiday spoke for 
many when she said, ‘This could have happened to anyone of us. It’s a sad state of 
affairs when police officers believe all blacks and Hispanics are criminals.’”677 
 
The communication during the protests illustrates the critics’ overall perception that 
the police respond differently towards African Americans than to whites. It also 
illustrates their mutually-felt victimization and their determination to continue their 
plight until justice has been served.  
In their zeal to fight police violence, police critics have exaggerated claims 
sometimes, and even falsely accused officers at times. Levitt points out that the 
Amnesty International report on the NYPD (1996) contained some distorted claims. 
For example, when “the group cited the fatal police shooting of a black grandmother, 
Eleanor Bumpurs, in her Bronx apartment during an eviction proceeding, [they] failed 
to mention that Bumpers had lunged at the officers with a ten-inch kitchen knife.”678 A 
year later, Louima claimed that officers had shouted “It’s Giuliani time, not Dinkins 
time,” during the assault, yet this accusation turned out to be false. Louima later 
retracted this claim, but the damage to the police had already been done and “the 
horrible image was already fixed in the popular imagination.”679 The Tawana Brawley 
case is another example of a false claim, see discussion in Sections 3.2 and 3.8. 
The Rev. Al Sharpton played a major role in the aftermath of numerous 
incidents of police violence and aggressive use of force. After a grand jury decided that 
there was not enough evidence for indicting an officer involved in the shooting of an 
Hispanic youth in Washington Heights, New York, Sharpton personally delivered a 
letter from the victim’s father to Janet Reno, the U.S. Attorney General, demanding a 
federal investigation of civil rights violations.
680
 After a new mosque incident occurred 
in 1994, which showed resemblances to the one in 1972, Sharpton showed up 
unannounced at a meeting with Police Commissioner Bratton, yet was refused entry. 
“This is an insult and affront to our community,” Sharpton responded.681 Sharpton also 
played a major role in the aftermath of the Diallo shooting, both in the organization of 
the protests and in his assistance to the Diallo family. His role as agenda-setter in the 
shooting’s aftermath has been criticized by some and lauded by others. Democratic 
Congressman Floyd Flake:  
 
“He just stepped in and began the process of trying to move the agenda, as he does in 
all these cases. I like to tell people this is his career. When you look at this situation in 
relation to Los Angeles and Rodney King, regardless of what anybody says about him, 
his presence and his finding a way to give people a means to vent probably saved this 
city from having the same kind of rioting…. I don’t know if anybody else could have 
done that.”682 
 
Thus, according to Flake, Sharpton’s strategies have both an agenda-setting and a 
cooling-down effect, preventing further escalation. Levitt, conversely, is less positive 
about Sharpton’s communication strategies. Referring to the month-long daily protests 
outside Police Plaza after the Diallo shooting, in which Sharpton had a leading role, 
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Levitt observes: “Partly this was political payback from Sharpton, who was expert in 
exploiting a racial wound and turning it into theater.”683  
 
Police officers and their unions 
A national survey conducted at the turn of the twenty-first century has shown that the 
police “have complex and sometimes contradictory attitudes toward the abuse of 
authority.”684 While most police officers in the United States disapprove of the use of 
excessive force, “a substantial minority believed that officers should be permitted to 
use more force than the law currently permits and found it acceptable to sometimes use 
more force than permitted by the laws that govern them.” Almost all of the interviewed 
officers believed that incidents such as Louima were “extremely rare.”685 More 
broadly, while critics consider police-violence incidents to be widespread and argue 
that officers use too much force in general, in particular against minorities, many 
police officers maintain that such cases are very incidental, and moreover, that the 
police should be granted more discretion in regard to the use of force. These 
perceptions are reflected in their positioning, which has overall been quite defensive in 
response to police-violence allegations. Police officers have often shown massive 
support for those accused. After the indictments in the Bumpur’s case, five thousand 
police officers marched in protest.
686
 The rank and file have also often accused their 
leaders of not doing enough to support and defend them, for example after the first 
Harlem Mosque incident.
687
 Soffer:  
 
“One of Seedman’s superiors, possibly Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy, 
ordered the prisoners released after Farrakhan promised that they would voluntarily 
report to police headquarters the next day. (They never showed.) White officers at the 
scene later criticized Ward for excluding all whites, including ballistics detectives, 
from the mosque and charged that he had acted as part of a cover-up by police brass in 
the killing of a police officer. Ward’s public statement that the cops had no right to 
enter the mosque and his public apologies to Farrakhan also rankled.”688 
 
In his analysis of the Mosque incident, Silverman points out: “Clearly, two policing 
worlds had sharply clashed. Top police leadership was sensitive to the outside minority 
community; the rank and file were more attuned to the need of their fellow officers.”689 
Not all police officers supported the police’s handling of the incident. Black police 
organizations issued their own statements (see Subsection 3.6.1). 
Unions have represented the rank and file in the public debate as well as in 
court. The PBA has offered much (legal) support for officers accused of police 
violence. Judicial tactics included the waiving of the right to a jury trial in favor of a 
judge, preferably “an older white man, specifically selected as close to retirement age 
so that he could ignore political pressure.”690 Communication itself can be seen as a 
tactic, Gutiérrez-Jones argues: PBA defense lawyers framed the police officers’ actions 
leading to Diallo’s death as “a split-second, life-of-death decision.” The author, who 
speaks of the “reconstituting of narratives around singular moments”, argues: “This 
tactic effectively evacuated Diallo as a person; as understood by the defense lawyers, 
he was significant only in terms of the officers’ projection of him as a threat. […] The 
time it takes to execute 41 shots is thus compressed into a moment that appears to 
equate the first bullet with all of the rest.”691 The scope of PBA activities reached 
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further than the defense of police-violence suspects. For example, after the Louima 
incident, the PBA provided legal assistance to the black and Hispanic officers who had 
been transferred to the 70
th
 precinct without their approval, and sued the City of New 
York for doing so.
692
  
The police also impacted the development of police-violence cases in another 
important way: Their code of silence impeded investigations, reforms and the process 
of debate (see subsection 3.5.2). After the gruesome assault by Officer Justin Volpe on 
Louima at the 70th Precinct station, no officer came forward to tell the truth, while all 
knew what had happened.
693
 The unions most probably further strengthened this code 
of silence after such incidents, by advising officers to use their Constitutional right to 
remain silent.
694
 Levitt elaborates on the uncertainty that still exists after the Louima 
case, due to the code of silence that prevented the officers from speaking out: 
 
“Today, more than a decade after Volpe sodomized Louima, no one can say with 
certainty that there was a second man in the bathroom with them. No one can say with 
certainty that he was Chuck Schwarz. No one knows whether Volpe sought to protect 
Schwarz in his guilty plea by fingering Wiese. No one knows whether Wiese sought to 
protect Schwarz with his story of entering the bathroom. For that matter, no one knows 
whether Schwarz himself pleaded guilty to perjury to protect his partner Wiese.”695 
 
This code of silence was fueled by a strong ‘us-versus-them’ culture that was even 
recognized by one of the defense lawyers in the Louima case:  
 
“I am so impressed by what these people do for society for such little money. […] But 
as much as I love and respect them, I know they will never fully trust me. To them I 
will always remain an outsider.”696  
 
Similar to the Louima case, the aftermath of the Diallo’s shooting was characterized by 
a strong code of silence, illustrating “the power of police cultures as internal mediating 
devices between the police and the wider public.” 697 Levitt describes some of its 
effects after the Diallo shooting:  
 
“Many expected [District Attorney Robert] Johnson to present to the Diallo grand jury 
evidence that would end with the four officers being charged with the lowest counts: 
either reckless endangerment or criminally negligent homicide. Johnson did that. But 
he also presented evidence of the highest count — second degree, or intentional, 
murder. The PBA and the rest of the city’s criminal justice establishment were quick to 
claim he had overcharged the cops, that indicting them for intentional murder meant 
they had deliberately set out to kill Diallo. Johnson maintained he had no choice: The 
cops had refused to testify before the grand jury to explain their actions, and that left 
him with four officers having fired 41 bullets, 19 of which had struck an unarmed man, 
with no justification at all. ‘Without somebody saying what had happened, there was 
no basis for making any other judgment,’ he said. Few in the Police Department 
accepted his explanation.”698 
 
Thus, while the code of silence may have led to a higher charges, these charges in turn 
led to a highly defensive reaction of the police and their unions, in fact exacerbating 




Official police response 
The NYPD’s response to police-violence incidents has often been criticized, not only 
by minority groups and civil rights activists, but also by researchers, for being too 
defensive, shallow and reactive. Ross, who examined stakeholders’ responses to 
police-violence incidents in New York, argues that the NYPD’s response was 
dominated by public-relations efforts.
699
 In this respect, the NYPD’s official responses 
were equally divided between “publishing figures on their ability to combat crime; 
stating that officers need more training; offering a settlement with the victim(s); and 
blaming the victim(s) for instigating the incident by resisting arrest.”700 While the 
police have also responded with reforms and policy changes, these were often safe and 
bureaucratic, Ross argues.
701
 Levitt points out that the initial reaction to the Diallo case 
was not only defensive, but also offensive, as the police tried to seek evidence that 
would discredit the victim. The public’s negative perception of the NYPD’s response 
to the shooting was aggravated by Police Commissioner Safir’s actions:  
 
“Because the shooting had resulted from official police policy — Safir’s expansion of 
the Street Crime Unit — Safir defended the officers. Giuliani defended Safir. The two 
became hostage to their own failed policies. Failing to recognize the shooting’s import, 
Safir went off to California with his wife the following weekend to attend a weeklong 
police chiefs’ conference. The department made no announcement of his whereabouts. 
I got a tip that he was in Los Angeles playing golf with other chiefs. Newsday sent a 
photographer. After the story appeared, Giuliani had him cut his trip short and return to 
New York. The following month, Safir made another stealth trip to California — this 
one to attend the Oscars. The Sunday night of the Academy Awards, he was spotted on 
national television in a tuxedo, standing next to the actress Helen Hunt. To attend the 
ceremony, he had canceled his Monday morning’s appearance before the City Council 
to testify about the Diallo shooting. [Marilyn] Mode [Safir’s assistant] had given as the 
reason for his cancellation a ‘scheduling conflict,’ citing unspecified ‘important 
meetings.’”702  
 
After his initial response, Safir’s communications shifted due to negative feedback:  
 
“Safir, meanwhile, seemed desperate to be photographed with virtually any black 
group or leader, even expressing the possibility of meeting with Sharpton. Such a 
meeting was, of course, anathema to Giuliani and never occurred. Instead, Safir found 
an obscure African, Sidiqui Wei, a native of Sierra Leone who headed a Brooklyn 
group called the African United Congress. Wei said he viewed himself as a bridge 
between the city’s American and African blacks, who were said to number about two 
hundred thousand in New York. He said he had attended Diallo’s funeral and heard 
Sharpton refer to him as ‘Brother Sidiqui.’ Rangel, however, called Wei a ‘fraud,’ 
apparently because he was not an African American in the conventional sense.”703 
 
This excerpt not only shows how Safir, with quick fixes, seeks to improve his 
relationship with minority communities with quick fixes, it also shows how any more 
substantial initiative (a meeting with Sharpton), is suppressed by Giuliani, who exerts 
his power over the police commissioner. In turn, Safir’s actions did not resonate well 
with community leaders such as Rangel. The latter rigidly delimits the notions of 




 In response to Amnesty International’s report on police brutality in 1996, 
Police Commissioner Safir attempted to soften the NYPD’s image by initiating the 
“Respect” campaign, promising improved sensitivity training and installing a Respect 
Committee to monitor police abuses. The words “Courtesy, Professionalism and 
Respect” were written on each patrol car. Yet critics questioned the commissioner’s 
sincerity. Levitt:  
 
“But credibility problems appeared the very day Safir announced his Respect 
campaign. His announcement followed a report by the London-based human rights 
group Amnesty international charging the NYPD with systemic brutality. […] Safir 
denied the obvious connection between Amnesty International’s report and the timing 
of his Respect campaign. He also failed to convince the NYPD’s black officers to 
support it.  
 
After a two-hour meeting with top police officials, which Safir attended for only 
twenty minutes, the Guardians, the department’s fraternal group of African-American 
officers, listed its concerns: no input from street-level cops, no definition of what 
constitutes disrespect, no specified sanctions for noncompliance, and no commitment 
of staff. Particularly upsetting was that only two of the forty-nine supervisors in the 
program were black. Safir further undercut his Respect campaign by the civilians he 
appointed. One was Dr. Ruth Westheimer, the sex doctor. When asked what advice she 
had for cops, she said, “I want you to be safe, but I’d rather you wear a vest than a 
condom.”705  
 
Police commissioner Ward’s response to the Tompkins Square Park riot was also 
considered weak. At the press conference following the riot, he defended the police 
officers involved, arguing that he had no evidence that they acted wrongly.
706
 Captain 
McNamara only received “a slap on the wrist” for his performance. Ward also 
prevented the Civilian Complaint Board from taking disciplinary actions, Soffer 
observes. The commissioner’s defensive response had a detrimental effect on public 




The mayor’s response 
Mayoral response to police-violence incidents has varied considerably. Some mayors 
presented themselves as sensitive to community concerns regarding police violence 
and some have been willing to adopt reform measures, in particular regarding the 
installation of a civilian review board. Yet while many mayors listened to community 
concerns, they have often been careful in their acknowledgement and support. For 
example, at a press conference after the Tompkins Square Park riots, Mayor Koch 
defended the police: “Take a cop on at your peril, and a cop at his peril will use undue 
force.”708 Moreover, he argued, the police had no mandate “to be meek in the face of 
physical assault upon them” (also see Subsection 3.7.2). 709  
Other mayors were very pro-police and reflexively defended the police after 
incidents. Giuliani set the example in this respect, with his “bellicose public posture 
and identification with the police and his single-minded determination to reduce crime 
at the expense of all else,” as Levitt put it.710 After the second Mosque incident in 
1994, Giuliani said that the officers had been “the only victims”: “If we can’t stand up 
for those police officers despite the color of our skin […] the city’s in more trouble 
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than I think people believed it was.” Giuliani also refused to speak with Sharpton, 
saying that “We have spent way more time on Reverend Sharpton than it’s really 
worth.”711 After the Diallo shooting, the mayor openly defended the officers involved, 
arguing that the incident was an unfortunate accident.
712
 In the shooting’s immediate 
aftermath, he visited a cop that was shot in a different incident, instead of the bereaved 
family. He also refused a meeting with Sharpton, even after former mayor Koch had 
advised him to do so. Moreover, he did not want to address the incident officially on 
television.
713
 At one point, he had told Representative Floyd Flake that communicating 
with black elected officials “would look like he was basically kowtowing to them.”714 
The mayor framed the shooting in a similar fashion as the police unions did:  
 
“We have a right to demand more respect from the citizens of the city for the police 
officers of the City of New York. It’s about time to stop carrying signs pretending that 
they’re racist, it’s about time to stop carrying signs equating them to the KKK, and it’s 
about time to stop invocations of Adolf Hitler, about our police department. […] They 
have to make decisions that I don’t know that I’d be capable of making […] and then 
they’re second-guessed by some of the worst in society. […] The short-sighted, and 
those who want to focus blame on the police, maybe for their own personal 
inadequacies, we’re never going to convince.”715 
 
His communication negatively impacted public perceptions. Kirtzman: “Watching for 
Giuliani’s response to Diallo’s death, the public saw a cold man, unsympathetic to the 
pain of black residents and so alienated from their leaders that he’d refused to meet 
with them for years.”716 The mayor’s response ultimately led to a boiling point in 
communities, followed by massive demonstrations.
717
 Even former mayor Dinkins 
partook in one of the protest marches. He was consequently handcuffed and arrested by 
the police in front of cameras, an act which some (amongst whom former mayor Koch) 
believe was orchestrated by Mayor Giuliani in order to “harass” the former mayor.718 
The mayor’s response to the Dorismond shooting was heavily criticized too. At the 
time, Giuliani had released Dorismond’s juvenile and arrest records, arguing it was 
“the public’s right to know.”719 Giuliani: “People do act in conformity very often with 
their prior behavior. [The news media] would not want a picture presented of an altar 
boy, when in fact, maybe it isn’t an altar boy.”720 Critics believe that the release was 
done purposely, in order to discredit the victim.
721
 Levitt: “The disclosure violated a 
long-standing, unwritten department policy in which only prior arrests leading to 
convictions are released, and only if the arrests are relevant to an issue at hand.”722 The 






Judicial proceedings following police-violence incidents have often been protracted 
and did not lead to convictions.
724
 Officers that are involved in police shootings are 
mostly acquitted, often also of the departmental charges brought against them. A lot of 
cases are settled. The Bumpurs family received $200,000.
725
 The Diallo case was 
settled with $3 million and the Dorismond case with $2.25 million.
726
 In the Louima 
case, the four officers involved were eventually convicted. Justin Volpe was sentenced 
to 30 years in prison, while the other officers received lower sentences. Louima’s 
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lawyers filed a civil rights lawsuit against the City of New York, but also against the 
PBA, who were accused of their failure to report incriminating statements made by the 
police. Ultimately, the City settled the case by paying Louima $7.125 million, the 
largest amount ever paid to settle a brutality case. The PBA, in turn, paid Louima 
$1.625 million, most probably the first time a union settled a police brutality case.
727
  
Both the incidents proper and the police and mayoral response often had a 
detrimental effect on public opinion, in particular those of minority groups. Their 
growing power and dissatisfaction may have led to a turning point: In recent years, 
external groups have been effective to a certain degree in pressuring the New York 
Police to change existing policies and programs, some scholars argue. While the Diallo 
shooting and its aftermath did not lead to convictions, it did result in the end of the 
SCU.
728
 The agenda-setting power of minority groups also led to much media attention 
and broader external investigations. In response to the Diallo shooting, the U.S. Civil 
Rights Commission conducted a broader investigation into the New York police’s 
conduct in minority communities. The State Attorney General also decided to 
investigate the stop-and-frisk practices of the New York police.
729
 However, despite 
these efforts, measures to combat police misconduct have remained traditional and 
ineffective, and hence police-violence incidents will reoccur, Simmons argues, if 
efforts “consistently emphasize the behavior of individual officers rather than address 
the ‘distinctive and influential organizational culture’ of police institutions.”730  
 
3.10.5 Racial profiling 
While close surveillance has been a distinct feature of police–minority relations for 
decades if not centuries and the U.S. Supreme Court has decreed police stop-and-frisk 
practices to be legitimate under certain restrictions (Terry v. Ohio 1968), the discussion 
about the legitimacy of racial profiling only took off in the late 1990s, after a series of 
more recent rulings in favor of the practice.
731
 This subsection briefly looks at this 
discussion, which focuses on the extent to which pedestrians are stopped randomly and 
to which people in cars are stopped for “driving while black”, a term also used in 
academic literature.
732
 Gelman, Fagan and Kiss: “Whether racially disparate stop rates 
reflect disproportionate crime rates or intentional, racially biased targeting by police of 
minorities at rates beyond what any racial differences in crime rates might justify lies 
at the heart of the social and legal controversy on racial profiling and racial 
discrimination by police.”733  
 Several research studies and commission reports have shown that police are 
more likely to stop African Americans than whites. They refute the police argument 
that the higher amount of stops can be explained by previous arrest rates or 
precincts.
734
 New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer published a report in 
1999, which concluded that blacks were stopped by the police six times more 
frequently and Latinos four times more frequently than whites.
735
  
The discussion about racial profiling in the 1990s should be interpreted in the 
context of the Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo shootings and the assault on Abner 
Louima, as well as the increased dissatisfaction with aggressive policing strategies of 
the SCU.
736 
Certain other events also sparked the debate, including a number of 
American Civil Liberty Union lawsuits and incidents such as the shooting of three 
unarmed minority motorists on the New Jersey Turnpike in 2002.
737
 The police officers 
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involved in the incident admitted to racial profiling and were convicted. The New York 
Times observed at the time:  
 
“The turnpike shooting came to symbolize the frustration of black and Latino motorists 
who had complained for years that they were being unfairly and illegally singled out 
by police officers based solely on the color of their skin. And it helped ignite a heated 
national debate about the proper use of profiling in police work.”738  
 
The debate has been highly polarized, with two factions holding diametrically 
opposing views.
739
 In particular, minority groups have been enraged by racial profiling 
practices.
740
 Skolnick: “Perhaps nothing generates bitterness more than stops and 
searches that are, or appear to be, racially motivated.”741 The police have responded to 
the allegations, by arguing that minorities commit a disproportionately higher number 
of crimes than whites and that the statistics are proof of “reasonable and efficient 
police practice.”742  
The debate has been marked by a series of milestones, such as the federal 
investigation by the Department of Justice, which urged the police to reduce citizen 
complaints about police behavior. Yet while complaints resulted in civil litigation, 
political mobilization, internal investigations within several police departments, and in 
New York they led to the regulation and extensive monitoring of police practices in 




3.10.6 Civilian review and accountability 
Many stakeholders, including the police commissioner, the mayor, police unions, civil 
rights organizations and the federal justice system, have fought for and debated about 
control of police discretion.
744
 This debate has focused on questions as to what degree 






American citizens have questioned the effectiveness of internal review, as they believe 
that the police are too lenient towards peers.
746
 There is broad public support (roughly 
80%) for civilian review in the United States.
747 
It is true that throughout the United 
States, Internal Affairs Bureaus have often proven to be ineffective, and their presence 
has even had adverse effects.
748
 The Bureau of Justice Statistics has brought out a 
report which concluded that agencies with internal affairs units were twice as likely not 
to sustain a complaint as those without such a unit.
749
 Internal investigations and 
accountability measures have also been criticized for their “rotten apple in a barrel” 
approach. Reiss:  
 
“[…] the organization insures that, at most, individual officers will be charged with 
misconduct and that the organization will not be held accountable for their misconduct. 
These operating principles have led chiefs to offer the so-called rotten apple in a barrel 
of good apples explanation of police misconduct. Unless the individual responsible is 
punished, the whole barrel will spoil. […] Altogether, individuals rather than 




Overall dissatisfaction with internal investigations, including claims of partiality, peer 
pressure, ineffectiveness, the low rate of substantiation of complaints, and the poor 
communication about the handling of complaints, has led to increased demand for 
external review, as well as for more transparency in internal investigations.
751
 The 
revelations of several committees have also shown the need for radical improvements 
with regard to accountability.
752
 However, Skolnick and Fyfe point out, it is also the 
perception of incredibility that is important: “Police cannot be impartial when 
investigating other police, and even when they are, they are unlikely to be credible.”753  
 
Civilian review 
During the civil rights movement in the 1960s, pressure mounted for the adoption of 
citizen oversight boards in the United States.
754 
Minority groups felt powerless against 
the police and their malpractice and maintained that complaints were not taken 
seriously. Throughout the United States, rallies were held by the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 
Police accountability was one of the themes during these protests.
 
Mainly in response 
to the civil rights movement and related protests, formal complaint procedures were 
put into place in many cities.
 
However, only few departments actually adopted external 
citizen review boards. By the mid-1960s, only six cities had done so; instead, most 
review remained internal. The adoption of an independent civilian review board 
became a problematic, protracted endeavor.
755 
 In New York, the NYPD had established the Civilian Complaint Review Board 
already in 1953, prior to the emergence of the modern civil rights movement. However, 
the Board did not consist of any civilian members. Instead, three deputy police 
commissioners reviewed complaints and decided whether disciplinary measures should 
be taken. Around 1955, the board was granted some more authority under Mayor 
Wagner, but remained internal. By the mid-1960s, similar to other cities, the demands 
for external review increased due to the civil rights movement. When Mayor Lindsay 
proposed installing a more independent Civilian Complaint Review Board in 1966, a 
vehement, emotional debate ensued (see case study later in this subsection). While the 
debate for external review lingered on after the defeat in 1966, pressure for reform 
mounted again after the corruption scandals in the 1980s and after incidents such as the 
Tompkins Square Park riot. The heightened demand for external review in the 1980s 
should also be seen in the context of the community policing movement. From the 
1980s onwards, American cities started to adopt civilian oversight more structurally, 
and by now, most cities have some type of external review.
756
 
Throughout the United States, many different approaches of civilian review 
exist, varying in composition, number of members, existing procedures, and mandate. 
The composition can vary from independent (nearly) all-civilian review boards 
appointed by the city council or the mayor, to boards comprising city council members, 
an independent auditor, or mostly law enforcement personnel.
757
 Yet even though 
civilian oversight has become common practice in the United States, the debate still 




Debates about the installing of civilian review have typically been led by 
supporters — mainly minority groups and civil rights organizations — on the one 
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hand, and the police and their unions on the other.
759
 Actual dialogue between these 
different groups has been scarce. For example, unions have often been left out of the 
process to install civilian review.
760
 Over the years, pressure to adopt external review 
instruments, and to make them independent, has come from African Americans 
particularly, strong proponents of civilian review and other reviews. The issue of 
civilian review is less important to white citizens (although many support the installing 
of civilian review boards). These differences have been explained by Weitzer and 
Tuch’s extension of the group-position model to police reform:  
 
“Dominant groups should perceive the police as an institution allied with their 
interests, whereas minorities should be more inclined to view the police as an 
institution contributing to their subordination. This does not mean that most minority 
group members are antagonistic to the police, but it does increase the odds that they 
will see police reform as necessary, compared to whites who tend to regard calls for 
reform as a threat to a revered institution. […] Views of the police are thus related to 
racial differences not only in general group-position relationships but also in real or 
perceived group vulnerability to abusive police practices.”761 
 
Nationally, the issue has been brought to the agenda by advocate groups such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the International Association of Civilian 
Oversight of Law Enforcement (IACOLE). Locally, communities have also criticized 
the police and demanded change, often in response to specific events such as (alleged) 
misconduct. The issue has also been put on the agenda by media, which often and 
prominently made a link between citizen review and police misconduct.
762
 As part of 
the consent decree processes, the U.S. Department of Justice has also demanded the 
installing of civilian review in specific cases.
763
 
The critics’ agenda-setting and reform power in this matter have been 
substantial. Initiatives to adopt external review boards were often a response to 
demands by minority groups after incidents.
764
 Yet critics also faced fierce resistance 
from the police and their unions. Police officers, who often saw “a complaint against a 
single patrolman as a challenge to the entire profession,” have been highly critical of 
civilian review.
765
 Police culture played an important role in this negative stance. 
Skogan:  
 
“They see [civilian review boards] as passing fads, something dreamed up by civilians 
for the police to do. Police are skeptical about programs invented by civilians. This is 
partly a matter of police culture. American policing is dominated by a ‘we versus 
they,’ or ‘insider versus outsider’ orientation that assumes that the academics, 
politicians, and community activists who plan policing programs cannot possibly 
understand their job. Police are particularly hostile to programs that threaten to involve 
civilians in defining their work or evaluating their performance.”766 
 
As rank-and-file representatives, the unions have probably been the most vehement 
critics of civilian oversight in the public debate, arguing that such oversight is an 
infringement of police authority and autonomy, that Internal Affairs is capable of 
handling complaints by itself, and that civilians do not have the knowledge to assess 
police misconduct cases. Moreover, they have argued that civilian review will impede 
police performance, as the police officer will hesitate to respond in certain situations. 





Union resistance to civilian review often resembled “a guerrilla war.”768 Tactics 
included collective bargaining strategies, the dissuasion of officers from cooperating 
with the investigations, as well as legal actions such as the questioning of particular 
provisions in the court of law and the demand for a legislative repeal of the ordinance 
for civilian review.  
Besides union activism, the police have also resisted civilian complaint 
procedures in other ways, for example by failing to cooperate with the police. In this 
context, perhaps the biggest obstacle to police-misconduct investigations, both 
internally and externally, has been the code of silence, as both scholars and several 
commissions alike have pointed out.
769
  
While police chiefs in the 1960s were vehement critics of external review, 
many now realize they cannot afford this criticism, as it can have a detrimental effect 
on their relationship with minority communities.
770
 Some police commissioners have 
displayed “proactive police leadership” in some cities by supporting community/police 
collaborations.
771
 This does not necessarily imply that the opinion of most chiefs has 
changed drastically: they generally believe that internal accountability is the best 
remedy against police scandals.
772
 In a publication prepared for the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police in 2000, the authors speak of “benefits and 
drawbacks.” In their view:  
 
“Citizen review is but one tool among many that can be used to promote and ensure 
accountability. It is neither a cure-all nor likely to promote desired results unless 
accompanied by a full package of accountability-building strategies. Over-reliance on 
these mechanisms can bring disappointment to a community.”  
 
The association believes that it is the public’s lack of knowledge that has led to their 
demand for civilian review: 
 
“Being essentially observers and having limited or no input into police decision-
making, and often possessing very little information, some citizens become frustrated 
when police misconduct occurs or is alleged. When citizens begin to lack faith in 
internal affairs processes and have no knowledge of how they work, they become less 
comfortable allowing the police to police themselves.” 
 
The association remains skeptical about the effectiveness of civilian review: 
 
“The best known criminal justice commissions (The Knapp Commission, the 
President’s Commission, The National Advisory Commission) have not supported 
independent civilian review and have argued that there is no substitute for good 
Internal Affairs units and solid police agency ethics. Examples of dysfunctional 
programs are plentiful.”773  
 
Overall, the American Civil Liberties Union remains skeptical about police motives, 
and has distinguished three different stages in the police’s positioning: 
 
 The “over our dead bodies” stage, during which the police proclaim that they 




 The “magical conversion” stage, when it becomes politically inevitable that 
civilian review will be adopted. At this point, former police opponents suddenly 
become civilian review experts and propose the weakest possible models;  
 
 The “post-partum resistance” stage, when the newly established civilian review 





Mayoral response to demands for civilian review has been mixed. While Mayor 
Lindsay launched a campaign to adopt a civilian review system in New York City, and 
Mayor Dinkins, in the 1990s, sought to implement an all-civilian review board, Mayor 
Giuliani was much less in favor of external review. Overall, the debate between 
advocates and opponents was often explosive, while interaction between the two 
groups was fierce. The dynamics of debate are well exemplified in the case study of the 
New York Civilian Complaint Review Board Referendum in 1966, as will be discussed 
below.  
 
CASE — THE NEW YORK CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD REFERENDUM 
“This is an historic moment. […] Perhaps the most important fight I have ever seen. I 
am appalled to discover, after passage of many civil rights bills, that many of the 
wonderful liberals are slightly doctrinaire, it appears. This fight is the guts of it. This 
separates the men from the boys.”775 
Mayor John Lindsay 
 
“The game begins with a publicity campaign focusing on fascist police, various 
atrocities, and other lurid events. The police and their friends counter with an equally 
illuminating defense: Nothing is wrong that a little get-tough campaign would not 
cure. The game ends with a ballot in which white voters are asked to choose between 
their friendly neighborhood policeman and the specter of black violence. The usual 
result is that the whites vote for the police and defeat the review board.”776 
Cyril D. Robinson 
 
The civil rights movement heightened demands for civilian review in New York. In 
particular, the shooting of James Powell increased such demands.
777
 The cycle of 
events started when in 1964, in response to civil rights demands prior to the Powell 
incident, City Councilman Ted Weiss of the Upper West Side proposed to replace the 
existing all-police review board with an all-civilian one that would report to the mayor 
instead of the police commissioner. However, the bill never passed. Two years later, 
the plan was revived by Mayor Lindsay. He, more moderately, proposed to add four 
civilians to the existing three police commissioners already reviewing complaints.
778
 
The NYPD fiercely objected both plans. Commissioner Michael Murphy responded to 
the initial proposal by saying that the police brutality allegations were “maliciously 
inspired” and came from “self-aggrandizing, self-appointed leaders” who “either 
through a lust for power or for more sinister motives” have launched a “planned pattern 
of attack against the police.” Their “blind assertions,” he added, “[are] aimed at 
destroying respect for law and order and are in effect, calculated mass libel of the 
police.”779 After a task force installed by Mayor Lindsay concluded that New York 
should make civilian review partially independent, Commissioner Broderick similarly 
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rejected the proposal calling it “a cruel hoax, a bromide, [and] an example of political 
expediency,” while insinuating that “it was an invitation to the mayor to take over the 
department.”780  
The PBA also opposed the review board. PBA President John J. Cassese said 
he would fight the plan at all costs, even if it meant that he would have to spend the 
PBA’s $1.5 million treasury.781 The PBA campaign became “one of the most hard-
fought and bitter political campaigns in New York City’s history.”782 The union fought 
the review board in several ways, for example by pushing for a bill to reverse the 
review board, attempts to get a court injunction, and the gathering of 100,000 
signatures in favor of a referendum.
783
 The PBA argued that the City Charter needed to 
be amended to legalize civilian review, which had to be approved in a referendum.
784
 
The PBA prevailed and a referendum was organized in New York concerning whether 
or not to stop the civilian review board instituted by Mayor John Lindsay. This 
referendum had national implications, as it made civilian review a cause célèbre
 
taken 
up by both liberals and conservatives throughout the United States, from the latter of 
whom the PBA received a substantial amount of donations.
785
  
In the campaign prior to the referendum, the PBA’s communication was often harsh 
and inflammatory. At one point, Cassese said that he was “sick and tired of giving in to 
minority groups,” and that “racial minorities would not be satisfied until you get all 
Negroes and Puerto Ricans on the board and every policeman who goes in front of it is 
found guilty.”786 After this remark, Cassese was replaced, but the PBA’s tone of voice 
was set. Niederhoffer: “His polemics, the advertising he authorized, and the image he 
projected with its undercurrent of racism and rightism, proved that when the chips are 
down, the police rely on demagoguery not professionalism.”787 During the campaign, 
the main argument provided by the PBA and others in support of the police was that 
civilian review would hinder police performance, in particular its response to disorder, 
Niederhoffer points out. The PBA also focused on police victimization. Cassese: “The 
morale of the men on the force would be lowered, the power of the police 
commissioner diluted and the efficiency of all policemen impaired.”788 The PBA 
strategically also used residents’ fears and anxieties as a powerful image in their 
communications. Flamm:  
 
“The image that dominated the campaign, however, came from the Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association (PBA), which in opposition to the review board distributed a 
provocative campaign poster. Employing racial, class, and gender code to tap into 
widespread fears and anxieties, the poster showed a young middle-class white woman 
exiting nervously from the subway and emerging alone onto a dark and deserted street. 
‘The Civilian Review Board must be stopped!’ read the accompanying text. ‘Her life 
… your life … may depend on it.’ The reason, it added, was that a ‘police officer must 
not hesitate. If he does … the security and safety of your family may be 
jeopardized.’”789 
 
The PBA’s advocacy against civilian review was supported by many officers, who 
often had a prominent role in the debate. Their patrol cars were frequently clad with 
anti-review-board signs, and rank-and-file officers often handed out literature, 
sometimes even harassing advocates campaigning in favor of the review board.
790
 
Within the police, only the Guardians (representing 1,300 black officers) supported the 





Meanwhile, the issue was also taken up by ultra-conservative forces, often 
collaborating with the PBA and police officers. In this sense, the police became a very 
real political actor. Flamm:  
 
“The JBS [John Birch Society] had launched a ‘Support Your Local Police’ campaign 
because it believed that the civil rights movement was ‘inspired, planned, and 
controlled’ by communists, who sought to foment racial strife, lawlessness, and 
disorder to discredit local law enforcement and compel the creation of a national police 
force. The campaign also enabled the JBS to raise needed funds (through the sale of 
bumper stickers and buttons) and to recruit new members (often policemen). When, for 
example, it sponsored a Town Hall rally against civilian review, a crowd of almost five 
hundred gathered, many if not most off-duty officers with PBA badges.”792  
 
Advocates of civilian review, minority groups and liberals, also organized themselves 
well. They formed the Federated Association for Impartial Review (FAIR). They also 
took the PBA to court in order to challenge the referendum, yet were unsuccessful in 
doing so. While their communication was often zealous, similar to that of the PBA, at 
times the tone was more muted. Flamm: “The mayor’s office […] kept minority 
campaigners and board members in the background to dispel the idea that civilian 
review was a ‘protective agent’ for them.”793 In their communication, supporters 
conveyed the argument that the civilian review board would serve as a riot prevention 
mechanism, as it would enhance police–community relations. They also framed the 
civilian review board referendum in a racial context: “DON’T BE A YES MAN FOR 
BIGOTRY — VOTE NO” read thousands of campaign posters.794 By doing so, 
advocates exacerbated the schism between black and white, as not all blacks were 
supportive of civilian review, and not all saw police violence as a serious problem. 
They also framed the debate in a political context, the referendum being “the most 
important issue of the ultra-conservative cause in this country,” according to Senator 
Jacob Javits.
795
 Advocates contended that opponents of the review board had Nazi 
sympathies.
796
 The harsh words used by liberals exacerbated the schism between 
opponents and proponents. Advocates for civilian review also used the police as a 
political tool. Together with Senator Robert Kennedy, Javits released an Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) Report, trying to show the link between ultra-conservative 
politics and the police, evidenced by the JBS’s fierce campaign and recruitment of 
policemen.
797
 Overall, the debate resulted in a negative spiral of events, in which 
“everyone — blacks and whites, liberals and conservatives — ultimately lost as racial 
tensions escalated.”798 In the end, more than two million New Yorkers partook in the 
referendum, with only 1 in 3 supporting the board. “Law and order” language used by 
conservatives and the police played an important factor in the civilian review defeat, as 
it “mobilized anxious whites, giving them a language of protest and a vocabulary of 
ideas with which to link troubling changes in their communities to broader 
developments in American society and culture.”799 
The substitute board created by Lindsay after the defeat did not have much 
clout. Lardner and Reppetto: “It lingered on for the next 25 years — a body that was 
neither civilian nor independent of the department but would add up to a time-
consuming mechanism that further blurred the responsibility for police discipline.”800 
Ironically, the fiasco also had a detrimental effect on accountability, as Mayor Lindsay 
did not want to provoke the police any further and hence condoned corruption practices 
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(see Subsection 3.9.2). The defeat also led to increased police union power and 
militancy throughout the country. Skolnick:  
 
“Both because it served as an example for police elsewhere and because of its role in 
the evolution toward militancy of the police involved, the most significant single case 
is the civilian review board battle in New York City. […] Perhaps the most significant 
impact of these struggles, aside from further polarizing an already polarized situation, 
has been to give the police a sense of their potential political power.”801  
 
Overall success 
The adoption of civilian oversight processes has proven to be an arduous endeavor.
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At times, advocates and opponents have been pitted diametrically against each other in 
the debate. Some scholars argue that police (unions) are now losing the debate.
803
 
Wilson and Buckler conclude that the unions’ collective bargaining efforts have not 
significantly influenced civilian oversight. Yet the number of African-American 
citizens in a city does have a positive relationship with the existence of civilian 
oversight, Wilson and Buckler point out.
804
 Others have also observed that civilian 
oversight initiatives usually start after minorities criticize the police in regard to 
specific police-violence incidents.
805
 While the debate about civilian review continues, 
a noticeable trend of growth in civilian review across the United States is evident, 
although reliable national statistics do not exist. A possible explanation is the broad 
public support for civilian review.
806
 Some unions have even shown their support.
807
  
However, from a different perspective, existing civilian review boards have been 
largely ineffective. While accountability to the public varies tremendously between 
agencies, review boards are only rarely truly independent.
808
 Most boards are 
considered to be weak.
809
 Part of their failure can be explained by the fact that the 
boards are highly dependent on police cooperation, yet the police often fail to provide 
this.
810
 Moreover, Wilson and Buckler point out, “It is reasonable to assume that while 
unions have been unsuccessful at stopping oversight, some may have been successful 
at reducing the power that oversights committees have in the investigative process.”811 
In addition, the review boards’ inherent focus on individual cases, rather than on 
structural causes, have made the boards unsuccessful as a tool. Reiss:  
 
“At the heart of the review board organizational form, then, is a tenuous presumption 
that misconduct can be controlled by investigating incidents of misconduct and 
sanctioning those who are found in violation. Investigation and oral testimony are thin 
reeds with which to sanction officer misconduct and cannot reach the organizational 
and systemic sources of that misconduct.”812  
 
In turn, the debate also had negative consequences. It negatively impacted the morale 





Aside from the installation of civilian complaint review processes, stakeholders have 
tried to hold the police accountable in other ways, too. The justice system, for example, 
has tried to limit discretionary powers by rulings such as Mapp vs Ohio, Simmons 
points out, to “deter officers from producing evidence in violation of a criminal 
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suspect’s constitutional rights by excluding evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment from being used at trial.”814 
 In addition, over the years a number of commissions have been installed after 
police corruption or violence scandals and consequential public outcry. These 
commissions were mandated to investigate police problems. In 1968, President Lyndon 
Johnson appointed the Kerner Commission, the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders. This commission focused on the resentment between ghetto residents 
and the police.
815
 After serious allegations of police misconduct in certain precincts, 
including brutality, stealing, selling drugs, and more, Mayor Dinkins appointed the 
Mollen Commission in 1992 to investigate the nature and extent of such misconduct in 
the NYPD. The Commission also evaluated existing prevention and detection 
procedures.
816
 The public hearings drew much media attention.
817
 In general, these 
commissions have increasingly focused on the strained relations between the police 
and the public, the existence of malpractices, and also the code of silence.
818
  
Commissions have faced much resistance, in particular from the PBA, which 
observed that the Knapp Commission “serves no purpose but to undermine the morale 
of and the trust in our first line of defense in the continuing war against crime.”819 It is 
suggested that the wildcat strike that followed, which officially was “in opposition to 
pattern bargaining”, was a response to the Knapp hearings.820 Similarly, Silverman 
points out, many of the Zuccotti committee’s proposals “were seen by insiders as 
fundamental assaults on existing procedures, including the tradition-bound civil service 
system, and accordingly, they were fiercely resisted.”821 The commissions’ impact on 
the police has been questioned. Take for example that of the Mollen Commission. 
Levitt:  
 
“True, the Mollen Commission had cleaned up the 30th Precinct. But after all the 
headlines and tragedies, the suicides and betrayals, what in the long run had it 
accomplished? […] nothing that the Mollen Commission did equaled the eloquence of 
its final report. Echoing the Knapp Commission’s warning twenty years earlier, it 
described a police culture that valued ‘loyalty over integrity’ and blamed ‘willfully 
blind supervisors who fear the consequences of a scandal more than the scandal itself.’ 
It quoted former Police Commissioner Kelly saying that only outside oversight ‘keeps 
the Department’s feet to the fire.’ […] The main recommendation made by the Mollen 
Commission — a permanent external corruption monitor with subpoena power to 
investigate, was rejected by Mayor Giuliani […] .”822  
 
Silverman similarly observes that as a response to the Zuccotti committee’s 
recommendations, only easy “add-ons” were implemented.823 Reiss more generally 
argues that such commissions, too, focus too much on individuals rather than 
organizations at large.
824
 Other methods to hold the police accountable include state 
and federal investigations into police misconduct, yet they have been rare.
825
 
Prosecutors have been hesitant to prosecute the police, as they often serve as a valuable 
partner to them in other cases, Simmons points out. Department of Justice officers, in 
turn, have often argued that state prosecutions serve as a better means of addressing 
police-violence issues, and hence federal investigations should only be used as a 
“back-stop.” In addition, federal prosecutions often require “that police officers have 
the specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s civil rights, as opposed to the specific intent 
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to assault the victim, which creates a difficult evidentiary requirement for the victim to 
meet.”826  
A shift occurred in the 1990s “away from legal measures based on ‘rational 
actor theories’ to hold the police accountable, such as criminal prosecutions.”827 
Simmons points out this change happened after a subcommittee of the House Judiciary 
Committee installed as a response to the national call for reform after the Rodney King 
Beating concluded that “the U.S. government lacked the authority to address systemic 
patterns or practices of police misconduct and could only prosecute individual police 
officers.” In 1994, Congress adopted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, granting the “DOJ the 
authority to seek injunctive relief to initiate reforms of law enforcement agencies 
where DOJ determines a ‘pattern or practice’ of unconstitutional violations or 
violations of federal law.” More specifically, the statute authorizes the Attorney 
General to conduct investigations and, if warranted, file civil litigation to eliminate a 
“pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers … that deprives persons of 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.”828 By 2008, the DOJ had initiated only a few lawsuits, all of which 
have been settled via court-enforced consent decrees. Simmons:  
 
“Citing the expediency and cost-effectiveness of their settlement strategy, U.S. 
government officials have expressly articulated a preference for avoiding litigation and 
negotiating with municipalities to ensure compliance with the suggested reforms. 
These agreements generally contain a package of reforms aimed at enhancing greater 
public accountability. Called the ‘new paradigm of police accountability’ by one 
commentator, the most common provisions of these agreements are aimed at 
implementing or changing internal policies related to developing early warning 
tracking systems to detect ‘problem officers,’ creating use-of-force reporting systems, 
and devising an impartial civilian complaint review process.”829  
 
3.10.7 Conclusion 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the debate concerning police–community 
related issues became vehement, continuous and diverse, involving a broad array of 
topics, such as use of force, police-violence incidents, racial profiling and civilian 
review, as well as a multitude of stakeholders, including minority groups and their 
leaders, civil rights groups, the police commissioner, the rank and file and their unions, 
and the mayor. Stakeholders debated about these issues in the formal arena of debate, 
but the police and citizens also met each other in the informal arena, which became 
exposed during riots and protest marches, often an immediate consequence of police 
actions. The media functioned as both a reflection and a catalyst of public perceptions 
and the continuing debate.  
The ongoing debate has been dominated by numerous police misconduct cases 
in New York, which, together, form a pattern of scandals that have led to much media 
coverage as well as intense reactions ranging from riots to public indictments of police 
practice, and a decline in confidence and satisfaction in particular amongst African 
Americans and Hispanics. The police performance during the riots and protests 
following incidents of police misconduct, have led to more complaints in regard to the 
use of force, and have further sparked the debate. 
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The various debates in the wake of these scandals, as well as the ongoing 
debate on police–community relations issues, together form a pattern too, in which 
reoccurring questions have been asked; reports published by civil rights groups and 
several commissions have echoed each other’s findings; and stakeholders have not 
drastically changed their positioning, with two factions in particular holding 
diametrically opposing views. Judicial proceedings often have been protracted too, 
mostly leading to settlements, not convictions.  
The ongoing debate has been initiated and led by a growing group of police 
critics, in particular African Americans, whose expectations of the police, as well as 
their empowerment and consciousness, has risen substantially. They have argued that 
police-violence incidents are widespread, officers use too much force in general, police 
are more aggressive towards blacks than whites, and complaints are not taken 
seriously. In the ongoing debate, these police critics often bundled forces. They have 
demanded reform measures such as the installation of a civilian review board, and the 
hiring and promotion of minority officers, and, after police-violence incidents, they 
have also demanded disciplinary and legal actions. 
The communication style of those criticizing the police in issues affecting 
police–community relations has often been zealous, determined and expressive, often 
focusing on the extreme character of specific incidents (such as the number of shots 
fired), as well as the need for justice and the widely-felt victimization, including the 
perception that the police respond differently towards African Americans than to 
whites. At times, claims have been exaggerated or even false. They have also framed 
the debate in both a racial and political context, exacerbating the schism between black 
and white, but also between those in favor and against police reform, rigidly delimiting 
the notions of ‘supporters’ and ‘opponents’ in the debate. They have also used the 
police as a vehicle for political communication. The Rev. Al Sharpton played a major 
role in the aftermath of numerous police-violence and aggressive-use-of-force 
incidents. While some have lauded his style, arguing that he set the agenda, but also 
prevented escalation, others see his actions as theatrical, political and inflammatory.  
With the exception of black police organizations, there has been a large schism 
between the perceptions and positioning of those critical of the police and the police 
themselves. Overall, rank-and-file officers, attuned to the need of colleagues, perceive 
community relations in a different way from others, including their management, 
maintaining that law enforcement and the concept of service do not match well. They 
have fiercely opposed their detractors’ criticism, demands, motives, and protests, 
framing incidents of police violence as unfortunate accidents based on a split-second, 
life-or-death decision; the police as the only victims; critics as shortsighted anti-police 
agitators with political motives; criticism as unbalanced, unjust, and often leading to 
police victimization; a complaint against a single patrolman as a challenge to the entire 
profession; and reform demands, such as civilian review, as infringements of police 
authority and autonomy. Their polarized and rigid views are in line with their overall 
conservative posture, which makes it hard for officers to understand or deal with 
dissident groups.  
The rank and file’s perceptions are reflected in their positioning, which has 
overall been defensive in response to allegations and reform demands aimed at 
improving the relation between the police and minority groups, such as civilian review. 
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Their strategies in many ways resembled those of the civil rights activists. Unions have 
successfully represented the rank and file in the public debate as well as in court, 
offering much (legal) support for officers accused of police misconduct, including the 
waiving of the right to a jury trial in favor of a judge. Tactics included collective 
bargaining strategies, the dissuasion of officers from cooperating with the 
investigations, as well as legal actions, such as the questioning of particular provisions 
in a court of law and the demand for a legislative repeal of the ordinance for civilian 
review. Unions, but also the officers themselves, often became very real political 
actors. In their communication, critics have often been labeled as ‘anti-police’ and 
‘communists’, while issues have been lumped into one simple one of ‘law and order’. 
Their strategy to discredit the protestors’ motives and demands, while focusing on 
prevalent fears and anxieties, has proven to be highly effective. Police culture played a 
dominant role in the rank and file’s views and positioning in police–community 
relations debates. The code of silence, stimulated by the unions and fueled by a strong 
‘us-versus-them’ culture, not only impeded investigations into police violence and the 
overall civilian review process, it also had a detrimental effect on the development of 
the debate, exacerbating the schism between the debating stakeholders.  
While police commissioners have underlined the importance of police–
community relations in theory, their views regarding police misconduct cases, racial 
profiling and civilian review are often similar to those of the rank and file. 
Departments’ official response to police-violence incidents has often been criticized for 
being too defensive, shallow and reactive, with a strong focus on public relations 
efforts, such as publishing figures on their ability to combat crime; stating that officers 
need more training; offering a settlement with the victim(s); and blaming the victim(s) 
for instigating the incident by resisting arrest. Reform efforts were safe and 
bureaucratic. In their communication, the police commissioners often discredited the 
protestors’ motives and demands, while pointing out that criticism and reform demands 
can lead to police victimization and a decline in authority. At times, police 
commissioners prevented the CCRB from doing its job. In particular, hardliner 
commissioners such as Howard Safir aggravated tensions. Even when police 
commissioners were willing to improve police–community relations, their efforts have 
been resisted by the mayor, or hardliner community leaders, and also internally, not 
only by police officers, but also by the traditional structure itself. In particular, 
professionalization had a negative effect on police–community relations.  
The mayor’s role in police–community relations has varied considerably. 
While some presented themselves as sensitive to community concerns and adopted 
reforms such as civilian review, these same mayors have also defended police actions 
on other occasions, while denying the existence of structural problems. Other mayors, 
in particular Mr. Giuliani, were very pro-police and have reflexively defended them, 
while framing incidents and their aftermath in a fashion similar to that of the unions. 
The positioning of such mayors has been particularly rigid: Giuliani refused to speak 
with community leaders and prevented the police commissioner from doing so, while 
adopting a hardliner approach to protesters and defaming both victims and their 
supporters. While mayors who were sensitive to community concerns have faced 
criticism too, Mayor Giuliani’s actions in particular were considered inadequate, 
indifferent and provocative.  
237 
 
What have been the overall results of the continuous debates that have been 
held in regard to police–community relations? The efforts of African Americans and 
their leaders, civil rights groups, commissions, and the media reinforced each other and 
certainly had an agenda-setting effect. They led to civil litigation, political 
mobilization, and both external and internal investigations. Yet their actual impact has 
been questioned. While over the years the police have introduced community policing, 
adopted civilian review and diversified the force, the overall police–community 
relations reform process has remained very protracted, with the debates on police 
violence, racial profiling, and civilian review still continuing. This is partly due to the 
fact that reforms aimed at improving police–community relations were often 
traditional, reactive, cosmetic and short-lived, with a strong focus on communication 
and public-relations activities, and on individual behavior rather than that of 
organizations at large. Hence the effects were limited too, in particular in relation to 
police culture. Moreover, reform efforts that turn out to be merely shallow PR 
instruments ultimately fail to convince stakeholders. Even the reforms proposed by 
external stakeholders often focused on individual cases, rather than on structural 
causes. Unions, too, played a decisive role. While they were unable to prevent the 
civilian review process, they did influence the development of these boards, which 
remain largely ineffective, and dependent on police cooperation, which the police often 
refuse to give. Moreover, some unions may have been successful in reducing the power 
that oversights committees have in the investigative process. On the positive side, the 
police critics’ growing power and dissatisfaction may have led to a turning point. In 
recent years, external groups have, to a certain degree, been more effective in pressing 
for change of existing policies and programs. 
Ironically, the criticism, protests and responses, in some ways have had a 
negative impact on police–community relations, leading to polarization of stakeholders 
and stagnation of the process of debate. More specifically, they have intensified 
negative perceptions in regard to the police, further antagonizing minority groups, and 
radicalizing certain activists, while giving police defenders ammunition to ward off 
reforms, such as civilian review. The incidents proper, and the police and mayoral 
responses, often had a detrimental effect on public opinion, in particular those of 
minority groups. They have also led to increased police victimization, particularly 
when the police are used as a political tool for broader issues. As a consequence, the 







In the second half of the twentieth century, the NYPD has been involved in two 
partially overlapping debates: one concerning police professionalization, reform and 
corruption, the other about a broad variety of police–community relations issues.  
In the formal arena of debate, a powerful, conscious, bitter and alienated group 
of critics (in particular African Americans) has been pitted against powerful police 
unions representing an equally bitter, conscious and alienated group of rank-and-file 
officers. While the police commissioner often sided with the rank and file on police–
community relations issues, reform commissioners were often pitted against the rank 
and file in the debate on professionalization, reform and corruption. The role of the 
mayor varied, as some mayors vigorously defended the police, while others were more 
understanding towards minority groups, proposing reform measures such as civilian 
review. As watchdog and news gatekeeper, the media have exposed police scandals, 
and reflected and catalyzed public perceptions in the continuing debate. Police and 
citizens also met each other in the informal arena of debate. Riots and protest marches 
exposed the interactions between minority groups and the police in this arena, 
including these stakeholders’ ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, demand for respect, and 
feelings of victimization, bitterness and alienation.  
The debates between these groups appear to be stuck in a perpetual loop. The 
formal arena of debate has been characterized by a perpetual cycle of reoccurring 
scandals, media coverage, public outcry, protests, debates, defensive responses, and 
reform efforts. In the informal arena of debate, encounters between the police and 
minorities continued to be moral disputes engendered, molded and driven by racial 
disparities. This chapter has identified three factors that contribute to these perpetual 
loops: the evolvement of the power landscape into a power equilibrium, the deeply-
rooted positioning and communication of key stakeholders, and the function and use of 
the police as a vehicle for political communication. This equilibrium is not a tranquil 
condition, but rather a power balance between opposing discourse, including rigid 
positioning and harsh communication strategies. 
 
3.11.1 The power landscape 
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the power landscape of the public debate 
had evolved into a power equilibrium between different stakeholders:  
 
Minority groups and civil rights groups. The power of minority groups, whose 
stamina, awareness and anger was fuelled by every new incident of police violence, 
had substantially risen in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet while the 
criticism conveyed by minority groups and civil rights groups has had an agenda-
setting effect, it only sporadically led to immediate change or open dialogue. 
 
The rank and file and their unions. New York police officers, whose powers were 
already substantial due to their discretionary liberties and police cultural features such 
as solidarity, cynicism and the code of silence, became even more powerful in the 
second half of the twentieth century, as a consequence of police unionization, 
professionalization, and bureaucratization. Police unions, in turn, gained much political 
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power, in line with the development of the broader public-sector unionization 
movement, but also as a consequence of both police professionalization and the civil 
rights movement. While the rank and file and their unions have been able to protract 
reform processes and impede investigations, and have posed serious limitations both on 
police management ambitions and the demands of critical external groups, they have 
been unable to silence their critics.  
 
The police commissioners. The New York police chiefs’ traditionally limited powers 
were put under extra pressure by the growing power and consciousness of the rank and 
file and those of minority groups, as well by the increasingly inflexible police 
organization as a whole. Moreover, they often had to deal with problems on their own, 
as the visible power link between the government and the police continued to fade 
(although the latter also gave the commissioner a degree of power). While reform 
commissioners have been unable to adopt lasting reform measures, commissioners in 
general have been able to impede reforms and stall debating processes, for example by 
preventing the CCRB from doing its job.  
 
The NYPD as an organization. Professionalization has empowered the police as an 
organization to impede reform and resist change. However, it has also prevented the 
organization from becoming innovative and flexible. The implementation of Compstat 
further contributed to this development.  
 
The mayor. New York mayors have broad powers to address (policing) issues or 
distance themselves from them. However, their reform powers are limited by their re-
electability, as well as by the diverse group of different stakeholders within their 
electorate. While mayors have been able to impede reforms and stall debating 
processes, for example by using their powers to suppress reports unfavorable to the 
NYPD, they have been unable to press for lasting reforms or substantially improve the 
debating processes.  
 
The media. The media, too, have substantial power in their roles as news gatekeepers 
and watchdogs. However, their power as a stakeholder in the debate is hampered by 
economic limitations on news production and the profit-making goals of the media, 
forcing them into an asymmetrical relationship with the police. While the media have 
been successful in bringing attention to police misconduct cases, the police have the 
power to regain control of the news by a ritual of normalization.  
 
Thus, while each stakeholder is powerful enough to hamper reform processes, stall the 
debate, or give the debate a new impulse, none of them have the capacity to adopt 
lasting reforms and/or improve the debating processes substantially and/or have the 
debate come to a closure.  
 
3.11.2 Stakeholder positioning and communication 
Each stakeholder’s (often deeply-rooted) positioning has also contributed to the 
perpetual loop in which both debates appear to be stuck. In particular, their 
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(communication) strategies certainly had a counterproductive effect on the views and 
positioning of other stakeholders:  
 
Minority groups and civil rights groups 
Roots — The new police critics’ ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, characterized by 
cynicism, victimization and alienation, is a product of both a long history of 
(perceived) police mistreatment and overall inequality, as well as of reoccurring new 
incidents of police violence and aggressive use of force practices, which have 
contributed to a strong oppositional subculture toward the police. 
 
Influence of other stakeholders’ communication — Specific strategies used by other 
stakeholders, such as the police’s and mayors’ defensive response to criticism, have 
had a direct effect on minorities’ confidence in, and cynicism towards, the police, thus 
influencing and reinforcing their positioning in the debate. Their interactions with 
rank-and-file officers in the informal arena of debate, in particular those involving 
perceived procedural injustices, can contribute to and/or reinforce neighborhood or 
subcultural beliefs, ultimately becoming part of the (African-American) cultural 
repertoire. In this respect, citizen attitudes are more strongly influenced by police 
treatment (of which communication is an important factor) than by the outcome of an 
encounter. 
 
Influence on other stakeholders’ communication — Whereas the new critics’ protests 
and communications have constructively put important issues on the political and 
public agenda, they have also served as catalysts for negative perceptions in regard to 
the police, further antagonizing members of their own group and radicalizing certain 
activists, while giving police defenders ammunition to ward off reforms, such as 
civilian review. Their displayed contempt for the police and use of the police as a 
vehicle for political communication has increased police alienation and perceived 
victimization, while reinforcing existing beliefs amongst the police.  
 
NYPD as an organization 
Roots — The NYPD’s overall rigid and conservative positioning is a product of the 
police mandate and organization itself, society’s high expectations, the 
professionalization and bureaucratization processes (and consequential insulation from 
public opinion and reform processes), and the implementation of Compstat, which, 
combined, have resulted in an organization that continues to be pitted against change. 
 
Influence on other stakeholders’ communication — The police’s organization, structure 
and mandate have contributed to the development of specific police communication 
characteristics, such as a focus on secrecy and resistance to change. It has also 
contributed to the rigid, top-down methods used by internal reformers who tried to 
professionalize the police.  
 
Police commissioners 
Roots — The police commissioners’ generally defensive positioning, at times 
characterized by ‘us-versus-them’ communication, is quite similar to that of the rank 
241 
 
and file and could have similar roots (see discussion of the rank and file’s positioning, 
below). 
 
Influence of other stakeholders’ communication — The union’s harsh strategies have 
negatively influenced the commissioners’ willingness to cooperate with the rank and 
file. Society’s pressure on the police has led to cosmetic reform efforts. Also, the 
media’s perceived sensationalism has had a detrimental effect on the commissioners’ 
openness. 
 
Influence on other stakeholders’ communication — The police commissioners’ and 
PIO’s defensive strategies and communications resulted in minority groups’ increased 
cynicism, as well as the media’s increased wariness. Yet they have also been 
successful in influencing their portrayal in the media. Certain commissioners’ blunt, 
get-tough vocabulary has inflamed tensions. Reform commissioners’ positioning 
towards rank-and-file members, who have been excluded from the reform process, has 
also resulted in cynicism and alienation.  
 
The rank and file and their unions 
Roots — The rank and file’s rigid, ‘us-versus-them’, defensive positioning, 
characterized by frustration, cynicism, resistance towards change, and a perceived 
minority status, is a product of the police function, normative orders, and culture, as 
well as of the professionalization and other reform processes, and the influence of the 
unions.  
 
Influence of other stakeholders’ communication — The use of the police as a vehicle 
for political communication, the received contempt from minority groups, and the lack 
of support from mayors or police commissioners has angered rank-and-file officers, 
lowered their morale and increased their demand for respect.  
 
Influence on other stakeholders’ communication — The aggressive communication 
style of the police unions resulted in the negative image of the rank and file and the 
reluctance of others to listen to and cooperate with them and their representatives. In 
turn, their ‘us-versus-them’ positioning exacerbated the schism between the debating 
stakeholders. The code of silence prevented an open dialogue with other stakeholders. 
 
The mayor 
Influence on other stakeholders’ communication — While the mayor’s successes in his 
communication with critics on issues related to police misconduct has been mixed at 
best, it is commonly believed that Mayor Giuliani’s style of communication in 
particular fueled racial tension in New York. 
 
Society 
Roots — Society’s conflicting, unbalanced and taken-for-granted expectations and 
views regarding the police can be traced back as early as the creation of the police.  
 
Influence on stakeholders and the overall process debate — These expectations and 
views have led to quick fixes and cosmetic or traditional reform efforts, discouraged 
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the mayor from committing to anticorruption measures, and moreover, contributed to 
the rank and file’s cynicism and demand for respect. In addition, reform was also 
hampered by society’s unwillingness to cooperate with the police, as well as by 
citizens’ lack of knowledge, skepticism, and fear. In sum, societal constraints towards 
the police impede the police’s power to effectuate change. 
 
Media 
Roots and influence on the debate — Due to the media’s inherent focus on events, 
persons, conflicts and development, their reporting remains incidental, episodic and 
does not address patterns of police misconduct. This particular focus has also resulted 
on certain occasions in sensationalized news and the dissemination of unproven 
allegations concerning police conduct. Due to the asymmetrical relationship with the 
police, but also due to the media’s focus on conflict, police and civil rights groups are 
often the two primary sources of information in news coverage.  
 
The influence of other stakeholders’ communication — Stakeholders’ responses, even 
those aimed at discouraging critical reporting, have a catalyzing effect on news 
production.  
 
Overall, the stakeholders’ positioning and communication has led to the polarization of 
other stakeholders and the stagnation of the process of debate. The interactions 
between stakeholders’ positioning and communication has increased these effects. For 
example, the mutual resentment and suspicion between the minority groups and the 
rank and file, as well as their strong demand for respect, have resulted in moral 
disputes engendered, molded and driven by racial disparities, ultimately leading to self-
fulfilling prophecies in the informal arena of debate, while these same ingredients 
stalled debates in the formal arena.  
Communication that occurs in the informal arena of debate can hamper 
debating processes in the formal one, though it is probable that this is a bidirectional 
process. For example, negative perceptions resulting from street encounters can 
influence stakeholders’ positioning in the formal arena of debate. More broadly, public 
opinion, partly shaped by (perceptions concerning) interactions in the informal arena, 
can influence the success of law enforcement practices, police–community relations 
and the overall legitimacy of the police, as well as the development of debates in the 
formal arena.  
To a degree, the overall scarcity of conciliatory discourse can be explained by 
the role of the media. By focusing on conflict, they have favored provocative or 
defensive voices in their reporting over more conciliatory ones. While stakeholders’ 
harsh communication and rigid positioning has had an overall negative effect on 
debating processes, it is unclear, partly due to this scarcity, whether more conciliatory 
communication would have improved the process of debate, although reform efforts 
that support open communication in theory, such as community policing, have 
improved public perceptions. In any case, stakeholders’ positioning often has deep 
historical roots and is solidly anchored in the stakeholders’ culture, organization, and 





3.11.3 The police as a vehicle for political communication 
While external political influences within the Police Department diminished, policing 
continued to be seen as an inherently political activity. In this context, the police are 
not only a very visible representation of government, their function is also believed to 
be detrimental to the minorities’ quest for status, power and material rewards in 
society. This quest is part of a broader struggle, characterized by prejudicial views and 
driven by group interest. As a consequence, the police have served as a vehicle for 
political communication in the public debate, as they are criticized for policies created 
by the government, while the agenda-setting of police issues is employed as a strategic 
means to gain broader control. Moreover, the police critics’ dissatisfaction with the 
police and the issues brought up by them are linked to a broader set of concerns held 
by these groups regarding the criminal justice system, government and society, not 
only concerning policing but also concerning racial and financial inequality in general. 
The use of the police as a vehicle for political communication has caused 
confusion in regard to the issues at stake, and stalled debating processes. Together with 
the boundary-spanning roles of officers and their mandate to use force, this usage has 
put the police in an exceptionally difficult position. While the police do not have the 
mandate and power to solve broader issues by themselves, the rank and file’s specific 
mandate and role can lead to misconduct and other issues, which, in turn, serve as a 
hook for these broader issues.  
 
3.11.4 Stuck in a perpetual loop? 
While each of the discussed factors has hampered reform efforts as well as the process 
of debate, the interaction between these factors has intensified these processes. For 
example, the police’s function as a vehicle for political communication on the one 
hand, and the police’s ability to insulate themselves from its impact on the other, have 
caused increased tension and form a strong impediment to the process of debate. 
The police critics’ growing power and dissatisfaction may have led to a turning 
point. However, it is too early to confirm whether the power equilibrium has indeed 
been disturbed. On a pessimistic note, the perpetual loop in which both debates appear 
to be stuck has also included reoccurring optimistic voices periodically announcing a 
breakthrough in these loops. 
Similar to previous police-violence incidents, the shooting of Sean Bell in 
2006 served as a starting point of a new circle of events within this perpetual loop. Part 
II of this study explores the communication processes during this shooting’s aftermath, 
providing more understanding into the micro-processes that contribute to the loop, as 
well those that can lead to a breakthrough. 
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Introduction to Part II — Micro-level analysis of the 
public debate on an incident of NYPD violence 
 
Enemy… on the borderline 
Who’ll be the next to fire 
Forty-one shots by Diallo’s side?  
 
You said he reached sir 
But he didn’t have no piece sir 
But now he rest in peace sir 
In the belly of the beast sir 
 
You guys are vampires 
In the middle of the night 
Suckin on human blood 
Is that your appetite?
1
 
Excerpt from Wyclef Jean’s ‘Diallo’ — A tribute to Amadou Diallo 
 
Society 
Marries us to The Bullet  
Divorces us from Life  
No one hears a Black child cry.
2
 
Carolyn Baxter’s poem on the shooting of Sean Bell 
 
While the history of public debate on New York police violence has been discussed in 
Part I by looking at broader patterns and societal developments, the cultural 
expressions above illustrate how this history can also be told through discourse, as the 
latter is both a product of and an influence on society. For example, the quoted song 
and poem above give insight into the historic pattern of injustice, pain and anger felt by 
members of the African-American community towards the shootings, the police, and 
society.  
Part II of this study examines the police-violence debate by looking at the 
discourse written and spoken by key stakeholders after the shooting of Sean Bell in 
2006. As the communication processes that followed this shooting were protracted and 
profoundly visible, and (as a consequence) much discourse is available, the debate on 
this particular shooting has been chosen as the main focus of the analysis in the second 
part.  
Rather than examining the continuation of historical macro patterns, this 
second part looks at the micro aspects of communication. These aspects are sometimes 
referred to as ‘organic’, as this part also aims to research the relationships and 
interactions between different actors and aspects which shape the debate on a micro 
level. This second part can hence be seen as a cross-section of the public debate, as 
opposed to the historical dimension researched in the previous part. This cross-section 
is a metaphor that should not be taken literally: The aftermath of the Sean Bell case 
spanned several years. 
 This introduction will deliberate further on the organic micro aspects of the 
Sean Bell shooting within the larger pattern of debate on police violence. It will do so 
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by looking at the practical consequences of the chosen tenets for this second part, while 
keeping in mind the multidisciplinary character of the overall research. The 
introduction will finish with a discussion of the chosen structure, research scope and 
use of sources.  
 
I — The police-violence debate in the context of the Sean Bell shooting and 
its aftermath 
In the early hours of November 25, 2006, 23-year-old Sean Bell left Club Kalua, a strip 
joint in Jamaica, Queens, New York, where he had celebrated his bachelor party with 
friends, the night before he planned to be wed.
3
 After Sean Bell stepped into his car, 
together with two of his friends — Joseph Guzman (21) and Trent Benefield (23) — 
the vehicle was shot at fifty times by a team of both plainclothes and undercover 
NYPD officers, killing Sean Bell and severely wounding his two friends. No weapons 
were found in the car. 
A team of undercover police detectives had been in the strip club that evening. 
Club Kalua was on the department's problem list, as the police believed the strippers 
were soliciting prostitution. One of the detectives, Gescard Isnora, testified that he 
overheard an argument between Sean Bell and his friends and another man, later 
identified as Fabio Coicou. According to Isnora, the conversation finished with 
Guzman shouting ‘Yo, get my gun’, and the three men walking back to Bell’s car. 
Fearing a shooting might take place, Isnora followed Sean Bell and his friends while 
warning his backup team, approached the car with his gun drawn, and, according to his 
own account, shouted, “Police! Don't move!” Sean Bell did not yield but accelerated 
the car and hit Isnora first, and then an unmarked police minivan. At that point, Isnora 
believed that Guzman reached for a gun. He yelled “gun” and opened fire, after which 
five other officers started to shoot as well. Detective Paul Headley fired one round, 
Officer Michael Carey three, Detective Marc Cooper four, Detective Isnora eleven, and 
Detective Michael Oliver thirty-one. Multiple accounts exist of the events leading up to 
the shooting. For example, while Isnora testified that he had identified himself to the 
three men in the car, Guzman and Benefield said that Isnora did not do so. The two 
young men testified that they were scared of being attacked themselves.  
The shooting of Sean Bell sparked an immediate outburst of emotions and 
criticism regarding the conduct of the implicated officers and that of the NYPD at 
large. Many people drew parallels with the shooting of Amadou Diallo, as both 
shootings raised questions regarding racial profiling and excessive use of force.
4
 Both 
national and international media paid profound and prolonged attention to the shooting 
and its aftermath. Nicole Paultre, the woman who was to wed Sean Bell, and who 
changed her name after the shooting into Nicole Bell in honor of her fiancée, made 
multiple TV appearances — including one on ‘Larry King Live’. She has received 
condolences from prominent Americans ranging from Spike Lee to then Senator 
Hillary Rodham Clinton.
5
 Community leaders and politicians such as the Rev. Al 
Sharpton and City Councilman Charles Barron took up the issue, while making TV 
appearances and leading protest marches at crucial moments in the aftermath of the 
shooting. Police Commissioner Ray Kelly and Mayor Michael Bloomberg made 
similar appearances at crucial moments, delivering official statements, but also 
organizing and leading community, political and press meetings. Police and detective 
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union leaders Pat Lynch and Michael Palladino — two prominent defenders of the 
officers involved in the shooting, were also quoted by many media. Other key figures 
include the numerous lawyers involved in the shooting and District Attorney Richard 
A. Brown and assistant District Attorney Charles A. Testagrossa, both leading the 
prosecution of the implicated officers. 
The prolonged aftermath of media coverage parallels the duration of the 
judicial, political and internal disciplinary processes that started just after the shooting. 
Key moments in the shooting’s aftermath include:  
 
November 27, 2006. Mayor Bloomberg organized a special meeting for community 
leaders and elected officials.
6
 
December 1, 2006. Sean Bell’s funeral was attended by hundreds of people.7 
December 16, 2006. Thousands of demonstrators joined the Rev. Sharpton in the 
“Shopping for justice” march down Fifth Avenue.8 
March 16, 2007. Three of the five police officers involved in the shooting were 
indicted by a grand jury. Detective Isnora, who fired the first shot, and Detective 
Oliver, who fired 31 of the 50 shots, faced charges of manslaughter, while Detective 
Cooper faced the lesser charge of reckless endangerment.
9
 
July 24, 2007. Nicole Bell filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the city.
10
 
January 7, 2008. Attorneys tried to move the trial out of the city. They were later 
granted a bench trial.
11
 
February 25, 2008. The trial against the three implicated detectives began.
12
  
April 25, 2008. All three implicated detectives were acquitted on all counts.
13
 
May 7, 2008. The Rev. Sharpton led civil disobedience protests throughout the city. 
Protesters blocked several bridges and tunnels. More than 200 people were arrested. 
All but eight cases were discharged.
14
  
October 8, 2008. Mr. Sharpton and seven others were found guilty of disorderly 
conduct during the protests following the acquittals.
15
  
July 27, 2010. New York City agreed to pay Sean Bell's family $3.25 million. Joseph 




March 23, 2012. Following department hearings, Detective Isnora was fired. 
Detectives Cooper and Oliver, and Lt. Gary Napoli, a supervisor who was at the scene 




The following subsections examine how the public debate on this case can be 
investigated within the tenets of this study as outlined in the general introduction.  
 
I.1 — The dialectical relationship between language and society (tenet A) 
While the relationship between discourse and society is dynamic rather than static, a 
cross-section of this relationship can provide a much deeper understanding of the 
organic, interactional aspects and micro processes of the public debate. First, instances 
of discourse can show, like a snap shot, the positioning of each of the actors toward the 
shooting, but also the alignment between different stakeholders and stakeholder groups 
(see II.2). In the same metaphorical line of thinking, discourse analysis can zoom in on 
the actors in the snapshot. For example, discursive events can show the perceptions of 
different stakeholders on the shooting, as the two quotes at the beginning of this 
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introduction have shown. Instances of discourse can also give insight into how 
stakeholders frame the shooting and its aftermath within a broader context/ideology 
(see II.2).  
Combined, the different instances of discourse can give insight into the micro 
processes that take place in the public debate on police violence and its dialectical 
relationship with society. First, it can show how perceptions, framings, alignment and 
positioning develop during the aftermath of the shooting. Second, such combined 
research can give insight into how different stakeholders respond to the conveyed 
perceptions, framings and positioning of other stakeholders.  
 
I.2 — Power and ideology (tenet B) 
A micro discourse analysis of the dynamical relationship between power and language 
in the Sean Bell case, can give insight into several aspects of this relationship. First, 
such analysis can show how and whether the use of language can be a driving force in 
debate, thus controlling its overall development, as well as the specific language of 
other stakeholders. For example, the cultural expressions presented at the beginning of 
this introduction could provoke a reaction from both those defending and those 
criticizing the police. Besides the power of language itself, the power of those using 
such language will also be researched. The analysis in this second part pays attention to 
which actors set the agenda of debate and drive the dynamics of discourse. 
 Discourse analysis can also provide more insight into the relationship between 
ideology and language use in the Sean Bell case. For example, discourse regarding the 
shooting and its aftermath can give insight into the broader paradigms held by 
stakeholders, or more specifically into the broader context in which different 
stakeholders frame the shooting. This broader context, in turn, provides insights into 
the ideology held by these groups. For example, Carolyn Baxter’s poem shows how 
she frames the Sean Bell shooting in the context of a violent society (‘marries us to the 
bullet’) in which the pain of the African-American community is not heard (‘No one 
hears a Black child cry’). In addition, discourse analysis can give insight into the 
alignment (or non-alignment) between (the ideologies of) different stakeholder groups, 
by analyzing the degree of alignment in language use. How stakeholders respond to the 
actions and communication of other stakeholders is a focal point in such research. 
 
I.3 — ‘No single truth’ from a discourse-analytical perspective (tenet C) 
The critical stance taken in this study primarily impacts the analysis of discourse by 
different stakeholders in the debate, the central focus of this second part. This 
discourse should be treated as a product of and action in societal context, and not as a 
truthful recollection of events. Hence the impact and not the validity of different 
perceptions, interpretations and positioning represented in the available discourse will 
be scrutinized.  
Specifically in line with Wodak’s critical theory of text planning, which states 
that strategies are an integral part of the ‘planning of texts’, this second part looks at 
the goals formulated in the discourse, either directly or indirectly.
18
 Also in line with 
this theory, which holds that stakeholders do not always plan their goals consciously, 
this study looks at acts of communication from both a ‘strategic PR’ perspective and a 
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‘spontaneous’ perspective, without, however, necessarily classifying them as one or the 
other.  
Lastly, the critical ‘no single truth’ perspective also applies to this study’s 
definitions of the debate and those involved. For example, the categorizations used in 
this study for different stakeholder groups, such as ‘police critics’, ‘police defenders’ 
and the NYPD as an institution, are academic choices aimed to facilitate analysis rather 
than being fixed entities. Illustrative in this matter is the remark made by Professor 
Delores Jones-Brown, one of the people labeled in this study as a ‘police critic’. In a 
personal interview, she argues that she is not completely comfortable with this specific 
‘police critic’ label, while she does agree with the other labels used:  
 
“I think the ‘police defender’ label is correct. Because there are folks that no matter 
what the police do, almost no matter what the police do, they are going to defend them. 
Why? Because they are the police. … [Yet concerning the police critics label] In this 
case … we have got innocent people who are put at risk … by that many bullets flying 
around in a residential neighborhood. For anyone to criticize that, is a logical valid 
thing.”19 
 
Professor Jones-Brown thus disagrees with the choice for the label of ‘police critic’, as 
criticism is ‘a logical valid thing’. By doing so, she indirectly argues that the label 
questions the criticism’s validity. In order to avoid confusion, it is important to point 
out that this study specifically does not intend to associate any categorizations with 
validity and truth.  
 
I.4 — Successful communication from a discourse-analytical perspective (tenet D) 
While the success of communication has been measured in Part I by looking at 
recurring patterns of scandal and reform on the macro level, the research in Part II will 
examine the success of the debate from a micro, organic, cross-sectional perspective. 
In line with this study’s position that the effects of communication can give insight into 
the success of communication, the mutual influences of the discourse conveyed by 
each of the stakeholders, or ‘the accumulation of discourse’ can determine the success 
of debate. 
Hence the analysis for Part II measures the quality of communication in two 
different ways: first by examining stakeholders’ evaluations of the communication of 
others and the overall process of debate, and second by looking — from a helicopter 
perspective — at the total outcome of the perceptions, interpretations and positioning 
conveyed.  
 
II — Overview of Part II: Structure, scope and use of sources 
Whereas Part I of this study scrutinized the historical dynamics of police criticism in 
the broadest sense of the word, the second part specifically aims to unearth the organic 
inter-stakeholder communication processes that take place after a police shooting 
occurs. The arena of debate is less complex from a micro perspective than from a 
macro one, as the topic of debate (the Sean Bell shooting) and the stakeholders are 
constant factors. The analysis of this second part can hence pay much more attention to 
the character of key actors rather than to a continuously changing décor. In line with 




How has the totality of communication practiced by stakeholders influenced 
the debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting?  
 
To research this question, this part will analyze separately the communication practiced 
by the different stakeholders participating in the debate that followed after the Sean 
Bell shooting. Participants in the public debate are divided into five main groups, i.e. 
(i) police critics; (ii) the New York Police Department; (iii) police defenders; (iv) 
political stakeholders, and (v) judicial stakeholders. The intermediary role of the media 
will also be discussed. Whereas this distinction simplifies to a degree the complex 
arena of debate, which comprises a multitude of different participants, some of whom 
can be placed in multiple groups, this distinction is necessary in order to structure the 
analysis of the organic interactions between different participants.  
The research framework chosen to analyze the stakeholders’ communication is 
built on three main pillars (i) perception; (ii) framing and (iii) positioning/alignment. 
By looking at the perceptions held and conveyed by stakeholders in the Sean Bell 
debate, the first research pillar scrutinizes the existing images concerning the charged 
detectives, the shooting, the NYPD in general, and other stakeholders in the debate, as 
well as any self-images held by the stakeholders. The analysis for the first pillar 
focuses specifically on the formation and perpetuation of labels/symbols by these 
stakeholders, as they can condense and succinctly explain the oft intangible and 
scattered perceptions held by stakeholders in the debate. The second pillar examines 
the broader context in which these stakeholders place the shooting. The analysis 
focuses in particular on the framings through which stakeholders interpret both the 
shooting and the ensuing public debate. The third pillar analyzes questions regarding 
stakeholder positioning, including ‘How do stakeholders interact with other 
stakeholders in the debate?’, ‘To what degree are the stakeholders’ communication 
strategies, arguments, and choice of words geared towards coalition/consensus?’ and 
‘What latitude do the stakeholders have in their conception of the issue of debate and 
in its desired outcome?’ In order to answer these questions, this pillar focuses 
specifically on the scope of stakeholders’ desired outcome of debate, the delineation of 
their held reality, and the driving force of their communication. In addition, the 
analysis of this section includes an examination of communication strategies, rhetorical 
strategies and vocabulary applied to convey the held perceptions, interpretations and 
positions in the debate. Some of these strategies will be discussed throughout the entire 
analysis, and not specifically in the third section, as the analysis of messages is difficult 
to separate from the analysis of the strategies used to convey such messages. As the 
communication practiced by speakers within one stakeholder group is not 
homogeneous, the subsection ‘Multiple hues’ looks at variations in and deviations from 
the communication practiced by stakeholders. 
Throughout the analysis for Part II, two integral parameters intersect the three 
chosen structural research pillars: (i) chronological dynamics: How do stakeholders’ 
perceptions, interpretations and positioning develop throughout the aftermath?; and (ii) 
arena dynamics: How do stakeholders’ perceptions, interpretations and positioning 
differ/overlap between communication arenas?  
The analysis for Part II does not differentiate between communication that is 
genuine, unprompted, and unplanned (‘spontaneous communication’) on the one hand, 
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and communication that aims to accomplish a preplanned strategic objective, ranging 
from a PR, judicial or communication goal (‘strategic communication’) on the other 
hand. However, the analysis does consider the possibility that the communication can 
be spontaneous, or strategic, or both. 
The first five chapters of Part II — each dealing with a different stakeholder 
group — are primarily based on the analysis of quotes and articles found in the New 
York Times, a newspaper that extensively covered the shooting and its aftermath. While 
different types of sources are also available, including speeches, reports, internal 
magazines and press releases, the amount of sources per event and stakeholder group is 
not equal. For example, while Mayor Bloomberg’s key speeches on the Sean Bell 
shooting are available on his website, other stakeholders, including the NYPD itself, do 
not provide such raw material.
20
 Conversely, all events and stakeholder groups do get a 
fair amount of attention in the New York Times.  
The selection of sources includes all printed New York Times articles released 
between the shooting and up until the trial of the Rev. Al Sharpton in October 2008. 
While this is not the end point of the debate, it is the endpoint of a fixed period: 
Sharpton’s trial followed the civil disobedience protests that took place earlier that year 
after the acquittals of the charged officers involved in the shooting of Sean Bell. The 
source selection comprises New York Times articles within the chosen time period 
containing the name “Sean Bell” in the body of the text. The quotes are used as 
primary data, while taking into account the functioning of the press as a filter/ 
transformer of information, as further scrutinized in Chapter 6. Occasionally other 
sources are also included in the analysis, if they are helpful to better understand 
communication processes. Some of the New York Times quotes and excerpts are 
scrutinized multiple times throughout this analysis. Such repetition is inescapable, as 
the rhetoric is multilayered and can comprise sentences and words simultaneously 
relating to perceptions, framing and positioning.  
Chapter 7 reports the analysis of 11 interviews held with key stakeholders in 
October 2009:  
 
1. President of the New York City Detectives’ Endowment Association (DEA), 
Michael Palladino.
21
 Perhaps the most outspoken commentator on the conduct of 
police critics in the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting. The New York Times 
quoted the union leader frequently on his appraisal of the conduct of police critics. 
During the interview, he is also outspoken about the conduct of the mayor, and to a 
lesser extent about that of the NYPD, which he appraises mostly positively.  
2. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) administrators/spokesmen Walter 
Liddy and Joseph Mancini.
22
 Although the PBA was much less visible than the 
DEA in the public debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting and hence their 
perceptions of the role of police critics were not as widely disseminated through 
the media, both PBA representatives have a strong opinion about that debate. Their 
appraisals show distinct similarities to those of Mr. Palladino, in particular 
concerning police critics. Both interviewees also speak candidly about the 
communication of the NYPD and the effect such communication has on other 
stakeholders. Both are critical of the mayor’s communication. In addition. Mr. 
Liddy also speaks briefly about the Queens DA’s office.  
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3. NYPD Detective Gary Lemite.23 An experienced detective of Haitian descent, 
whose experiences as a Housing Authority police officer in Brownsville have been 
depicted in a book The Ville. He appraises not only the communication by police 
critics (in a similar, yet more nuanced way than the union representatives), but also 
that of other stakeholders, including those of the police defenders, the latter from a 
partly stakeholder-observant perspective. His positioning is more coalition-
oriented than those of the other interviewed police defenders.  
4. The New York City Police Department’s Deputy Commissioner of Public 
Information Paul Browne.
24
 Together with Police Commissioner Kelly, Mr. 
Brown is a key stakeholder representing the NYPD. During the interview at One 
Police Plaza, the NYPD spokesman is quite outspoken about the communication 
practiced by police critics in the public debate that followed the Sean Bell 
shooting. While he does not expound much on the role of the police defenders in 
the debate, at certain instances during the interview the spokesman does convey in 
subtle terms his perception of the communication articulated by this stakeholder 
group. There is a profound schism between how the spokesman perceives the 
communication of the unions after the Sean Bell shooting, at a time when the 
unions and the NYPD are holding a similar reality concerning what happened and 
their positioning was basically aligned, and after incidents where this was not the 
case, such as after the fatal shooting of the 19-year-old, unarmed, Timothy 
Stansbury, when the Police Department was heavily criticized by the unions for 
denouncing the conduct of the officer involved and saying that the NYPD was at 
fault. Mr. Browne also positively appraises the mayor’s communication.  
5. Counsel for Latino and Immigrant Affairs for state senator Malcolm Smith, 
Lourdes Ventura.
25
 Responsible for production of the report Improving Public 
Confidence in Law Enforcement and the Criminal Justice System, which detailed 
the findings of the New York State Tri-level Legislative Task Force commissioned 
by Mr. Smith in response to the Sean Bell shooting. While representing a (milder) 
police critic, Ms. Ventura appraises other police critics from a partly stakeholder-
observant perspective. Compared to other interviewees, Ms. Ventura is much more 
positive about the communication of the NYPD. Her observations during the 
interview were concise and clear. 
6. New York Civil Liberties Associate Legal Director Chris Dunn.26 Also labeled 
as a ‘police critic’ in this research, Mr. Dunn is nevertheless much less involved 
than other critics in the public debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting. 
Similar to Ms. Ventura, Mr. Dunn also appraises other police critics from a partly 
stakeholder-observant perspective during the interview held with him. Although 
his observations appear to be more dispassionate than those of Mr. Barron and Ms. 
Jones-Brown, there is a certain degree of overlap concerning the perceptions held 
on the police defenders’ communication, especially concerning the role taken by 
the unions during the debate. He also shares his perceptions of Mayor Bloomberg’s 
communication, although much less extensively than Mr. Barron and Ms. Jones-
Brown. While most interviewed stakeholders focus on how they perceive and 
interpret the statements made by the NYPD in the press, Mr. Dunn mainly shares 
his experiences and views on how the NYPD operates behind the scenes.  
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7. Queens Assistant District Attorney Charles Testagrossa.27 The chief prosecutor 
at the Sean Bell trial, Mr. Testagrossa was one of the key players in the debate that 
ensued after the Sean Bell shooting. During the interview held in his office, he 
appraises the roles of different stakeholders from a stakeholder-observant 
perspective.  
8. New York Times police reporter Michael Wilson.28 Writing extensively about the 
Sean Bell shooting and its aftermath, Mr. Wilson is a key representative of the 
media. During the interview, he appraises the communication of police critics in a 
similar way to that of police defenders and the NYPD, although he conveys his 
viewpoints in less stark, more nuanced terms in the interview held with him, and 
moreover, positions himself as an intermediary, strictly stakeholder-observant 
participant in the debate, similar to Mr. Testagrossa.  
9. City Councilman Charles Barron.29 Next to Al Sharpton, one of the most vocal 
police critics in the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting. He has a strong opinion 
about the communication practices of the NYPD, as becomes clear during the 
interview in his district office in Brooklyn. He upholds a different conception of 
the term ‘police defenders’ than the one chosen for this research; his definition 
broadens the notion to include the political and judicial machine that cooperates 
with the police. The city councilman has a strong opinion on the group labeled in 
this research as ‘police defenders’, in which the DEA and the PBA play an 
important part. He is also one of the few interviewees who, during the interview, 
speaks more extensively about the Queens DA’s office. 
10. Director of the John Jay College Center on Race, Crime and Justice and 
former prosecutor in New York City, Prof. Delores Jones-Brown.
30
 A police 
critic who is quoted in the media several times on the Sean Bell shooting. During 
the interview, she speaks extensively about her appraisal of the NYPD, police 
defenders, mayor and judicial stakeholders. Her perceptions are to a certain extent 
in line with those of Mr. Barron, although she is less explicit and much more 
nuanced in denouncing the communication of these stakeholders. Ms. Jones-Brown 
is the only interviewee who proactively talks about the communication of the two 
judicial stakeholders, the Queens DA’s office and Judge Arthur Cooperman, in the 
Sean Bell debate. 
11. Sean Bell family representative King Downing.31 While criticizing the NYPD in 
a fashion similar to other interviewed critics, Mr. Downing also speaks extensively 
about the media, as discussed in Part II, Chapter 6. He did not have a visible role in 
the debate that ensued after the shooting.  
 
The interviews were conducted by the researcher. In order to prevent any distortions 
this might cause, the interviewees were presented with, and asked to comment on, their 
own statements as well as those made by other stakeholders in the public debate 
following the Sean Bell shooting. They were also asked to give their views on the 
process of the debate and its participants. 
Because of their disparate contents, Chapters 6 and 7 are structured differently 
from the earlier chapters that focused on groups of stakeholders. Chapter 6 uses the 
stakeholders’ assessments to scrutinize the role of the media in the Sean Bell debate, 
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particularly that of the New York Times. Chapter 7 examines how the communication 
per stakeholder group is appraised by the stakeholders involved in the Sean Bell 
debate. 
 As the discourse analysis for Part II is extensive, the full analysis has not been 
included in the body text of this study, but is available as an appendix at 
http://irs.ub.rug.nl/data/2. Chapters 1 to 7 summarize the findings of the discourse 
analysis for Part II.  
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Chapter 1: Police critics 
 
This chapter looks at the group of stakeholders that are critical of the police 
involvement in the Sean Bell shooting. This group, far from homogeneous, ranges 
from moderate to extreme critics, from prominent community leaders and prestigious 
human rights organizations to obscure community groups and grass roots initiatives, 
and from related family members to passers-by and random people on the street. The 
NYPD is even criticized from within its own ranks by African-American police 
fraternities such as the ‘100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care’. The group of 
police critics varies in consistency depending on time and location. In court the group 
of police critics comprises the victims, family members and their lawyers, but the 
group of police critics is much larger and more diverse in the numerous protests that 
have been taking place.  
 The most prominent of these critics is the Rev. Al Sharpton, who from the 
outset has sided with the Bell family and with victims Joseph Guzman and Trent 
Benefield. Together with the victims’ lawyers, they form the core of the group of 
police critics in the aftermath of the Sean Bell debate. Their reproaches against the 
NYPD and those made by the victims’ lawyers, comprise an important segment of this 
chapter’s analysis, as their actions and words have strongly influenced other police 
critics. The main focal point of this chapter, however, is the synergetic actions between 
the many different groups, which result in an overall positioning based on collectively 
felt perceptions within collectively constructed framings. This chapter hence focuses 
on the common denominator between the different groups of ‘police critics’. Yet 
differences between these diverse groups will not be overlooked. A relative — but 
relevant — outsider to this group is the New York Civil Liberties Union. Although a 
fervent critic of the NYPD, the organization commented only very sparsely on the Sean 
Bell shooting. Moreover, the nature of communication is remarkably different from 
that of other police critics. Therefore the communication of this group will be analyzed 
separately in Subsection 1.3.1.  
The use of the police as a tool for political communication, discussed in the 
first part of this study, is also scrutinized in this chapter. In particular, the use of the 
police as a vehicle for political communication is compared to the framings constructed 




1.1 Perceptions and images 
The perceptions held by police critics in regard to the incident, other stakeholders, and 
themselves, are particularly scattered and elusive. In the following analysis, these 
scattered perceptions are captured in labels that occur throughout the aftermath of the 
shooting. 
 
1.1.1 ‘50 shots’: A label for perceived police behavior 
When scrutinizing the communication of police critics in the aftermath of the shooting, 
an immediate, persisting and eminent emphasis on the amount of shots fired in the 
shooting becomes apparent. After initial references to the number of bullet wounds 
sustained by Sean Bell (17), police critics soon begin to focus on the total number of 
50 shots fired by the police during the incident. Through persistent repetition, e.g. in 
the protest march slogan “Fifty shots, that’s not hot”, the label ‘50 shots’ acquires an 
iconic status symbolizing excessive violence and perceived injustice. 
 
‘50 shots’ as a communication strategy: Perpetuation and reinforcement 
The Rev. Sharpton strongly influenced the creation and perpetuation of the ‘50 shots’ 
label, expressing and reinforcing the community’s perception of the incident and of the 
New York Police Department at large. The number ‘50’ is used by Mr. Sharpton, as 
well as by other community leaders and members, as a self-explanatory symbol, 
explaining without clarification the injustice done to Sean Bell and the black 
community. Apart from the use of the symbol ‘50’ as spontaneous discourse to explain 
injustice, it is also applied as a PR strategy to put this injustice on the political and 
public agenda. The strategic use of the number ‘50’ as a PR symbol allows for 
prolonged media attention for the shooting. In that sense, the symbol ‘50’ has an 
agenda-setting function, serving as a catalyst to reiterate the magnitude of the case.  
 
50 shots: A symbol for magnitude, culpability, excessive police violence and 
lawlessness 
Besides referring to the notion of injustice, the 50 shots label’s most explicit meaning 
is the magnitude of the shooting, implying that the amount of shots is excessive. In the 
police critics’ communication, the number of shots fired is also linked to callousness 
and ‘murder’. To police critics, these aspects are condoned by a racist justice system. 
More indirectly, police critics draw parallels between the shooting and the ‘Wild, Wild 
West’ with its untamed, lawless and unruly character, with illegitimate and unfair 
warfare, and with one-sided killing and illegitimate street justice. While these 
associations do not directly relate to the number ‘50’, they do refer to situations in 
which many shots are fired.  
 These descriptions provide more insight into how the police critics perceive the 
shooting and the role of the officers involved. While police critics perceive the incident 
itself as an unjust, unlawful, one-sided act of excessive violence, they believe that it is 
the police who are solely to blame for this violence. Hence the shooting is 
characterized as ‘murder’. In a broader and more indirect sense the label ‘50 shots’ also 




50 shots: An impersonal image of the police officer 
As the label ‘50 shots’ represents the shooting in relation to the police, ‘50 shots’ is a 
rather impersonal and detached image of the force, especially in contrast to the 
personal and emotionally charged ‘Sean Bell’ label, discussed below. ‘50 shots’ is the 
only substantial label used to describe the role of the police in the shooting. Police 
critics do describe their perception of the police on numerous occasions, yet none of 
these descriptions are reiterated in the way ‘50 shots’ is. This impersonal aspect of the 
label ‘50 shots’ strongly influences the already existent ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, 
which will be further scrutinized in Subsection 1.3.2. 
 
Summary 
The label ‘50 shots’ succinctly captures the scattered and elusive perceptions held by 
police critics. They associate the shooting with magnitude and injustice and the police 
with guilt and lawlessness, but also with an impersonal ‘them’. The label ‘50 shots’ 
also comprises the police critics’ perceptions regarding culpability for the shooting: It 
is the police who are to blame for this. The label emerges almost instantly after the 
shooting, while reiterated throughout the aftermath. As the label is so strongly 
perpetuated, it has the potentiality to affect the positioning of the police critics, but also 
the perceptions, framings and positions held and constructed by other stakeholders, in 
particular the NYPD and police defenders.  
 
1.1.2 ‘Sean Bell’: A self-label for the black community 
Similar to his role in the perpetuation of the label ‘50 shots’, Mr. Sharpton strongly 
influenced the articulation, further development and reinforcement of the perceptions 
held by police critics on Sean Bell. The memorial speech carried out by the reverend at 
Sean Bell’s funeral not only captures existing feelings, but also serves as a catalyst, 
crystallizing the leitmotif for protest marches to come:  
 
At Sean Bell’s funeral (December 2006) 
A New York Times excerpt:  
 
The first to speak was the Rev. Al Sharpton, who has advised the grieving family. Mr. 
Sharpton noted that 51 years ago, to the day, Rosa Parks was arrested in Montgomery, 
Ala. She had faced down injustice and made history, he said. Now it was Mr. Bell’s 
turn. 
 
[…] “They took his life, but we can’t let them take his legacy,” the Rev. Al Sharpton 
said, repeatedly greeted with cheers and “Amens” from the overflow crowd. “We must 
give Sean a legacy. A legacy of justice, a legacy of fairness.”  
 
[…] At the end of his speech, he called out, “Goodnight, Sean, sorry you had to leave 
us so soon, but we’ll make sure they don’t forget you!”1 
 
Several elements stand out in the statement above. First, with this statement, Sharpton 
simultaneously points out that Sean Bell has a legacy and that we should give him a 
legacy. This statement implies that Sean Bell is someone who represents justice and 
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fairness (‘he has a legacy’), but also that the black community has a task to propagate 
this representation of justice and fairness (‘we must give him a legacy’). In other 
words, Sean Bell is and should become a symbol for justice. In this, Sharpton aims 
high: Sean Bell should become a symbol just like Rosa Parks, the woman who refused 
to give up her bus seat to a white man and with that stand became an iconic figure in 
the civil rights movement. By doing so, Mr. Sharpton not only ‘introduces’ the label 
‘Sean Bell’, he also places it within the broader context of the civil rights movement, 
which will be further discussed in Section 1.2. 
Sharpton also forges a connection between the community and Sean Bell. In 
Sharpton’s words, Sean Bell becomes someone everyone in the black community 
knows and can to relate to. This is not only reflected in the statement itself, but also in 
the choice of words used by Sharpton. By addressing Sean Bell by his first name, by 
speaking directly to him, and by consequently using the pronoun ‘we’, Sharpton 
creates an intimate ‘like knows like’ group feeling, further reinforcing the already 
existing ‘us-versus-them’ sentiments felt by community members. In this sense, Sean 
Bell is not just a symbol for justice and goodness in general, but is so within the 
community he represents.  
Thus, the victim Sean Bell becomes a label in Sharpton’s speech, capturing 
and condensing existing feelings towards Sean Bell and the community in general, and 
serving both as a catalyst to further express these feelings and a ‘binding agent’ for the 
community.  
 
The need for a legacy: A communication catalyst for persistent manifestation  
Mr. Sharpton’s call to give Sean Bell a legacy was answered by his followers in the 
period that followed the funeral. Evidence of this includes the numerous references to 
the label ‘Sean Bell’ in the protest marches that took place in the aftermath of the 
shooting, as well as in other venues. Slogans such as ‘I am Sean Bell’ and ‘We are 
Sean Bell’ are used randomly in protest marches, on billboards and in chants. They 
also appear in cultural manifestations and as merchandising worn by community 
members.  
Mr. Sharpton’s plea to perpetuate the label ‘Sean Bell’ and the legacy it 
represents thus becomes a catalyst for persistent manifestation and protest, but also 
provides a powerful referential tool for the reverend’s rhetoric, even in other police-
violence cases.  
 
Sean Bell has a legacy: Images of a ‘good kid’  
As stated by Mr. Sharpton at the funeral, the label ‘Sean Bell’ stands for a legacy of 
justice and goodness. This legacy is reinforced in the media by family members, 
friends, and Mr. Sharpton and his supporters, who communicate images of Sean as ‘a 
good kid’ (‘that little boy’, ‘he was doing the right thing’, ‘Sean is a good kid’).  
Police critics link the ‘good kid’ image to values and themes such as sustained 
devotion, marriage and fatherhood, sacrifice and responsibility (‘He gave up […] 
everything to be with his high school sweetheart’; ‘He was doing the right thing […] 
He was going to marry the mother of his children’; ‘He didn’t want any more of New 
York life’), a true American sports figure (‘he was a great baseball player’; ‘[he] kept 
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in shape, running and lifting weights […] hoping to return to the sport one day’) and 
innocence/puppy love (‘that little boy’; ‘his high school sweetheart’). 
This image of Sean Bell is set against negative themes such as violence, further 
marking the divide between good and bad. The icon ‘Sean Bell’ thus becomes an 
emotionally charged symbol: It is linked to negative emotions such as grief and 
victimization, but also to themes linked to positive emotions, such as fatherhood, 
marriage, and the love for a child. Sean Bell becomes a symbol everyone can relate to. 
He is not only likeable; he represents values that most people share. The perception of 
Sean Bell being a good kid creates and underlines an image of an underdog victim.  
The emotionally charged ‘Sean Bell’ label reappears numerous times 
throughout the aftermath of the shooting. The label is used by family members, but can 
also be found in the rhetoric and vocabulary used by other stakeholders, including the 
broader group of community members in support of Sean Bell. The label is used in two 
different ways by stakeholders, and can be roughly divided into two ‘sub’ labels: ‘I am 
Sean Bell’ and ‘We love Sean Bell’, as further discussed in the following subsections.  
The press had a profound role in perpetuating the emotionally charged values 
described above, which not only becomes apparent in their selection of quotes, but also 
in the way these quotes are embedded in an emotionally charged storyline.  
 
I am Sean Bell: A self-label for identification, victimization and injustice 
Perhaps the most prominent label that transpires in the aftermath of the shooting is the 
slogan ‘I am Sean Bell’, reoccurring in many protests and on merchandising and other 
material manifestations.  
In their communication, police critics often forge a self-imposed relationship 
with Sean Bell and/or with the incident, or, more broadly, see the shooting as a symbol 
for the (injustice done to) the whole black community. The label ‘I am Sean Bell’ thus 
fosters broad and strong community identifications.  
The self-imposed relationship between police critics and the victim is built on 
the assumption that they themselves could be the next ‘Sean Bell’. The police critics’ 
focus on this relationship works as a communication device to highlight the magnitude 
of the case: The shooting affects everyone in the black community. In addition, the 
reference gives insight into how the black community sees itself as a victim of police 
violence. This victimization is intensified by the emotionally charged core label ‘Sean 
Bell’ which stands for justice and innocence.  
 
‘We love Sean Bell’: A self-label for communal bonding, emotion and grief 
The communal bonding inherent in the ‘I am Sean Bell’ label is further intensified by 
the display of love and affection for the victim, not only by family members, but also 
by community members in general. This pattern is captured in the slogan ‘We love 
Sean Bell’. While less distinctly visible than the ‘I am Sean Bell’ label, the slogan is 
another reoccurring element in police critics’ rhetoric.  
 The love for Sean Bell is not surprisingly most prominent with family 
members and relatives, who frequently express their love and bonding towards Sean 
Bell in public. More striking is the fact that the feelings of love, bonding and hurt are 
widely shared by community members, most of whom had not even met Sean Bell. In 
expressing their love, these community members make similar statements and use 
296 
 
similar rhetoric and choice of words to those expressed by family members and close 
relatives, often stating that they have something in common. (‘Sean Bell, we love you, 
baby’, ‘I know what the families are going through right now […] It’s really, really 
tough right now’, ‘We have something in common: the grieving for the loss of 
children’.) 
 The love for Sean Bell and for his family, as well as the hurt that is felt, are 
communicated in a dramatic/emotional way. Rhetorical strategies include emphasis by 
repetition, use of adverbs that emphasize the extremity of a situation, and words that 
express hardship. 
Sean Bell thus not only becomes a symbol to the black community, he 
becomes a beloved symbol; a person everyone knows and cares for. ‘We love Sean 
Bell’ is a sub-label that shows the high level of emotions held and expressed by 
community members, and also serves as glue that binds the community. Within the 
sub-label, the emotionally charged core component ‘Sean Bell’ is central to this 
emotional intimacy, grief, and display of love, as it has connotations of a likeable 
person who stands for injustice and innocence.  
 
Summary 
Both the police critics’ perception of the Sean Bell shooting and their self-image are 
condensed, magnified, and reiterated through the label ‘Sean Bell’ and the sub-labels ‘I 
am Sean Bell’ and ‘We love Sean Bell’. These labels — aimed at conveying police 
critics’ anger about the Sean Bell shooting — condense, magnify and reiterate broader 
sentiments of victimization, a strong ‘us’ feeling combined with the necessity of 
unconditional bonding and participation, and the perception that police misconduct is 
widespread in black communities. These labels can both be seen as spontaneous 
discourse and strategic PR discourse.  
The interaction between the sub-labels and the core ‘Sean Bell’ label result in a 
complex rhetorical fabric. The prominent manifestation of the label ‘Sean Bell’ in 
these sub-labels reinforces the emotional characteristics, and the values ‘sacrifice’, 
‘sustained devotion, marriage and fatherhood’, ‘responsibility’, ‘a sports figure’ and 
‘innocence’ which are part of the core label. This has several consequences. First, 
because Sean Bell’s image is that of a pure, honest and innocent person (core label), 
the perception of his victimization by an impersonal ‘they’ is reinforced. As Sean Bell 
is used as a symbol to represent justice for the black community (‘I am Sean Bell’), the 
black community’s perception of victimization by an impersonal ‘they’ is consequently 
also reinforced. Second, as the ‘Sean Bell’ label stands for someone who everyone in 
the community knows and loves (core label), the community feelings of bonding and 
togetherness are further underlined in the sub-label ‘We love Sean Bell’. Third, by 
using the emotionally charged label ‘Sean Bell’ as a symbol that represents the entire 
community (‘I am Sean Bell’), the emotional and human ‘flesh and blood’ side of the 
community is emphasized. 
Time and location are factors of lesser importance in this discussion. The label 
‘Sean Bell’ emerges rapidly after the shooting, and can be found in all venues where 
the debate takes place. As semi-private meetings lend themselves better for passionate 
oratory, the police critics’ vocabulary and rhetoric do slightly differ between venues. 
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However, the emotional components of the rhetoric again penetrate to every venue, 
also to law courts.  
 
1.1.3 Conclusion 
A poem by artists from Urban Word NYC, a teenage poetry group:  
 
Mourning for those who never reached their wedding morning  




The different labels (‘50 shots’, ‘We love/I am Sean Bell’) have been discussed 
separately, yet in fact they occur simultaneously throughout the fabric of 
communication. The poem above shows how images of goodness and love (‘wedding’, 
‘church bells’) merge with grief and violence (‘mourning’, ‘sirens’), illustrating how 
the labels discussed in this section interact with each other to a great extent. This 
interaction results in a powerful, new, cohesive and exacerbated image, comprising two 
opposites ‘us-versus-them’, in which the ‘us’ side is portrayed in a highly emotional 
way, and the ‘them’ side in an impersonal and unemotional way. This enhanced 
contrast between a personalized ‘us’ and a distant ‘them’ not only intensifies ‘us-
versus-them’ feelings, it also boosts the emotional rhetoric used and the feelings of 
victimization. 
Together, the combined images reflect the police critics’ overall perception of 
the incident: While the shooting is associated with magnitude and injustice and the 
police with guilt and lawlessness, Sean Bell is seen as a symbolic victim for the pain 
and victimization felt in the community.  
Due to the fine line between rhetorical and communication strategies, it is 
impossible to determine exactly the nascence and development of such labels. 
However, it can be concluded that the powerful rhetoric exercised by community 
leaders like Mr. Sharpton fanned existing perceptions. The powerful images occurred 
straight after the shooting and consistently reoccurred throughout the aftermath in the 





This section examines how police critics frame the shooting and its aftermath, that is, 
which interpretation they give to what happened on the night of the shooting and the 
processes that took place after that.  
 
1.2.1 Framing the shooting: Police misconduct and racial injustice 
The analysis of the label ‘50 shots’ revealed some elements of the police critics’ 
interpretation of the shooting. As argued in Section 1.1.1, the label does not just stand 
for the excessive quantity of shots fired, but also relates to a broader pattern of 
excessiveness. In their statements in the aftermath of the shooting, police critics often 
make a cognitive link — either direct or indirect — between the Sean Bell shooting 
and other (high-profile) police shootings, or in a more general sense police misconduct. 
The case that police critics most frequently refer to when speaking of Sean Bell is the 
shooting of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed African immigrant, who died in a barrage of 
41 police bullets in 1999. More broadly, police critics believe that the Sean Bell 
shooting does not stand on its own, but that it is part of a perpetual pattern of 
‘questionable police tactics and abuse’ and of ‘continuous and systemic violations’, 
which has both an organic dimension (the shooting is part of multiple problems within 
the department), and a historical dimension (incidents have occurred frequently in the 
past).  
The pattern of misconduct is often described in an emphatic and/or emotional 
way. In the police critics’ rhetorical strategy, magnitude is a key element. They 
emphasize the historical dimension of the problem (the pervasive historical pattern of 
police violence), the horizontal, organic dimension of the problem (existing problems 
within the department) and the current central point of the problem (the shooting). In 
some instances, this focus on magnitude can be seen as strategic PR discourse.  
 A second component in the police critics’ framing is the racial lens through 
which police critics interpret the shooting. People in black neighborhoods feel singled 
out by the police. The stop-and-frisk numbers contribute to this perception. Hence the 
Sean Bell shooting is seen in a racial context, while in fact two of the three indicted 
officers are black. 
 This racial dimension is historically deep and has two components. The first 
component is the broader pattern of violation of African-American rights, which not 
only refers to police misconduct, but also to an overall pattern of abuse. The second 
component — of which the label ‘I am Sean Bell’ is a product — is the civil rights 
fight against this abuse, as will be further discussed in the next subsection.  
The racial framing also has a horizontal dimension. Police critics frame the 
shooting in a reality where police officers demonstrate a lack of respect for their 
environment (‘The incident in Bell, in my view, was more a product of a lack of 
concern for their environment than it was on how they fired their weapons’; ‘[they are] 
ignorant savages who continue to prey upon our people as if we have no respect by 
virtue of our humanity or our citizenship’).  
In sum, police critics interpret the shooting within a broader historical and 
organic framing of continuous and pervasive police misconduct, unfair policies and 
procedures, abuse of power and racial injustice in the broadest sense of the word. 
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Police problems range from excessive use of force to racial profiling and general 
treatment of community members. Police critics construct this framing by linking the 
shooting to a pattern of other high-profile shootings, such as that of Amadou Diallo, 
while emphasizing the historical and organic dimension of the problem as well as its 
current central point. 
 
1.2.2 Framing the aftermath of the shooting: The civil rights movement  
against systematic judicial and political failures 
The processes that take place after the shooting are also embedded in a broader 
framing. The fight for justice for Sean Bell is seen as part of the broader civil rights 
movement and the judicial process as part of a pattern of systematic judicial and 
political failures, marked by inadequacy and impasse (‘Is this 1955 Alabama?’, ‘For 
too long we have tried to make changes, only to be disrespected’). At times a racial 
layer is added to this framing of failure and victimization (‘no matter what, because of 
whom you are and the community you come from, you will get nothing’).  
Part of this distrust towards the judicial and political structures is that police 
critics feel that officials are working hand in glove against the interests of the 
community. The relationship between the police and prosecutors is hence perceived as 
too close and tangled. This notion fits within the overall conception that the judicial 
system is not working properly to serve justice.  
Thus, police critics interpret the aftermath of the shooting within a historical 
and organic framing of the protracted civil rights fight instigated by African-Americans 
and their community leaders against police misconduct and racial injustice, which has 
been continuously thwarted by systematic judicial and political inadequacy, incapacity, 
failure, impasse and unwillingness, partly caused by political ties and cooperation, in 
turn resulting in further feelings of victimization and fatalistic sentiments.  
 
1.2.3 A second agenda versus broader framing 
Part I of this study described how different groups in society use the police as a tool for 
political communication, aiming to address issues for which the police do not bear 
chief responsibility. This subsection discusses whether the framings used by police 
critics can be labeled as second-agenda criticism. In general, when a framing itself is 
the actual issue at stake to critics (and not just a broader context of a problem) this 
could indicate the use of such criticism. 
The analysis of the corpus focused on:  
 Communication that shows an indication of criticism of different issues than the 
Sean Bell shooting, but in which the police appear as the main target and the Sean 
Bell shooting the main point of attack (in other words: The framing is prevalent 
over the issue at stake).  
 Communication that shows an indication to purposely harm/offend a larger/ 
different group than the New York Police, but in which the police appears as the 
main target.  
 
The communication by the New Black Panthers, a more rigid and uncompromising 
group within the group of police critics, clearly comprises second-agenda components. 
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First, while this group uses the shooting of Sean Bell and its aftermath as an immediate 
cause of provocation, their aim is to bring the issue of a ‘white power structure’ to the 
attention of a larger (black) public, while mobilizing them to start ‘a revolution’. In this 
sense, the framings ‘white power structure’ and ‘black nationalism’ are more important 
to this group than the issue of Sean Bell. Second, the New Black Panthers aim to hurt a 
larger group of people than the New York Police, by using the Sean Bell case to harm 
white businesses (‘we begin a boycott of non-black businesses, or rather white 
businesses, that support a white power structure, that supports the police that is killing 
us’) and by using statements that offend mainstream Americans, and not just the police 
(‘Off the pigs who kill our kids’, ‘50 shots for 50 cops’) 
 The cues to such second-agenda criticism are not so explicit in the messages 
conveyed by other, more mainstream police critics, especially as specific issues such as 
the Sean Bell shooting are often part of broader framings held by police critics, such as 
the historical patterns of general injustice towards African Americans. On the one 
hand, the pervasiveness of broader issues in the communication of police critics, as 
well as the broader economic/political target referred to by police critics, suggest that 
the Sean Bell shooting possibly serves as a news hook to communicate a broader or 
different agenda (‘This is the beginning. We will quickly go now to direct action and 
economic targets’, ‘we don’t want Santa Claus coming down the chimney this year.’ 
The issues of racism, racial inequality, and civil rights, but also the ‘us’ feeling/racial 
bonding, in police critics’ communication tend to prevail over the issue of police 
violence or the Sean Bell shooting specifically, and moreover, seem to stand on their 
own (‘Right now this is a unity thing’, ‘Racism is the root of most of the evils that ruin 
this country’). In this light, the previously discussed racial framing becomes prevalent 
over the direct cause for concern, i.e. that of the Sean Bell shooting. Moreover, some 
critics seem to let their criticism on the police-violence shooting depend on broader 
mayoral actions and decisions, which can either result in a decrease or increase of the 
usage of the police as a political tool, depending on the positive/negative appraisal of 
the mayor.  
On the other hand, Mr. Sharpton, the most visible police critic, refrains — as 
will be further scrutinized in Subsection 1.3.4 — from instigating acts of violence 
against the police and his statements are generally in line with American values, clearly 
distancing himself from hard-line critics such as the New Black Panthers. Police 
critics’ communication in the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting can hence best be 
described as ‘broader-agenda criticism’ rather than as second-agenda criticism. Still, by 
conveying such broader-agenda criticism, stakeholders do bring up broader issues 
which the police are not chiefly responsible for, such as perceived widespread racial 
inequality, yet the police do take the full force of this criticism. Thus, broader-agenda 
criticism can have a similar effect on the process of debate as second-agenda criticism. 
 
1.2.4 Conclusion 
Most police critics interpret the shooting within a broader framing of pervasive police 
misconduct, unfair policies and procedures, abuse of power and racial injustice in the 
broadest sense of the word. The processes that took place after the shooting are also 
placed within a broader framing: While the fight for justice for Sean Bell is seen as part 
of the civil rights movement, the aftermath of the shooting is rooted within a framing 
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of prolonged and systematic judicial and political inadequacy, incapacity, failure, 
impasse and unwillingness. All discussed framings have powerful organic and 
historical dimensions.  
 The rhetoric used to convey the cognitive associations with these broader 
framings is highly emotional, describing in harsh words the magnitude of the historical 
and organic dimensions of the shooting as well as the magnitude of the case itself.  
Although police critics incorporate similar references to interpretative framings 
in their communication, and moreover, use similar rhetorical strategies, there are 
certainly gradations. Radical groups such as the New Black Panthers lay a far heavier 
emphasis on interpretative framings than more mainstream critics, and moreover, use 
extremely harsh rhetorical strategies aimed at a larger group, indicating that they aim at 
an implicit second agenda.  
Police critics apply the discussed framings without discrimination of time and 
place. From the outset, the Sean Bell shooting was linked to other police-violence 
cases. However, there are slight nuances. Within semi-private meetings, mainstream 
police critics are more pronounced in their focus on the civil rights movement. Also, 
rhetoric is particularly emotional on such occasions.  
 In conclusion, the discussed framings can be seen as the base for the 
perceptions discussed in the previous section, but also for the positioning of police 
critics to be scrutinized next. While the ‘blame factor’ within the ‘50 shots’ label is a 
product of a broader pattern of perceived injustices, the ‘us-versus-them’ perceptions 
are — to an extent — a product of the civil rights movement against those who are 
responsible for these injustices. Depending on the framings constructed by other 
stakeholders in the debate, the police in particular, the powerful framing of police 
critics can have a profound effect on the overall process of communication in the 






To understand the positioning of police critics in the Sean Bell debate, this section 
scrutinizes how rigidly defined their desired outcome of debate is and how rigidly 
police critics delimit the reality concerning the shooting, as well as their broader 
conception on police–community relations. This section also discusses the driving 
force of the police critics’ response to events that occur throughout the aftermath of the 
shooting, as well as the rhetorical strategies used by police critics.  
 
1.3.1 The delineation of debate: Justice for Sean Bell  
Police critics such as the Bell family, the two wounded men, their lawyers, and 
protesters, all lay special emphasis on the concept of ‘justice’. They do this 
continuously throughout the aftermath of the shooting and in all of the different venues 
in which the debate takes place. Police critics feel that justice needs to take place and 
won’t be satisfied before they have gotten justice, and therefore they are determined to 
get it. ‘No justice, no peace’ and ‘Justice for Sean Bell’ are two of the key slogans used 
by police critics.  
The police critics have a clear notion of what the concept of justice should 
entail. In the English language, the concept of justice has two meanings that are 
relevant in this matter: 
 
1. Just behavior or treatment/the quality of being just; 
2. The administration of the law or authority in maintaining this.3 
 
The police critics’ use of the concept of justice relates to both of these definitions. 
More specifically, the critics not only believe that there should be just behavior or 
treatment following the Sean Bell shooting, they are also saying that the authorities are 
responsible for maintaining justice. In their view, justice implies that holding the 
officers criminally accountable and punishing them is the only fair and right thing to 
do. Yet ‘Justice for Sean Bell’ also has a broader, political, component, including 
resignations, policy changes and compensation for the family.  
Justice itself is a notion that is part of the common values that humans share. 
The notion itself is ‘coalition-oriented’ as it seeks common ground with the realities 
held by other stakeholders. The police critics’ definition of the concept, however, is 
delimiting, which could indicate that such common ground is not sought, and that the 
use of the notion is not coalition-oriented.  
 
No justice, no peace: A catalyst label for persistent protest 
An excerpt from Mr. Sharpton’s speech:  
 
“We don’t hate cops. We don’t hate race. We hate wrong. There’s a difference 
between peace and quiet. Quiet means shut up. Quiet means suffer in silence. Peace 
means justice. We want peace, but we won’t get quiet until we get justice.”4 
 
This pervasiveness of the notion of justice is partly due to Mr. Sharpton’s 
communication strategy and rhetoric. The reverend incorporated the notion of justice in 
his speech at the funeral of Sean Bell and later continued to use the rhetoric from this 
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speech to criticize the shooting and its aftermath. In addition, he used the rhetoric as a 
theme in the different protest marches held for Sean Bell. By forging in his statement a 
causal relationship between the words ‘quiet’, ‘peace’, and ‘justice’, Mr. Sharpton sets 
up conditions for the first two to take place: Community members will and should not 
be quiet without peace, while peace only takes place when there is justice.  
This causal relationship has a profound effect on the positioning of the police 
critics in the Sean Bell debate, influencing the negotiation space available and 
invigorating the zeal to continue to fight. Moreover, Mr. Sharpton anticipates any 
criticism that might denounce their protests as ‘disturbance of the peace’. Although the 
passionate oratory and emotional rhetoric used by Mr. Sharpton at the funeral should 
be seen within the context in which the speech took place — a funeral — and in the 
light of the audience — a grieving like-minded group of family, friends, and 
community members — components of the rhetoric return frequently throughout the 
statements made by Mr. Sharpton and other police critics in other instances, causing a 
catalyst effect for the use of the slogans ‘Justice for Sean Bell’ and ‘No justice, no 
peace’. The causal relationship forged by Mr. Sharpton in his funeral speech is a 
driving force: We will continue to be ‘loud’ until we get peace.  
Due to the catalyst effect, both slogans become labels, through which the 
scattered and elusive expectations concerning the debate can be better understood, 
similar to the previously discussed labels ‘50 shots’ and ‘We love Sean Bell’. While 
‘50 shots’ represents the police critics’ perception towards the police, and ‘We love 
Sean Bell’ represents the self-image that police critics hold, ‘Justice for Sean Bell’ 
represents the police critics’ desired outcome of debate, and ‘No justice, no peace’ 
represents both the condition for the debate to be resolved and the preparedness to fight 
for this.  
Similar to the definition used by police critics for the notion of justice itself, 
the label ‘No justice, no peace’ propagates a delimiting prerequisite for the debate to 
come to an end. This delimitation narrows down the possibilities for negotiation, 
making the label and what it stands for less coalition-oriented. On the other hand, the 
label also propagates a non-violent approach to achieve justice, by which Sharpton 
dissociates himself and his supporters from more radical voices. This peaceful 
approach only applies to actions, not words: Although Mr. Sharpton does not imply the 
use of violence, the reverend does set a harsh and uncompromising tone, which is non-
coalition-oriented and can have an effect on other stakeholders, as will be discussed in 
Subsection 1.3.4.  
So, while the rigid definition of justice sets the parameters for the playing field 
in which negotiation can take place, both the rigid and coalition-oriented characteristics 
of ‘No justice, no peace’ indicate the level of rigidity and harshness at which the game 
will be played.  
 
The rigidity of justice: ‘People’s verdict: Guilty’ 
To better understand the police critics’ conceptualization of the notion of justice and 
their method of communicating this conceptualization, this section scrutinizes how 
police critics reacted to different judicial decisions that took place after the shooting, as 
well as how they positioned themselves in different judicial settings.  
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The decision that conflicts most with the police critics’ notion of justice is 
evidently Judge Cooperman’s decision on April 25, 2008 to acquit the charged 
detectives. The police critics’ responses to the acquittals give insight into the group’s 
delineation of justice. To police critics, the concept of justice is not just the 
administration of the law or the authorities in maintaining just treatment: Justice only 
takes place when the officers are held criminally accountable. Second, the 
communication also shows how a perceived ‘abortion of justice’ results in an 
‘evaporation of respect’ in the legal system. The disappointment in the outcome should 
be seen within the framing of judicial and political failure: Police critics are not only 
disappointed by the acquittals, they have been disappointed over a prolonged period, as 
justice did not appear to take place in previous incidents either. Hence the acquittals 
were ‘predictable’.  
Much of the criticism that emerged after the verdict was not just directed at the 
system itself, but at Justice Cooperman directly. The ‘not guilty’ verdict does not fit 
within the critics’ notion of justice, resulting in the question: How could Justice 
Cooperman have done this? This disbelief is amplified by vocal expressions as well as 
by the repetition of arguments, demonstrating a lack of understanding of the views held 
by other stakeholders Again, the label ‘No justice, no peace’ is reinforced: In the 
reality held by police critics, Justice Cooperman rejected justice, and therefore the 
‘fight for justice must go on’.  
 
The notion of justice before the acquittals  
The police critics’ notion of justice was challenged from the very beginning. 
Immediately after the shooting, police critics showed a communal feeling of distrust 
towards the political and judicial handling of the Sean Bell case. illustrating the 
transition from broader framing of police misconduct and racial injustice to the current 
positioning and feelings felt by police critics.  
 During the grand jury process that took place a few months after the shooting, 
the police critics’ communication reveals the rigidity of their definition of justice. To 
police critics, there is only one possible outcome of the grand jury trial: All three 
officers should be indicted. Their communication also demonstrates their distrust 
towards the judicial system. Verbal threats occur frequently in the police critics’ 
communication and can be typified as instances of communicative blackmail, in which 
(future) actions that do not match the rigidly defined notion of justice are paired with 
repercussions. For example, the Rev. Al Sharpton said just after the acquittals he would 
call for a special prosecutor to take over the case if he considered the grand jury’s 
action ‘insufficient’. Similarly, Mr. Guzman and Mr. Benefield said that they would 
refuse to help prosecutors during a subsequent trial if the grand jury indicts only one of 
the officers. Mr. Guzman: ‘I wouldn’t cooperate, not at all.’ 
The officers’ indictment on March 16, 2007 was a turning point, as at this 
moment in time the prerequisites for justice were met according to the police critics. 
Now that their need for justice was (temporarily) satisfied, their response is in many 
ways the exact opposite of their earlier communication. Some of the police critics then 
showed confidence, as the system at that point was operating in line with their notion 
of justice. Yet the confidence police critics had in the system was still very fragile. The 
difference in response to the indictments and the acquittals further emphasizes the rigid 
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notion of justice held by police critics: The process only works, and the police critics 
will only be satisfied, when the prerequisites are met. 
Another recurring theme is the police critics’ resilience and their struggle in a 
process that is perceived as long. Their communication is not just in line with the 
notion of ‘No justice, no peace’, but with the broader framing of continued fighting 
against racial injustice within an uncooperative legal and political system. Police critics 
sense a perceived magnitude of previous and broader injustices as well as the perceived 
bitter fight for civil rights that evokes this resilience, but also the feelings of suffering.  
To some critics the charges were not sufficient, as these charges still did not fit 
within their notion of justice. The words chosen to describe their sense of justice have a 
vindictive character, further discussed in Subsection 1.3.4. Furthermore, their words 
demonstrate distrust towards the legal system represented by the impersonal 
vocabulary.  
After the indictments, the pace of developments slowed down for a while. 
There was a large time span between the indictments and the upcoming court case, to 
take place about a year later. This deceleration in itself was a challenge to the notion of 
justice. In his communication, Mr. Sharpton underlines the community’s resilience to 
fight for justice in a process that is characterized by judicial inertia. At other points 
between the indictments and the trial, he also made remarks that demonstrate the 
rigidity of the notion of justice, as well as the harshness of the strategies used by the 
reverend to achieve justice. Not only should there be an aggressive prosecution 
(relating to the rigid notion of justice), the reverend also advised the victims not to 
cooperate when developments were not in line with their conception of justice, for 
example if the trial would move to another venue. The latter threat can be seen as a 
harsh strategy to get justice, similar to the previously discussed instances of 
‘communicative blackmail’.  
The trial of Detectives Isnora, Oliver and Cooper preceding Justice 
Cooperman’s ‘not guilty’ verdict is also a challenge to the notion of justice. For 
example, police critics are unable or unwilling to understand the motives and actions of 
Mr. Ricco — the black lawyer who represented Detective Isnora — as these motives 
are not in line with their notion of what is just. Their statements demonstrate a feeling 
of ‘either you’re with us or you’re against us’ — illustrating the existing ‘us-versus-
them’ sentiments. ‘Us’ in this context refers to both the police critics specifically and 
to the black community as whole. Within this context, Mr. Ricco is seen by police 
critics as a betrayer of the black community (‘He’s a betrayer. All day. Just by 
representing this man’) Consequently, Mr. Ricco is not part of those representing the 
label ‘Sean Bell’: He is an outsider who is treated with suspicion.  
 
After the turning point: When justice does not take place 
After Justice Cooperman’s verdict, the ‘pray-in’ protests organized by Mr. Sharpton 
and other community leaders, as well as the arrests and court case that followed, can be 
seen as a climax to what happens when ‘justice’ does not take place.  
 The ‘pray-in’ protests and their consequences are a climax in different ways. 
First, the initial warnings expressed by police critics on what could happen when 
injustice takes place have now happened: A failure of justice has led to civil 
disobedience. In this way, the protests are a climax of the blackmail rhetoric expressed 
306 
 
earlier by police critics: No justice, no peace. Second, the ‘pray-in’ protests can be seen 
as a climax of the (PR) strategy to emphasize the contrast between justice and injustice, 
further defining the rigid definition of justice. By urging protesters to have themselves 
arrested (without acting violently), the reverend creates a sharp contrast between 
victims (justice) and the police (injustice). Consequently, the notion that the judicial 
system is failing, is reinforced by the ironic yet intentionally planned outcome of the 
protests, when Mr. Sharpton and his supportive protesters are charged and ultimately 
convicted for disorderly conduct. The police critics’ strategy has a profound effect on 
the newspaper coverage, in which the contrasting images of justice (the protesters 
urging for justice) and injustice (protesters put in a police van) are merged into 
storytelling. The media in this way serve as a tool for police critics. As a final point, 
the protests display a climax in the police critics’ resilience and fighting mentality.  
 
Summary 
This subsection has demonstrated how most police critics share a rigid notion of the 
desired outcome of the debate, captured in the label ‘Justice for Sean Bell’. In turn, the 
label ‘No justice, no peace’ is characterized by a delimiting prerequisite for the debate 
to be resolved. So, whereas the ‘rigid definition’ of justice delineates the playing field 
in which negotiation can take place, the rigid and coalition-oriented characteristics of 
‘No justice, no peace’ show the level of rigidity/harshness of these negotiations as well 
as the zeal to continue the fight. 
The rigidity of both the outcome of debate and the negotiation space within the 
debate is intensified by the catalyst effect of these labels, which are to a certain extent 
part of Mr. Sharpton’s communication/PR strategy and rhetoric. This rigidity, in turn, 
has a profound effect on the overall positioning of the police critics in the Sean Bell 
debate, which so far can be best described as uncompromising.  
The framings discussed in the previous section to a great extent affect this 
rigidity of the outcome and negotiation space: While the framing of police misconduct 
and racial injustice fuel the police critics’ insistence that justice take place, the process-
oriented framings of the civil rights movement and the systematic judicial and political 
failure stimulate the resilience, the feeling of prolonged suffering, and the distrust in 
the judicial system. The labels discussed in the first section also affect the rigidity in 
outcome and negotiation space, serving as a catalyst for ‘us-versus-them’ sentiments, 
and fuelling the emotional character of the battle for justice.  
 The rhetoric used by the police critics to convey and accomplish their desired 
outcome of debate is highly emotional and often harsh. The communication strategies 
include communicative blackmail and amplification, the latter serving both as a 
method to create a ‘state of urgency’ (the agenda-setting effect), and as a way to 
energize other police critics.  
 Time is an important factor in the police critics’ battle for justice. The 
confidence and faith of the police critics are challenged throughout the aftermath of the 
shooting, resulting in a three-pronged climactic effect, including the ‘evaporation of 
respect’ for the judicial system, the amplification of the schism between justice and 
injustice, and the resilience to continue fighting. Place is of lesser importance: The 




1.3.2 The delineation of reality: ‘Us-versus-them’ positioning 
The police critics’ rigid definition of justice is part of a broader reality held by this 
group, formed by the labels ‘I am Sean Bell’, ‘We love Sean Bell’ and ‘50 shots’, and a 
product of the discussed historical and organic framings.  
This subsection scrutinizes the scope of this broader reality held and conveyed 
by police critics in a similar fashion as has been done for the concept of justice, first by 
looking at the scope of the reality itself, then examining how the police critics’ notion 
is challenged by events that take place in the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting, and 
finally by examining the boundaries of ‘us-versus-them’.  
 
The rigidity of reality: A single version of the truth 
The venue in which the police critics’ scope of reality is most clearly visible is in court. 
The way the lawyers present the ‘truth’ there is strikingly and persistently inflexible. 
Their communication conveys the persistent thought that there is only one version of 
what happened, and that any other version would be untruthful. Not only do the 
lawyers emphasize their own truth with rhetorical strategies, they also emasculate other 
versions by labeling them as ‘not credible’. While this focus can be expected in judicial 
discourse, the emphasis on ‘one single version of the truth’ does stand out.  
Outside the courtroom, other police critics similarly focus on ‘the truth’. Mr. 
Sharpton, for example, applies the same techniques as the lawyers to present the same 
rigid notion of truth. By doing this, he seeks no common ground: The police are to 
blame for the incident. This blame, already manifest in the label ‘50 shots’ and part of 
the broader framing of police misconduct and racial injustice, in itself is 
uncompromising. The police critics not only argue that Sean Bell died at the hands of 
the police, they also argue that encounters with the police are hostile and that the police 
are trained to be hostile against black youth, evidencing the transition from the 
historical and organic framings of misconduct and injustice to the current reality of the 
Sean Bell shooting.  
More important in relation to the discussion of the scope of the police critics’ 
reality is that statements show the level of rigidity of this blame factor: No other 
interpretations, perceptions and viewpoints are possible according to police critics, as 
evidenced by the use of dogmatic assertions and exclamations. No statistics are used in 
these instances to affirm the assumptions made. This rigidity of blame, in turn, fits 
within the police critics’ overall rigidly delimited reality. 
 To prevent future incidents, police critics also present a set of broader solutions 
to improve police–community relations. In references to such solutions, the police 
critics point out that ‘the police have a community relations problem’, rather than that 
‘the police and the community have a problem’ (The police ‘have to get their grades 
up’ and implement ‘significant changes’). With their solutions, which are solely 
directed towards the police, police critics do not seek common ground. The police 
should for instance ensure a diverse force, and should ‘become more familiar with hip-
hop slang and gestures’. 
 
Challenging reality: Victimization and denial  
The reality held by police critics is challenged by other stakeholders’ communication, 
for example in verbal attacks or (counter)-criticism. Such challenges take place for 
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instance when the NYPD or the police defenders (specifically the detectives’ lawyers) 
provide counter-evidence or counter-arguments. The police critics often respond by 
sullying the sender’s motives and underlining the victimization of Sean Bell, but also 
by suggesting that the police are using false propaganda as a harmful communication 
strategy. By doing so, police critics further broaden the schism between their reality 
and the ‘fictitious’ accounts presented by police defenders.  
In their response to criticism from other stakeholders, the police critics’ focus 
on victimization has a racial undertone. For example, they have suggested that police 
defenders link the victim’s race to immorality, and that police defenders are unfairly 
using race as an argumentative strategy to hurt the victims, and the black community in 
general. The corpus also shows how police critics refuse to understand the different 
realities presented by lawyers, by shielding themselves from other truths (‘What does 
[sic] this got to do with you all shooting Sean Bell’, ‘Any excuse they try to come up 
with or whatever, it’s no good to me […] I don’t want to hear it. My son is dead. Let’s 
talk about that’), and by expressing doubts about the lawyers’ understanding of the 
reality of police critics (‘You really don’t know me’; ‘Maybe in his mind, he thinks 
that’s the truth’).  
So far, the analysis of reality challenges has demonstrated how police critics 
hold a rigid definition of reality, while no common ground is sought with other 
stakeholders. Other realities, presented as arguments or evidence, are simply dismissed 
by police critics: There is one truth, and other versions are fiction. The presentation of 
different realities furthermore leads to a sense of victimization, which can be seen both 
as a spontaneous effect and strategic PR discourse. As a spontaneous effect, the sense 
of victimization felt by police critics after criticism fits within the broader framing of 
victimization, racial inequality, skepticism towards the judicial/political system, and 
police profiling. The victimization is partly due to a self-righteous attitude: As there is 
no other reality, criticism of one’s own reality is felt as a personal attack. Police critics 
believe that no proper respect is given. From a strategic communication perspective, 
the victimization can be categorized as a way to refute criticism by use of emotions 
(‘emotional blackmail’), as it suggests that criticism has negative consequences. The 
referral to the notion of victimization in this way can be seen as a way of (counter) 
attack. Other rhetorical strategies used by police critics as a response to reality 
challenges include ridiculing, use of irony, deliberately shielding from another reality, 
and the questioning of the trustworthiness of the critic while suggesting the critics use 
unfair strategies, such as propaganda and lying in general. In turn, arguments are 
ignored or not properly addressed, and no true dialogue is initiated in the media.  
 
From rigidly defined reality to an ‘us-versus-them’ positioning  
The police critics’ rigid definition of reality, which excludes the understanding of 
realities held by others, leads to an overall ‘us-versus-them’ positioning.  
In this positioning, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups are rigidly delineated. This 
delineation is in part racial but also based on support. Groups are consequently 
‘pigeon-holed’ in either camp. The African-American detectives who shot Sean Bell 
are definitely ‘them’, although they are black (‘Some would argue that these were not 
black cops […] They’re black in color, but they didn’t represent their community. 
They were representing the police.’) Such profiling is also done with others who don’t 
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support the notion of justice as promoted by the police critics, such as Patrick Lynch, 
head of the PBA. This profiling has a stigmatizing effect: While police critics express 
their worries of being profiled, they are in fact profiling the ‘them’ group. Membership 
of the ‘us’ group is strongly delimited and should be rigidly enforced, according to 
police critics. In their communication, the black community, in particular those who 
have experienced police violence, are singled out in the ‘us’ component. Only they can 
feel and understand what this ‘us’ entails, and only they are the ones who feel the pain. 
The police critics’ perceived ‘victimization’ and the mistrust of the judiciary are 
delimited along the racial ‘us-versus-them’ lines (‘no matter what, because of who you 
are and the community you come from, you will get nothing’).  
Police critics have strong doubts whether the ‘them’ group really understands 
or cares, as they have not experienced the pain, and therefore cannot feel it or 
understand it. Suffering and understanding distinguish the sensitive, emotional ‘us’ 
from the insensitive, depersonalized ‘them’. This overall fatalistic ‘us-versus-them’ 
positioning can be seen as both spontaneous discourse and as strategic communication 
discourse purposed to amplify the wrongdoings of the ‘them’ group against the 
victimized ‘us’ group. 
The positioning towards the ‘them’ group is distant and impersonal. There is a 
stringent boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and what’s beyond the boundary is 
unknown. The ‘them’ group is expected to hold the same ‘us-versus-them’ positioning. 
Police critics consequently react with surprise to any deviations (‘[Mr. Cuomo] clearly 
is taking positions that I’m sure the law enforcement community might not embrace’).  
 
Summary 
This subsection has demonstrated how the police critics’ rigid definition of reality only 
accommodates a single version of the truth of the incident itself and the broader 
patterns of police misconduct and racial injustice. The police critics’ reality comprises 
a rigidly delimited ‘blame factor’ in which criticism and solutions presented are one-
sidedly directed at the police. When this rigidly delimited reality is challenged by 
criticism or counter-evidence, feelings of (racial) victimization and denial are 
exacerbated.  
In turn, the police critics’ rigid definition of reality leads to an overall ‘us-
versus-them’ positioning, in which the ‘us’ and ‘them’ components are rigidly 
characterized by anticipated behavioral patterns and delimited by level of support, race, 
moral obligation and ability or inability to feel the suffering. The police critics’ 
mistrust of the judiciary is part of an overall pessimistic reality concerning the level of 
understanding and caring of the ‘them’ group. 
 On a rhetorical level, the rigidly defined ‘us-versus-them’ reality is conveyed 
and defended by use of dogmatic assertions, emphatic, emotional and harsh 
vocabulary, and strategies such as stereotyping/profiling, self-victimization, ridiculing, 
use of irony, the deliberate shielding from another reality, and the questioning of the 
trustworthiness of stakeholders that criticize them, while suggesting that these 




1.3.3 The driving force of response and the filter of debate: Emotion 
Emotion is one of the most pronounced characteristics of the police critics’ perceptions 
and framings. Not only do the labels ‘I am Sean Bell’ and ‘We love Sean Bell’ emit 
emotion, the rhetoric used to explain the broader framings also contains emotional 
elements. Moreover, the battle for justice, the ‘us-versus-them’ feelings and 
positioning and the notion of victimization are all emotionally charged. On a broader 
note, the analysis of the corpus has shown that the entire reality of the police critics is 
viewed through an emotional filter and that emotion is used as a departure point and 
driving force in the police critics’ positioning within this reality.  
Starting just after the shooting and continuing throughout its prolonged 
aftermath, community leaders expressed their concern about growing tensions in the 
communities. Such concerns peaked after critical moments in this aftermath when the 
rigidly defined notion of justice was not served, i.e. just after the acquittals and at the 
very beginning, when the criminal investigations were proceeding too slowly for 
critics. Police critics expressed their concerns to the press, like-minded stakeholders, 
and directly to the mayor and the police commissioner.  
Community leaders see themselves as a reliable gauge and voice tube for 
community feelings, possessing the ability to accurately measure ‘temperatures’ in the 
community. These ‘temperatures’ show the ‘us’ community sentiments, felt by the 
entire group (‘On a scale of 1 to 10, the distrust was a 7. Now it’s a 10-and-a-half.’, 
‘This was a powder keg’, ‘There is a temperature in our communities that is rising, and 
the tension is intensifying’). The words and word combinations used to express 
concern can be characterized as fervent and coercive. Speakers use aggravating words 
and word combinations with references to gauge measurements and the explosiveness 
of the situation to make their point. A certain threat emanates from the character of 
these statements and the applied coercive vocabulary: If authorities do not act 
appropriately and immediately, then the balance could flip negatively, as the gauge has 
reached its climax. The reference to ‘tension’, in this sense, could refer to an early 
signal of violence to take place, further aggravating the coercive statements. The focus 
on tension is thus not just a spontaneous rhetorical strategy; it also becomes a political 
communication tool to pressurize authorities, similar to the previously discussed 
blackmail strategy.  
 Besides speaking about the emotions of others, police critics also convey their 
own emotions concerning the Sean Bell shooting. Their statements show how the 
emotional starting point is the result of the interpretative framings held by police 
critics, showing how the long battle of the civil rights movement against police 
misconduct, racial injustice, and systematic judicial and political failures has left the 
critics angry, emotional, and distrustful.  
Not only is the starting point of debate emotional, police critics also assess 
each new moment in the aftermath from an emotional stance. The corpus shows how 
emotion plays a dominant role in the way that police critics assess and respond to new 
developments in the aftermath of the shooting, and how they formulate arguments in 
their response. These statements can be seen as spontaneous discourse, but also as a 





This subsection has demonstrated how the transition of framing to current debate is 
characterized by emotion. Such emotion is the driving force of response, but also 
functions as a filter: Each new development is assessed from an emotional perspective. 
This filter, in turn, is related to the ‘us-versus-them’ perceptions and positioning, in 
which the shooting itself as well as the criticism that follows are seen as personal 
blows. The emotions of community members are also fueled by the passionate oratory 
and powerful ‘Sean Bell’ labels uttered and perpetuated by Mr. Sharpton and other 
community leaders. Emotion can be seen both as part of a spontaneous response to 
developments and also as a strategy to secure the desired outcome of debate. 
 The use of emotion is pervasive throughout the communication exercised by 
the police critics and can be found in all venues of debate. This pervasiveness and the 
multitude of different functions of emotion indicate that the entire reality of the police 
critics is emotionally charged.  
 
1.3.4 The character of communication: ‘We can be angry without being 
mad’ 
This subsection looks at the communication strategies used by police critics in the 
interaction with other stakeholders, in particular opponents, in the debate. Some of 
these strategies have been discussed already, as they are initiated to convey 
perceptions, framings, and the delineation of both debate and reality.  
 
A non-violent approach 
As has been demonstrated in the historical part of this research, the display of violent 
behavior (such as riots), or incitements to violence/aggression have been used in the 
past as strategies to influence public debates on police problems. However, the notion 
of violence has played a very minor role in the Sean Bell debate. From the outset, the 
Rev. Al Sharpton and other community leaders strongly opposed physical aggression 
in their statements: 
 
Just after the shooting (November 2006) 
Mr. Sharpton:  
 
“We appeal to people: Don’t do anything disruptive or in any way contrary to the 
memory of Sean Bell. […] We do not want the world to see him as anything other than 
what he was. He was not violent. He was not a thug. He was not in the street. Don’t 
use your anger to distort who he was.”5 
 
Mr. Sharpton’s statement comprises different rhetorical layers. On a superficial level, 
the reverend is saying that protesters or other police critics should not be violent. He 
links this peaceful approach to the character of Sean Bell, stating that violence would 
‘distort who he was’. At a deeper level, Mr. Sharpton combines different images to 
create a powerful rhetorical mix. By blending the image of ‘Sean as a good kid’ — 
manifested in the label ‘Sean Bell’ — with both the ‘personal identification’ and ‘the 
need to spread a legacy’ — manifested in the label ‘I am Sean Bell’ — Sharpton’s non-
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violent approach is intensified, and moreover, the image of innocence relating to both 
Sean and the community is strengthened.  
 The disassociation from violence is a deliberate choice of Mr. Sharpton and the 
group of people supporting him. The organizational set-up of the different non-violent 
‘pray-in’ protests confirms this. Moreover, Mr. Sharpton has pointed out his non-
violent intent on several other occasions:  
 
Just after the acquittals (April 2008) 
A New York Times excerpt:  
 
The scope of the protests on Wednesday contrasted with the relatively muted response 
to a state judge’s acquittals of the detectives on April 25. At the time, Mr. Sharpton 
and other activists, politicians and community leaders praised the overall peaceful 
response that followed the verdict, but vowed to fight the judge’s decision in strategic 




Mr. Sharpton:  
 
“Some in the media seemed disappointed; they wanted us to play into the hoodlum, 
thug stereotypes. […] We can be angry without being mad.”7 
 
With the latter remark, Mr. Sharpton not only emphasizes that he does not want to be 
associated with violent protests, he also speaks for the whole black community by 
using ‘we’ and ‘us’. In addition, he indirectly prides himself and the community for not 
acting in ‘hoodlum’ stereotypical ways, while indirectly criticizing ‘some in the media’ 
for using such stereotypes. ‘Being angry without being mad’ in fact can be 
characterized as the rhetorical energizer that has enticed many protesters to march on 
numerous occasions to express their anger about the Sean Bell shooting. Statements 
made by protesters and other police critics literally reflect Mr. Sharpton’s plea. While 
police critics distance themselves from violence, they associate their way of protest 
with calmness, sensibility, intelligence and strategy. Only then can justice be achieved.  
This peaceful attitude and approach is pervasive throughout the discourse 
exercised during the aftermath of the shooting. Of course, there were some instances of 
violence as well as calls for violence. One of the most discussed statements in this 
category was made by City Councilman Charles Barron, who, with an indirect plea for 
violence, filled with harsh and uncompromising vocabulary, did not shun the use of 
harsh rhetorical strategies to gain advantage in the Sean Bell debate. His controversial 
words were vehemently discussed in different media.  
Other quotes, mainly expressed by the New Black Panthers, clearly advocate 
violence, yet such controversial pleas were scarce. The impact of such statements is 
thus questionable, as they are not endorsed by Mr. Sharpton or other mainstream 
critics, who at times clearly distance themselves from those unmistakably attacking the 
police and proposing violence.  
 
Confrontational and harsh rhetoric  
While Mr. Sharpton’s plea to ‘be angry without being mad’ opposes physical violence, 
it seems to legitimize a wide array of harsh strategies to verbally attack and criticize 
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other stakeholders, in particular the NYPD and the detectives involved in the shooting. 
Police critics use confrontational, derogatory and emotional strategies. The rhetoric is 
not only harsh, it is also very personal. The detectives are individually attacked for 
their wrongdoing, while those supporting the police are likewise condemned (‘That 
was his time to be a cowboy’, ‘You took a father and a husband, ‘Patrick Lynch is an 
asshole, he siding with the cops’[sic]). 
Overall, the police critics’ rhetoric is filled with allegations, name-calling, and 
other verbal abuses. Their confrontational communication can be seen as a product of 
their rigidly defined reality, and in particular its inherent ‘us-versus-them’ sentiments.  
 
Vengeance 
A distinctive element within the confrontational, harsh communication displayed by 
the victims, Mr. Sharpton, and those associated with them, is a desire for vengeance. 
This notion of vengeance fits within the broader notion of ‘justice must be served’, and 
within the ‘us-versus-them’ positioning. Indications of this notion can be found 
throughout the aftermath of the shooting and within the different venues of 
communication. The vindictive language is a reoccurring element in the 
communication exercised by police critics, either specifically pronounced in statements 
or concealed in words and word combinations, while manifesting itself either in 
feelings of exuberance or bitterness. The notion of vengeance is connected to the 
rigidly defined notion of justice, in that justice will only take place for police critics if 
vengeance takes place. What is furthermore significant is that the feeling of vengeance 
is not only felt by the victims and their families, but also by many others in the victims’ 
community, accentuating both the ‘We love Sean Bell’ feeling and the broader ‘us-
versus-them’ sentiments. 
 
The roots of harsh communication 
During the interview held with Mr. Barron, the councilman points out that the police 
critics’ harsh communication strategies are the result not only of the historical pattern 
of police misconduct and racial injustice, but also the judicial and political inertia and 
flaws in the aftermath of incidents. Moreover, the communication serves as a way of 
ventilating emotions that occur as a result of this interpretative framing, and also as a 
way for police critics to set the political agenda, as, according to Mr. Barron, milder 
rhetoric has not worked.  
 
Summary 
While violent behavior is not a main factor in the Sean Bell debate, the debate is 
nevertheless characterized by aggressive communication strategies, including 
vengeance and personal attacks. The vocabulary is harsh, uncompromising and 
emotional, and filled with allegations, name-calling, and other verbal abuses. The 
analysis of this subsection complements the previously discussed strategies to convey 
specific labels, framings, and the delineation of debate and realities, which were 
equally harsh and uncompromising.  
Both the non-violent approach and the aggressive rhetorical strategies are 
fuelled by the rhetoric of Mr. Sharpton and other community leaders, and more 
specifically by the slogan ‘We can be angry without being mad’. In addition, the 
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rhetorical aggression is also a product of the ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, the existing 
sentiments of injustice, and the reiteration of the guilt label ‘50 shots’. This is a two-
way interactive process: The harsh communication methods used by police critics in 
turn also exacerbate the harsh character of the labels, framings, and overall positioning. 
 
1.3.5 Multiple hues: Conciliatory and facts-driven communication 
While most of the statements uttered by police critics can be categorized as rigid and 
emotional, there are certainly shades of gray. The discussion of these statements has 
been postponed for two reasons: First, these approaches are relatively sparse in 
comparison to the rigid communication predominant in the discussion so far; second, 
by capturing such approaches in one subsection, the multiple hues regarding the 
positioning of different police critics, as well as the specific character of this 
‘conciliatory discourse’ and ‘facts-driven discourse’, become apparent. 
 
Conciliatory communication  
Mr. Sharpton and those associated with him distance themselves not only from those 
who invoke violence, as discussed in Subsection 1.3.4, but also from critics who apply 
harsher communication strategies than Sharpton does. For instance, Mr. Sharpton at 
one point clearly distances himself from City Councilman Charles Barron, by using 
humor and other strategies. When Mr. Sharpton is defending his pray-in protests before 
Judge Stephen in October 2008, he again seeks common ground, understanding the 
reality of others who might have experienced inconvenience. Yet such understanding is 
not pervasive in the statements uttered by Mr. Sharpton and those associated with him. 
Rather than illustrating conciliatory discourse, the analyzed quotes reveal the position 
carved out amongst other police critics: The reverend and his followers do not want to 
be linked to any aggressive and violence-prone critics, but on the other hand are set to 
find justice and do this in a way that consists of mainly uncompromising and some 
conciliatory elements.  
Some of the police critics have a more conciliatory approach than Mr. 
Sharpton. People in this group include State Senator Malcolm Smith and City 
Councilman Leroy Comrie. Characteristics of their more flexibly defined reality and 
use of milder communication strategies include an understanding of motives, thoughts, 
and arguments held by oppositional or neutral parties, a positive outlook on the future, 
a desire to find the middle road and please all parties involved, and a critical attitude 
towards the motives held and methods practiced by the stakeholder group which he is 
party to. 
Besides Mr. Comrie and Mr. Smith, others have also made statements that can 
be considered more conciliatory in tone. Characteristics of this conciliatory discourse 
in fact form the linguistic antonyms of the previously discussed characteristics that 
shape rigidly defined discourse:  
 
A pessimistic outlook versus a positive outlook  
While a lot of statements include a feeling of distrust towards the governmental, 
judicial and law enforcement systems in place and the stakeholders practicing such 
communication consequently have a pessimistic outlook on the future, especially in 
regard to actions to be taken by other stakeholders, some stakeholders practicing 
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conciliatory discourse conversely see the future as an opportunity to make 
improvements.  
 
Lack of understanding versus understanding: Flexibility and non-flexibility in 
realities and outcomes  
While most of the police critics’ statements entail a rigidly defined reality concerning 
the shooting itself, the broader pattern of police misconduct, and what should be done 
to resolve these issues, in which there is little understanding for the reality felt and 
communicated by the police, or by any other group that does not share the police 
critics’ rigidly defined notion of justice, conciliatory discourse by contrast does entail 
such understanding as well as a more flexibly defined reality.  
 
‘We are right’ versus ‘we can be wrong too’  
Part of the rigidly defined reality is the insistence on being right. Conversely, in the 
instances of communication that are more nuanced and have been labeled as 
conciliatory discourse, police critics do acknowledge personal flaws, or flaws made by 
the community which the critic is part of.  
 
Facts-driven communication 
Not all police critics’ communication is driven by emotion. Facts-driven 
communication is mainly conveyed by the New York Civil Liberties Union, an 
organization that only sporadically sought attention in the public debate that followed 
the Sean Bell shooting. In a personal interview held with the NYCLU Associate Legal 
Director Chris Dunn, he points out that the organization’s driving force of response is 
not emotion, but rather facts and information, and hence the organization is not a 
central player in the Sean Bell debate. Mr. Dunn does not foster the police critics’ 
rigidly delimited desired outcome of debate, i.e. ‘Justice for Sean Bell’, but instead 
speaks more generally of a ‘fair process’, which can also result in the acquittal of the 
implicated detectives. The NYCLU responds to different issues than other police 
critics. These different issues involve the conduct of the NYPD as a whole, rather than 
that of individual officers. While Mr. Dunn does refer to the Sean Bell shooting, he 
only does so to highlight his broader concerns with the performance of the department. 
 NYCLU representatives also formulate their criticism on these issues in a 
different way from other police critics. The facts-driven communication conveyed by 
the NYCLU comprises statements that do not focus on the emotions and victimization 
felt after the Sean Bell shooting, but instead consist of arguments based on statistics 
and other facts. No passionate oratory is used. Nevertheless, NYCLU’s communication 
cannot be classified as conciliatory discourse, as it presents a rigidly defined reality 
regarding the conduct of the NYPD, by using emphatic language, by sketching an 
uncompromising picture of the NYPD’s performance and by not showing 
understanding for the reality held by the NYPD.  
 The NYCLU is not the only police critic that conveys facts-driven 
communication. Nevertheless, the overtone of the police critics’ communication 





This subsection has shown how some discourse differs from the overall rigid, harsh 
and emotional communication conveyed by police critics. 
Conciliatory discourse consists of less rigid definitions of debate and reality 
and less confrontational rhetorical strategies such as humor, self-reflection, positivism, 
understanding and concession, in order to seek common ground between different 
realities. In other words: Conciliatory discourse is coalition-oriented. The conciliatory 
discourse can be seen as either spontaneous communication or as strategic PR 
discourse aimed at carving out a position in the group of police critics. By doing so, 
Mr. Sharpton and other police critics distance themselves from more radical critics, 
while milder critics distance themselves from the reverend himself.  
In turn, facts-driven communication comprises criticism of the NYPD based 
on statistics and facts, while avoiding passionate oratory or preliminary conclusions on 
the conduct of the officers.  
 
1.3.6 Conclusion 
This section has focused on how the police critics’ positioning in the Sean Bell debate 
is characterized by rigidity, harshness and emotion.  
Rigidity can be found in the desired outcome of debate, the prerequisites for 
the debate to come to an end, the negotiation space, the realities, truths and solutions 
held and presented in regard to the shooting and the broader patterns of police 
misconduct and racial injustice. This rigidity, fuelled by the starkly divergent images 
captured in the ‘50 shots’ and ‘I am/We love Sean Bell’ labels and a product of the 
broader event and process framings leads to an equally rigid ‘us-versus-them’ 
positioning, in which common ground with other realities is only sought sporadically.  
 While harshness can be found in the communication strategies used by police 
critics, the concept of emotion functions as the driving force of response, igniting and 
fuelling the rhetorical motor from the very start. In addition, it serves as a filter through 
which actions are perceived, assessed, and responded to. Emotion can be seen as 
spontaneous communication aimed at conveying feelings and as a pre-planned PR 
strategy which is used to ‘blackmail’ other stakeholders, but also to amplify the 
magnitude of the case and create a state of urgency (agenda-setting). This reality leads 
to an emotionally charged ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, in which victimization and 
blame are exacerbated and polarized. 
There are certainly multiple hues in how police critics position themselves in 
the debate. To a degree, the level of rigidity, harshness and emotion can be seen as a 
strategy to carve out a position in the group of police critics, as critics can distance 
themselves from milder or more radical critics by doing so. The central figure in the 
debate remains Mr. Sharpton, who, together with other community leaders, serves as a 
gauge for community sentiments. His oratory comprises both conciliatory and non-
compromising elements, although the latter has the upper hand.  
 The rigidity and harshness of the police critics’ positioning, as well as the 
display of emotions, are amplified when the prerequisites for justice are disregarded 
and when the police critics’ truths and realities are challenged. Venues where this 
rigidity, harshness and high level of emotions are particularly profound include protest 
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marches and the court. Semi-private gatherings held for peers also exacerbate the 





1.4 Conclusions and outlook 
This chapter discussed the communication practiced by the police critics participating 
in the Sean Bell debate. Overall, the statements made by police critics can be 
characterized as polarized, with a profound ‘us-versus-them’ schism molding labels, 
framings and positioning, occurring throughout the aftermath of the shooting in all 
venues of debate.  
 The ‘us’ component is a product of a broader organic and historical 
interpretative framing concerning the prolonged civil rights movement against police 
misconduct, racial injustices, and judicial and political failures, while fuelled by the 
highly personalized and emotional labels ‘I am Sean Bell’ and ‘We love Sean Bell’, 
which exacerbate emotions, a sense of victimization, identification and love for the 
victim, and a strong group feeling. The ‘us’ group is delineated by race, level of 
support and understanding, moral obligation and ability or inability to feel the 
suffering. 
 The ‘them’ component, in turn, is a product of the broader interpretative 
framings of police misconduct, racial injustice, judicial and political failures and the 
lack of understanding of and care for ‘others’. It is fuelled by the impersonal label ‘50 
shots’, which comprises images of police culpability, magnitude, misconduct, 
lawlessness and injustice. The ‘them’ group is delineated by culpability, race, and level 
of support and understanding.  
 Taken as a whole, the ‘us-versus-them’ positioning is a product of the 
polarized interpretative framings of the injustices on the one hand and the fight against 
these injustices — as well as the victimization felt — on the other. The schism between 
the victimized ‘us’ and the unjust ‘them’ is fuelled by the polarized labels ‘50 shots’ 
and ‘I am/We love Sean Bell’.  
Such polarization results in an overall ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, in which 
debate and reality are rigidly defined, in which there is not much leeway for 
negotiation or alternative interpretations/solutions, and in which harsh and emotionally 
charged strategies (fuelled by ‘We can be angry without being mad’) are used to 
underline the schism. These strategies include stereotyping/profiling, passionate 
oratory, personal attacks, vengeance, amplification, self-victimization, 
emotional/communicative blackmailing, ridiculing, use of irony, the deliberate 
shielding from another reality, and the questioning of the trustworthiness of other 
critics while suggesting the critics use unfair strategies, such as propaganda and lying 
in general. The ‘us-versus-them’ schism even penetrates to the level of vocabulary, as 
not only harsh, uncompromising, amplifying and emotional words are used, but an 
emphasis is also laid on the words ‘we’ and ‘they’.  
Due to the ‘need for a legacy’ (core label: Sean Bell), the self-identification 
with the victim (‘I am Sean Bell’), and the strong communal group feelings (‘We love 
Sean Bell’), the police critics feel ‘morally obliged’ to fight for the rigidly defined 
conditions set in the label ‘No justice, no peace’, which in itself is part of a broader 
interpretative framing as the chant is literally a product of the civil rights movement. 
This results both in a strong zeal to fight, but also in limited negotiation space.  
 The analysis has shown how the discussed labels, framings and positioning 
interact with each other to a great extent, unearthing the fine transition lines between 
the three, while also demonstrating how interpretative framings produce labels and 
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affect positioning, how labels serve as a catalyst for these framings and the positioning 
— while condensing, magnifying, and reiterating captured images and perceptions — 
and how the positioning, in turn, can further exacerbate the use of labels and the 
interpretations constructed by stakeholders.  
 The Rev. Al Sharpton plays a key role in this. With his passionate oratory, 
repetition of labels, and use of the described communication strategies, to a large 
extent he shaped the images, interpretations, and positioning held and maintained by 
police critics. Not only does he energize the community to fight for justice, he also 
ensures prolonged media attention for this fight, applying agenda-setting 
communication strategies that amplify the perceived ‘state of urgency’. Yet this is also 
a two-way process: The reverend acts on the feelings, perceptions and interpretations 
that are already entrenched in the community, underscoring the fine line between 
spontaneous communication and PR strategies, while making it impossible to 
determine exactly the nascence and development of such labels. 
 Although shades of gray do exist in the discourse of police critics, such shades 
do not have the upper hand. It might be so that milder or more radical discourse is 
prevalent in other (private) settings, but not in the statements found in the New York 
Times. Time and place determine part of these multiple hues: The ‘us-versus-them’ 
positioning is more profound in semi-private gatherings and protest marches, but also 
when the rigidly defined notion of debate as well as broader realities are challenged by 
other stakeholders. Labels and interpretative framings, on the other hand, are pervasive 
throughout the aftermath of the shooting, and occur in all of the researched venues of 
debate.  
In their communication about the Sean Bell shooting, the police critics’ 
strongly focus on their interpretative framings, which could indicate the use of second-
agenda criticism. However, this supposition needs to be explored further in future 
studies. It can be said, though, that radical groups such as the New Black Panthers lay a 
far heavier emphasis on these framings than others, while aiming to offend a much 
larger group than just the police, which strongly suggests the use of second-agenda 
criticism. Conversely, the existence of broader-agenda criticism in the police critics’ 
communication is easier to validate. 
 What is the impact of the communication practiced by police critics on the full 
process of debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting? Which elements hampered 
that process, and which elements had a positive effect? The rigidly defined outcome of 
debate and broader realities, as well as the harsh communication strategies practiced, 
are not coalition-oriented and do not seek common ground. This is bound to affect the 
process of debate, yet the extent of this effect depends on the impact on other 
stakeholders, the police in particular, and to what extent the discussed images, 
framings, realities, outcome of debate, and rhetorical and communication strategies 
align with those of other stakeholders. 
 
                                                          
1 Alan Feuer, “Bridegroom’s Legacy Remembered at His Funeral,” New York Times, sec. B, December 2, 
2006; The Associated Press, “Mourners Bid Farewell to Police Shooting Victim,” New York Times, 
December 1, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/01/nyregion/02funeral_ap.html. 
2 Andy Newman, “In Downtown Brooklyn, a Sort of Circus in Celebration of Everything Literary,” New 
York Times, sec. B, September 15, 2008. 
3 Concise Oxford English Dictionary [CD-ROM], 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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Chapter 2: The New York Police Department 
 
This chapter examines the communication conveyed by the New York Police 
Department in the aftermath of the shooting. The nature of this group of actors in the 
debate differs significantly from that of police critics: Whereas the group of police 
critics comprises a multitude of different people and entities, which together produce a 
vast amount of communication that is divergent in nature, the Police Department 
operates far more homogeneously in this context. While the force comprises more than 
37,000 police officers, these officers only rarely speak out, as contacts with the press 
are restricted on most occasions, and police officers need formal approval for 
answering reporters’ questions. The communication attributed in the media to the 
NYPD is conveyed mainly by the police commissioner in conjunction with Paul 
Browne, the Deputy Commissioner of Public Information, and his communication 
team. While their communication partly reflects the collective feelings, perceptions, 
and interpretations of police officers, it is much more a reflection of those held by the 
Police Department as a whole, conveyed by the police chief and his communication 
department. The police officers, as stakeholders in the debate, will be scrutinized 
further in Part II, Chapter 3, which examines the role of police defenders.  
What is striking in the NYPD’s discourse reported in the New York Times is 
the limited amount of communication that is generated in regard to the Sean Bell 
shooting and the events that followed, especially in comparison to the vast amount of 
communication produced by police critics. To a degree, this difference is a direct 
reflection of the NYPD’s one-voice communication approach. The difference can also 
be the result of some of the constraints that the NYPD has to deal with in its 
communication, further discussed at the end of this introduction. Lastly, the difference 
can indicate a disparity in approach between police critics and the Police Department. 
While the police critics deliberately and proactively sought to communicate, 
organizing agenda-setting meetings and protest marches, the NYPD was more reactive 
in its approach.  
 The analysis is facilitated by the fact that perceptions and images, but also the 
references to framings and positioning are less scattered than those held by police 
critics, as they are funneled into one clear voice. However, due to the limited amount 
of available communication it is harder to capture perceptions and images in labels, or 
to determine the department’s understanding of the shooting in interpretative framings, 
as well as its overall positioning in the debate. This problem is exacerbated by the 
nature of the communication itself, which is far less inflammatory and pronounced 
than the passionate oratory used by Mr. Sharpton and other police critics. The 
analytical frameworks adopted to anticipate this will be dealt with in the introductions 
to the sections ahead.  
 Many of the NYPD’s quotes have been paraphrased by the New York Times, 
mostly into indirect speech, but at times the discourse has also been summarized, more 
so than with that of the police critics. A reason for this is that many of the statements 
are made by Mr. Browne or other spokesmen, and not by Police Commissioner Kelly. 
Caution is hence required in the characterization of communication, as the paraphrased 
statements can be altered by the New York Times. Hence larger text fragments are 
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analyzed, also because the NYPD’s reluctance to speak out comes to light especially 
when examined in a larger context.  
The communication conveyed by the NYPD is constrained in many ways, in 
stark contrast to the communication by police critics, who can speak freely on both the 
shooting and its aftermath. In the interview held with Mr. Browne, the spokesman 
extensively addressed the constraints the department faces when it communicates with 
the press about explosive issues such as the Sean Bell shooting. He focuses on two 
main factors that limit the communication of the NYPD, i.e. the powerful role of the 
unions, which are able to impede seriously the police commissioner, and
 
the effect his 
communication can have on both the judicial and administrative proceedings: While 
the commissioner has a responsibility to communicate with the community, Mr. Kelly 
is also the arbiter in the eventual internal trial.
1
 His communications can infringe the 
rights police officers enjoy in both administrative and judicial proceedings, potentially 






2.1 Perceptions and images 
This section examines the perceptions and images held, constructed and conveyed by 
the NYPD concerning the Sean Bell shooting incident, other stakeholders, and 
themselves.  
Subsection 2.1.1 examines the organization’s official (proactive) statements 
about the shooting, which provide more insight into the context and consequences of 
the limited amount of perceptions and images conveyed by the NYPD on the shooting 
and can also expose hidden perceptions. Subsection 2.1.2 then aims to reveal hidden 
perceptions held by the NYPD, by delving deeper into the way the Police Department 
responds to the profoundly visible labels ‘50 shots’, ‘I am Sean Bell’ and ‘No justice, 
no peace’. 
 
2.1.1 ‘This event’: Non-committal and nondescript labels for the 
‘indistinctive’ shooting 
The NYPD delivered its most pronounced statements on the shooting just after the 
incident took place and also just after the acquittals. At these crucial moments, Police 
Commissioner Kelly took the lead in the department’s communication efforts.3 In Mr. 
Kelly’s initial response to the shooting, he does not convey any explicit information 
(‘We don’t have enough information yet in this case’). His communication is 
characterized by nondescript, non-individuating and non-committal word choice. He 
does not mention key details (the number of shots fired) or names of people (not even 
Sean Bell) involved in the shooting. Instead, the incident is simply referred to as ‘this 
case’ or ‘the shooting’. The perception that Commissioner Kelly indirectly conveys is 
that the shooting is ‘indistinctive’. His statements are factual messages, which do not 
comprise a public expression of sympathy (‘I can’t afford to have a visceral reaction’). 
Most of his statements are reactive to reporters’ questions, possibly also indicating 
caution.  
Police Commissioner Kelly’s approach is reinforced by the statements made 
by Mr. Browne and his team. In their statements, the non-committal, non-elaborative 
approach is more explicit and again the perception of ‘indistinctiveness’ stands out. 
The officials refrain from mentioning Sean Bell’s name or the number of shots fired, or 
providing other details on the shooting. Instead, Mr. Browne speaks of ‘the totality of 
the situation’ and ‘the totality of this event’, while another police official speaks of 
‘what the undercover did’: all nondescript, factual and detached characterizations of 
the shooting.  
During the period between the direct aftermath of the shooting and the 
acquittals of the detectives, the quantity of communications by the NYPD decreases 
considerably. The only other proactive and explicit response to the incident and the 
potential culpability for the implicated officers occurs just after Judge Cooperman’s 
verdict of April 25, 2008. The police commissioner responded by reiterating the 
statement ‘I can’t have a reaction’. Again, he does not communicate about any details 
of the shooting, and moreover, merely refers to what happened by using the non-
individuating wording of ‘this case’. His communication is again factual.  
The reiterative character of the non-committal, nondescript and non-emotional 
perceptions results in the creation and perpetuation of the label ‘This event’. This label 
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tones down the importance and magnitude of the shooting, as opposed to the label ‘50 
shots’ and the humanizing and communally felt sentiments of love, hurt and 
victimization that are part of the ‘I am/We love Sean Bell’ labels.  
The effect that the label has on the further development and reiteration of 
perceptions differs from the police critics’ labels. Although the label is reiterated, this 
is not done to the extent that the police critics’ labels are. The agenda-setting function 
is thus considerably reduced, although the label ‘This event’ does deflect the powerful 
agenda-setting perceptions and images felt, created and reiterated by police critics.  
In a personal interview held with Mr. Browne, the NYPD’s chief spokesman 
responds to some of these observations.
4
 He said that he was unaware of the 
nondescript and distant character of the NYPD’s communication following the Sean 
Bell shooting, pointing out that this specific characteristic was probably caused by the 
media (‘If you read the whole New York Times and haven’t found [an] expression of 
concern to the family, then that’s a failure in their reporting’). While it is unlikely that 
the police commissioner never expressed sympathy to the Bell family (although not 
one single article with such an expression can be found within the selection of 
sources), and moreover, the department must have referred to the victims by their 
names on a variety of occasions, it can nevertheless be deduced that the Police 
Department did not focus on this in its communication.  
 
Summary  
Although the approach of Police Commissioner Kelly and his communication team 
might seem to impede insight into the perceptions and images held and constructed by 
the NYPD, it is in fact this character itself that provides more information about these 
perceptions and images. In stark contrast to the powerful and prominent message that 
emanates from police critics’ labels, the Police Department projects a different, more 
concealed, image of the shooting into its communication. The constant reiteration of 
nondescript and non-emotional words such as ‘case’, ‘event’ and ‘situation’, as well as 
the omission of the name Sean Bell, the exact number of shots fired, and other vital 
details, reveal the NYPD’s perception that facts, statistics, broader patterns and 
processes are more important than emotions and — in a general sense — the personal 
side of the shooting. The reiterative character of the non-committal, nondescript and 
non-emotional perceptions results in the creation and perpetuation of the ‘indistinctive’ 
label ‘This event’.  
 
2.1.2 Opposing labels: Seconds, order, and peace versus shots, lawlessness 
and unrest  
Although the NYPD prefers not to comment on the shooting, it is still confronted with 
the perceptions created by police critics, at times compelling the NYPD to respond.  
In response to the perceptions connected to ‘50 shots’, the commissioner never 
literally mentions this symbolic number, but does characterize the number as 
‘unusual’.5 However, this characterization says more about the interpretative framing 
of the shooting within a broader pattern of ‘usual conduct’ (see Subsection 2.2.1) than 
about the NYPD’s perception with regard to the shooting. Moreover, it can be seen as a 
strategy to delineate the NYPD’s reality, while anticipating and dismissing the framing 
held by police critics that the shooting is yet another example of excessive police 
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violence (see Subsections 2.3.2 and 2.3.4). His communication team responds to the 
label ‘50 shots’ by emphasizing the first shot, while suggesting that the total number is 
less important and startling to the department (‘the number of bullets is certainly 
startling to the general public, but the key question is why was the first shot fired by 
each of them’), and by focusing on the limited time frame in which the shooting 
occurred (‘50 shots can be squeezed off in a matter of seconds’). This strategy gainsays 
the powerful message emanating from the ‘50 shots’ label. The department downplays 
the magnitude and lawlessness inherent in the police critics’ label ‘50 shots’ by saying 
that there is ‘nothing in the law’ that says that a police officer ‘can’t fire a certain 
number of shots’ and by images of a competent force that does not make rash 
decisions, but has ‘prepared for any contingency’. This also gives insight into how the 
NYPD sees itself: as a professional and stable organization that is on top of the 
process. 
While no image of equal magnitude is presented to counter ‘50 shots’, new 
perceptions come to light by looking more closely at the language used by the NYPD. 
Apart from the focal point of ‘the first shot’, and the focus on order, on rare occasions 
the NYPD also conveyed perceptions of the detectives involved in the shooting. One 
police official points out that the functioning of the police cannot be viewed as 
‘monolithic’, as it involves ‘five individuals’ and ‘five individual decisions’.  
Police Department representatives also counter the anger and emotions 
emanating from the labels ‘I am/We love Sean Bell’ and ‘No justice, no peace’, and 
from the statement ‘We can be angry without being mad’ without referring explicitly to 
these labels. Just after the acquittals, the commissioner says there have been ‘no 
problems’, and there has been ‘no history of violence’, obviously referring to the 
physical component of the array of methods used by police critics to respond to police 
issues. Yet by stressing that there are no problems, without referring to the reasons why 
problems might occur, and by saying there will be ‘some people’ who are 
‘disappointed’ with the verdict, he largely ignores the anger felt by community 
members, while creating a peaceful image that opposes ‘No justice, no peace’. The 
depersonalized character of ‘some people’ linearly opposes both the scale of the 
protests held, and the universality of the label ‘I am Sean Bell’, diminishing both the 
magnitude and the emotionality of this deeply personalized label. In addition, the word 
choice ‘disappointed’ counters the highly emotional and emphatic remarks in reference 
to community feelings.  
 
Summary 
The Police Department reactively responds to existing police critics’ labels by refuting 
perceptions in regard to the magnitude of shots fired, culpability and lawlessness of the 
officers and in a broader sense the police, and by toning down the magnitude of the 
anger felt by police critics (as opposed to the police critics’ labels ‘I am/We love Sean 
Bell’). The analysis of the NYPD’s reactions furthermore shows how the organization 
perceives the (blame for the) shooting as more complex and the officers themselves as 
more personal than the police critics did (e.g., with their label ‘50 shots’). While the 
images ‘unusualness’ ‘seconds’, ‘order’ and ‘peace’ are embedded in the non-
committal communication conveyed by the NYPD, they are far less profoundly visible 





The preceding discussion of perceptions and images held, constructed and conveyed by 
the Police Department first shows that such perceptions and images are difficult to pin 
down due to the NYPD’s non-committal communication approach. By looking more 
closely at the organization’s proactive statements on the shooting and its reaction to 
police critics’ labels, it is the caution itself and the nondescript and non-committal 
word choice that reveal how the police see the shooting and its victims, as well as the 
broader movement in support of the victims, as indistinctive. These thoughts are 
captured in the label ‘This event’. Conversely, the Police Department perceives the 
implicated officers as well as the performance of the police as a whole in a more 
distinctive fashion. While Mr. Kelly is officially saying ‘he can’t have a reaction’, the 
NYPD on a deeper level labels the shooting with the characteristics of ‘unusualness’ 
and ‘seconds’, and, in addition, it characterizes its own conduct, and the events that 
take place after the shooting, by the notions ‘preparedness’, ‘order’, and ‘peace’.  
No passionate and rousing oratory is used; the statements are void of emotion; 
no specific details are provided in regard to the shooting. Hence the discourse is 
nondescript: It does not refer to Sean Bell, Joseph Guzman, or Trent Benefield, or to 
any other details of the incident. Similar to how ‘50 shots’ portrays a depersonalized 
image of the police, the nondescript statements made by the NYPD result in a 
depersonalized image of the victims, as well as of the shooting itself, which is depicted 
as a statistical anomaly. Thus, in stark contrast to the powerful and prominent message 
that emanates from police critics’ labels, the Police Department communicates a 
different, much less blatant image of the shooting. The label ‘This event’ therefore 
linearly opposes the personal, emotional, and weighty character of police critics’ 
labels.  
As part of spontaneous discourse, the perceptions conveyed by the NYPD are a 
reflection of a reality in which facts and processes are more important than emotions; 
this is further discussed in Subsection 2.3.3. The perception that the shooting is 
indistinctive fits within this reality, as it is the processes, and not the case itself, that are 
important to the NYPD. As strategic discourse, the approach is a method for deflecting 
the powerful agenda-setting perceptions and images felt, created and reiterated by 
police critics, as further discussed in Subsection 2.3.4. The constructed perception of 




This section examines how police defenders interpret the shooting of Sean Bell within 
a framing of broader developments and issues. While the NYPD does not proactively 
communicate its framings of the shooting, clues can be found in the department’s 
response to the police critics’ framings, and to reporters’ questions in general. The 
analysis in this section is divided into that of the interpretative framings of the shooting 
(Subsection 2.2.1), and that of the interpretative framings of the aftermath of the 
shooting (Subsection 2.2.2).  
 
2.2.1 Framing the shooting: Process, statistics, routine, and 
police uniqueness 
The Police Department’s framings mainly come to light when the organization is 
confronted with the interpretative framings of police critics in press conferences or 
when critical questions are raised by reporters. At these moments, the department lays 
explicit and repeated emphasis on the unusual character of the case (‘Statistically, the 
shooting is an aberration’). By implying that the Sean Bell shooting is an aberration, 
the NYPD refrains from placing the case in a deep/broad historical or organic framing 
of police misconduct and racial injustice, but instead interprets the case as an anomaly 
within a broader pattern of continuous improvement, professionalism and of 
superiority in comparison to other cities. This ‘routine’, marked by ‘calmness’, 
restraint in shootings, and ‘arrests without incidents’ is a framing for the shooting, but 
also for the conduct and specific role of the police.  
 The Police Department puts heavy emphasis on statistics to interpret the Sean 
Bell shooting and other incidents. While police critics interpret the Sean Bell shooting 
from within a broader framing of individual and communally felt hurt that emanates 
from each of the previous police-violence cases individually, the NYPD interprets the 
shooting as a case number, part of the overall pattern of shootings. The commissioner 
abdicates responsibility for this pattern, by saying — as a deterministic proposition — 
that the pattern is practically unchangeable (‘They sometimes come in spurts, they 
sometimes come in groups; that’s the way it is’) and, moreover, is influenced by the 
‘dangers that police officers face’ — a notion that will be further explained below.  
On the broader issue of police conduct, the NYPD interprets its work and 
mandate as unique. This is conveyed both directly (‘no other agency does what we do’) 
and more indirectly (‘A police officer’s split-second decision […] is the weightiest 
responsibility conferred by law’). It is this unique mandate that causes tensions in the 
community (‘The nature of our job in the Police Department is telling people things 
they don’t want to hear’). The uniqueness of the work also results in a vulnerable 
position for the police officer. The department’s framing comprises a sense of potential 
victimization, merging the weight of the work with the vulnerability of the officer 
(‘Cops rid the streets of murderers, drug dealers, thieves, and all too often 
themselves’).  
Although the NYPD admits that shootings often have an unruly character, it is 
the ‘murderers, drug dealers, and thieves’ who rule the streets, and not the police, who 
are responsible for this unruliness. The police are hence forced to make ‘split-second 
decisions’, in which ‘bullets can fly in unintended directions’. The notion of ‘the 
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streets’ occurs frequently in NYPD communication, and even more so in that of police 
defenders (see Part II, Chapter 3). Colloquial speech scholar Irving Lewis Allen, who 
researched the historical and cultural dimensions of the word’s usage in New York, 
points out that the use of the word ‘street’ can refer to ‘fallen from protection’ and 
‘anything can happen, and it is usually bad’.6 His theory is backed by the NYPD’s 
communication, in which the notion of ‘streets’ is linked to ‘murderers, drug dealers, 
and thieves’ and vulnerability, and characterized by a self-centered perspective of 
personal experience. The commissioner’s personal account is telling in this context: 
‘You’re running around and the adrenalin is surging’. 
References to race are rare in the NYPD’s communication. In fact, the NYPD 
does not bring up the issue proactively, but rather responds reactively to critics’ 
questions. In doing so, dogmatic assertions are used that reject the accusations of racial 
injustice. The racial framing itself differs from that of the police critics, as it largely 
ignores the historical and organic dimensions of perceived police misconduct and 
racial injustices. The statement that the Sean Bell shooting was not racial, because ‘two 
of the officers involved were white, one Hispanic and two black’ is a much narrower 
framing than the police critics’ interpretation that the detectives were representing the 
police and that the police represents the white ‘them’ opposing the black ‘us’. 
Moreover, the statement that ‘the number of stops conducted by police officers is 
driven by the situations they encounter on patrol’ does not acknowledge the reality that 
people in black neighborhoods feel singled out by the police. The racial dimension — 
historically and organically limited in the sense of police misconduct and racial 
injustice pattern — is interpreted from within a statistical factual framing in which race 
is just a parameter in the overall pattern of shootings, and not a feeling, method of 
identification, or sense of being.  
 
Summary 
The NYPD — from both a self-centered and statistical perspective — interprets the 
shooting as an aberration and case number, part of a historical pattern of continuous 
improvement, professionalism and of superiority in comparison to other cities, and of 
an organic pattern of calmness, restraint in shootings, and arrests without incidents, in 
which the unique character of the police, as well as the unruliness and lawlessness in 
the streets, are responsible for the incidents that do occur. In the interpretation of the 
NYPD, The role of the police at large is thus rather that of a potential victim than that 
of a perpetrator. In addition, the unique character of the police pits the organization 
against other organizations, and the individual officers against unruly elements in the 
streets. Racial aspects of the shooting and police conduct in general are not interpreted 
as part of a historical or organic pattern of racial injustice, but instead are narrowly 
interpreted by looking at the race of the implicated officers, or in a broader sense, by 
the organization’s own interpretation of stop-and-frisk statistics.  
Although less obviously visible than the police critics’ ‘us-versus-them’ 
framing, the NYPD’s interpretation of the shooting comprises a multilayered ‘us-
versus-them’ component. Not only is the unique nature of the police set against that of 
other organizations, the individual police officer is also pitted against unruly elements 
in the streets. This framing has both an organic and a historical component, although 
the Police Department lays more emphasis on the first. Their ‘us-versus-them’ framing 
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is different from the ‘us-versus-them’ framing constructed by police critics, in that it 
does not comprise components such as race and the civil rights movement. However, 
the NYPD’s framing does comprise elements of victimization, similar to the police 
critics’ framing. On a rhetorical level, the focus on ‘we’ reinforces the ‘us-versus-
them’ interpretation of police conduct. (‘No other agency does what we do’; ‘The 
nature of our job in the Police Department is telling people things they don’t want to 
hear’).  
 
2.2.2 Framing the aftermath of the shooting: A history of proper and 
professional conduct 
Whereas police critics refer to a history of failures on behalf of the police in dealing 
with police-violence incidents, the NYPD rarely refers to historical patterns. The 
shooting of Amadou Diallo is not mentioned, nor is its aftermath. This lack of 
emphasis is telling in the light of a strategic PR perspective: Whereas the police critics 
aim to underline a historical and organic magnitude of failure, it is to the advantage of 
the NYPD to downplay this magnitude. From a spontaneous perspective, the lack of 
emphasis shows how the Police Department believes that the handling of the current 
case should stand on its own, and that history should not be confused with current 
events. Also, it could indicate that the department has a neutral/positive attitude to 
previous or broader processes that take place after a shooting, and that it hence does 
not see the need to mention them.  
On the few occasions that the NYPD does refer to a broader historical framing, 
the police commissioner interprets his own role in the aftermath of the shooting, and 
indirectly that of the department, from within a historical framing of competence, 
openness, diplomatic skills, accountability and the ability of building relationships and 
dealing with police–community problems. The police commissioner aims to show that 
the NYPD in the aftermath of shootings has made considered and well-thought-out 
decisions. This contrasts with the police critics’ framing in two ways. First, it dismisses 
the interpretation that the handling of the Sean Bell shooting is part of a pattern of 
failure on behalf of the police, stressing instead that the organization has historically 
put a lot of effort into this, with very positive results. Second, it interprets the handling 
of the case from within a historical factual process-oriented framing, in contrast to the 
highly emotional framing constructed by police critics. The processes following the 
Sean Bell shooting are also placed within a process-oriented organic framing in which 
the NYPD’s actions and communications do not stand on their own, but heavily 
depend on broader judicial and governmental processes.  
Without referring to previous incidents in either optimistic or pessimistic 
terms, the police appear to have full confidence in the process taking place, and also in 
the external players in this process, such as the RAND Corporation and the United 
States attorney’s office. This positive outlook does not extend completely to the police 
critics. While the NYPD does not often speak about its critics, the existing references 
expose diverging framings on current police critics’ actions and behavior. While Police 
Commissioner Kelly says that Mr. Sharpton has always been ‘forthright’ and never 
‘duplicitous’, Mr. Browne blames Mr. Dunn — and indirectly the organization he 
represents — for being ‘predictable’, ‘uninformed’ and ‘biased.’ Of course, these 
statements are directed at different groups subsumed under the umbrella term ‘police 
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critics’. There are several explanations for this divergence. While both Mr. Sharpton 
and the New York Civil Liberties Union have similar objectives in curbing police 
shootings, the NYPD maintains it has a better working relationship with the former, 
which is detailed in other articles not related to the Sean Bell shooting, but also in the 
interview held with Mr. Browne.
7
 From a strategic PR perspective, however, the 
differences in approach could indicate the NYPD’s understanding and anticipation of 
Mr. Sharpton’s important agenda-setting role in police-violence cases. The New York 
Civil Liberties Union does not claim this role as the organization aims to steer away 
from the emotional aspect of cases and instead prefers to focus on the totality of police-
violence problems, as discussed in Part II, Chapter 1.  
 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
The analysis in this section has shown how the NYPD interprets the shooting, its 
outcome, the processes that have taken place in its aftermath, and the specific conduct 
of the NYPD in all of these, from a self-centered, optimistic, future-oriented, process-
oriented, statistical, and factual framing void of emotions.  
Within this narrow interpretative framing, the shooting is viewed as an 
aberration and a ‘case number’, part of an unchangeable pattern of shootings, but also 
part of a historical and organic pattern of continuous improvement, professionalism, 
superiority in comparison to other cities, calmness, restraint in shootings, and arrests 
without incidents, in which the unique character of the police, as well as the unruliness 
and lawlessness in the streets, are responsible for the incidents that do occur. This 
results in a related interpretative ‘us-versus-them’ framing in which the ‘us’ component 
is characterized by uniqueness and potential victimization and the ‘them’ component 
by being an outsider and by potential culpability. The racial aspects of the shooting are 
also part of a narrow framing, in which the race of the implicated officers, and the 
organization’s own interpretation of statistics, determine whether the shooting and the 
conduct of the police in general are racist. The aftermath of the shooting, in turn, is part 
of a historical and organic pattern of competence, openness, diplomatic skills, 
accountability and the ability of building relationships and dealing with police–
community problems. While the police interpret the role and conduct of others in the 
debate positively, the interpretation of the role and conduct of police critics is mixed.  
The framings of both the shooting and its aftermath are conveyed infrequently 
and subtly. Only when Sean Bell is not the main topic of discussion does the NYPD 
appear to speak out more freely. In a broader sense, the framings of both shooting and 
aftermath are the interpretative antithesis of the framings held and constructed by 
police critics. This converse character can be explained from both a spontaneous 
perspective and a strategic PR perspective. As spontaneous discourse, the statements 
convey the interpretations of the NYPD, which are different from the police critics due 
to framings that simply do not match. Conversely, as strategic PR discourse, the 
statements aim to divert attention from the profound historical and organic 
interpretations found in the press and held by other stakeholders, which gives more 
insight into the positioning of the NYPD in the debate. This communication strategy is 
much more subtle than the police critics’ strategies.  
On a rhetorical level, the vocabulary is nondescript, factual and detached. 
Whereas Mr. Sharpton and other community leaders use passionate and rousing oratory 
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to amplify the magnitude of police misconduct and racial injustice, the Police 
Department deliberately appears to avoid such rhetoric. Still, dogmatic assertions are 
used that reject the accusations of racial injustice. 
In conclusion, the interpretative framings held and constructed by the NYPD 
are — similar to those constructed by police critics — the linkage between perceptions 
and positioning. To start with the former, the interpretations discussed in this section 
function as a deeper layer of perception and interpretation, fuelling the labels discussed 
in Section 2.1. While the non-committal and nondescript images that are part of the 
label ‘This event’ link to the deeper interpretative framing of the shooting as an 
aberration and a ‘case number’, the scattered images ‘unusualness’ ‘seconds’, ‘order’ 
and ‘peace’ refer to both the historical pattern and organic pattern of proper, 
professional conduct during and after shootings, as well as to the unique character of 
policing, and the consequential dangers and uniqueness that sets ‘us’ against ‘them’. In 
a broader sense, the personalized/distinctive ‘us’ and the depersonalized/indistinctive 
‘them’ images discussed in Section 2.1 are also a product of both the self-centered 
perspective and the unique role that the NYPD attributes to itself. The framings also 





This section takes a closer look at the way the NYPD positions itself in the debate and 
how it communicates towards other stakeholders. The reluctant, passive, nondescript 
and non-committal way in which the NYPD conveys its perceptions and interpretations 
on the shooting have already revealed that the department does not seek a profound, 
outspoken positioning in the debate.  
 
2.3.1 The delineation of debate: Appropriateness of process and topic 
The NYPD does not speak about a desired outcome and playing field of debate. The 
need for justice, or even the word justice, is not part of the discourse from the NYPD 
as reported in the New York Times. On a broader note, the NYPD never once speaks 
about how it envisions a specific desired ending of the process that ensued after the 
Sean Bell shooting. Police Commissioner Kelly in fact deflects reporters’ questions on 
the outcome of debate.  
However, the department does speak of objectives to be accomplished in the 
aftermath of the shooting, by repeatedly using the adjective ‘appropriate’, not only for 
its own actions (‘appropriate follow-up’), but also in a more general way to refer to 
pinpointed steps in the debate (‘what discipline is appropriate for the officers 
involved’). Although the NYPD does not actively link the adjective ‘appropriate’ to an 
overall objective, it does suggest that all appropriate actions and procedural steps are 
‘appropriately’ conducted by the appropriate persons, as the department labels actions 
in the debate as either ‘appropriate’ (‘The NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau is conducting 
appropriate follow-up’) or ‘inappropriate’ (‘it’s inappropriate for me to comment on 
the verdict’). The adjective ‘appropriate’ to a certain extent resembles the definition of 
justice discussed in the previous chapter:  
 
Appropriate  
 Adjective  
1 Suitable; proper.8 
 
While justice refers to ‘just behavior or treatment’, appropriate refers to ‘proper’, 
which in turn can include proper behavior/treatment. The difference is that the notion 
of justice often refers to the judicial system, and the adjective ‘appropriate’ does not 
necessarily do so. It does not even have to refer to behavior or treatment. The adjective 
‘appropriate’ is both non-specific and flexible. Moreover, while the police critics pair 
the notion of ‘just behavior or treatment’ with rigidly defined conditions, condensed in 
the label ‘Justice for Sean Bell’, the NYPD does not do this. In addition, it is unclear 
who (i.e. which stakeholder) decides on the conditions for appropriateness, and 
whether this varies depending on different moments in the aftermath. The NYPD does 
not clearly specify whether this ‘appropriateness’ refers to the consensual standards set 
by all New Yorkers, police critics, governmental and judicial stakeholders, or simply 
the police themselves.  
The NYPD’s use of the adjective ‘appropriate’ only appears to delimit the 
desired objective of debate in that each sequential action/milestone in the debate should 
be ‘appropriate’. The emphasis on the notion of appropriateness does show that the 
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NYPD positions itself as but a cog in a larger scheme, a passive player whose interest 
is for the debate to develop along set lines and for stakeholders, including the NYPD 
itself, to heed these ‘appropriate’ guidelines. The outcome of debate, in other words, is 
less important to the NYPD than the process of debate.  
The NYPD’s overall objective that the process of debate should be conducted 
appropriately is in line with the process-oriented, factual interpretation of the shooting 
and its aftermath. The NYPD therefore does not act like a catalyst in the debate, as the 
police critics do with their energizing and agenda-setting label ‘No justice, no peace’. 
Instead, the department is a deliberately passive actor. 
The fact that the NYPD communicates in indefinite terms about its 
delimitation of debate does not imply that it maintains a flexible and broad positioning. 
Instead, and if anything, it shows that the department keeps its demarcation non-
specific, similar to the way the institution conveys perceptions and interpretations of 
the shooting. This, in itself, can be seen as a delimiting objective. 
 Thus the (delimiting) objective in the debate/the desired process of debate — 
captured in the non-specific, process-oriented notion of ‘appropriateness’ — is dual-
layered. The first layer of the NYPD’s objective in the aftermath is that all 
‘appropriate’ steps should be taken, by the appropriate organizations, at the appropriate 
time. The second layer, which is more concealed in the available communication and 
captured in the non-specific character of the notion of appropriateness, is the NYPD’s 
objective not to take sides at any moment in the aftermath of the shooting. 
 
The rigidity of appropriateness: defense by ad hoc reasoning  
This dual-layered objective in the debate/the desired process of debate is challenged 
frequently. To start with, the police commissioner responds to reporters’ questions that 
conflict with the second layer of his objective in the debate with non-committal 
statements (‘We don’t have enough information yet in this case’, ‘I can’t have a 
visceral reaction’). It is striking that throughout the aftermath of the shooting, the 
NYPD gives different reasons for the department’s reticence. While directly after the 
shooting there was not yet enough evidence according to Mr. Kelly, making it 
inappropriate to comment on the verdict, the police commissioner emphasizes, after the 
acquittals, ‘the disciplinary action that might emanate from’ the case he is responsible 
for. The ad hoc nature of his reasoning (which results in a consistent rejection) 
suggests that Mr. Kelly’s refusal to give a reaction can be classified rather as strategic 
PR discourse aimed at deflecting persistent reporters’ questions than as spontaneous 
discourse, showing how the NYPD aims to safeguard its objectives by giving evasive 
answers to stakeholders’ questions. Commissioner Kelly’s approach is reinforced by 
the statements made by Mr. Browne and his team. Mr. Browne’s approach linearly 
opposes the PR strategy of police critics and in particular that of Mr. Sharpton: While 
the latter incorporates passionate and rousing oratory in its communication in order to 
stimulate agenda-setting, and in a broader sense functions as a catalyst, Mr. Browne’s 
approach is conversely more typical of evasive PR discourse that does not answer the 
questions asked by the press (‘What we look at is the totality of the situation’, ‘We 
don’t know the totality of this event yet’). 
The first layer of the NYPD’s objective in the debate is also challenged, for 
example by remarks that the conduct of the police was inappropriate. As a response, 
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the focus on appropriateness is intensified (‘The mayor is certainly entitled to his 
opinion. […] I think we need an in-depth examination of all the facts’). This focus on 
process can also be seen as a means of avoiding talking about the incident, hence 
linking to the second layer of the NYPD’s objective in debate.  
 
Summary 
This subsection has shown how the dual-layered objective in the debate — captured in 
the evasive, process-oriented notion of ‘appropriateness’ — comprises both the 
NYPD’s desire that all ‘appropriate’ steps should be taken in the ‘Sean Bell’ debate by 
the appropriate organizations, and at the appropriate time; and second, the desire that 
the NYPD does not commit itself and take sides at any moment in the aftermath of the 
shooting. By using non-committal and evasive rhetoric, by not answering questions, 
and by focusing on process, the police heavily safeguard their objectives; this reveals 
how rigidly defined this overall objective in fact is to the NYPD. Phrased differently, 
while the second layer of the NYPD’s objective in the debate is challenged, it does not 
give in to challenges. The NYPD in fact delimits the playing field/process of debate by 
deciding what is ‘appropriate’ to talk about, and what is not. Thus, while the notion of 
appropriateness at first glance is non-committal and evasive, it in fact delimits the 
scope of debate. The second part of the discussion in this subsection has also exposed 
how these two layers of the desired process of debate interact with each other: The 
focus on ‘appropriate’ processes is a strategy to deflect debate challenges. 
 
2.3.2 The delineation of reality: Deflective ‘us-versus-them’ positioning 
This subsection scrutinizes the scope of the reality held by the NYPD by looking at 
how broadly the department defines reality and how this reality is challenged, as well 
as to what extent Police Commissioner Kelly and Mr. Browne display understanding 
for multiple interpretations. This subsection also examines whether the NYPD 
positions itself in an ‘us-versus-them’ manner similar to the police critics. It also looks 
at the decisions made in regard to the Sean Bell shooting and the broader solutions 
presented by the Police Department to prevent future incidents. 
The NYPD’s persistent refusal to judge the shooting stands in stark contrast 
with the police critics’ insistence on knowing and telling the only version of the truth. 
While the police critics rigidly define the culpability for the shooting, the NYPD does 
not speak out about this. In addition, the NYPD does not act as a legal expert, in the 
same way as Mr. Sharpton does, nor does it comment on the developments that take 
place in court. While it is impossible to determine how rigidly the police commissioner 
delimits the reality of either the detectives or the victims as truthful, the reticence in 
itself characterizes the positioning of the Police Department. Whereas Police 
Commissioner Kelly and Mr. Browne do not actively promote their own version of 
truth, they do not display understanding for the version of the victims either.  
 Conversely, the NYPD does give insights into the delimitation of its reality 
concerning how the NYPD is handling the shooting incident, and, in a broader context, 
how the organization is dealing with the police–community problem and allegations of 
police violence. What is striking in the communication of the police commissioner is 
the extent to which he commends his personal actions and those of his department, 
demonstrating how the NYPD rigidly defines its own performance as ‘appropriate’ and 
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‘the best we’ve ever had’. In this sense, the conditions for the adjective ‘appropriate’ 
are set by the NYPD itself, and by no one else. Thus, although the NYPD does not 
clearly delineate the shooting and the issue of culpability, it does rigidly delimit its 
responsibility in regard to police–community relations problems and to its handling of 
the aftermath of the shooting, by excluding blame.  
Within this strict delimitation of the broader sense of police responsibility, 
there is not much room for the reality held by police critics, which is only occasionally 
understood and referred to. The police’s rigid definition of this broader reality hence 
consists mostly of a single version of the truth of the handling of the shooting and 
police–community relations in general, in which hardly any other interpretations, 
perceptions and viewpoints are possible.  
 
Proactive decisions: ‘We’ll put in place what we think is appropriate’ 
The NYPD conveys several proactive decisions in regard to the Sean Bell shooting and 
offers several solutions for broader community-relations problems. These include the 
impounding of the implicated officers’ guns (just after the shooting), the 
commissioning and release of the RAND investigation into the effectiveness of the 
NYPD’s firearms training (January 2007 and June 2008), the adoption of sobriety test 
measures (June 2007), and the commissioning and release of another RAND 
investigation into the department’s stop-and-frisk data (autumn 2007).  
Although the proposed measures and investigations appear to be coalition 
oriented and the Police Department shows preparedness to implement them by 
focusing on speed and meticulousness and being on top of the process, it does so from 
within its own framing of the shooting based on its own conditions for appropriateness 
and its interpretation of statistics by the department itself or by organizations the police 
critics do not approve of. Take for example the statements made after the release of the 
second RAND report, when analytical remarks from police critics were ignored. While 
the NYPD decides by itself what is appropriate (‘We’ll put in place what we think is 
appropriate as quickly as possible’), the solutions presented emanate from the 
department’s own conditions for ‘appropriateness’, and not from those of the police 
critics (‘Christopher Dunn of the civil liberties group called the report “an example of 
them not doing analysis and instead looking for justifications. It simply reflects the 
dishonesty that runs through this report”’).  
In the language used to convey these decisions, the NYPD seems to 
depersonalize every aspect of the Sean Bell case. While the measures were called in 
response to the Bell shooting, Mr. Kelly does not proactively link the name Sean Bell 
to the solutions, nor does he link the second RAND investigation to the specific 
questions raised by the shooting (‘We didn’t say, “Hey, take a look at this case”.’). The 
nondescript and informal character of the latter statement underlines the dismissal of 
the police critics’ weighty desires. While the remark also refers to the broad scope of 
the research, which does match the police critics’ objectives, it is the language used 
that undermines the coalition-oriented character of the message. 
The NYPD thus does not seek common ground with the reality held by police 
critics. While the police commissioner does not deny their reality that ‘the police have 
a community-relations problem’, he does not acknowledge this reality either, nor does 
he convey a more mainstream conception that the police and the community have a 
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problem. While references to the problems remain vague, the discourse does not 
acknowledge the historical dimensions of the police critics’ interpretation of police 
misconduct and racial injustice. The fact that the RAND group in its first investigation 
was not asked to look at personal characteristics like the race and age of perpetrators or 
victims in police shootings, also shows how the reality of police critics is ignored. 
 
Reality challenges 
An analysis of how the NYPD reacts when their reality concerning the shooting is 
challenged by other stakeholders is almost impossible, as the NYPD does not 
proactively convey its reality concerning the shooting, nor its delimitation of this 
reality. The only images conveyed by the police are ‘indistinctiveness’, ‘process’, 
‘unusualness’ ‘seconds’, ‘order’ and ‘peace’. These images do give insight into the 
positioning of the NYPD, as they show to what extent the organization seeks common 
ground with the reality of other stakeholders. In itself, the perceptions of 
indistinctiveness and process and the statement ‘I can’t have a reaction’ do not appear 
to dismiss the reality held by police critics on the shooting, yet they do ignore it. Not 
only won’t the NYPD respond to the reality felt by police critics, its factual reaction is 
clearly not in line with the emotionally charged reality perceived by the police critics. 
However, on a deeper level the NYPD does dismiss the police critics’ reality. By 
conveying the scattered images of ‘indistinctiveness’, ‘unusualness’ ‘seconds’, ‘order’ 
and ‘peace’, the NYPD subtly dismisses the reality of the police critics captured in the 
labels ‘I am/We love Sean Bell’, and ‘50 shots’ while diminishing its inherent images 
of magnitude, lawlessness, emotionality, and group identification. This dismissal is 
supported by subtle rhetoric. By using words such as ‘probably’, no definite statements 
are made regarding police culpability for the incident. Conversely, dogmatic assertions 
and emphatic word choices are used to refute the ‘50 shots’ image (‘You can’t view 
this as monolithic’, ‘The most important thing is the first shot’), thus presenting a 
delimiting reality concerning the events that occurred during the shooting. 
 The reality challenges in regard to the NYPD’s handling of the aftermath of 
the shooting, as well as the reality concerning broader police–community problems, are 
relatively easier to research. This is possible due to the fact that the NYPD has 
conveyed the demarcation lines of these realities, as well as the realities themselves, 
which are characterized by a history of proper and professional police conduct and the 
perception that the NYPD’s handling is ‘appropriate’.  
The NYPD’s reality of proper and professional police conduct is challenged on 
many occasions, for instance when the police investigation into the existence of a 
‘fourth man’ in the car received much skepticism and was criticized for its 
overzealousness; when the NYPD was questioned by the NYCLU about its 
relationship with the Civilian Control Review Board (CCRB); when the Police 
Department, during a city council meeting, received critical questions from council 
members on the performance of the department and Mr. Barron asked the police 
commissioner to resign; when the department received criticism on the stop-and-frisk 
numbers published in the spring of 2008; when, after the shooting of Khiel Coppin, the 
department received criticism on handcuffing people who have been shot by the police; 
and when the police announced the start of an internal investigation into the conduct of 
the implicated officers.  
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The NYPD responds to such reality challenges foremost by focusing on 
procedure and facts. For example, by saying that handcuffing wounded perpetrators ‘is 
standard procedure’, the NYPD refers to its own self-centered interpretative framing of 
procedures and proper conduct, while ignoring the emotions-driven reality held by 
police critics. At times, the department also conveys the deterministic belief that the 
processes themselves cannot be altered (‘He said there was nothing he could do about 
the skepticism about the existence of a fourth man’), a notion that will from now on be 
referred to as ‘process determinism’. The department also responds to such challenges 
by lauding its own conduct, for example for having a training program that is ‘among 
the best that there is’ and for having a force that is ‘more diverse than ever’ (as a 
response to the criticism at the city council hearing). By saying this, Mr. Kelly 
indirectly argues that the police critics’ perception that the police are culpable for 
mistreatment of African Americans must be wrong, thus revealing the delimitation of 
his own reality and the dismissal of others. By acknowledging ‘the need to deal with 
the perception of mistreatment’, Mr. Kelly might be seeking common ground with the 
reality conveyed by police critics at the council hearing that ‘too many African-
American New Yorkers feel that they are at risk’, but he does not acknowledge the 
overall perceived reality by police critics that the police have a community-relations 
problem. 
 The department thus does not respond to the realities held by police critics. For 
example, in reaction to this criticism from the NYCLU, Mr. Browne does not respond 
to the specific reality conveyed by the NYCLU that the Police Department should be 
‘much more responsive to the board recommendations’. By not responding he also 
ignores the broader reality held by police critics concerning police misconduct and 
racial injustice. The spokesman responds only to the broader criticism conveyed by the 
NYCLU that the NYPD ‘has ignored the CCRB’ and arguably ‘has been hostile to the 
CCRB’, by lauding the department itself, thus reiterating the interpretative framing of a 
competent organization capable of dealing with police–community problems. In 
addition, he also sullies the NYCLU’s motives and methods of criticism (‘as 
uninformed as it is predictable and biased’), which is an unusual strategy within a 
broader pattern of nondescript, evasive, contained, rhetoric typical for deflective 
strategic PR discourse. Similarly, when Mr. Browne responds to a reality challenge 
comprising questions raised by police critics on the openness of the internal trials, the 
spokesman ignores their reality ‘that people don’t have confidence that justice is being 
served’ because the decision-making process ‘takes place outside of the public’s view’. 
Mr. Browne ignores this criticism by referring to normal guidelines and procedures 
(‘After the trial, the trial record is available’) and he moreover does not mention that 
this practice is contested by some critics, such as Joel Berger from the Citizens Union 
Board (‘The process of decision-making is so opaque, and takes place outside of the 
public’s view, that people don’t have confidence that justice is being served’).  
 
From rigidly defined reality to an ‘us-versus-them’ positioning  
While the NYPD does not explicitly speak of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the Police Department 
does convey personalized/distinctive ‘us’ and depersonalized/indistinctive ‘them’ 
images, as discussed in Subsection 2.1.1, and subtly communicates an ‘us-versus-them’ 
interpretative framing in which the ‘us’ component is characterized by uniqueness and 
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potential victimization and the ‘them’ component by being an outsider and by potential 
culpability, as discussed in Section 2.2. In combination with the disregard and subtle 
dismissal of other realities, this leads to a different ‘us-versus-them’ positioning in 
which a personalized/distinctive, capable and unique ‘us’ decides on what is 
‘appropriate’, while a depersonalized/indistinctive, potentially harmful ‘them’, 
including their desired outcome of debate and reality, are largely ignored in the public 
debate. 
While the perceptions of ‘them’ are not explicitly quoted by the New York 
Times, during a personal interview, Mr. Browne speaks more candidly of how the 
department perceives ‘them’, especially in regard to the department’s handling of the 
shooting. Mr. Browne believes that different stakeholder groups are ‘against’ the 
police, particularly in connection with the Sean Bell shooting. While the public as a 
whole is perceived as unsympathetic to the role of the Police Department and the 
officers implicated in the Sean Bell shooting, the media and police critics, who Mr. 
Browne sees as a hostile, aggressive but also insincere ‘them’, are more constantly 
pitted against the police. 
 
Summary 
While the NYPD appears to avoid delineation of its reality concerning the shooting, on 
a deeper level, a different picture becomes apparent: With the combined focus on 
indistinctiveness and process, the NYPD subtly ignores the reality of police critics, and 
with the scattered images of ‘indistinctiveness’, ‘unusualness’ ‘seconds’, ‘order’ and 
‘peace’, the NYPD subtly dismisses the reality of the police critics concerning the 
shooting, captured in the labels ‘I am/We love Sean Bell’, and ‘50 shots’. The counter-
images presented by the NYPD diminish the labels’ inherent images of magnitude, 
lawlessness, emotionality, and group identification. On a rhetorical level, the NYPD 
uses dogmatic assertions and emphatic expressions to underline this subtle dismissal.  
Conversely, the NYPD defines and delimits the reality in regard to its own 
conduct more profoundly as ‘appropriate’ and ‘the best we’ve ever had’, thus rigidly 
excluding blame for the organization’s conduct during the aftermath and for police–
community problems at large. In other words, the Police Department maintains a single 
version of the truth of the handling of the shooting and police–community relations in 
general, in which hardly any other interpretations, perceptions and viewpoints are 
possible.  
This rigid delimitation surfaces when the NYPD presents solutions to the 
problems of which the Sean Bell shooting is a part. While the solutions presented 
appear themselves to be conciliatory, the language used to convey these solutions, as 
well as the roots of the solutions, are based on the organization’s own conditions for 
appropriateness, including its self-interpretation of statistics, and the evaluation of 
third-party research. Hence these solutions exclusively match the NYPD’s own 
framing of its conduct and police–community problems, while ignoring those 
conveyed by other stakeholders. Moreover, the link between the Sean Bell shooting 
and the solutions is not explicitly made. 
The NYPD responds to reality challenges concerning its conduct with 
strategies such as process determinism; indistinctiveness; merely focusing on an aspect 
of the reality held by police critics and not acknowledging or showing understanding 
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for this reality; not answering questions, setting unilateral standards for what is 
appropriate behavior for the NYPD; and profoundly lauding its own conduct (and thus 
implying that the perceptions of police critics must be biased). Such dismissal also 
reveals itself on a rhetorical level: The chosen vocabulary is factual, which in itself 
does not seek common ground with the emotionally charged reality held by police 
critics. In contrast to Mr. Sharpton’s passionate and rousing oratory, the language used 
in the statements can be typified as bland, factual, and in line with institutional public 
relations responses that do not give any judgment, but do not answer the questions 
either. By doing this, again, the reality of police critics concerning the NYPD’s 
conduct is ignored.  
 The NYPD’s delimiting reality concerning the conduct of the police, and to a 
lesser extent its reality concerning the shooting, specifically lead to an ‘us-versus-
them’ positioning, in which the ‘them’ group comprises a multitude of different 
contingents pitted against the department. 
 
2.3.3 The driving force of response and the filter of debate: 
Facts and processes 
This subsection takes a brief look at how the nondescript, process-oriented, factual and 
detached character of the NYPD’s communication relates to the driving force and filter 
of debate. The NYPD’s driving force comes to light in Mr. Kelly’s official statement 
after the acquittals. By saying that he cannot have a visceral reaction and that opinions 
should be based on facts, the commissioner appeals to logic and reason over emotion. 
By doing so he literally opposes the emotive communication and emotions-driven 
reality of police critics. His discourse is thus not emotions-driven, but facts-, process- 
and response-driven.  
The corpus also shows that the handling of the case is interpreted from a 
factual organic framing. This framing, in turn, reveals the filter of debate. While the 
police critics interpret each new development in the aftermath through an emotional 
filter, the NYPD, conversely, interprets developments in the aftermath from a clinical, 
procedural, scientific and dispassionate filter. Thus, while Nicole Paultre Bell said after 
the acquittals: ‘April 25, 2008, they killed Sean all over again,’ Commissioner Kelly 
remarks that the NYPD will ‘await word from the United States attorney before we 
will proceed with any formal investigation’. Similarly, the remark from Sean Bell’s 
father ‘What are they trying to do? […] Destroy their bodies?’ is the polar opposite of 
Mr. Browne’s clinical comment: ‘What we look at is the totality of the situation.’ 
As a final point, it is important that, while NYPD’s communication is facts-, 
process- and response-driven, it is also driven by the rigid positioning and 
magnitudinal labels maintained and zealously communicated by police critics, and by 
the critical questions asked by reporters. Police Commissioner Kelly’s statements after 
the acquittals for example are made in response to the police critics’ strong positioning, 
although he does not admit that.  
 The NYPD’s facts-, process- and response-driven communication can be seen 
not only as spontaneous discourse, but also as deflective PR communication, aimed at 
delimiting debate and reality. The driving force and filter of debate are the polar 
opposite of the emotional perspective held by police critics, and the passionate and 




2.3.4 The character of communication: Deflection 
The communication methods scrutinized so far in this chapter include process 
determinism; indistinctiveness; singling out an aspect of the reality held by police 
critics, but not showing the full picture; not acknowledging or showing understanding 
for the police critics’ reality; not answering questions; the setting of unilateral 
standards for what is appropriate behavior — only by the NYPD itself, and not by 
external stakeholders/organizations; profoundly lauding personal efforts (and thus 
implying that the perceptions of police critics must be biased); presenting solutions that 
are based on the organization’s own conditions for appropriateness (including its self-
interpretation of statistics, and the evaluation of third-party research); the 
communication of nondescript and depersonalized perceptions that diminish the 
magnitude of the powerful police critics’ labels, and the communication of specific 
interpretative framings that lack emphasis on historical and organic depth, thus 
diminishing the magnitude of the police critics’ interpretative framings.  
 The nature of these communication methods differs very much from that used 
by police critics. Overall, the communication is not confrontational, but much more 
defensive and deflective in its response to reality and debate challenges. The fact that a 
lot of responses to the press are made by a police official or by Mr. Browne, and not by 
the police commissioner himself, further underlines the New York Police Department’s 
deflective communication strategy. 
While the NYPD does not use confrontational methods, its deflective methods 
can equally be characterized as harsh, as the perceptions, interpretations, and 
positioning of the police critics — purposely or not — are ignored. These deflective 
communication methods can hence have an equally detrimental effect on the debate.  
All of these methods can be either seen as spontaneous discourse, or as PR 
strategies marked by bland, factual responses that do not give any judgment, but do not 
answer the questions asked either. 
 
2.3.5 Multiple hues: Conciliatory communication 
So far, the positioning of the NYPD in the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting can be 
characterized as relatively inflexible as the department communicates its own 
objectives as well as its perceived reality concerning the shooting in nondescript terms, 
and, in addition, rigidly defines the reality regarding its handling of the shooting as 
well as broader police–community problems. Moreover, in its communication the 
organization ignores — and at times dismisses — large segments of the reality held by 
police critics concerning the Sean Bell shooting and the broader patterns of police 
misconduct, racial injustice, and the civil rights movement against systematic judicial 
and political failures.  
 Although most of the NYPD’s communication fits within this characterization, 
there are certainly exceptions. However, the NYPD’s discourse cannot simply be 
divided in coalition-oriented communication and non-coalition-oriented 
communication. Instead, conciliatory communication and uncompromising 
communication are mostly entwined, and moreover, communication that appears 
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coalition-oriented often has a deeper, contrasting, layer. Also, it is hard to determine 
what common ground there is, as the NYPD does not convey its positioning explicitly. 
 
Four different gradations can be identified in the language used by the NYPD:  
 
1. Communication that is not coalition-oriented, and does not appear to be either. 
This type of communication has been left out of the discussion of this subsection. 
It includes most of the nondescript, evasive and non-committal statements made. It 
also includes explicit non-conciliatory communication, which does not occur very 
frequently: Only Mr. Browne’s remark on the NYCLU is truly not coalition-
oriented.  
2. Communication that appears to be coalition-oriented, mainly by its focus on 
process (‘We have prepared’), but on a deeper level is often used as a way of 
avoiding an official reaction (thus safeguarding the department’s objective in the 
debate) and of deflecting criticism and ignoring the reality held by police critics 
(thus rigidly delimiting the NYPD reality). Such communication is characterized 
by nondescript, factual and detached characterizations typical of deflective 
strategic PR discourse. The vagueness about future deadlines further diminishes 
the coalition-oriented approach. 
3. Communication that appears to be coalition-oriented, as it acknowledges the 
existence of police critics’ perceptions and provides solutions that support this 
acknowledgement. However, on a deeper level such communication is only to a 
certain extent coalition-oriented, as it does not acknowledge culpability or show 
true understanding for the reality held by police critics: It acknowledges the 
existence of perceptions, but maintains that the perceptions themselves are biased 
(‘They want crime to go down, but they don’t want to be stopped and they don’t 
want their sons to be stopped, so it’s a challenge’, ‘Just because it might not look 
pretty […] doesn’t mean what the police are doing is not a good thing’. The word 
choice remains cautious. Not only do the statements comprise verbs and adverbs 
expressing uncertainty or possibility, they are also nondescript: Instead of 
addressing the special role of community leaders in serving as a gauge for 
community problems, the NYPD remains vague in its descriptions such as ‘We’ve 
had complaints from people’. This type of communication occurs more often when 
Sean Bell is not the main topic of debate, but a side issue. 
4. Communication that is coalition-oriented, as it not only acknowledges the 
existence of the reality held by police critics, but also displays understanding for 
this reality while acknowledging partial culpability and offering solutions that truly 
seek common ground (‘We need to do a better job of saying: “Hey, we got the 
wrong person. We apologize”.’). Such communication is characterized by 
spontaneous, upfront and descriptive vocabulary, unlike the deflective strategic PR 
discourse discussed throughout this chapter. The department on these occasions 
actively listens to community feelings, combined with an action-oriented approach 
(‘So, we know that we constantly have to work at keeping strong relations with our 
community’). The vocabulary used is much more spontaneous, upfront and 





While the second gradation is especially pervasive in NYPD discourse, the first and 
fourth are the least common. In a more general sense, it is important to note that all 
statements discussed in this chapter are for the most part reactive responses. The 
commissioner and his spokesperson are mainly responding to questions from the press 
and are not proactively seeking attention in the way that Mr. Sharpton and other 




This section has shown how the overall positioning of the NYPD, held by Police 
Commissioner Kelly and his communication team, is rigid, while characterized by 
factuality and process.  
The NYPD’s communication is driven by processes and facts, but also by 
reporters’ questions and by the police critics’ powerful agenda-setting perceptions and 
positioning. In addition, process and facts serve as a filter through which actions are 
perceived, assessed, and responded to.  
The rigidity, often hidden in the fabric of language used by the NYPD, is 
different in nature to that of police critics, but can be found in similar aspects of the 
positioning, i.e. in the process-oriented notion of ‘appropriateness’, in the realities and 
solutions held and presented (or purposely not presented) in regard to the shooting and 
in the conduct of the police in handling the aftermath of the shooting and broader 
police–community problems — the latter defined and delimited as ‘appropriate’ and 
‘the best we’ve ever had’. In addition, the methods used to convey these notions are 
harsh, as the perceptions, interpretations, and positioning of the police critics are — 
purposely or not — ignored. On a rhetorical level, the NYPD’s vocabulary is 
nondescript, factual, and detached, while the department also uses rhetorical strategies 
such as reiteration by which it in fact emphasizes the evasiveness. This reiterative 
evasiveness comes to light in the communication of key labels such as 
‘appropriateness’. In turn, some dogmatic assertions and emphatic expressions are used 
to dismiss — in a subtle manner — the reality of others. 
All of this results in a different kind of ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, in which 
a personalized/distinctive, capable and unique ‘us’ decides on what is ‘appropriate’, 
while a depersonalized/indistinctive ‘them’, as well as their desired outcome of debate, 
are largely ignored. It is important to note that the NYPD’s concept of ‘them’ is 
multifaceted: On a ‘street’ level, ‘them’ comprises hostile, potentially dangerous 
people pitted against the police, while in the public debate the NYPD finds itself pitted 
against hostile media, police critics and, in the Sean Bell case, also against the general 
public. The deflective positioning, typical for evasive PR discourse, only rarely seeks 
common ground with other realities or desired outcomes of debate.  
 Location and time are factors that influence the positioning of the NYPD: The 
Police Department is more deflective and delimits its objectives and its reality more 
rigidly when confronted with challenging questions on key moments in the aftermath 
of the shooting, while it is more outspoken and upfront and displays more flexible 
definitions of debate and reality when Sean Bell is not the main topic of the discussion. 
There are four identified gradations of positioning, ranging from communication that is 
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2.4 Conclusion and outlook 
This chapter examined the perceptions, interpretations, and positioning held, 
maintained, constructed and conveyed by the NYPD. The overall nature of the 
communication uttered by the Police Department can be characterized as deflective, 
non-committal, reactive, self-centered, self-praising, optimistic, future-oriented and 
process-oriented, with a subtly communicated ‘us-versus-them’ schism molding the 
different elements of discourse. Each of these elements shapes the communication in a 
different way. 
First, the deflective, non-committal, and reactive nature of the discourse, 
driven by the agenda-setting labels and positioning of police critics — but also 
influenced by the institutional and judicial restrictions mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter — makes it hard to expose the organization’s perceptions, interpretations, 
and positioning. Yet the evasiveness itself and, more specifically, the nondescript, non-
individuating and non-committal word choice, demonstrates how the NYPD perceives 
the shooting and its victims, as well as the broader movement in support of the victims, 
in an indistinctive fashion — captured in the label ‘This event’. The evasiveness also 
shows how the organization often interprets the shooting and the role of police critics 
in an indistinctive and non-emphatic way; the former as just a ‘number’ that is part of a 
larger statistical picture. Deflection is also used to secure the desired process of debate, 
and to ignore realities held by other stakeholders including those on their perception of 
police culpability. This makes deflection a profound communication tool for the 
NYPD.  
 A second key component in the language used by the NYPD is that it is facts-, 
process- and response-driven, which in many ways complements the deflective, 
cautious nature of the communication. This might seem a contradiction at first glance, 
yet the NYPD is profoundly selective in disseminating facts during the aftermath of the 
Sean Bell shooting, which makes the overall nature of the communication deflective. 
The facts- and process-driven nature of the communication results in the perception 
that the shooting is but a ‘case’, a statistical anomaly, an aberration within a larger 
statistics-driven framing, while the Police Department characterizes its own conduct, 
and the events that take place after the shooting, by the notions ‘preparedness’, ‘order’, 
and ‘peace’ — all of which are process-oriented. In turn, the organization judges its 
own conduct, which in itself is process-determined, by existing procedures and 
guidelines. Moreover, the NYPD presents the pattern of shootings itself as an 
incontrovertible fact. In its positioning, the NYPD’s umbrella objective in 
debate/desired process of debate and the negotiation space are all captured in the 
process-oriented notion of ‘appropriateness’. Moreover, the Police Department 
responds to debate and reality challenges by focusing on process. The focus on process 
is thus a second profound communication tool for the NYPD.  
 Third, the self-centered, optimistic, and self-praising nature of the 
communication projects the perceptions of ‘appropriate conduct’, an organization that 
is ‘on top of the process’, and the ‘indistinctive’ images of ‘seconds’, ‘order’ and 
‘peace’. In addition, this specific nature of the communication is reflected in the 
interpretative framing of the shooting within a historical and organic pattern of 
continuous improvement, professionalism, superiority in comparison to other cities, 
calmness, restraint in shootings, and arrests without incidents, in which the unique 
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character of the police, as well as the unruliness and lawlessness in the streets, are 
responsible for the incidents that do occur. Moreover, the processes after the shooting 
are framed within a historical and organic pattern of competence, openness, diplomatic 
skills, accountability and the ability to build relationships and deal with police–
community problems. The positioning is also shaped by this specific nature of 
discourse: Not only is the rigidly defined reality of the department’s conduct ‘the best 
we’ve ever had’, the latter proposition is also used to dismiss the reality held by police 
critics, including that on police culpability. Thus, self-praise is a third communication 
tool used by the NYPD.  
On a rhetorical level, the specific nature of the discourse is marked by 
nondescript, factual and detached vocabulary, but also — at first glance paradoxically 
— by reiteration, dogmatic assertions and some emphatic expressions aimed at 
underlining the non-committal nature of the NYPD’s positioning. Moreover, the latter 
types of strategy are used to emphasize some of the issues on which the NYPD does 
commit itself, such as their perception that the shooting was not racial. The rhetoric is 
also marked by a lack of references to the name of Sean Bell, other victims in the 
shooting, or the group of police critics at large.  
The communication strategies used to convey the perceptions, interpretations 
and positioning range from process determinism; indistinctiveness; merely focusing on 
an aspect of the reality held by police critics and not acknowledging or showing 
understanding for this reality; not answering questions; restricting the setting of 
unilateral standards for what is appropriate behavior exclusively to the NYPD; 
profoundly lauding their own conduct (and thus implying that the perceptions of police 
critics must be biased); presenting solutions that are based on the organization’s own 
conditions for appropriateness (including its self-interpretation of statistics and the 
evaluation of third-party research); the communication of nondescript perceptions that 
diminish the magnitude of the powerful police critics’ labels and the communication of 
interpretative framings that partly lack emphasis on historical and organic depth (for 
example concerning issues of race), thus diminishing the magnitude of the police 
critics’ interpretative framings.  
 The three different aspects of communication result in a subtly communicated 
‘us-versus-them’ schism, comprising a personalized/distinctive ‘us’ component — 
characterized by uniqueness, capability and potential victimization — and a 
multifaceted, depersonalized/indistinctive ‘them’ component — characterized as 
outsiders and by potential culpability. The schism, in turn, results in a mostly 
uncompromising, often dual-layered, deflective ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, in which 
‘us’ decides on what is ‘appropriate’, while the ‘them’ group, and the perceptions, 
interpretations and positioning of ‘them’, are ignored and dismissed by means of 
deflective communication strategies (the latter are also used to hide the rigidity of this 
schism itself). The uncompromising aspect might seem to contradict the evasive, non-
committal aspect of the positioning, yet the NYPD is uncompromising in its decision 
not to commit. 
 There are not many differences between the discourse from the police 
commissioner on the one hand and his communication team on the other. They appear 
to speak in one clear voice. The only notable difference is that Mr. Browne’s discourse 
in the public debate is mainly characterized by deflective PR communication (during 
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the interview he is more candid), while that of Police Commissioner Kelly is more 
mixed, as on rare occasions it is characterized by spontaneous, upfront and more 
descriptive vocabulary and, moreover, at times also more coalition-oriented in nature 
(gradations 3 and 4, as discussed in Subsection 2.3.5). The fact in itself that a lot of 
responses are uttered either by ‘a police official’ or by Mr. Browne, already 
characterizes the evasive character of NYPD communication: While it is to a certain 
degree normal for institutions to communicate through their spokesmen, it still results 
in less spontaneous and less emphatic communication than when it is conveyed by the 
person leading that organization (Mr. Bloomberg, for example, is quoted much more 
frequently than Mr. Kelly on the shooting). 
Time and place also influence the gradation of discourse that seeks common 
ground: The more the Police Department is pressurized by other stakeholders, the more 
deflective the communication becomes.  
 While the institutional and judicial restrictions heavily determine the character 
of the NYPD’s communication, the discourse can certainly be viewed from both a 
spontaneous and strategic perspective. As part of ‘spontaneous discourse’, the NYPD’s 
communication is a reflection of their self-centered, optimistic, self-laudatory reality in 
which facts, statistics and broader processes are more important than — in a general 
sense — the personal human interest side of events, and in which the handling of the 
Sean Bell case should stand on its own, and that history, which is perceived in a 
neutral/positive way, should not be confused with current events. As strategic PR 
discourse, the NYPD’s communication approach aims to deflect the powerful agenda-
setting perceptions and images felt, created and reiterated by police critics. It is 
important to note that the perceptions and interpretations discussed do not necessarily 
represent (all of) the perceptions and interpretations held by the NYPD. In the broad 
spectrum of communication delivered by various different media, it is likely that the 
NYPD at times conveys different perceptions and interpretations.  
The communication of the NYPD is in many ways the antithesis of that uttered 
by police critics. While the latter consists of powerful, agenda-setting, magnitudinal 
perceptions; an emotion-driven ‘catalyst’ character of response and communication; 
emotional rhetoric; profound historical and organic ‘pessimistic’ framings; passionate 
and rousing oratory; clear-cut, easy-to-digest messages; an attention-seeking 
positioning and an overall willingness to communicate, the language used by the 
NYPD, conversely, consists of indistinctive, cautious, and evasive perceptions; a facts-
, process- and reaction-driven character of response; nondescript, factual and detached 
rhetoric; often narrow and non-emphatic historical and organic ‘optimistic’ framings 
and an attention-deflecting positioning. Yet there is also overlap, marked by a similar 
‘us-versus-them’ schism, an equally rigidly delimiting scope of debate and reality, and 
equally ‘relentless’ communication strategies. 
                                                          
1 Paul Browne, interview by author, October 30, 2009. 
2 The restrictions are also brought up by other interviewees, even those who are highly critical of the 
Police Department. See Part II, Chapter 7. While Mr. Browne does not give further details on how the 
unions can impede the police commissioner, their powers have been discussed in Part I, and are also 
discussed by other stakeholders, as will be scrutinized in Part II, Chapter 7. 
3 At other moments in the aftermath, it was often his spokesman Mr. Browne or other (sometimes 




                                                                                                                                                          
5 In fact, there is no exact reference to this number in the quotes made by the police commissioner. 
6 Irving L. Allen, The City in Slang: New York Life and Popular Speech (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 27–28. 
7 See for example: Raymond Kelly, “NYPD True,” Op-Ed, New York Daily News, June 10, 2007, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2007/06/10/2007-06-10_nypd_true.html. 
8 Concise Oxford English Dictionary [CD-ROM], 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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Chapter 3: Police defenders 
 
While the NYPD does not visibly, profoundly, or proactively support the implicated 
officers in the press or in court, the number of people that does show support is 
substantial, ranging from the implicated officers themselves, their lawyers, 
union/fraternity leaders, supportive police officers, and random external supporters. 
The group’s consistency is more heterogeneous than that of the NYPD, but not as 
eclectic and scattered as the group of police critics. Its core is formed by the implicated 
officers’ lawyers and by the President of the Detectives’ Endowment Association, 
Michael Palladino. The latter takes a prominent and outspoken ‘layman’ role in the 
debate similar to Al Sharpton. Other union leaders are less prominently involved, 
although Pat Lynch, the President of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, and 
Victor Swinton, the President of the Guardians Association, a fraternal organization for 
black police officers, do speak out during the aftermath.
1
 Individual police officers also 
show support, yet do so infrequently and mostly anonymously. There is not an active 
and outspoken group of citizens in support of the detectives or the police at large: In 
fact no ‘pro-police’ meetings or demonstrations were held by citizen groups in support 
of the detectives. The police defenders mainly speak out in the courtroom, and during 
press meetings and interviews.
2
  
Apart from their courtroom testimonies (which were read aloud) the implicated 
officers only (sporadically) speak out after the acquittals. As they don’t defend a third 
party and their communication is often specific in nature, the analysis of their discourse 
will sometimes be discussed separately. The officers are represented by their lawyers, 
who defend their clients for professional reasons, but are often also engagés morally 
committed to the cause of the officers. Thus, while their discourse can be categorized 
as ‘strategic judicial discourse’, it might also be more spontaneous, aimed at conveying 
both their own perceptions, interpretations and positioning and those of the officers 
they represent.
3
 The analysis hence interprets their communication in the light of 
spontaneous, judicial and PR discourse.  
As the perceptions, framings and positioning of individual police officers are 
eclectic in nature and are only occasionally covered in the New York Times, this 
chapter’s analysis focuses on the discourse of their union/fraternity leaders. While such 
analysis disregards to a degree the differences within the diversified group of police 
officers, it does capture an overall consensus, as the union/fraternity leaders are their 
representatives in the press and in court. Not all unions/fraternities are supportive of 
the officers involved in the shooting, which in itself is an indication of the force’s 
diversification. As discussed in Part II, Chapter 1, the NYPD is criticized from within 
its own ranks by African-American police fraternities such as the ‘100 Blacks in Law 




3.1 Perceptions and images 
The police defenders are much more outspoken in conveying their perceptions than the 
NYPD, yet their perceptions remain more scattered and elusive than those held by 
police critics, often intricately interwoven into courtroom discourse, opinion letters, 
and interviews, and not in slogans and one-liners. The police defenders furthermore 
appear to communicate mixed messages, also varying between the different parties 
within the group of police defenders, and between the different arenas of debate.  
This section first examines the courtroom testimony derived from the 
implicated officers, as this densely packed discourse can succinctly show their held 
perceptions, and provide cues for those held by other police defenders. In doing so, the 
analysis does distinguish between courtroom discourse and communication that occurs 
outside of the courtroom. The subsequent subsections will focus on the perceptions 
communicated outside of the courtroom in regard to the shooting and those involved.  
 
3.1.1 ‘Police! Don’t move!’: A closer look at the perceptions held by the 
implicated officers 
In the densely packed testimony transcripts that were read aloud in court by an official 
from the Queens District Attorney’s office during the trial held in spring 2008, 
Detectives Isnora and Oliver and Lieutenant Napoli, unlike police critics, do not focus 
on the 50 shots fired, but rather on the short time frame (‘seconds’) in which the 
shooting occurred (‘Everything happened so quick’, ‘It was a matter of seconds’).4 
This is supported by words and word combinations that underline the large number of 
(verbal) actions that took place within a short time frame (‘yelled’, ‘kept saying’) 
Within this short time frame, the large amount of shots is mostly presented as an act 
that ‘just happened’ without conscious involvement of the detectives: ‘All the rounds’ 
and ‘everything’ are the active subjects, rather than the officers themselves. The 
officers thus abdicate responsibility by creating an overall perception that the chaotic 
situation (‘the seconds’) — and not the officers themselves is the main ‘culprit’ of the 
shooting. The meaning of the label ‘seconds’ is thus threefold, capturing the implicated 
officers’ perception of the totality of the shooting, their perception of their own actions 
and emotions felt in this, and their belief that the totality of the events caused a tragic 
outcome.  
The totality of the shooting is described as ‘everything’, while the victims are 
characterized as ‘the driver’, ‘him’, ‘he’, ‘anyone’ and ‘a passenger’. This nondescript, 
neutral word choice is in line with that of the NYPD’s label ‘The event’. Conversely, 
the officers portray themselves and their colleagues more as three-dimensional 
characters, with emotions and motives, resulting in an overall personalized ‘us’ team, 
and a depersonalized ‘them’. While it is inevitable that these images appear so 
frequently and profoundly in courtroom testimony, as the officers need to tell their side 
of the story, the perceptions of a personalized ‘us’ and a depersonalized ‘them’ do 
stand out within an overall held reality of ‘A matter of seconds’, in which culpability is 




3.1.2 ‘A matter of seconds’: a label for the shooting and who is responsible 
Outside of the courtroom, both the detectives’ lawyers and Mr. Palladino also refer to 
‘seconds’ (‘it only took 10 seconds’), but at times make references to the large amounts 
of shots fired too.
5
 However, the police defenders merely acknowledge the fact that 
others find this amount excessive (‘I can understand’), while they try to shift the focus 
(‘fixation’) from the number of shots to the seconds in which the events took place and 
the danger the officers were facing (‘it only took 10 seconds: the thing was over before 
it began’, ‘[the officers] believed that their lives and the lives of their partners were in 
imminent danger’). In a similar fashion to the NYPD, they also focus on the first shot 
rather than on the totality of shots. Again, the ‘seconds’ is perceived as a cause of the 
chaotic and lawless situation.  
The police defenders use nondescript vocabulary to convey the shooting itself 
(‘the thing’), yet are much more emotive and emphatic in conveying the perceptions 
and the emotions felt by the officers. By focusing on the officer’s reasons for firing 
their weapons, the police defenders give a three-dimensional picture of the motives of 
the implicated officers, while they don’t do so for the others involved in the shooting. 
The names of the victims of the shooting are only rarely referred to. 
 
Summary 
The police defenders’ continuous focus on the number of seconds gives insight into 
their held perceptions. The earlier-discussed expression ‘A matter of seconds’ captures 
these perceptions even more than the expression ‘10 seconds’, as it stands for the 
imminent danger of the events leading up to the shooting, the fear felt by the officers, 
and the perceived necessity to respond. While this label provides a vivid picture of the 
officers’ motives, the culpability for and the totality of the shooting are simply 
described as ‘a matter’. The label in itself is a factual explanation, yet also stands for 
the emotions felt by the detectives during the shooting, making the label emotionally 
charged. Whereas the label ‘50 shots’ comprises a rigidly defined notion of culpability, 
the label ‘A matter of seconds’ comprises an explanation as to why this notion should 
not be so rigidly defined.  
The label can be seen as spontaneous discourse by which the perceptions of the 
officers are conveyed; as strategic PR discourse, by which these perceptions are 
intentionally emphasized and reiterated; and as ‘strategic judicial discourse’ aimed at 
convincing the judge/jury that the officers should be acquitted.  
 
3.1.3 A ‘tragic set of events’: a label for the shooting and who is responsible 
The police defenders outside of the courtroom, ranging from the lawyers, the detectives 
themselves and both former and current policemen, also characterize the shooting as a 
‘tragedy’ almost instantaneously and universally, a notion that at first glance appears to 
be more directed towards the victims and the magnitude of the shooting. In the English 
language, the word tragedy has two meanings: 
 
Tragedy 
1. An event causing great suffering, destruction, and distress.  






Although the police defenders’ use of the word obviously refers to the first definition, 
both definitions imply that while a tragedy is a ‘set of events’ in which the ‘actors’ do 
their part, it is the event itself that causes ‘great suffering, destruction, and distress’. 
The word ‘tragedy’ hence opposes the clear-cut culpability in the label ‘50 shots’, as it 
implies that it is the event itself that caused the suffering. The police defenders 
repetitively link the word to phrases such as ‘not a crime’, and ‘does not rise to the 
level of criminality’, further reinforcing the notion that the officers are not to blame for 
the suffering. The focus on innocence is also exacerbated by phrases such as ‘set of 
events’ ‘mistake’ and ‘incident’.  
While the police defenders’ reference to ‘tragedy’ appears to comprise the pain 
and emotions felt by the victims, the focus on the universality of the tragic 
consequences diminishes the magnitude of these feelings (‘horrible tragedy for all 
involved’, ‘shootings are always tragic’), hence opposing the one-sided victimization 
of the label ‘I am Sean Bell’. In some instances, the tragedy for the officers is even 
placed above that of the Bell family (‘There is nothing more heart-wrenching than to a 
see a police officer put through the system’). By defining all shootings as tragedies, the 
detectives’ responsibility for the shooting is practically annulled.  
The notion of ‘tragedy’ also appears to be more descriptive in regard to the 
victims and the group of police defenders than the courtroom testimonies and the 
discourse related to ‘A matter of seconds’. An explanation for this could be that the 
latter label is specifically used to convey the felt reality in which the police were 
operating on the night of the shooting, and the former is used to show what the 
outcome of the event is in retrospect. However, the police defenders still often pair the 
word tragedy with nondescript expressions, such as ‘A tragic set of events’. Moreover, 
the police defenders do not emphatically link the word ‘tragedy’ to the name of Sean 
Bell, as they only rarely use the label ‘Sean Bell case’. The apparently descriptive 
perception communicated by the police defenders that the shooting is a ‘tragedy’ is 
thus at best a mix of descriptive and non-descriptive elements.  
In contrast to the NYPD’s clinical depiction of an ‘aberration’, the perception 
of a ‘tragedy’ is certainly emotionally charged, especially when paired with words such 
as ‘horrible’, or when described as ‘heart-wrenching’. However, references to tragedy 
are also often combined with the expressions ‘set of events’, ‘mistake’ and ‘incident’, 
which are more neutral and detached.  
The police defenders focus on tragedy can be seen as ‘spontaneous discourse’ 
aimed at conveying perceptions and images held and constructed by police defenders, 
as ‘strategic PR discourse’ aimed at altering public perceptions of the incident and as 
‘strategic judicial discourse’ aimed at influencing court decisions. The statement that 
the incident does ‘not rise to the level of criminality’ underlines this judicial focus.  
 
Summary 
This subsection has demonstrated how police defenders label the totality and outcome 
of the shooting as ‘A tragic set of events’. This dual-layered notion combines 
emotionally charged and descriptive perceptions of the universally felt victimization 
with detached and indistinctive perceptions in regard to the magnitude of the shooting 
and the role of the officers. The ‘tragic’ component of the label is emotionally charged, 
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and both organically broad (everyone is involved in the tragedy) and historically broad 
(all shootings are tragic) exacerbating the perception of broad victimization, while 
deflecting the question of who is responsible for the shooting: Everyone is a victim, 
also those who fired ‘50 shots’. Conversely, the expression ‘set of events’ is not 
emotionally charged, and moreover, is an indistinctive and detached way of 
characterizing the shooting without assignment of blame. 
 
3.1.4 ‘Every day is hell for these guys’: a self-label for the 
implicated officers and the police defenders as a group 
Besides the focus on ‘A matter of seconds’, the police defenders also convey their 
perceptions of the implicated officers in other ways. While they are at first somewhat 
reluctant to do so, this changes during the grand jury process, when both the lawyers 
and Mr. Palladino in fact stress the need for the officers to speak out, by emphasizing 
the advantages of knowing the officers’ inner lives (‘get a sense of his background, his 
character’), by expressing the officers’ enthusiasm in doing so (‘pleased’, ‘eager’), and 
by underlining the officers’ emotions after they were able to speak out (‘relieved’).  
The focus on the emotions felt by the implicated officers extends from the 
vocabulary used to emphasize the importance of ‘speaking out’ to an overall emotional 
and emphatic tone (‘every day’, ‘nervous wreck’), in describing this inner life itself, 
which is filled with emotions, ranging from being upset to feeling remorse, and can be 
summarized as a ‘hell’ (‘Every day is hell for these guys’). By providing such an in-
depth characterization, the officers are humanized, in a similar way to how police 
critics humanize Sean Bell. The police defenders also link the officers’ emotions to a 
sense of victimization, evidenced by the negative emotions conveyed by the lawyers on 
behalf of their clients (‘crushed’, ‘tore emotionally’), but also by the officers’ depiction 
of being ‘helpless’ and ‘an underdog’. Mr. Culleton’s remark that he has an ‘overriding 
responsibility to represent Jesse’ resembles Mr. Sharpton’s quote to ‘fight for that little 
boy’. In this light, the police defenders also perceive the case as weighty and important 
for the implicated officers (‘very important case’) which differs from the approach of 
the NYPD and is more in line with the magnitudinal images conveyed by police critics. 
To a lesser extent, police defenders also acknowledge the suffering felt by the victims 
and their relatives (‘They are suffering, and I am very conscious of that’). The police 
defenders thus perceive the shooting in its totality as emotionally charged, as a result of 
which the suffering of the victims does not differ much from the suffering of the 
officers (in line with ‘A tragic set of events’).  
 The police defenders link their perceptions in regard to the pure and sincere 
emotions felt by the officers to perceptions of an overall pure and sincere character 
(‘good cops’), again by focusing on the inner lives of the officers involved (‘there was 
no criminality in their hearts, nor in their minds’). Besides being innocent, all officers 
are perceived as ‘sincere, humble individuals’: ‘Jesse’, for instance, is both a ‘hero’ 
and a ‘decent, dignified, graceful young man and he did his job as best he could’ and 
moreover, goes to a ‘very small but very strong church’, while ‘Mike’ ‘acted 
professionally’, and was ‘a fast-rising officer with a dry sense of humor’, Lieutenant 
Napoli ‘has an excellent prior record’ and Detective Oliver is ‘an impeccable officer 
[and] has an unblemished record’. The lawyers go to great lengths to emphasize this 
character, even by making Detective Isnora ‘stand up’ so everyone can see that ‘that is 
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Detective Gescard Isnora’. These depictions assign values to the officers, such as 
heroism, grace, professionalism, innocence, and purity, which show resemblances with 
those assigned to Sean Bell (‘a good kid’), as they are part of a broader set of American 
values and body of thought. The officers hence become emotionally charged symbols 
everyone can relate to, especially the police themselves (‘We have been portrayed as 
insensitive murderers […] and I can tell you that we are not’). Thus, an intimate like-
knows-like group feeling is created similar to that of the police critics. On a rhetorical 
level, the police defenders emphasize the human side of the officers, their sense of 
victimization, their likability, and the connection felt with them, by using personal and 
intimate vocabulary, such as ‘Jesse’, ‘Mike, ‘this guy’, and ‘my guy’. 
These depictions, as well as the personalized and intimate vocabulary used to 
convey them, oppose (and respond to) the police critics’ impersonal label ‘50 shots’, 
through which the story of the officer is merely portrayed by the number of shots fired. 
Moreover, they dismiss other elements of the ‘50 shots’ label, such as injustice, guilt 
and violence. The police defenders reiterate that the police officers were ‘not 
cowboys’, or a ‘trigger-happy John Wayne type’ which is a direct reaction to the 
‘Wild, Wild West’ lawlessness perceived by the police critics.  
 From a judicial stance, the focus on the officers’ need to speak out, as well as 
on their emotions and sense of victimization is a strategy for the lawyers to show the 
officers’ version of events, while stressing their innocence. From a strategic PR 
perspective, this focus emphasizes the officers’ personality and human side, while 
showing their goodness and sincerity. Similarly, from a spontaneous perspective, the 
police defenders perceive the police officers much more as complex characters than the 
police critics do, characterizing them as good and pure victims of the situation. 
 
Summary 
This subsection has demonstrated how police defenders humanize the implicated 
officers in various ways. They do so by stressing the need to convey the inner life of 
the officers, by portraying this inner life — filled with pure and sincere emotions of 
remorse and hurt — as a ‘hell’, and by characterizing them as overall pure and sincere 
individuals, while ascribing positive and widely supported values to them such as 
heroism, grace, professionalism, innocence, and purity, thus portraying them as ‘good 
cops’. These rhetorical strategies are accompanied by vocabulary that stresses a 
personal connection between the police defender and his object of defense, as well as 
with highly emotional and emphatic rhetoric, exacerbating the officers’ suffering. This 
results in the humanization of the officers into three-dimensional universally likable 
characters; in an annulment or perceived annulment of culpability; in an increase of 
victimization; and in an overall symbol-making process by which the police defenders 
(and specifically police officers) identify themselves and show empathy with the 
implicated officers, thus stimulating the intimate like-knows-like group feeling, while 
further exacerbating the gap between a personalized ‘us’ and an depersonalized ‘them’. 
The statement ‘Every day is hell for these guys’ captures and succinctly describes most 
of the perceptions discussed in this section, as it shows the magnitude (‘every day’) of 
suffering and victimization (‘hell’), the personalization of and personal/group 
identification with the officers (‘these guys’) and the association with ‘goodness’ of 
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overall character and felt emotions (‘these guys’ and its implicit reference to ‘good 
guys’).  
 
3.1.5 Fellows versus characters: value-based ‘us’ and ‘them’ labels 
The polar nature of the perceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is evidenced by Mr. Palladino’s 
depiction of the detectives during a personal interview as ‘these fellows’ and that of 
police critics such as Mr. Sharpton as ‘(these) character(s)’.7 While ‘these fellows’ is 
much in line with ‘these guys’, thus further personalizing the detectives, ‘these 
characters’ not only depersonalizes the police critics, but also patronizes them and 
questions their credibility. This is also supported by the fact that Mr. Palladino can’t 
immediately come up with the name of Charles Barron (‘what is his name, Barron’). 
In short, the labels ‘fellows’ and ‘characters’ stand for a personalized, friendly 
‘us’ and a depersonalized, unreliable ‘them’. These different labels are products of the 
‘us-versus-them’ reality and positioning discussed in Subsection 3.3.2. The labels also 




While Mr. Sharpton conveys and reiterates easy-to-digest messages by making use of 
‘passionate and rousing oratory’ in order to galvanize support, the police defenders do 
not repeat the same phrases over and over. None of the police defenders assume a role 
similar to that of Mr. Sharpton or other community leaders who acted as a gauge, 
reading perceptions of the community; as a funnel, channeling these perceptions; and 
as a catalyst, magnifying and reiterating such perceptions. Instead, the perceptions held 
by police defenders are intricately interwoven into the discourse and emerge randomly, 
often outwardly conflicting with other statements made by this group. The labels 
identified in this section are hence not reiterated during protest marches or at other 
events like the labels ‘50 shots’ and ‘I am Sean Bell’ were, but rather capture, 
symbolize and succinctly describe a set of scattered and evasive perceptions intricately 
interwoven into the police defenders’ communication.  
The cues for these labels — as well as some of the interactions between them 
— can be found in the officers’ testimonies: Their reality, felt emotions, and the notion 
of culpability is captured in the expression ‘A matter of seconds’, a label referring to 
the perceptions of the imminent danger of the events leading up to the shooting, the 
fear felt by the officers, and the perceived necessity to respond. Conversely, the label 
does not provide much information about the totality of the shooting, the question of 
who is responsible, or the victims involved, describing them as simply ‘a matter’. 
 Besides the courtroom testimonies, a large amount of entwining, sometimes 
conflicting perceptions occur, again captured by the label ‘A matter of seconds’, and 
now also by ‘A tragic set of events’ and ‘Every day is hell for these guys’. Together, 
these labels capture the perceptions concerning the chaotic and unruly reality in which 
the implicated officers acted but for which they are not responsible, the evasiveness of 
the blame-factor and the perception of the totality of the shooting in retrospect, and the 
humanization, personalization and victimization of the implicated officers, as well as 
the personal/group identification with ‘these guys’. 
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 These three labels furthermore expose the apparent conflicting nature of the 
perceptions. While ‘A tragic set of events’ ascribes ‘the tragedy’ to all involved in the 
shooting, the true personalization, humanization and victimization occurs within the 
label ‘Every day is hell for these guys’, which only involves the implicated officers. On 
a rhetorical level, discourse that is related to ‘A tragic set of events’ contains more 
personal and emotionally charged perceptions of the victims and the shooting, while 
discourse referring to ‘A matter of seconds’ and to a lesser extent ‘Every day is hell for 
these guys’ depicts the victims and the shooting in an indistinctive and unemotional 
way, somewhat resembling the NYPD’s perception of ‘this event’. Of course, the label 
‘A tragic set of events’ is intended to describe the totality of the event in retrospect, 
while the other labels are used to depict the perceptions of the officers. Another 
explanation for this apparent inconsistency could be that the police defenders use 
evasive and indistinctive vocabulary where culpability is concerned, while using 
personal vocabulary to underline the universality of victimization. Both strategies — 
which can be seen as either spontaneous or strategic — result in the same outcome: a 
perceived decrease in culpability. The dual-layered character of the label ‘A tragic set 
of events’ captures this apparent paradox and underlying outcome, as it combines 
emotionally charged and descriptive perceptions of the universally felt victimization 
with detached and indistinctive perceptions regarding the magnitude of the shooting 
and the role of the officers. Moreover, the personalization of the victims within this 
label is less profound than the consequently conveyed humanization of the implicated 
officers). Thus, while some of the perceptions conveyed by police defenders appear to 
be coalition-oriented, overall they stimulate a (perceived) annulment of culpability, and 
an increase in victimization, and result in a symbol-making process by which the police 
defenders identify themselves and show empathy with the officers, thus stimulating the 
intimate like-knows-like group feeling, while further exacerbating the gap between a 
personalized, humanized and victimized three-dimensional ‘us’ and a depersonalized 
one-dimensional ‘them’. This, of course, impacts the overall positioning of the police 




Police critics’ framings can be divided into interpretations of the shooting (Subsection 
3.2.1) and those of the aftermath (Subsection 3.2.2). As these interpretations are not 
profoundly conveyed by police defenders, this section will also look at how the police 
defenders respond to the police critics’ framing of unlawful police shootings, police 
misconduct, racial profiling and racial injustice.  
 
3.2.1 Framing the shooting: ‘You have to be in the officer’s shoes’ 
The analysis of courtroom testimonies in Subsection 3.1.1 already revealed aspects of 
the self-centered perspective by which the officers interpret the shooting. This 
subsection’s analysis further scrutinizes these testimonies. While serving as a 
justification for actions — which partly explains this self-centered perspective — the 
testimonies do show how the officers interpret the shooting by taking into account their 
personal/police dominated experience (‘thank God, none of us were hurt and we were 
going home’, ‘We were OK’), their concerns (‘it was the last thing in the world I ever 
wanted to do’, ‘I have to live with that also for the rest of my life’), and their personal 
emotions (‘we were all in a state of shock’), while excluding those held by police 
critics. This is evidenced by a focus on the first person singular and strong rhetorical 
focus on ‘we’, while the ‘them’ group is not part of their mental picture 
(‘Unfortunately as a result, sometimes people die’, ‘We didn’t really discuss anything 
more’).  
The testimonies also provide some insight into the historical and organic 
dimensions of the officers’ framings. While Subsection 3.1.1 has shown how the 
officers perceived the situation as dangerous and chaotic, the analysis now shows how 
they interpret the shooting as part of a broader interaction process that entails danger 
and chaos (‘I had many dangerous situations where I have been robbed’), but in which 
the officer shows restraint and astute assessment (‘never fired my weapon’). In 
addition, these personal experiences, as well as references to thoughts both prior to and 
during the shooting (‘I never had any intentions in my career, actually, of even thinking 
of doing that’, ‘I thought I had no choice that night’), also expose the historical and 
organic dimensions of the self-centered perspective. While most statements do not 
directly expose this historical dimension, they still exude a sense of reverberation, as if 
it is not the first time the officers have been in such a situation and as if the discourse 
referring to unruliness and chaos is part of their everyday discourse.  
Outside of the courtroom, the police defenders discourse is characterized by a 
similar police/self-centered framing of the shooting, again delineated by the emotions, 
needs, thoughts, concerns and previous experiences of the officers and framed within a 
historical and organic interaction process that entails danger and chaos (‘It’s a 
dangerous job’, ‘any moment of hesitation could cost them their lives’), but in which 
the officer shows restraint and astute assessment, and in which the officer is rather a 
victim than a perpetrator of the dangerous situation inherent within this interaction 
(‘you have to be in the officer’s shoes’, ‘risking their lives’). The self-centered 
perspective again excludes other interpretative vantage points (‘You’re not thinking of 
anything until it’s over and you exhale’).  
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This broader interaction process is also evidenced by the use of the expressions 
‘in the street’, ‘street smart’ and ‘out there’, which do not explicitly interpret the 
shooting from a broader perspective, but still exude a sense of reverberation. In the 
light of Mr. Allen’s previously discussed definition (Part II, Chapter 2, Subsection 
2.2.1), ‘the streets’ here refers to the dangerous and ‘bad’ things that can happen in a 
city, not just on the night of the shooting, but rather continuously. The police defenders 
hence hold a more continuous belief that the police are potential victims of the dangers 
that occur ‘in the street’, and an officer has to be ‘street smart’ in order to deal with 
these dangers. Conversely, those persons that represent these dangers are interpreted 
rather derogatorily and one-dimensionally as ‘a perp or whatever’ and ‘a guy with a 
gun’.  
The historical and organic dimensions of the police defenders’ self-centered 
framing are less defined and articulated as those expressed by police critics. The 
analysis hence also examines how the police defenders react to the police critics’ 
framing of unlawful police shootings, police misconduct, racial profiling and racial 
injustice and how they integrate and classify such notions in their discourse.  
To start with the framing’s first component, the police defenders do not see the 
Sean Bell shooting as part of a broader pattern of ‘unlawful police shootings and police 
misconduct’ as they maintain different definitions of police misconduct and 
lawlessness. First, while the police critics see the conduct of the officers as an organic 
component of the often ‘lawless and excessive’ practices of the NYPD (such as the 
stop-and frisk procedures), the police defenders do not look at these other practices, but 
argue that the conduct was not lawless, ‘because they were told to do so by a superior 
officer’ and the officers acted ‘as they were trained to do’. Second, while the police 
critics see the large amount of shots fired as part of a broad historical pattern of 
excessiveness and lawlessness (for instance by referring to Amadou Diallo and to other 
police shooting victims), the police defenders do not look at these other shootings, but 
say that the conduct was not excessive, because the officers ‘are not taught to shoot 
guns out of people’s hands’. Third, while the police critics see the outcome of the 
shooting as excessive, because three unarmed men were shot, police defenders see this 
outcome as an unfortunate yet unavoidable result of police work in response to ‘the 
situation that is in front of them’, in which for instance Officer Carey ‘acted fully 
within the scope of his duty and the guidelines of the department’ and in a broader 
sense the officers were ‘justified in using deadly force in return’. In addition, the police 
defenders also curtail the magnitude of such patterns (‘unfortunately as a result, 
sometimes people die’). The word ‘sometimes’ in this sense downplays the magnitude 
of the historical pattern of police shootings, while ‘people’ diminishes the magnitude 
and importance of the ‘organic’ consequences of these shootings.  
The notion of ‘racial profiling and racial injustice’ also differs within the 
framings held by police critics and police defenders. First, while the police critics see 
the implicated officers as an organic component of a Caucasian-dominated NYPD and 
its often ‘racist’ practices, the police defenders look more narrowly at ‘the photos of 
the officers’, which indicate that ‘at least three of the five officers are people of color’, 
and at the officers’ backgrounds (‘[Mr. Cooper] had mentored black youngsters, 
worked to get guns off the street, and had been a member of the Guardians 
Association, a black fraternal group’). Second, while the police critics see the shooting 
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as part of a broad historical pattern of racial profiling and racial injustice instigated by 
the NYPD, the police defenders again look more narrowly at the photos and the 
officers’ backgrounds, indicating to them that this shooting can’t be part of such a 
pattern. Third, while the police critics see the outcome of the shooting as racial, 
because an unarmed African American was shot, the police defenders once more look 
at the photos and the officers’ backgrounds, indicating to them that race can’t be at 
stake (‘racism had absolutely nothing to do with this shooting’).  
 
Summary 
This subsection has shown how the police defenders unanimously interpret the conduct 
of the officers, as well as the shooting and its outcome, within a self/police-centered 
framing delineated by the concerns, feelings, thoughts and previous experiences of the 
implicated officers, or in a broader sense all police officers. This self-centered 
approach is seemingly a result of the nature of police work itself. Within this historical 
and organic ‘us’ interpretative framing, the police conduct is part of a historical and 
organic pattern of proper training, strict guidelines, and strong leadership, while the 
shooting and its outcome fit within the historical and organic interaction process that 
entails danger and chaos, but in which the officer shows restraint and astute 
assessment, and in which the officer is rather a victim than a perpetrator of the 
dangerous situation inherent within this interaction. In certain ways, this resembles the 
interpretative framing of the NYPD, yet the former is much more outspoken in 
conveying this framing, and moreover, lays a much heavier emphasis on victimization. 
In addition, this subsection has also demonstrated how police defenders 
maintain a narrow and self-centered definition concerning the notions of lawlessness, 
excessiveness and race, applying police protocol, training, guidelines and superior 
orders as factors that determine whether the shooting was excessive and lawless (and 
not the fact that three unarmed men were shot) and the race and background of the 
implicated officers (and not the predominance of Caucasians in the NYPD or the race 
of the victims) as factors that determine whether the shooting was racist. The police 
defenders, moreover, subtly downplay the existence of a broader historical and organic 
pattern of unlawful police shootings, police misconduct, racial profiling and racial 
injustice in the broadest sense of the word. In turn, both the usage of these different 
definitions, as well as the subtle denial of such broader patterns, result in an 
interpretative antithesis of the framing held and constructed by police critics.  
The analysis has also exposed how interpretative framings are intricately 
interwoven into the fabric of the police defenders’ discourse. More specifically, it is 
not the message itself, but rather the subtly reverberated vocabulary and rhetoric that 
lay bare the dimensions of constructed framings.  
The self-centered interpretative framing, often excluding other interpretative 
vantage points, suggests a rigid positioning that does not seek common ground, as will 
be further discussed in Subsection 3.3.2.  
 
3.2.2 Framing the aftermath: A fight against ‘professional police haters’ 
The police defenders convey their interpretation of the shooting’s aftermath almost as 
subtly as their interpretation of the shooting itself. The analysis in this subsection 
focuses especially on how the police defenders interpret judicial aspects of the 
360 
 
aftermath of the shooting and how this relates to the police critics’ framing in terms of 
systematic judicial and political failures. 
The label ‘Every day is hell for these guys’ — as discussed in Subsection 3.1.4 
— provides insight into how the police defenders interpret the aftermath of the 
shooting largely from a self/police-centered perspective, dominated again by 
experiences, feelings and concerns (supposedly) held by the implicated officers, 
through which the interpretative vantage point of the victims is often overlooked (‘This 
is the start of my life back’). The officers’ discourse does not reveal much of the 
historical and organic dimensions of this self-centered interpretative framing. An 
explanation for this is that while the implicated officers have been in (dangerous) street 
encounters before (a broader interpretative framing of the shooting), they have not 
been involved in a judicial process. However, other communications, in particular 
those of lawyers and the Op-Eds written by former police officers, do give more 
insight. First, the police defenders see the aftermath as part of a broader pattern of 
police suffering and police victimization (‘there is nothing more heart-wrenching than 
to a see a police officer put through the system, especially one who didn’t do anything 
wrong’), often conveyed only by subtle reverberation.  
Unlike police critics, police defenders in the main appear to have full 
confidence in the criminal justice system. This confidence becomes clear in references 
both to the historical dimension of justice (‘a foundation that this country was built 
upon’, ‘we have the greatest criminal justice system in the world here in the United 
States’), and the organic dimension (‘12 fair-minded people’, ‘apply the law’). While 
the police critics see the aftermath as part of both a historical pattern (‘For too long we 
have tried to make changes’) and an organic pattern (‘not capable of stepping away 
from this investigation and doing it appropriately’), and consequently feel they need to 
‘look for and demand justice’, the police defenders much more optimistically believe 
that the ‘foundation’ of justice is already there, and that the judge/jurors simply need to 
‘apply the law’. They are hence not looking for justice, but for fairness.  
However, the historical and organic confidence in the system is not strong on 
all occasions (‘a grand jury presentation is one-sided’, ‘refusal to dismiss the charges 
was a disappointment, but no surprise’). Here, police defenders not only show their 
disappointment, they also interpret this disappointment as part of a broader pattern 
(‘not expected’ and ‘no surprise’). Police defenders also suggest that it is not the 
criminal justice itself that is flawed, but that it is ‘weakened’ by external factors. In that 
light, the shooting’s aftermath is also interpreted as an unwelcome deviation from a 
pattern where cases are tried in court rather than in the media (‘the proper arena, the 
court of law’), an interpretation that is also shaped by a self-centered perspective (‘I 
spent quite a few years investigating cases, I was a very active Detective, so I was used 
to […]’). 
Thus, it can be concluded that the police defenders interpret the aftermath of 
the shooting as part of a pattern of overall confidence in judicial justice, but that the 
justice has not always been fairly applied, often due to external factors.  
The police defenders do convey strongly their interpretations of the role of 
those who criticize the implicated officers and the police in general. They see the 
aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting as part of a historical and organic pattern of unfair 
criticism (‘for years he’s made reckless allegations’, ‘the police are always second-
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guessed when they use deadly physical force’, ‘people will come with signs comparing 
the department to the Ku Klux Klan’), unfair methods of conveying this criticism, 
(‘The signs are sometimes clever but always mean-spirited and reflecting a calculated 
rage’, ‘these are just convenient clichés that people use’) and unfair motives for 
conveying this criticism (‘in furtherance of his own agenda’, ‘self-serving’, ‘it’s all 
about credibility, something the Rev. Al had forsaken a long time ago in the Tawana 
Brawley case’), which in turn lead to a pattern of police victimization (‘demonizing the 
police’, ‘they turn their back on people like Gescard Isnora’). Thus, in the police 
defenders’ interpretative framing the police critics become ‘police haters’ ‘who have 
made careers out of demonizing the police’ and who think it is always imperative ‘to 
assign blame’.  
While the police defenders do recognize the police critics’ broader historical 
and organic framing of the civil rights movement against systematic judicial and 
political failures (‘they feel an obligation to raise their voices in anger’), they do not 
acknowledge this pattern (‘for some reason’, ‘It’s a contradiction, a puzzle’). 
Moreover, police defenders, in particular the lawyers, do not relate the racial injustice, 
part of the pattern of systematic judicial and political failures, to (their personal 
conduct) in the aftermath (‘I’m in the black community. Am I on trial?’). The latter 
statement by Mr. Ricco (Detective Isnora’s lawyer) implicitly refutes the broader 
pattern of racial judicial injustice as perceived by police critics, as well as racial 
victimization due to this pattern, contesting the interpretation held by the black 
community that his conduct reinforces the broader pattern of racial injustice in the 
judicial process following shootings. He also attacks the community for doing so 
(‘Would I fold to the community’s sense of outrage?’).  
 
Summary 
This subsection has demonstrated how police defenders unanimously interpret the 
aftermath of the shooting within a self/police-centered framing delineated by the 
concerns, feelings, thoughts and previous experiences of the implicated officers, or in a 
broader sense all police officers. Within this historical and organic ‘us’ interpretative 
framing, the aftermath of the shooting is part of a historical and organic pattern of 
prolonged and profound unfair criticism, methods and motives instigated by police 
critics, which in turn has lead to a pattern of police suffering and victimization and a 
weakening of the criminal justice system.  
Unlike police critics, police defenders see the aftermath of the shooting as part 
of a pattern of overall judicial justice, which has not always been ‘fairly’ applied due to 
the unfair criticism, methods and motives of police critics. The core of this group — 
within the interpretation of police defenders — is formed by Al Sharpton and his 
followers, or in a broader sense, those that criticize the police, a significant notion that 
will be further discussed in Subsection 3.3.2. 
In addition, this subsection has demonstrated how police defenders maintain a 
narrow and self-centered definition concerning the racial dimensions of the judicial 
process ensuing after police shootings, regarding individual racial background and not 
the race of the victims or the African-American community at large as a factor that 
determines whether the judicial process is racist, and whether African Americans are 
racially victimized.  
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All framings are subtly conveyed. It is often not the statements themselves, but 
rather the faintly reverberating vocabulary and rhetoric that expose the dimensions of 
the interpretative framings held by police defenders.  
The police defenders’ self-centered framing of the shootings’ aftermath 
suggests a rigid positioning in the debate, of which a few examples have already been 
mentioned. The self-centered historical search for fairness — as opposed to the search 
for justice — is the link between the interpretative framing and the positioning 
constructed and held by police defenders, as further discussed in Subsection 3.3.1. 
 
3.2.3 Conclusion 
The analysis for this section has shown that police defenders unanimously interpret the 
conduct of the officers, as well as the shooting, its outcome and the processes that have 
taken place in its aftermath, within a self/police-centered framing delineated by the 
concerns, feelings, thoughts and previous experiences of the implicated officers, or in a 
broader sense all police officers. Within this narrow ‘us’ interpretative framing, the 
police conduct is part of a historical and organic pattern of proper training, strict 
guidelines and strong leadership, while the shooting and its outcome fit within the 
historical and organic interaction process that entails danger and chaos, but in which 
the officer shows restraint and astute assessment, and in which the officer is rather a 
victim than a perpetrator of the dangerous situation inherent within this interaction. 
The aftermath of the shooting, in turn, is seen as part of a historical and organic pattern 
of prolonged and profound unfair criticism (with occasional bursts of unfair public 
outrage) as well as unfair methods and motives instigated and maintained by police 
critics, which in turn has led to a pattern of police suffering and victimization and a 
weakening of the criminal justice system. The framings of both the shooting and its 
aftermath are the interpretative antithesis of the framings held and constructed by 
police critics, as the police defenders maintain different definitions for key factors such 
as the notions of lawlessness, excessiveness and race, as well as for the functioning of 
the criminal justice system, and the role of both the police and the civil rights 
movement.  
 The interpretative framings of the shooting and its aftermath are hence 
unanimously conveyed, although it is remarkable that the police defenders never 
communicate the totality of their interpretations at once, but rather focus on the 
different elements on different occasions, which results in a complex, intricate and 
entwined web of interpretative framings. This is especially true for interpretations of 
the aftermath of the shooting; the historical and organic dimensions of their 
interpretations often only come to light in their use of subtly reverberating rhetoric as 
well as in the more direct (yet still subtle) links to the past.  
The police defenders’ rhetoric is harsh and emotional on most occasions. 
Similar to the cognitive associations conveyed by police critics, these interpretations 
show the historical and organic magnitude of notions such as police criticism and 
police victimization. In this sense, the framings can be seen as strategic PR and judicial 
discourse, aimed at underlining the case’s magnitude, and influencing both public 
opinion and the outcome of the court case. 
 The interpretations discussed in this section proved to be a deeper layer of 
perception and interpretation, fuelling the labels discussed previously. While the labels 
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‘A matter of seconds’ and ‘A tragic set of events’ link to an interaction process that 
entails danger and chaos, but in which the officer shows restraint and astute 
assessment, and in which the officer is rather a victim than a perpetrator of the 
dangerous situation inherent within this interaction, the label ‘Every day is hell for 
these guys’ both refers to the pattern of proper conduct during shootings and the unfair 
criticism, methods and motives and consequential police victimization that occur 
afterwards. In a broader sense, the ‘us-versus-them’ images discussed in Section 3.1 
are also a product of both the police defenders’ self-centered perspective and their 
interpretation of the police critics’ role as ‘professional police haters’, whose actions 
lead to police victimization. The framings also function as the basis for the positioning 
of the defenders, as will be discussed in the section ahead. While the self-centered 
perspective and the narrow and self-centered definitions concerning the notions of 
lawlessness, excessiveness and race already give insight into the bandwidth of the 
playing field and reality created and held by police defenders, the pattern of police 
victimization during and after shootings as well as the pattern of unfair criticism, 
methods and motives instigated by police critics, together comprise the starting 




The police defenders clearly position themselves as advocates for the implicated 
officers, often outspokenly defending them to the hilt. In a similar fashion to previous 
sections, this section takes a closer look at this positioning. 
 
3.3.1 The delineation of debate: All police officers deserve fairness 
The police defenders — in particular Mr. Palladino and the lawyers — consistently 
focus in their communication on one specific desired outcome of debate, characterized 
by two notions: ‘fairness’ and ‘to deserve’. While this focus resembles that of the 
police critics, the emphasis is less emphatic, and is not captured in a slogan such as 
‘Justice for Sean Bell’. Also, the sense of urgency that exudes from ‘Justice for Sean 
Bell’ is less pronounced. The English language defines both notions as follows:  
 
Fair  
Adjective — 1. Treating people equally. 2. Just or appropriate in the circumstances. 
Deserve  
Verb — Do something or show qualities worthy of (a reward or punishment as appropriate).8 
 
Similar to the definition of justice, the definitions of ‘fair’ and ‘deserve’ relate to ‘just 
and appropriate’. Both notions complement each other: The desired outcome of the 
debate should be appropriate; that is what the officers ‘deserve’. Hence the officers 
‘deserve fairness’.  
 The police defenders convey mixed messages on what this fairness should 
entail. On a superficial level, the officers are ‘entitled to due process’, ‘they’re entitled 
to a fair and impartial investigation’, and they have ‘the right to a fair trial’. These 
statements appear to refer to the first tier of the definition above: ‘the equal treatment 
of people’. This ‘equal treatment’ suggests that the proposed fairness is broadly 
delimited as equal judicial treatment for all stakeholders involved, even though the 
police defenders are saying that only the officers deserve such treatment. On this 
superficial level, the references to fairness focus largely on the criminal justice system, 
and in particular the trial itself.  
However, on a deeper level, ‘to deserve fairness’ is more rigidly delimited, as 
the ‘equal treatment’ proposed by police defenders (‘We do feel confident that the 
grand jurors will give him a fair shake’) is paired with conditions for fairness to take 
place, in particular the acquittals of the officers (‘We’re confident that […] my client 
and all the other officers will be exonerated’). Fairness here does not so much mean 
‘equal treatment of people’ but rather ‘just and appropriate in the circumstances’, 
referring not really to a ‘consensus opinion’ of all stakeholders involved, but rather to 
the opinions held by police defenders. On this deeper level, ‘to deserve fairness’ 
extends from judicial fairness to fair treatment on all accounts: It is ‘unfair’ that 
Detective Oliver has been ‘characterized as a cowboy’, the officers ‘deserve to have 
their careers taken off hold’ and it is ‘unfair to characterize the shooting, in any 
fashion, as racially motivated’. These statements not only stress the desired fairness, 
but also the current state of perceived ‘unfairness’. 
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This deeper layer of discourse fits within the police defenders’ self-centered 
perspective (‘to deserve’) and their framing of unfair criticism, methods and motives, 
as the police defenders do not believe that the criminal justice system itself is unfair, 
but that the fairness is brought into jeopardy by external groups. This also exposes the 
difference between the police critics’ notion of justice and the police defenders’ notion 
of fairness: While the former directly refers to the justice system itself, the latter refers 
to the confidence in this system, but also to factors that can negatively influence this. 
Thus, by referring to ‘fairness’ instead of ‘justice’, culpability shifts from the criminal 
justice system to the police critics, while the police defenders remain confident in the 
system itself. 
The police defenders’ notion of ‘unfairness’ also comprises a sense of 
victimization. This is how the notions ‘victimization’ and ‘unfairness’ relate in the 
English language:  
 
Victimize 
Verb — Single (someone) out for cruel or unjust treatment.  
Unfair  
Adjective — 1. Not based on or showing fairness; unjust. 2. Contrary to the rules of a game.9 
 
While ‘unfairness’ and ‘victimization’ both involve ‘unjust treatment’, the latter notion 
is more emotionally charged than the former. Thus, by saying that the officers are 
treated unfairly, the police defenders are subtly saying that they are victimized. This 
subtleness and obliqueness is caused by the double meaning of the definition of unfair. 
The officers are not just receiving ‘unjust treatment’, but this treatment is also 
‘contrary to the rules of a game’, which is a factual, and not an emotional, way of 
saying that the officers have been victimized. The expression ‘to deserve fairness’ 
further reinforces the notion of victimization. The police defenders reiterate the fact 
that the charged detectives ‘deserve fairness’, because they believe that they are not 
receiving it. The fact that the police defenders are only referring to the officers and do 
not mention the victims, further supports this.  
 Fairness itself is a notion that fits within the common values that Americans 
share, just like the notion of justice, and is thus ‘coalition-oriented’ as it seeks common 
ground. However, the deeper layer of discourse shows how police defenders narrowly 
define fairness. The police defenders use of the word is dual-layered, which leads to a 
dual-layered desired outcome of debate: ‘The implicated officers deserve fairness’. The 
analysis fine-tunes this outcome further in the following paragraphs, which examine 
how defenders respond to challenges posed by different judicial decisions 
 
The rigidity of deserving fairness: An unequal demand for equality  
Up to the indictments, police defenders respond optimistically to key moments in the 
debate and show confidence in the judicial process. Only police critics can bring this 
fairness into jeopardy. From the start they are portrayed as perpetrators, and the 
judicial grand jury process and the implicated officers as victims of this (‘an 
unprincipled and pernicious attack on the integrity of the grand jury process’, ‘the sole 
effect is to deny these police officers a fair and impartial grand jury investigation’). 
After the indictments, which by themselves challenge the police defenders’ 
desired outcome of debate, the police defenders’ tone of voice alters to some extent. 
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While the work of the jury itself is not criticized, the police defenders firmly 
disapprove of its decision (‘a chilling message to all of law enforcement’). Police 
defenders now also point out apparent flaws in the process, which weren’t addressed 
previously (‘[the indictment] was not unexpected — a grand jury presentation is one-
sided’). The discourse also comprises a sense of victimization, similar to that conveyed 
by police critics when their notion of justice was not met (‘The message that’s being 
sent now is that even though you’re acting in good faith, in pursuit of your lawful 
duties, there is no room, no margin for error’). As spontaneous discourse, the police 
defenders’ communication shows that the police feel attacked and unfairly treated by 
the grand jury’s decision. As strategic PR discourse, the communication can be seen as 
‘emotional blackmail’: Police defenders will only be satisfied when all conditions are 
met and make threats that not meeting these conditions can have negative 
consequences. The overall tone remains optimistic concerning the future judicial 
proceedings (‘it is a good day in that we can finally get involved in the process’). The 
confidence police defenders share in the eventual outcome of the trial (‘I firmly believe 
that he will be found not guilty’, and ‘we’re all confident he will be vindicated’) also 
underlines this optimism. This confidence does not extend beyond the criminal justice 
system, as the defenders do not trust (‘I hope, but have little faith in’) external groups 
(‘they’) who are using unfair methods (‘angry rhetoric’) that are obstructing the justice 
system (‘let the juries make their decisions in peace’). 
This change in communication after the indictments gives more insight into the 
police defenders’ delimitation of the notion of fairness. Whereas the process itself is 
still perceived as mostly fair, the grand jury decision is not. Thus, although the first 
layer of the desired outcome of debate is still partially met, the second layer is not. 
While this does not result in an ‘evaporation of respect’ for the legal system (‘I respect 
their decision’), unlike the acquittals did to police critics, such coalition-oriented 
discourse is countered by statements comprising emotional blackmail.  
 
In between the indictments and the trial 
After the indictments, the police defenders tried several times in various court 
appearances to change the judicial conditions for the trial. The rulings resulting from 
these court appearances by themselves challenge the notion of fairness held by the 
police defenders, who were growing more pessimistic towards the judicial system and 
other stakeholders in the debate, now that their conditions for fairness were repeatedly 
not met. Mr. Culleton for example allegedly ‘vents against the grand jury that indicted 
his client on manslaughter’ (a New York Times depiction) and also argues that the 
grand jury was inconsistent by indicting ‘only three of the five officers’, while Mr. 
Kartagener says that the judge’s refusal to dismiss the charges was a ‘disappointment, 
but no surprise’. Mr. Palladino, in turn, is ‘dismayed’ by the ruling not to change the 
venue (also a New York Times depiction) and is even more outspoken on another 
occasion in conveying his pessimism, by saying that the ‘foundation that this country 
was built upon […] of due process and innocent until proven guilty […] has been 
weakened and may have been compromised’. However, he directs his criticism not so 
much at the system itself, but at the media and other police critics. Both the judicial 
system, and the police who depend on this system, are victims of this (‘the negative 
publicity and the antics of Al Sharpton and others [that] have created a situation where 
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the right to a fair trial is in jeopardy’). Yet again, the new rulings do not result in an 
evaporation of respect (‘However, the court has spoken’).  
 
During and after the trial 
During most of the trial, the New York Times mainly quotes police defenders outside of 
the courtroom, who focus on the second layer of their desired outcome of debate and 
show zeal to fight for this (‘I want those men to be cleared of all these charges and 
return to their lives and live them out in peace’). In their closing arguments, the 
lawyers do speak out again on the notion of fairness and how they fear it is being 
challenged. At this point, the lawyers stress that the first layer of their desired outcome 
of debate is in jeopardy (‘That’s not how you’re supposed to try cases’). However, they 
also refer to the second layer, pointing out what could happen if just and appropriate 
treatment does not take place. This strategy may be seen as emotional blackmail (‘Next 
time, you’re dead. That’s what they’re asking for’). In this statement, as well as in 
other responses to challenges, the desired outcome of debate ‘the implicated officers 
deserve fairness’ is extended to ‘all police officers deserve fairness’.  
After the acquittals, the subtle criticism expressed by police defenders towards 
the system has made way for the initial optimism and trust in its functioning and value 
(‘all of the detectives were found not guilty in a court of law’), now that the conditions 
for both layers of the desired outcome of debate are largely met. Yet the police 
defenders continue to express their anger and disagreement with those that challenge 
the system by using unfair criticism and methods, now ranging from Al Sharpton and 
the witnesses (‘Rev. Al needs to be reminded that all of the detectives were found not 
guilty in a court of law’), to the DA’s office and even to the NYPD itself, when the 
department announces it has filed departmental charges against the officers (‘the 
charges that have been served today have been drawn up without the benefit of hearing 
what the officers have to say’). The departmental process itself, however, is again 
viewed with a degree of confidence (‘cautiously optimistic’). Some of the rhetoric is 
harsh and accusing, and the referral to the ‘Rev. Al’ is even mocking.  
 
Summary 
This subsection has demonstrated how police defenders share a rigid notion of the 
desired outcome of debate, initially formulated as ‘the implicated officers deserve 
fairness’. The discussion of debate challenges has shown that fairness not only applies 
to the implicated officers, but that ‘all police officers deserve fairness’.  
The rigid definition of this desired outcome of debate is intricately entwined in 
the police defenders’ communication, as they leave unsaid at first glance what they 
actually mean by fairness. While the dual-layered desired outcome of debate on a 
superficial level is broadly delimited, as fairness can refer to the American value of 
equal treatment within the criminal justice system for all people involved, on a deeper 
level it refers more rigidly to just and appropriate treatment of merely the implicated 
officers and the police at large, both within and outside of this trusted system. The 
notion ‘just and appropriate’, in turn refers not so much to a ‘consensus opinion’ held 
by all stakeholders involved, but to the opinions held by police defenders, implying 
that the officers should be exonerated and that they should not be (unfairly) criticized. 
In addition, this deeper layer also refers to the current state of unfairness caused, in the 
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view of police defenders, by the unfair criticism, methods and motives conveyed and 
held by those who criticize the police and thus inflict damage on the criminal justice 
system, the implicated police officers, and ultimately all police officers.  
Although there is no clear-cut label that captures both a prerequisite for the 
debate to be resolved, and the zeal by which this prerequisite is sought, like the label 
‘No justice, no peace’ does, the police defenders are almost as determined to achieve 
their desired outcome of debate as the police critics. However, this is conveyed more 
subtly. While the rigid definition of ‘deserving fairness’ delimits the playing field in 
which negotiation can take place, the emphatic and emotive rhetoric shows the harsh 
character of these negotiations as well as the zeal to continue the fight. 
The scope, dynamics and characteristics of the desired outcome of debate 
become more apparent at times when this outcome is challenged. Although the police 
defenders show confidence in the criminal justice system itself, cracks in this 
confidence appear when those who are part of the criminal justice system make 
decisions that oppose the second layer of the desired outcome of debate. Conversely, 
those permanently critical of the implicated officers and the New York police in 
general are denounced, criticized and mocked on a continual basis, which intensifies at 
times when the desired outcome of debate is severely challenged.  
The specific outcome of debate conveyed by police defenders is a product of 
the broader interpretative patterns discussed in the previous section, just like ‘Justice 
for Sean Bell’ is. While the ‘to deserve’ component relates to the self-centered 
interpretative framing delineated by the concerns, feelings, thoughts and previous 
experiences of the implicated officers, the second layer of the desired outcome of 
debate, i.e. exoneration of the implicated officers and putting a halt to (unfair) 
criticism, fits within the historical and organic interaction process between the police 
and the community that entails danger and chaos, but in which the officer shows 
restraint and astute assessment, and in which the officer is rather a victim than a 
perpetrator of the dangerous situation inherent within this interaction. Within this 
pattern, the police are victims, so they should be exonerated and not further criticized. 
Those that criticize the police, in turn, are the perpetrators. In addition, the current fight 
against unfairness and victimization is part of the historical and organic pattern of 
prolonged and profound unfair criticism, methods and motives instigated by police 
critics and the consequential pattern of police suffering and victimization and a 
weakening of the criminal justice system. The perceptions discussed in Section 3.1 also 
affect the rigidity of the definitions concerning debate outcome and negotiation space, 
functioning as a catalyst for ‘us-versus-them’ sentiments, and invigorating the 
emotional character of the battle for deserved fairness.  
The vocabulary used to convey the desired outcome of debate is often harsh, 
emotive and emphatic, further exacerbating the schism between the perpetrators 
(‘they’) and the victims. The communication strategies include emotional blackmail, 
reiteration and amplification, the latter serving as a method of creating a ‘state of 
urgency’ (the agenda-setting effect). 
 
3.3.2 The delineation of reality: ‘us-versus-them’ positioning 
The police defenders’ rigidly defined dual-layered desired outcome of debate 
scrutinized in the previous subsection is part of a broader reality defined by the 
369 
 
perceptions and the historical and organic interpretative dimensions discussed in 
previous sections. The analysis in this subsection looks at the borders of this broader 
reality. 
 
The rigid definition of reality: a single version of the truth 
In their definition of the reality concerning (culpability for) the shooting, the officers’ 
lawyers emphasize ‘the truth’ and ‘the facts’, in a similar fashion to that of the police 
critics, hence presenting their reality as the only ‘accurate’ or ‘truthful’ one (‘the truth 
is the truth’, ‘put some facts to some of the fiction that ran in the street’). They also 
emphasize the truth by using dogmatic assertions (‘they’re not criminals’) and by 
stressing the ‘accuracy’ of the testimony given by the defendants. The rigidly defined 
truth that is conveyed in the courtroom can be seen as courtroom rhetoric/PR discourse, 
as it is obvious that lawyers support their clients fully, and in their defense do not seek 
common ground in regard to the reality of what happened. However, the rigidly 
defined truth can also be seen as spontaneous discourse. Outside of the courtroom, Mr. 
Palladino and other advocates, in a similar fashion to Al Sharpton, also position 
themselves as experts by questioning the honesty and conduct of the three victims (‘If 
you’re not guilty of something, and there’s no gun in the car, then why not stop the 
car?’) and by presenting their own reality as the truthful one (‘Here is what we know’). 
The use of categorical assertions such as ‘shootings are always tragic’ and ‘it 
does not rise to the level of criminality’ not only show an emphasis on, but also a 
delimitation of the truth, while emphatic reiterations such as ‘the truth is the truth’ 
highlight the insistence on only one truth and reveal a method to shield from other 
truths. The police defenders also emasculate other versions of the truth by labeling 
them as unreliable (‘the fiction that ran in the street’).  
The police defenders’ reality in regard to culpability for the shooting and 
related matters such as racial motivation is particularly uncompromising. While this 
reality, already manifest in the labels ‘A matter of seconds’ and ‘A tragic set of events’ 
and part of broader historical and organic framings in itself is rigidly defined and does 
not seek common ground, police defenders use uncompromising vocabulary (‘to 
nullify’, ‘no way under any version of events’, ‘this is nonsense’) that leaves no 
opening for other interpretations. They also express ‘confidence’ that ‘the facts’ will 
prove the officers’ innocence in court, thus implying that their reality is the only 
truthful one. The notion of fairness is also used to define reality as other interpretations 
are ‘not based on or showing fairness’ or simply put: unjust.  
 Unlike police critics and the NYPD, police defenders do not offer any 
solutions to improve police–community relations in their responses to the Sean Bell 
shooting. This fits within their self/police-centered interpretative framing dominated by 
the concerns, feelings, thoughts and previous experiences of the implicated officers. In 
addition, they do not respond to the solutions suggested by police critics. However, 
when proposed solutions are actually implemented by the NYPD, the police defenders 
do speak out (‘the PBA will not allow management to cast doubt on every shooting by 
subjecting a police officer to a test for which there is no cause or justification’). Thus, 
while the police–community solutions offered by police critics are solely aimed at the 
police officers, the police defenders refute the proposed measures solely by looking at 





While the police critics’ reality is challenged only at designated points in the aftermath 
by counter-evidence and counter-criticism, the reality held by police defenders is 
defied almost continuously, as the entire judicial process is a challenge to their belief 
that the implicated officers are innocent.  
The discussion of perceptions and interpretations has already demonstrated 
some insight into the way police defenders respond to reality challenges. For instance, 
the police critics’ label ‘50 shots’ is countered by ‘A matter of seconds’. Also, the 
police critics’ allegations towards the police officers are countered by the positive 
characterization of ‘good cops’ within the label ‘Every day is hell for these guys’.  
The analysis in this subsection shows how the police defenders also respond to 
reality challenges in other ways. First, the police defenders respond by refuting the 
criticism itself. The negative media reports on Detective Oliver (a challenge to the 
police defenders’ image of ‘a good cop’) were ‘irrelevant to the facts of the case’ as 
‘neither he nor his client was aware of a reported $10,000 settlement in the cabbie 
incident’. Police defenders also question the credibility and motives of those criticizing 
their reality (‘smear campaign masquerading as investigative journalism’, ‘character 
assassination of my client for the purpose of selling newspapers’, ‘Somebody wanted 
this case to come out and fit a script’) and argue that the methods used by police critics 
are unfair (‘Justice Arthur J. Cooperman was able to navigate through the rhetoric of 
the prosecution’). 
Second, the police defenders respond to reality challenges by arguing that the 
police critics’ unfair criticism, methods, and motives lead to victimization, as they 
negatively affect the judicial process and the concerns, feelings, thoughts and previous 
experiences of the implicated officers. By doing so, the police defenders link their 
desired outcome of debate to reality challenges created by police critics (the current 
state of unfairness): The right to a fair trial had been ‘damaged’, the jury pool had been 
‘incurably poisoned’, and the implicated officers’ ‘civil rights and due process’ were in 
danger. Mr. Oliver has been ‘vilified since Day 1’, Mr. Cooper has been ‘ostracized’ 
and feels ‘crushed’ and ‘betrayed by the African-American community’. The police 
defenders, in turn, are portrayed as ‘good cops’ and ‘good lawyers’: While Mr. Cooper 
‘had mentored black youngsters, worked to get guns off the street, and had been a 
member of the Guardians Association, a black fraternal group’, Mr. Culleton is a 
‘death penalty lawyer who has been “trying to save people from our community from 
the gallows”’. 
As spontaneous discourse, the police defenders' sense of victimization felt after 
criticism fits within their framing of a historical and organic pattern of prolonged and 
profound unfair criticism, methods and motives instigated by police critics, which has 
led to a pattern of police suffering and victimization and a weakening of the criminal 
justice system. Similar to that of police critics, the sense of victimization is partly due 
to a self-righteous attitude: As there is no other reality, criticism on one’s own reality is 
felt as a personal attack. Police defenders feel that no proper respect is given. As 
strategic PR discourse and strategic judicial discourse, the sense of victimization can 
be categorized as ‘emotional blackmail’, as it suggests that criticism can have negative 
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effects. The reference to victimization in this way can be seen as a way of (counter) 
attack. 
 On a rhetorical level, police defenders underline the sense of wrongdoing and 
its causal relation to victimization, by emphasizing its magnitude in different ways: 
While the lengthy time span of wrongdoing is stressed by statements such as ‘the very 
outset of this case’, the nature of the wrongdoing is emphasized by emphatic 
descriptions such as ‘feeding frenzy’, and ‘an enormous amount of highly prejudicial 
local media publicity’. The magnitude of the victimization is also emphasized by 
police defenders in their use of equally emphatic and emotionally charged descriptions 
such as ‘poisoned’, ‘castigated’ and ‘vilified’.  
The police defenders’ responses to reality challenges show the unyielding 
nature of their reality, in which no common ground with other realities is sought. Other 
realities on the shooting and the conduct of the officers are simply dismissed: There is 
one truth, and other versions are ‘a script’. While the police defenders do at one point 
acknowledge the existence of the labels ‘Sean Bell’ and ‘50 shots’ by saying that the 
case has become known as ‘the Sean Bell Case’, and ‘the 50-Shot Case’, they do so 
only to show how these untruthful labels victimize the detectives.  
 
From rigidly defined reality to an ‘us-versus-them’ positioning  
The police defenders’ rigid definition of truth and the non-understanding of those held 
by others results in an ‘us-versus-them’ reality, which in its totality is similar to that of 
the police critics, yet the demarcation lines that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’ do differ.  
While the police defenders’ discourse does not delimit ‘us’ and ‘them’ by 
racial lines, the ‘us’ group is delimited foremost by unequivocal support towards the 
officers. Contrary to police critics, who relate support to personal/group identification 
(‘I am Sean Bell’), the police defenders lay more emphasis on the support itself 
(‘vigorously represent our detectives in the department’s trial room’). This support is 
fuelled by police kinship (‘our detectives’) and at times is ranked higher than the rule 
of law itself (‘I would have given him support even if he was found guilty by the 
court’).The ‘us’ group, at times depicted in the New York Times as a tight-knit secretive 
police culture, is thus two-pronged, comprising supporters on the one side and those 
receiving support, i.e. the implicated officers on the other. The group of police officers 
at large can be associated with either of these groups. Those who do not show ‘support’ 
such as the Grand Council of Guardians are not part of the ‘us’ group (‘We parted 
ways before the Sean Bell shooting’). In addition, the police defenders delimit the ‘us’ 
group by emphasizing that the reality of the police — characterized by uniqueness — 
is hard to understand for outsiders (‘you have no idea what it’s like’, ‘you had to be 
there’). While police defenders themselves might not all have experienced ‘what it’s 
like’ either, they can understand and relate to this reality, which is a condition for 
membership of the ‘us’ group.  
In the reality held by police defenders, the ‘us’ group is also delimited by 
victimization and thus restricted to those who have to pay the price for ‘unfairness’, i.e. 
the implicated officers, but also the police at large (‘They turn their back on people like 
Gescard Isnora’, ‘We have been portrayed as insensitive murderers’), and even at times 
the lawyers (‘supporters of Mr. Bell’s family sort of discouraged me from doing my 
sworn duty’).  
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While the ‘them’ group is rigidly delimited by the notion of criticism, the 
consistency of this group, in turn, is flexible, depending on those who 
challenge/criticize the reality of police defenders at a particular moment, ranging from 
Al Sharpton, social activists, demonstrators, memorial websites, lawyers, and the 
media, but also the public in general, the mayor, the grand jury members, several 
African-American police organizations, and even Police Commissioner Kelly. Police 
defenders expect police critics to act within a fixed pattern, and have a rigid concept of 
reality, just as the ‘us’ group does. While the ‘them’ group knows ‘little about’ what 
happened they still feel ‘an obligation to raise their voices in anger’, which is behavior 
that is never fully understood (‘It’s a contradiction, a puzzle’). Moreover, police 
defenders convey the conception that those who are unsupportive are considered 
outcast by police critics (‘a defense lawyer, Anthony L. Ricco, suggested at cross-




This subsection has demonstrated how the police defenders’ rigid definition of reality 
only accommodates a single version of the truth of the incident itself in which no other 
interpretations, perceptions and viewpoints are possible. The police defenders’ reality 
rigidly excludes blame for the shooting incident. Solutions presented are either ignored 
or refuted if they conflict with the concerns of the police. When this rigidly defined 
reality is challenged, feelings of victimization and denial are exacerbated, while the 
police defenders use strategies such as ridiculing, use of irony, deliberately shielding 
from another reality, and the questioning of the trustworthiness of the critics while 
suggesting that they use unfair strategies. Hence police critics’ arguments are not 
properly addressed or they are ignored, and no true dialogue is initiated in the media. 
The police defenders’ rigid definition of reality leads to an overall ‘us-versus-
them’ positioning. The ‘us’ component is demarcated by level of support, police 
fraternity, ability to understand the suffering, and victimization, resulting in a diverse 
dual-layered ‘us’ group. Permanent members include police fraternities and spokesmen 
and a large part of the police rank and file (although they do not speak out 
individually), the implicated officers, and their lawyers. The ‘them’ component, in 
turn, is quite flexible in consistency, as it is mainly demarcated by those who criticize 
the police at a certain time in the aftermath. While Al Sharpton is a permanent 
component of this group, the mayor and the police commissioner himself are also 
labeled as ‘them’. The ‘them’ group is characterized by a predictable pattern of 
behavior (i.e. unfair criticism, methods and motives, as well as non-understanding and 
non-support), while never being fully understood.  
 
3.3.3 The driving force of response and the filter of debate:  
Third person emotionality and a self-centered perspective 
The police defenders’ self-centered perspective functions as a filter of response: Each 
new development is assessed by looking at the impact on the implicated officers or the 
police at large. The starting point and driving force of debate is characterized by 
emotion, yet the use of emotion differs from that of the police critics.  
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The analysis in this subsection hence looks more closely at the use of emotion. 
The police defenders’ discourse is characterized by a mix of emotional and more 
factual characteristics: While the label ‘Every day is hell for these guys’ exudes 
emotion, the labels ‘A tragic set of events’ and ‘A matter of seconds’ exude both 
emotion and factuality. Emotion is also an important component of the historical and 
organic framing of unfairness and victimization, and of the second layer of the desired 
outcome of debate: exoneration of the implicated officers and putting a halt to (unfair) 
criticism. This second layer can be seen as the departure point of debate for the police 
defenders. The analysis has shown how police defenders use emotion mainly in the 
third person singular/plural, while taking a more factual stance in the debate 
themselves. This comes to light in the label ‘Every day is hell for these guys’, i.e. ‘hell’ 
(emotion), ‘for these guys’ (third person). While police defenders also personally feel 
victimized, and the notion of victimization itself is emotionally charged, the police 
defenders remain more factual about this. For instance, the statement ‘We have been 
portrayed as insensitive murderers — and I can tell you that we are not’ does exude 
personal victimization, but not personal emotion. This differs from the police critics’ 
approach, as this group not only speaks about emotions of the community, but also 
shows their own emotions much more often.  
The police defenders thus function more as a gauge for police feelings than 
that they show their own emotions. The emotions that are mentioned, in turn, are often 
simply stated, instead of being colorfully depicted to the extent of those of the police 
critics. While the police defenders describe the officers’ feelings more frequently by 
saying ‘he was very upset’, police critics use metaphors such as ‘this was a powder 
keg’. However, at times police defenders also use passionate rhetoric, manifest in the 
label ‘Every day is hell for these guys’ (‘nervous wreck’, ‘he has been vilified from 
Day 1’), resulting in a mixed picture. There are exceptions to the third-person 
emotionality (‘There is nothing more heart-wrenching than to a see a police officer put 
through the system, especially one who didn’t do anything wrong’). 
The reality of the official spokespeople section of the police defenders is thus 
less emotionally driven than that of police critics, but more than that of the NYPD. 
 
3.3.4 The character of communication: Confrontation and deflection 
As the police defenders have a defensive rather than an offensive role in the debate, 
similar to that of the NYPD, yet also draw on confrontational strategies, this subsection 
looks at both the police defenders’ confrontational and defensive discourse. While 
some of the communication strategies have already been discussed previously 
(specifically in the conclusions of Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2), the analysis in this 
subsection looks at strategies that have not been touched upon yet, as well as at the 
broader communication approach of which the discussed strategies are part.  
 
Intricate confrontational discourse: Circumstantial ad hominem argumentation 
While the police defenders covered in the New York Times refrain from instigating 
violence, and the discourse is not as harsh as the vindictive discourse conveyed by 






The most pronounced examples can be found in Mr. Ricco’s cross-
examination of witnesses. The lawyer uses harsh and accusing rhetoric in which he 
both directly and more subtly questions the moral and intellectual qualities of Mr. Bell 
and his friends: While the references to ‘getting so damn drunk’, ‘a sense of twisted 
sexual prowess’ and ‘you were watching them girls on the stage’ are a direct attack on 
the moral qualities of Sean Bell and the witnesses, the use of slang/incorrect grammar 
defames the character of the witness in a more intricate way. His use of slang and 
incorrect grammar is an intricate form of circumstantial ad hominem argumentation as 
it subtly dismisses the testimony of the witnesses by the social class they are associated 
with, i.e. ‘street people’. This social class is portrayed in a derogatory way: While the 
use of ‘bad’ grammar indirectly discredits the intellect of this ‘social class’, the 
negative connotation of the word ‘street’ in ‘street people’, discussed in Subsection 
3.2.1, questions the moral standards of the group of people to whom Mr. Ricco is 
referring. In his explanation of his usage of slang, his references to ‘the real side of 
people’ and ‘you don’t take that stuff off of people’ are also direct and harsh attacks on 
the moral qualities of the witnesses (and the group they are part of), as these sentences 
not only imply that Sean Bell’s friends, as well as the people they are associating with, 
are ‘street people’, but also that they are trying to hide their background. On a broader 
note, Mr. Ricco refutes the attribution of American values of sustained devotion, 
marriage and fatherhood to Sean Bell in the label ‘We love Sean Bell’ by saying ‘He 
put his marriage to his high school sweetheart on the back burner’. Mr. Ricco also 
surreptitiously questions the intellect of one of the witnesses, Mr. Coicou, with the 
implied irreverent reference to ‘kook’ (North American informal expression for a mad 
or eccentric person), and his accusation that the witness is using words he doesn’t 
know the meaning of.
11
 In addition, Mr. Ricco questions the moral qualities of the 
witness with the patronizing remark ‘Stay out of trouble’. However, these remarks do 
not necessarily refer to the social class Mr. Coicou belongs to. 
 Mr. Ricco’s statements, to a degree, can be seen as courtroom tactics and thus 
do not necessarily reflect the perceptions held by the lawyer. However, the character of 
communication remains harsh either way. Outside of the courtroom, Robert Leuci, a 
former New York Police Department narcotics detective, uses similarly aggressive 
methods in his New York Times Op-Ed, by questioning the moral background of the 
victims (‘nothing new for Mr. Guzman; he’d been convicted in an armed robbery 
during which the victim was shot at’), but also the dubious background of the night 
club where Sean Bell and his friends were the night of the shooting (‘a hotbed of 
narcotics, prostitution, gun sales and under-age drinking’), and the people who come 
there (‘sporting life’), thus using circumstantial ad hominem argumentation.  
In the remainder of the communication found in the New York Times, there is 
no discourse that matches the harshness of how Mr. Ricco and Mr. Leuci contest 
intellect or moral qualities. Yet the police defenders do attack the police critics for their 
background, as the analysis of this chapter has shown in different subsections. 
According to police defenders, police critics use unfair criticism, draw on unfair 
methods, and maintain unfair motives. Moreover, similar to that of police critics, the 
police defenders’ communication is not only harsh, it is also very personal: Al 
Sharpton (and to a lesser extent Charles Barron) are singled out. Although their 
rhetoric is not imbued as much with name-calling and direct verbal abuses as that of 
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the police critics, the communication still consists of harsh allegations (‘always mean-
spirited’, ‘those like Al Sharpton who have made careers out of demonizing the 
police’), in which the character of those criticizing the police is defamed. Such 
allegations are, however, less harsh than those made by police critics. To a degree, this 
discrepancy can be attributed to the defensive role police defenders have in the debate. 
Still, and similar to Mr. Ricco’s rhetoric, this discourse can be labeled as circumstantial 
ad hominem argumentation, as police defenders dismiss statements made by police 
critics by looking at their background (‘credibility, something the Rev. Al had forsaken 
a long time ago in the Tawana Brawley case’).  
 
Intricate defensive communication 
Apart from harsh rhetoric, police defenders also use other methods, which are not 
direct attacks, but rather defensive and deflective strategies that are often indiscernible, 
as it is often what the police defenders refrain from saying that can also affect the 
outcome of debate, similar to the NYPD’s communication approach. Examples of 
these include the indifference towards the measures proposed and arguments used by 
police critics, but also the vehemence by which police defenders aim to secure the 
interests of the implicated officers and the rank and file in its totality when the NYPD 
tries to implement new measures. The labels ‘A matter of seconds’ and ‘A tragic set of 
events’, which refute the magnitude of the labels ‘50 shots’ and ‘I am/We love Sean 
Bell’, can also be seen as deflective communication strategies.  
On a broader note, the defensive police defenders’ communication is quite 
deflective, just like that of the Police Department. With the exception of the discourse 
that is directed towards the witnesses in the courtroom, the police defenders tend to 
speak about the police critics in the third person and only rarely aim their 
communication directly at them. 
 
Summary 
In short, police defenders draw on harsh and confrontational communication strategies, 
by which they attack those that criticize them, while using deflective and defensive 
rhetoric to secure the interests of the implicated officers. The confrontational rhetoric is 
harsh, uncompromising, and emotional while imbued with allegations and 
circumstantial ad hominem argumentation. While the offensive rhetoric is similar to the 
police critics’ communication, the defensive rhetoric resembles much more the 
NYPD’s communication, ignoring arguments and proposals brought up by police 
critics, and speaking about this group of stakeholders in the third person.  
 
3.3.5 Multiple hues: Conciliatory discourse 
The communication that seeks common ground is relatively sparse, yet exercised by all 
police defenders in an equal pattern. Those within the core group of police defenders 
do not distance themselves from others who are supportive of the police in the way 
police critics do, which is in line with the NYPD’s one clear voice approach. Similarly, 
while there might be rifts within the Guardians Association, a black police union, the 
group is still communicating its support for the police in one clear voice through its 
leader Victor Swinton.  
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The character of the communication that seeks common ground matches the 
police defenders’ dual-layered, yet rigidly defined outcome of debate, as well as the 
overall subtleness and intricacy of communication. Hence the dichotomies conveyed 
by police critics (such as ‘we are right’ versus ‘we can be wrong too’) are not found in 
the police defenders’ discourse. Instead, and similar to that of the NYPD, 
communication that seeks common ground is entwined with communication that does 
not.  
 
Apparent flexibility in reality: ‘A set of events’ versus ‘a horrible tragedy’  
The most profound example of how police defenders appear to show understanding for 
the reality felt by police critics is the use of the word ‘tragedy’, or in a broader sense 
the label ‘A tragic set of events’. While, the ‘Tragic set of events’ label at first glance 
appears to seek common ground with the ‘50 shots’ and ‘We love/I am Sean Bell’ 
reality held by police critics, it in fact only does so on a limited basis, merely alluding 
to the emotions and hurt felt by all, and thus in fact diminishing the magnitude of the 
emotions and hurt felt by police critics.  
 
Apparent flexibility in truth and culpability: ‘We are right’ versus ‘expressions of 
regret’, ‘non-apology apologies’ and other seemingly conciliatory discourse 
Within the rigidly defined reality, police defenders for the most part maintain a strict 
delimitation of the truth, while insisting on ‘being right’. In the New York Times, the 
police defenders on no occasion acknowledge personal fault in regard to their 
positioning in the debate (in contrast to the police critics who do so on some 
occasions), nor do the police defenders ever question the overall conduct of the police. 
Only in a few excerpts do the police defenders appear to apologize (mostly indirectly) 
for the shooting. These apologies, however, are again examples of the dual-layered 
intricate character of the police defenders’ communication. While Detective Oliver 
expresses regret for fatally shooting Mr. Bell (‘it was the last thing in the world I ever 
wanted to do’), he also, indirectly, says he does not regret his own actions leading up to 
the death (‘Unfortunately as a result, sometimes people die’). His ‘expression of regret’ 
can be seen as a communication method that deflects culpability and is furthermore 
combined with a self-centered framing dominated by his personal concerns (‘I have to 
live with that also for the rest of my life’).  
While Detective Cooper’s statement after the acquittals appears on the surface 
to be a more direct apology (‘say sorry to the Bell family for the tragedy’), in fact he 
does not say sorry for his own actions either. This ‘non-apology apology’ — another 
communication method that deflects culpability by the use of ‘the tragedy’ as agent, 
makes the event itself the main culprit of the hurt felt by all involved, and not 
Detective Cooper. Furthermore, he combines his statement with a self-centered 
framing (‘This is the start of my life back’).  
The police defenders, especially the lawyers, do express their sympathy for the 
Bell family, although these expressions are not paired with statements on culpability. 
Instead, Mr. Palladino ‘quickly followed with a defense of the detectives’, again 




 Only one statement made by the president of the Sergeants Benevolent 
Association in regard to a taunting phone call after the acquittals can be labeled as 
seeking common ground (‘If it happened in our office, I want to know who did it’), as 
it does not condone the behavior that police critics’ condemn.  
 
Flexibility in outcome of debate: Refusal versus acceptance of 
reality-conflicting measures  
The police defenders’ desired outcome of debate in itself is an example of the intricate 
amalgamation of coalition-oriented discourse and non-coalition-oriented discourse. As 
discussed in Subsection 3.3.1, the first layer of the desired outcome of debate alludes to 
equal treatment for all, while the second layer merely to the fair treatment of the 
officers. 
There are also more specific examples of communication that appear to be 
more flexible in the outcome of debate. For instance, while Subsection 3.3.2 has 
demonstrated how union leaders contest measures that conflict with the desired 
outcome of debate and the rigidly defined reality dominated by the concerns, feelings, 
thoughts and previous experiences of the implicated officers, individual police officers 
do not necessarily agree with this stance. While one officer interprets the new sobriety 
measures within a ‘process and guidelines’ framing similar to that held by the NYPD 
(‘Whatever the rules are, that’s what I follow’), another officer interprets the shooting 
in terms of the self-centered framing dominated by personal concerns, feelings, 
thoughts and previous experiences (‘I don’t have a problem with it. I don’t drink, so no 
big deal’). Conversely, a third officer’s remark truly seeks common ground between 
his personal concerns (‘anything […] that lifts the clouds over police shootings is a 
good thing’) and the perceptions and interpretative framing of police critics (‘Anything 
that makes the public feel more at ease […] is a good thing’). Although he does 
recognize a drawback to the rule (‘The only downside is if a police officer is 
inebriated’), which fits within the self-centered interpretative framing of 
personal/police concerns, he pairs this with an affirmation of the need for such new 
guidelines (‘No police officer should ever be inebriated at any time’).  
 
Summary 
This subsection has demonstrated how communication that appears to steer a middle 
course is often dual-layered, combining less rigid definitions of debate and reality with 
more rigid ones. The police defenders’ communication can be divided in four 
gradations, which in part resemble those discussed for the NYPD:  
 
1. Communication that is not coalition-oriented, and does not appear to be either. 
This includes the confrontational, non-coalition-oriented discourse, which occurs 
frequently in the police defenders’ communication.  
2. Communication that appears to be coalition-oriented, as it seeks common ground 
with the reality held by police critics, but on a deeper level does not. Moreover, on 
this deeper level the communication aims to deflect culpability, and in some 
instances even dismisses the perceptions, interpretations, and positioning held by 
police critics. Strategies such as the ‘non-apology apology’ and the ‘expression of 
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regret’ can be seen as either spontaneous or strategic forms of communication 
aimed at deflecting culpability, while appearing to seek common ground.  
3. Communication that appears to be coalition-oriented, as it appears to seek common 
ground between personal concerns and the perceptions and interpretative framing 
of police critics, but on a deeper level is only to a certain extent coalition-oriented, 
as it remains part of the broader self-centered framing of personal concerns, 
feelings, thoughts and previous experiences.  
4. Communication that is coalition-oriented, as it truly seeks common ground 
between personal concerns and the perceptions and interpretative framing of police 
critics. 
 
While the first and second types of communication are pervasive in the police 
defenders’ communication, type 4 is the least common. On a rhetorical level, the 
communication in gradations 2–4 is less harsh and accusing than other communication 
discussed so far.  
 
3.3.6 Conclusion 
This section has demonstrated how the positioning of the police defenders is intricately 
dual-layered in nature: While on a superficial level the positioning often appears to be 
flexible and to seek common ground, on a deeper level it is characterized by rigidity, 
harshness and deflection, while driven by third-person emotionality and filtered by 
self-centeredness.  
Rigidity can be found in different aspects of the police defenders’ positioning. 
The positioning is first characterized by a rigidly defined and passionately fought 
outcome of debate, captured in the dual-layered label ‘All police officers deserve 
fairness’, which on a deeper level comprises exoneration of the implicated officers and 
putting a halt to (unfair) criticism towards the police at large and those that defend 
them. Second, the rigid positioning held by police defenders is also characterized by a 
rigidly defined ‘us-versus-them’ reality concerning the shooting and the role of 
stakeholders in this, in which no other interpretations, perceptions and viewpoints are 
possible, and in which solutions presented are either ignored or refuted if they conflict 
with the concerns of the police. In sum, rigidity can be found in the definitions for the 
desired outcome of debate, the prerequisites for the debate to come to an end, the 
negotiation space, the realities, truths and solutions contested in regard to the shooting 
and its broader framings, similar to the rigid positioning held by police critics.  
This results in an overall ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, in which a dual-
layered, victimized, supportive, and understanding ‘us’ and a perpetrating, criticizing, 
and non-understanding ‘them’ — although flexible in composition — are still pitted 
against each other.  
 Third-person emotionality, also captured in the label ‘All police officers 
deserve fairness’ and its inherent victimization, is the starting point of debate and 
driving force of response: Police defenders are driven by empathy with the police, 
while keeping a more factual stance than police critics. Similar to police critics, the use 
of emotion can be seen both as a form of spontaneous PR discourse aimed at 
conveying felt emotions and as a form of strategic PR/judicial discourse aimed at 
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amplifying the magnitude of the case and creating a state of urgency (agenda-setting), 
but also at ‘blackmailing’ other stakeholders. However, the third-person emotionality 
only marginally leads to an emotionally charged ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, in 
contrast to the reality held by police critics. Although victimization and blame are 
profound elements in the positioning held by police defenders, the ‘third-person 
emotionality’ prevents emotional escalation.  
In addition, the self-centered perspective serves as a filter through which 
actions are perceived, assessed, and responded to, again captured in the label ‘All 
police officers deserve fairness’.  
 Harshness and deflection, in turn, can be found in the rhetorical and 
communication strategies, but also in the dual-layered nature of the discourse, in which 
actual harshness is often deflected by intricate strategies.  
Although the positioning of police defenders at first glance seems to seek more 
common ground than that of the police critics and the NYPD, its dual-layered character 
results in a distorted image: less rigid definitions of debate and reality are combined 
with more rigid ones, and moreover, seemingly conciliatory discourse in some 
instances actually dismisses the perceptions, interpretations, and positioning held by 
police critics. Most of the discourse remains uncompromising and rigid. 
 There is no central figure that determines the positioning of the police 
defenders. Mr. Palladino does take an ‘expert layman’ positioning similar to that of Mr. 
Sharpton, but he does not influence the positioning of police defenders in the way the 
reverend does by perpetuating labels such as ‘No justice, no peace’. Instead, the 
positioning is determined by a core group of police defenders, who are not as 
diversified as the eclectic group of community leaders, and position themselves in a 
less blatant, more intricate manner. 
 Debate and reality challenges lay bare the police defenders’ deeper-layered 
rigid positioning, victimization, and an ‘us-versus-them’ reality, while also exposing 




3.4 Conclusions and outlook 
This chapter has examined the police defenders’ communication in the debate that 
followed after the Sean Bell shooting. Overall, this discourse is intricate in nature and 
on a deeper level polarized, with an almost hidden ‘us-versus-them’ schism subtly 
molding labels, framings and positioning.  
The ‘us’ component is a product of the self/police-centered framing delineated 
by the concerns, feelings, thoughts and previous experiences of the implicated officers, 
or in a broader sense all police officers, and is placed within a historical and organic 
pattern of proper training, strict guidelines, strong leadership and a display of restraint 
and astute assessment in dangerous and chaotic interactions, in which the officer is 
rather a victim than a perpetrator of the dangerous situation inherent within this 
interaction. In addition, this component is placed within a pattern of police suffering, 
victimization, and a weakening of the criminal justice system. It is subtly fuelled by the 
labels ‘A matter of seconds’ and ‘Every day is hell for these guys’, both exuding the 
(third-person) emotionality, victimization, humanization and ‘goodness’ of the officers, 
and the police force in its totality. The ‘us’ group is flexibly delineated by support, 
understanding, fraternal/police kinship and victimization. 
 The ‘them’ component, in turn, is a product of the (perceived) broader 
historical and organic interaction process that entails danger and chaos, as well as of 
the pattern of prolonged and profound ‘unfair’ criticism, methods and motives 
instigated by ‘them’. This component is fuelled by the impersonal aspects of the label 
‘A tragic set of events’, dismissing the highly personalized images of the shooting’s 
victims, as well as the communal pain felt by police critics. It is also fuelled by the bad 
connotations engendered by the expression ‘street people’, as well as negative 
references to intellect, moral qualities, and general background. The ‘them’ group 
flexibly comprises those expressing (unfair) police criticism, or displaying non-
understanding and non-support. Its core is depicted as a group of ‘professional police 
haters’. 
 Combined, the ‘us-versus-them’ schism is a product of the polarized 
interpretative framing of unfair criticism, methods and motivation on the one hand and 
the fight against this unfairness — as well as the victimization felt — on the other 
hand. The schism is subtly exacerbated with the images of a depersonalized yet 
morally questionable ‘them’ and a humanized and morally impeccable ‘us’. 
Such polarization, although subtly and intricately conveyed, results in an 
overall uncompromising, rigidly defined, dual-layered, harsh and deflective ‘us-versus-
them’ positioning, in which debate and reality are strictly delimited, in which there is 
barely any leeway for negotiation or alternative interpretations/solutions, and in which 
harsh and deflective communication strategies are used that either exacerbate this 
schism, or deflect attention from it. These strategies include personal attacks, 
amplification, self-victimization, emotional blackmailing, ridiculing, use of irony, and 
the questioning of the trustworthiness of other critics while suggesting they use unfair 
strategies (circumstantial ad hominem argumentation), but also more deflective 
methods such as third-person references, the deliberate shielding from another 
reality/ignoring the argumentation of other stakeholders, the ‘non-apology’, the ‘non-
apology apology’ and ‘the expression of regret’. The ‘us-versus-them’ schism is 
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infused in the vocabulary, marked by uncompromising, amplifying and emotional 
words and by a profound accentuation of the words ‘we’ and ‘they’.  
 There is no central figure influencing, catalyzing and communicating the 
perceptions, framings and positioning held by police defenders. Instead, there is a 
dominant group of spokesmen, comprising the lawyers of the implicated officers and 
union leaders, who are not politically diversified and therefore have a similar role in 
the debate, convey similar perceptions and framings, and maintain a similar 
positioning. These spokesmen, in turn, not only convey the perceptions, framings and 
interpretations of the implicated officers, but also, to a degree, represent that of the 
rank and file at large. The disparities in the police defenders’ communication can in 
part be attributed to the specific roles of different segments within this group. For 
instance, while the lawyers use judicial discourse, other segments are less likely to do 
so.  
The perceptions, framings and positioning that make up the ‘us-versus-them’ 
schism are more profoundly visible when debate and reality challenges occur. 
Courtroom rhetoric (to a degree deliberately) also exacerbates the ‘us-versus-them’ 
schism, while communication outside of the courtroom appears to be more coalition-
oriented. Police defenders only make use of a few communication channels, while the 
implicated officers and the rank and file are kept out of the public eye, possibly 
resulting in discourse that is less harsh, confrontational and emotionally charged.  
The analysis of the police defenders’ communication reinforces the previously 
made observation that labels, framings and positioning to a great extent interact with 
each other: while interpretative framings produce labels and function as the departure 
point of the positioning, labels serve as subtle catalysts for these framings and 
positioning, while this positioning in turn can further enhance the use of labels and the 
interpretations constructed by stakeholders. 
It is likely that the rigidly defined outcome of debate and broader realities, as 
well as the use of harsh and deflective communication, which are not coalition-oriented 
and do not seek common ground, affect the process of debate. In addition, the flexible 
composition of ‘them’ in combination with its rigid characterization as perpetrator of 
unfairness and the police defenders’ victimized response to this group suggests that 
criticism in itself is rejected no matter who gives such criticism or what the nature of 
the criticism is. 
                                                          
1 All three indicted officers were detectives, and thus foremost supported by the DEA. 
2 Police defenders also appear in other venues, such as internal union magazines and online message 
boards. See for example: “The RANT Forums,” The Polecat, accessed 7/28/2012, 2012, 
http://theerant.yuku.com/. 
3 Although judicial rhetoric is obviously also used by the victims’ lawyers, their role was much smaller 
within the overall group of police critics. 
4 Detective Michael Cooper’s testimony is not extensively covered in the New York Times, and his quotes 
do not provide much more insight into the perceptions held by the police officers. 
5 Most refrain from mentioning the symbolic number ‘50’, and instead mainly refer to ‘the number/amount 
of shots’, although Mr. Culleton does mention the 31 shots fired by his client. 
6 Concise Oxford English Dictionary [CD-ROM], 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
7 Michael Palladino, interview by author, October 21, 2009. 




                                                                                                                                                          
10 This does not imply that police defenders never convey communication that instigates violence, or make 
use of harsh communication methods. Such confrontational discourse can be found for instance on 




Chapter 4: Political stakeholders 
 
This chapter examines the communications by the chief city and chief state 
administrators of New York, Michael Bloomberg and both Governor George Pataki 
and his successor Governor David A. Paterson, in the debate that ensued after the Sean 
Bell shooting.  
 While each of these administrators has a political role in the debate, the mayor 
holds a more pivotal role than the two governors, as he is the chief administrator 
responsible for city services, of which the New York Police Department is a part, and 
moreover, he has the power to appoint and remove the heads of all city executive 
branch agencies, including the police commissioner.
1
 Mayor Bloomberg is thus a key 
player in the Sean Bell debate. This chapter hence focuses mainly on the perceptions, 
interpretations, and positioning conveyed by the mayor and his spokesmen. The 
communication conveyed by the two governors will be discussed in a short section at 
the end of this chapter.  
 Similar to police defenders, the mayor conveys mixed — sometimes 
conflicting — messages on held perceptions, interpretations and positioning. This 
makes it more difficult to determine a pattern in his communication. The mayor does 
not communicate as often as the police critics and police defenders do, which limits the 
amount of data available for research. The mayor, like the police commissioner, speaks 
out only at key moments in the aftermath of the debate. However, Mayor Bloomberg is 
much more outspoken than the police commissioner. Mayor Bloomberg’s 
communication particularly will be compared to that of the NYPD, as both bear 




4.1 Perceptions and images 
The New York Times mainly quotes the mayor at key moments in the aftermath of the 
shooting, similar to Police Commissioner Kelly. In between key moments, he seldom 
makes statements in connection to the Sean Bell shooting. However, on the occasions 
that he does speak out, he is relatively outspoken on how he perceives the shooting in 
its totality as well as specific aspects, in particular the people who were involved. 
While this outspoken approach makes it easier to distil perceptions, the limited amount 
of times the mayor speaks out, as well as the diverse nature of his communication, 
make it harder to capture his perceptions in labels. It is also harder to distinguish 
between the reasons for the transitory nature of perceptions and the perceptions 
themselves, similar to such distinction in the evasive communication conveyed by the 
NYPD. Also, perceptions of the victims and the implicated officers are frequently 
entwined and hard to separate.  
Hence the analysis in this subsection is structured chronologically rather than 
thematically, in order to scrutinize the roots for the transitory and eclectic nature of the 
mayor’s perceptions. Because his perceptions of the shooting and those involved are 
frequently entwined, they will not be separated in the analysis. While this section 
focuses mainly on the nature of the perceptions and not on the reasons for this specific 
nature (as further discussed in Section 4.3), a complete separation of both research 
threads is impossible.  
Lastly, the mayor rarely conveys images of himself in the selected New York 
Times articles. The following analysis will thus not focus on self-perceptions, as has 
been done in previous chapters, but rather examines why these perceptions do not 
occur.  
 
4.1.1 From ‘unacceptable’ to ‘a tragedy’: Dynamic event-based perceptions  
The mayor’s initial reaction 
Mr. Bloomberg’s initial reaction — a written statement disseminated to the press on 
the night after Sean Bell was shot — shows resemblances to Mr. Kelly’s response to 
the shooting: The mayor does not give any details on the shooting itself or on the 
victims, and instead uses nondescript words such as ‘the scene’, ‘an altercation’ and 
‘it’ to describe the shooting and the events leading up to it, without mentioning the 
number ‘50’, or other striking details. His statement, in particular the vocabulary used, 
is in line with the Police Department’s depiction of the shooting as ‘this event’. 
Although Mr. Bloomberg acknowledges that the community leaders have ‘concerns’, 
he does not specify them.  
 The mayor’s portrayal of the officers involved in the shooting, however, is 
more detailed than that of the shooting at large, as it focuses on a possible explanation 
for why the officers fired (‘the NYPD officers on the scene had reason to believe that 
an altercation involving a firearm was about to happen and were trying to stop it’). This 
particular focus is in line with the images conveyed by the NYPD (‘seconds’, ‘order’, 
and ‘peace’), as well as with the police defenders’ label ‘A matter of seconds’, yet it is 
less specific, emphatic and rigid than both, especially the latter.  
 The mayor emphasizes that his initial statement is based on ‘what we know’. 
While the police commissioner also said his perceptions are based on ‘what we know’, 
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the police commissioner’s perceptions are not transitory, whereas the mayor’s are. This 
becomes clear during the press conferences following this first statement, when more 
information becomes available on what happened on the night of the shooting. 
 
When more information became available  
In the press conferences following his initial statement, Mayor Bloomberg’s 
communication shows a remarkable change. The mayor now conveys profound, 
detailed and emphatic images of the shooting itself, depicting the excessiveness on the 
police side (‘excessive force’, ‘50-odd shots fired’), and innocence on the side of the 
victims (‘There is no evidence that they were doing anything wrong’, ‘Clearly they 
were victims’). As the mayor specifically links ‘50-odd shots’ to excessiveness and 
‘victims’ to ‘no evidence that they were doing anything wrong’, his perception appears 
to match the police critics’ ‘50 shots’ label with its focus on magnitude, number of 
shots fired, and excessiveness, as well as the core ‘Sean Bell’ label, with its focus on 
victimization and innocence. Yet the specific reference to ‘50-odd shots’ is still 
different from the references made by police critics, as the approximation ‘odd’ 
diminishes the symbolic value of the number 50.  
The perceptions conveyed by Mr. Bloomberg value the shooting 
(‘inexplicable’ and ‘unacceptable’), in a similar way to that of the police critics. These 
valued-based perceptions, however, are not emotionally charged, but rather distinguish 
on a factual level between what the mayor accepts and what he does not, which in turn 
also gives insight into his positioning in the debate.  
These perceptions conveyed by Mr. Bloomberg appear directed at and attuned 
specifically to those present at the meeting, i.e. a variety of community leaders and the 
press. 
 
Speaking with the community and the family  
After the mayor held a private meeting with the Bell family after the shooting, his 
communication appears to be directed not just to the community members, but now 
also to the family itself. Mr. Bloomberg conveys a mixture of perceptions of the 
shooting and those involved. On the one hand, he conveys emotionally-charged 
perceptions such as ‘loss’, parental love, empathy, and feelings, all of which to a 
certain degree fit within the police defenders’ label ‘A tragic set of events’. However, 
the mayor goes into much more detail in his depiction of the tragedy, while focusing on 
the specific loss felt by the victims (‘I don’t think that any parent can understand what 
it would be like to lose a child until it happens’). On the other hand, the mayor also 
conveys detached perceptions concerning facts and policies (‘racial profiling is […] 
No. 1, not the policy’). This, in turn, is more in line with the strong focus on facts and 
procedures in the communication conveyed by the NYPD.  
Mr. Bloomberg thus moves from factual yet value-charged perceptions in 
regard to the shooting and the conduct of the officers, to both emotional and value-
charged perceptions of the victims, and factual, yet non-value charged perceptions of 
the shooting and the conduct of the NYPD. On this occasion, the mayor does not refer 
to culpability anymore.  
Mr. Bloomberg also speaks out on the Sean Bell case during the annual Martin 
Luther King memorial (January 15, 2007). This time, the mayor conveys emotionally-
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charged perceptions (‘The tragedy of Sean Bell’, ‘terrible moment for New York’) on 
the shooting, yet a more universal notion of culpability (‘we really do have a long ways 
to go’). Mr. Bloomberg emphasizes the magnitude of the shooting itself, in contrast to 
the police commissioner. He underlines this magnitude not only by the adjective 
‘terrible’ but also by stressing the universality of to whom the ‘terrible moment’ 
applies (everyone in ‘New York’). In a way his communication resembles the police 
defenders’ label ‘A tragic situation’ with its inherent reference to universally felt 
victimization and a nondescript depiction of the shooting itself (‘moment’). Yet while 
the police defenders say that the shooting was a tragedy for all involved, thus reducing 
the magnitude of the culpability of the officers, Mr. Bloomberg rather stresses the 
magnitude of the tragedy itself as well as the shared responsibility of all New Yorkers 
to do something about it.  
 
Anticipating unrest 
Just before the indictments, the mayor still conveys value-based perceptions of the 
shooting such as ‘disturbing’ and ‘worrisome’, which are in line with his earlier-
conveyed perceptions of ‘unacceptable and inexplicable’. However, the perceptions 
now are vaguer, and do not reflect a dichotomy, nor do they relate directly to 
culpability.  
He now focuses more on tensions that may arise (‘I’m sure there will be some 
hotheads no matter what happens on either side’). This statement appears to be similar 
to that of Mr. Kelly (‘Obviously there will be some people who are disappointed with 
the verdict. We understand that’.) Yet while the mayor’s reference to ‘some’, similar to 
Mr. Kelly’s remark, diminishes the magnitude of the amount of people who are angry, 
his reference to ‘hotheads’ does not diminish the anger felt by these people. Another 
difference is the timing of the statements. As Mr. Kelly made this specific statement 
after the acquittals, his reference to ‘some’ merely refers to the police critics. The 
mayor, however, made his remark just before the indictments, when the outcome was 
still undecided, and specifically says that people ‘on either side’ will criticize the 
indictments ‘no matter what happens’, thus referring to both police critics and police 
defenders. The reference to ‘hotheads’ hence becomes much more universal. Yet the 
mayor also distinguishes between the ‘hotheads’ and the ‘muted reaction from the 
community’, thus portraying those with very angry reactions as marginal outsiders 
pitted against the community, while differentiating between acceptable and 
unacceptable responses.  
Before the acquittals, the mayor again focuses on tensions that may rise. 
Similar to the police commissioner, Mayor Bloomberg ‘plays down any suggestion 
that the city could erupt in violence’, maintaining that the situation itself is contained 
and not unruly or untamed, thus refuting images of lawlessness. However, while the 
police commissioner describes events in non-individuating terms, the mayor does so 
only to a lesser extent, as he still specifically speaks of ‘the Sean Bell case’. Although 
the mayor does not specifically refer to the police critics, his remark that ‘everybody 
will […] have a right to say what they want to say’ acknowledges the magnitude of ‘I 
am/We love Sean Bell’ more than Police Commissioner Kelly’s remark that ‘there will 
be some people who are disappointed with the verdict. We understand that’. Although 
the remarks seem alike, Mr. Bloomberg’s use of ‘everybody’ is both inclusive and does 
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not tone down the magnitude, while Police Commissioner Kelly’s reference to ‘some’ 
underlines the subtle ‘us-versus-them’ perceptions conveyed by the NYPD and, 
moreover, tones down the magnitude of ‘I am/We love Sean Bell’. 
 
No more references to culpability  
The mayor’s remarks just before and after the acquittals are strikingly different from 
his earlier, profoundly value-based perceptions conveyed just after the shooting, as he 
makes no further references to culpability. His statement at first glance show stark 
resemblances to the police defenders’ label ‘A tragic set of events’, as he also stresses 
the universality of the suffering (‘There are no winners in a trial like this’). However, 
by summing up the victims, he specifically focuses on the suffering of the Sean Bell 
family, thus not diminishing the magnitude of their victimization, but emphasizing it 
(‘An innocent man lost his life, a bride lost her groom, two daughters lost their father, 
and a mother and a father lost their son’). On the other hand, and similar to police 
defenders, he does not speak out on whether the implicated officers are culpable. The 
reference to ‘no winners’ implicitly refer to these officers. What is also different is that 
the mayor links the suffering both to the shooting itself and the trial (‘in a trial like 
this’). By doing so, the mayor specifically extends the victimization to the trial, 
pointing out that there are two sides to the story. By saying that ‘today’s decision is no 
different’, the mayor appears to diminish the magnitude and weight of the decision 
itself, similar to the NYPD’s focus on process and broader patterns, yet he also 
magnifies the authority of the decision (‘we accept their authority’).  
 
4.1.2 Conclusion 
The nature of the perceptions conveyed by the mayor is strikingly different from that of 
other stakeholders, as the mayor appears to communicate different perceptions on 
different occasions. The eclectic nature of his perceptions makes it impossible to 
capture them into labels. Combined, the mixture ranges from value-based factual 
perceptions such as ‘unacceptable’ and ‘inexplicable’, to empathetic, value-based 
perceptions such as ‘disturbing’ and ‘worrisome’; perceptions of the magnitude of the 
shooting, as well as on the psyche of the implicated officers and on the pain felt by the 
parents, the community, and New York at large; perceptions relating to the innocence 
of the victims; perceptions of certain vehement and rigid police critics and police 
defenders, and images of peace and civil obedience.  
The only dynamics that can be observed are that just after the shooting, the 
mayor conveys perceptions that are more value-based and judgmental than those 
toward the end, which focus more on the tragedy of the shooting and the prolonged 
pain felt by those involved in it. The chronological pattern also seems to be driven by 
‘what we know’, and hence the perceptions become more detailed when more 
information becomes available. Yet rather than a dynamic chronological pattern driven 
by time in general or chronological developments, the perceptions seem to be driven by 
location, specific developments, and audience. The mayor appears to mix an eclectic 
array of value-based, non-value based, factual and emotional perceptions, in order to 
obtain and safeguard certain (communication) goals, for example to control potentially 
inflammatory situations, such as after the indictments. Although the discourse appears 
to be upfront and sincere, the mayor’s statements can still best be characterized as a 
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strategic communication approach rather than as spontaneous discourse. Yet rather 
than a deflective, defensive or pro/anti-police agenda-setting purpose, as discussed in 
regard to previous stakeholders, the mayor’s approach is aimed at appeasing the 
existing and often conflicting feelings of different stakeholder groups, while 
maintaining law and order. This goal will be further scrutinized in Section 4.3.  
Although the mayor uses powerful perceptions in order to position himself, 
comparable to community leaders such as Mr. Sharpton and ‘official’ police defenders 
such as Mr. Palladino, his positioning appears to be much more flexible, as the 
communicated perceptions are more varied than those of other official leaders. In fact, 
the eclectic mix of perceptions fits within the combined perceptions of other 
stakeholders, but is less harsh and rigid. The perceptions, thus, are stakeholder-
centered, a notion that will be further explained in the next section.  
 On a rhetorical level, the mayor at times does distinguish between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, but he does not attribute any perceptions or values to either. Hence the 
perceptions of a personalized and victimized ‘us’ and a depersonalized and sometimes 
criminalized ‘them’, do not exist in the mayor’s communication. This also fits within 
the stakeholder-centered nature of his discourse.  
The mayor does not characterize his own conduct, as pointed out in the 
introduction to this subsection. This lack of self-images differs from the 
communication of other stakeholders discussed so far. The fact that Mr. Bloomberg 
does not convey perceptions of himself can be attributed to the less direct involvement 
the mayor has in the debate than for instance Police Commissioner Kelly. To a degree, 
the lack of self-perceptions can also be attributed to the fact that the NYPD has to 
defend its own actions much more than the mayor does. However, as the mayor is 
responsible for all city services, including the NYPD, and he is the one who appoints 
the police commissioner, his role in the debate following the shooting is not negligible. 
The lack of self-perceptions is hence also a consequence of the positioning maintained 






The degree of openness in the mayor’s discourse makes research into his 
interpretations easier than for those of the NYPD. Yet his interpretations of the 
shooting and the aftermath also appear to be transitory, and at first glance even 
inconsistent. Hence the analysis in the first subsection was structured chronologically 
rather than thematically, in order to lay bare both the (roots for the) dynamics of 
interpretations on the shooting and the interpretations themselves. For the 
interpretations of the aftermath of the shooting, a more thematic approach has been 
chosen.  
In his communication, the mayor entwines interpretations regarding the 
shooting with interpretations regarding events that ensued after the shooting. This 
makes it difficult to separate the analysis into two different threads. Although the 
analysis does distinguish between these two different aspects, there will be some 
overlap.  
As the mayor’s positioning in the debate by nature is responsive, comparable 
to that of police defenders and the NYPD, this analysis also examines how the mayor 
interprets specific elements in the police critics’ framing, such as race and police 
misconduct, but also aspects of the framings of the police defenders and the NYPD.  
 
4.2.1 Framing the shooting: You have to be in the stakeholder’s shoes  
The analysis shows how the mayor’s discourse is characterized by a dynamic pattern of 
transitory interpretative framings on the shooting. This pattern at first glance appears to 
be driven by the availability of facts on the case (‘what we know’), but a closer 
examination shows that the dynamic pattern also results from a stakeholder-centered 
solution-driven perspective by which the mayor interprets the shooting. This 
subsection reviews some of the elements of this interpretation. 
 
A two-pronged approach 
The interpretations of the mayor are characterized by a two-pronged approach, in 
which a factual perspective is combined with an emotional one. This becomes clear 
just after the shooting, when the mayor interprets the shooting, as well as specific 
aspects such as racial profiling and use of force, first from a factual and procedural 
perspective (‘No. 1, not the policy’, ‘see whatever the facts are’, ‘not the policy of the 
Police Department’), which resembles the factual, process-oriented perspective of the 
NYPD, but he also interprets the shooting from the perspective of that of a parent (‘and 
I just pray that most of us parents, we never find out’), which contrasts with the 
interpretations conveyed by the police commissioner, who specifically says he cannot 
‘have a visceral reaction’. His interpretation does not entirely resemble the fact-
oriented perspective of the NYPD either, as the mayor uses facts as a strategy to 
understand culpability and other aspects of the shooting. 
Mr. Bloomberg’s mixture of interpretative perspectives at first glance appears 
to resemble the police defenders’ dual-layered approach. As with the police defenders’ 
interpretation, the mayor interprets the shooting from an emotional perspective in 
reference to the grief and loss of the parents, but also from a factual perspective as far 
as conduct and culpability are concerned. However, the mayor does not diminish but 
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rather emphasizes the magnitude of the suffering of the victims. Moreover, his fact-
oriented perspective is not deflective, as the police defenders’ reference to a ‘tragic set 
of events’ is. The interpretative perspectives are thus not dual-layered but rather two-
pronged.  
Although the two interpretative perspectives remain divergent, they do fit 
within the totality of framings constructed and conveyed by other stakeholders in the 
debate. When combined, the two divergent perspectives seek (some) common ground 
with the emotions-driven reality of police critics, but also with the fact-oriented 
framing of the NYPD and police defenders, without diminishing the magnitude of the 
shooting and without using passionate oratory: While the mayor interprets the 
consequences of the shooting for the family on an emotional level — thus not shunning 
the human side of the shooting — he interprets aspects such as the role of the 
implicated officers and their potential culpability, racial profiling and use of force, 
from a factual stance — thus not shying away from linking the facts on the case to 
broader patterns and possible solutions.  
 
A stakeholder-centered approach 
From within his two-pronged approach, the mayor conveys mixed messages about his 
interpretation of the shooting. For example, while he acknowledges that others link the 
case to a ‘pattern that is unacceptable’, and says that he himself sees that pattern too (‘I 
find that pattern’), he also says that the shooting was an ‘isolated case’. Thus, although 
both interpretations fit within a fact-oriented perspective, the interpretations themselves 
can be very different.  However, combined, these divergent messages fit within the 
totality of interpretations conveyed by other stakeholders, as they seek common ground 
with both the interpretative framing of the NYPD (‘the case is an aberration’), and with 
that of police critics (‘a pattern of police shootings, police misconduct, racial profiling 
and racial injustice in the broadest sense of the word’).  
The mayor’s active and frequent consultation with other stakeholders 
emphasizes this stakeholder-centered approach. By consulting with the police 
commissioner (‘the commissioner and I both said that’), and actively listening to the 
community (‘a lot of people feel that’), the mayor’s interpretative framing is purposely 
shaped by the interpretative framings of others.  
As part of this stakeholder-centered approach, the mayor also mixes more 
narrow interpretative framings (that of the family) with broader framings held by a 
much larger group of stakeholders, at times even all New Yorkers. His quote ‘we can’t 
bring back the man that she was in love with, we can and will build and make things 
better’ combines an emotional perspective with a factual perspective, resulting in a 
specific, emotional, and personal interpretative framing (the loss for Nicole Paultre 
Bell) and a broad, factual, and optimistic interpretative framing applicable to all New 
Yorkers. By forging a connection between interpretations of the processes ensuing 
after the shooting, the mayor specifically links the shooting to measures to be taken, 
thus positioning himself in a proactive way, interpreting events from a solution-driven 
perspective, although these solutions remain abstract.  
On a rhetorical level, the mayor often uses inclusive words such as ‘New 
York’, ‘this city’ and ‘we’, which underline the stakeholder-centered perspective. 
While other stakeholders use ‘we’ to underline ‘us-versus-them’ framings, perceptions 
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and positioning, the mayor conversely uses the pronoun in an inclusive way, referring 
to all people living in ‘New York’ and in ‘this city’. 
 
Occasion-based interpretations 
The divergent framings conveyed by the mayor thus do not so much show a pattern of 
inconsistency, but rather a change of focus by which different elements are highlighted. 
For example, just after the indictments the mayor’s interpretation of the shooting is 
slightly different from previously conveyed interpretations. The mayor this time clearly 
interprets the shooting from the perspective of the officers (‘being a police officer […] 
is a very dangerous job’), comparable to the police defenders’ perspective that ‘you 
have to be in the officer’s shoes’. By linking ‘this case’ to ‘incredible job’ and ‘very 
difficult circumstances’, the mayor indirectly interprets the interactions that took place 
between the police and the victims as part of the police defenders’ historical and 
organic interaction process that entails danger and chaos, as well as the NYPD’s self-
praising historical and organic framing of proper and professional conduct.  
The shift of focus can be understood by looking at the dynamics of the 
interpretative framings held by other stakeholders at that particular moment. While the 
police defenders interpret the indictments as a ‘message … that even though you’re 
acting in good faith, in pursuit of your lawful duties, there is no room, no margin for 
error’, the police critics interpret the indictments as proof that ‘the process works’. 
Within this light, the mayor focuses his interpretation of the shooting on the group that 
at that point of time is the most pessimistic about the proceedings. 
 
Optimism 
The mayor’s interpretation is at all times optimistic and future/solution-oriented. Take 
for example the mayor’s statements just before and after the acquittals, when he 
interprets the shooting within a framing of progress made (‘praising the ethnic diversity 
and joy’), expected progress (‘we can and will build and make things better’), suffering 
and love (‘the man that she was in love with’).  
While the mayor’s interpretation is at all times optimistic, he does not shy 
away from incorporating the more critical viewpoints of other stakeholders in his 
messages. Take for example his statement at the annual Martin Luther King gathering 
in Harlem (‘despite all the progress we have made in this city, we really do have a long 
ways to go’), in which the mayor combines the NYPD’s interpretation (a historical 
pattern of continuous improvement, professionalism and of superiority in comparison 
to other cities), with the police critics’ interpretation of the shooting (a historical 
pattern of police misconduct). Another example occurred just after the shooting, when 
the mayor said that ‘There were people that stood up and said we’ve made a lot of 
progress and there were people that stood up and said we have a long ways to go’, 
while acknowledging that there is a pattern in which the ‘relations between the police 
and the community’ are ‘far from perfect’. With this statement, the mayor interprets 
the shooting from both an optimistic historical pattern of progress, resembling that of 
the NYPD and police defenders, and a historical pattern of police flaws and 
consequential need for progress, resembling that of the police critics. By 
acknowledging the framings of both groups (‘there were people’) and by applying this 
acknowledgement as a starting point for his interpretation of the shooting (‘I think both 
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of those groups were right on target’), the mayor does not interpret the shooting from a 




While the mayor builds his interpretation of the shooting on that of other stakeholders, 
he is selective in the elements he chooses to use. While the resulting interpretations are 
value-based, they are never uncompromising or rigid, thus excluding harsh and 
uncompromising elements from other stakeholders’ interpretations. For example, in his 
statements after the indictments, when he interpreted the shooting from the perspective 
of the police defenders, he did not interpret the Sean Bell shooting as part of a pattern 
in which the unruliness and lawlessness in the streets are responsible for the incidents 
that do occur, as the police defenders and to a lesser extent the NYPD do.  
Within this perspective, the interpretative framings of other stakeholders thus 
serve as guiding buoys for the interpretative framing of the mayor. His remark, ‘that 
was my personal opinion’, after characterizing the shooting ‘excessive’ shows how the 
mayor might listen to others in forming an interpretation, but that the resulting 
conveyed interpretation itself is personal.  
 
Summary 
By combining all interpretative elements conveyed by the mayor, a more integrated 
interpretative framing of the shooting emerges. Within the optimistic two-pronged 
stakeholder-centered perspective, the mayor places the shooting within a broader 
historical pattern of both progress and need for progress, of personal and communal 
suffering, and of the dangers the police officers face, as well as the incredible job 
performed by them, and of solid NYPD guidelines which are not always followed. 
Some inconsistencies remain in the framings, such as the contradictory references to a 
structural pattern of police misconduct, especially that of racial profiling.  
 On a rhetorical level, the use of ‘we’ stands out, which shows how the mayor 
consults others to form his opinion, but also that he infers that the interpretations of 
others are similar to his.  
The mayor’s stakeholder-centered perspective and the consequential dynamic 
pattern of interpretative framings differ profoundly from other stakeholders, who all 
interpreted the shooting from a mainly self-centered perspective.  
The perspective can be seen both as spontaneous discourse that reflects the 
interpretations of the mayor and as a strategic premeditated communication approach, 
aimed at securing specific (communication) goals. The paradoxical combination 
between a ‘pattern that is unacceptable’ and an ‘isolated case’ fits within the latter type 
of communication, as it is a consequence of the mayor’s positioning which aims to 
seek common ground with multiple stakeholders, as will be further discussed in 




4.2.2 Framing the aftermath: Open communication and 
constant collaboration 
While the mayor’s framings concerning the aftermath of the shooting at first glance 
appear to be as transitory in nature as the framings on the shooting, they can be divided 
more easily into themes. This subsection compares the mayor’s interpretation of the 
shooting’s aftermath, and especially the interpretation of his own function, to that of 
the police commissioner, as both have a responsibility to guide these processes. The 
analysis in this subsection is hence structured thematically rather than chronologically, 
examining aspects such as specific stakeholders’ roles, as well as the interpretation of 
the trial itself.  
 
A self-centered framing versus one of a broader interactive 
communication process 
In their interpretation of the aftermath of the shooting, both Mayor Bloomberg and 
Police Commissioner Kelly specifically refer to their period in office and recollect their 
‘on the job’ experiences (‘In the six and a half years I’ve been mayor’/‘Mr. Kelly said 
he has a long history inside the department’). Further, both acknowledge that good, 
open communication is important in police–community relations, of which the 
interaction processes that occur after police shootings are a part (‘the most important 
thing is always the importance of keeping open communication and constant 
collaboration’/‘you build relationships […] and hopefully that’s built up a certain level 
of trust’). However, while the police commissioner interprets the police–community 
communications from a self-centered ‘praising’ perspective (‘I’ve always prided 
myself on being forthright and open’) and, moreover, primarily looks at his own role in 
this (‘you can go back to other incidents perhaps where people relied on something 
I’ve said or I’ve done’), the mayor conversely interprets such communications from 
both a stakeholder-centered perspective as a two-way interactive process, of which the 
mayor is part (‘if we keep listening to each other’), without commending himself for 
his communication skills, or interpreting his role in other ways.  
 Thus, while the police commissioner interprets the events that take place after 
the shooting not so much as part of a broader interactive communication process, but 
rather from a self-centered framing and a pattern of excellent communication skills, the 
mayor conversely interprets the events mainly as part of a much broader 
communication process concerning much broader problems than just police 
misconduct (‘that’s true whether it’s about fighting crime or building housing or the 
economy or education’), in which he, along with others, takes part. 
 
Divergent framings of optimism  
All stakeholder groups discussed so far look optimistically at the judicial processes 
ahead, yet there are striking differences in the way they do so. While Police 
Commissioner Kelly, Mr. Lynch and Mr. Martin combine an optimistic future-oriented 
interpretation of the processes after the shooting with a self-centered framing (‘he is as 
comfortable as ever being the face of the police in a controversy’; ‘we don’t anticipate 
violence’/‘we are prepared’; ‘we’re pleased […] we have the opportunity’; ‘we do feel 
confident that the grand jurors will give him a fair shake’; and ‘we are cautiously 
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optimistic about the whole proceeding’), the mayor’s optimistic future-oriented 
interpretation is paired with a stakeholder-centered framing (‘We’ve come a long way 
from the time when people rushed into the streets and tried to tear apart our society’).  
What is also striking is that Mayor Bloomberg specifically interprets the role 
of (most of the) police critics within this stakeholder-centered, optimistic, future-
oriented framing (‘people are today much more sophisticated […] or understanding’). 
His remarks oppose the pessimistic framing of police defenders, who interpret the role 
of police critics as professional ‘police haters’ instigating a historical and organic 
pattern of prolonged and profound unfair criticism, methods and motives. The mayor, 
conversely, says that this is a pattern of the past, not the present (‘We have come too 
far as a society — and as a city — to be to be dragged back to those days’), although 
he does acknowledge the pattern itself. The mayor does not interpret the role of all of 
the police critics in a positive way: By referring to ‘hotheads’ he makes a clear 
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable critical behavior, not only from police 
critics, but also police defenders. This is in stark contrast with the police defenders’ 
negative interpretation of all criticism.  
The mayor in fact subtly argues that he too believes the city needs police 
improvement (‘they [New Yorkers] know it’s not perfect; they want to improve it’), 
thus indirectly interpreting the shooting as part of a pattern of police flaws and 
consequential need for progress. However, the mayor does not put specific emphasis 
on this misconduct and injustice itself, and moreover, mainly looks at the progress 
made. He does not interpret the process after the shooting from the same pessimistic 
perspective as the police critics, and his remarks do not match the police critics’ 
statements that ‘For too long we have tried to make changes, only to be disrespected.’ 2 
 
Divergent framings on the verdict and the criminal justice system at large 
Similar to police defenders and police critics, the mayor lays specific emphasis on the 
criminal justice system. Yet their interpretations of this system are not identical. The 
mayor’s remarks especially differ from the interpretation of police critics, as he 
dismisses their interpretation that the judicial processes following the shooting are part 
of historical and organic patterns of systematic judicial and political failure, 
inadequacy and impasse (‘I think we should all step back and let our country of laws 
provide the kind of justice that young men and women are fighting around the world to 
protect’).  
The mayor’s remarks at first glance appear to interpret the role of the criminal 
justice system in the same way police defenders do. However, while the latter mainly 
interpret the processes after the shooting as part of a pattern of overall judicial justice, 
into which the outcome of the case is expected to fit (‘We do feel confident that the 
grand jurors will give him a fair shake’), the mayor, even more pronouncedly, both 
interprets the judicial process and the restricted opportunities for criticism as an 
incontrovertible fact (‘America is a nation of laws’) which cannot and should not be 
circumvented (‘we accept their authority’, ‘those are the rights we enjoy in a 
democratic nation’).  
 Apart from placing the trial itself within a broader optimistic stakeholder-
centered framing, the mayor also interprets other aspects of the trial, and in particular 
the verdict itself. While speaking of the acquittals, the mayor told the press he was 
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planning ‘to treat Friday like any other day’, but he also stated that ‘he did not think the 
decision in the Sean Bell case is just like everything else’. While the first part of his 
statement diminishes the magnitude of the trial, by referring to it as just ‘every other 
day’, the second part conversely acknowledges this magnitude. He further underlines 
the magnitude of the suffering by linking the interpretation of the trial to the 
interpretation of the shooting (‘No verdict could ever end the grief that those who knew 
and loved Sean Bell suffer’). Thus, the mayor tones down the magnitude of the trial 
only in the light of looming unrest, as does the NYPD, yet in other ways he emphasizes 
the magnitude of the trial and verdict, interpreting the trial in a similar way to the 
police critics as an extension of the suffering felt by them.  
 
Summary 
This subsection has shown how the mayor’s communication is characterized by 
various interpretative framings on the events occurring after the shooting and on the 
specific role of the stakeholders partaking in it. These divergent framings can be 
understood by the two-pronged stakeholder-centered perspective used by the mayor in 
his interpretation of these processes. This perspective shapes the mayor’s framings in 
three ways.  
First, while Mr. Bloomberg does not often convey interpretations regarding his 
own role in the shooting’s aftermath — and moreover always does so in reference to a 
broader integral process in which all stakeholders take part — he elaborately interprets 
the role of other stakeholders in the debate in positive terms. The only stakeholder 
which the mayor does not specifically speak about in regard to the aftermath of the 
shooting is the group of police defenders, yet his general references to criticism and 
fighting problems are so inclusive that they can also refer to this group, and thus his 
statements indirectly interpret this group’s role in a positive way too.  
Second, within the stakeholder-centered perspective, the mayor selectively 
incorporates optimistic, future-oriented aspects of other stakeholders’ framings, while 
excluding pessimistic and overtly negative, harsh and uncompromising aspects. Thus, 
the mayor again uses other stakeholders’ framings as guiding buoys for his own 
interpretation.  
Third, his strong focus on two-way communication and collaboration, which is 
a profound component in the mayor’s interpretations, by itself is stakeholder-centered, 
as he aims to include all stakeholders in a continuous debate on problems that extend to 
police misconduct and racial profiling.  
Within the mayor’s optimistic two-pronged stakeholder-centered perspective, 
the processes following the shooting are on the one hand part of a historical and 
organic pattern of evolutionary sophistication in communication and collaboration 
between all stakeholders involved in problems that extend beyond police misconduct 
and racial injustice, and on the other hand they are part of a pattern of a ‘nation of 
laws’ in which laws delimit the conditions for criticism and in which only the criminal 
justice system can determine justice.  
 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
This section has shown how the transitory and dynamic interpretative framings 
concerning both the shooting and that of the aftermath of the shooting fit within an 
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optimistic two-pronged stakeholder-centered perspective. Within this perspective, the 
mayor’s interpretations are built upon those of other stakeholders, selectively 
incorporating optimistic, future-oriented aspects of such framings — using the latter as 
guiding buoys — while also positively emphasizing the role of others in the debate as 
well as the importance of two-way communication and collaboration, rather than 
lauding personal efforts.  
 As with his perceptions, the mayor’s interpretations are event-driven. Mr. 
Bloomberg adapts his interpretations in line with those of the stakeholder group that is 
affected by a specific event. By doing so, he combines facts with emotion, 
personalization with generalization, and framings on the shooting with framings on the 
events following the shooting.  
Together, these different aspects make up an overall historical and organic 
framing of both progress and need for progress; personal and communal suffering; the 
dangers the police officers face, as well as the incredible job they perform; solid NYPD 
guidelines which are not always followed; continuous progress in the way stakeholders 
interact, and a pattern of a ‘nation of laws’. 
The mayor’s interpretations, and in particular his stakeholder-centered 
perspective, can be seen as a strategic premeditated communication approach, rather 
than as spontaneous discourse, as he aims to secure specific communication goals with 
his discourse, i.e. two-way communication and collaboration.  
 His stakeholder-centered perspective and the consequential dynamic pattern of 
interpretative framings concerning both the shooting and events following the shooting 
starkly oppose the self-centered perspective maintained by police critics, the NYPD, 
and police defenders. As a result, the mayor is the only stakeholder that holds 





The transitory, inclusive stakeholder-centered perceptions and interpretations conveyed 
by Mayor Bloomberg give insight into his positioning in the debate. This section will 
take a closer look at his positioning, by examining the delineation of debate and reality, 
as well as the driving force and filter of debate, and the character of his communication 
methods.  
 
4.3.1 The delineation of debate: Acceptable police conduct, 
open communication, constant collaboration 
Although Mr. Bloomberg conveys an array of different messages in regard to the 
delineation of debate, there is one description that stands out. It entails the profound 
and powerful positioning conveyed by the mayor during the first major press 
conference after the shooting and referred to by the New York Times at several 
moments throughout the aftermath, in which he calls the shooting ‘unacceptable’ (‘I 
can tell you that it is to me unacceptable or inexplicable how you can have 50-odd 
shots fired’).  
The word ‘unacceptable’ in itself appears to be rigid, as it draws a line between 
what is acceptable and what is not, thus suggesting a rigid positioning. A closer look at 
the definition of unacceptable, however, shows how the word can be used in different, 
also less rigid ways:  
 
Unacceptable 




The notion ‘not allowable’ is more forceful and rigid than ‘not satisfactory’, as it has 
legal and political connotations. While the notion ‘not satisfactory’ is still rigid to a 
certain extent, as it implies a binary judgment, it does not necessarily involve political 
measures and repercussions. The use of the notion can be relatively free of obligations 
and suggests room for (non-compulsory) improvement, as opposed to the outright 
rejection implied in the more committal ‘not allowable’.  
 Because the mayor only rarely couples his frequent use of the word 
‘unacceptable’ with such measures, repercussions, or steps to be taken specifically in 
relation to the shooting, it is unclear whether his statements refer to ‘not satisfactory’ 
or ‘not allowable’.  
Right after the shooting, the mayor does pair his statement that both the 
shooting itself and the pattern of shootings are ‘unacceptable’ (‘I find that pattern 
unacceptable as well’) with the statement that ‘the city would review its policies and 
training procedures to ensure fair treatment’. This statement rather relates to ‘not 
satisfactory’ than ‘not allowable’, and moreover, rather forms an objective on its own 
(‘fair treatment’).  
The objective of ‘fair treatment’ of all New Yorkers, which the mayor also 
refers to at other instances in the debate, does not specifically relate to the Sean Bell 
case, but addresses broader police–community relations problems (‘he was committed 
to “do everything we can to make sure that the Police Department conducts itself in a 
way that treats everyone in the city fairly and equally”’). This objective is not directed 
at ‘them’, but involves active participation of the mayor himself, and of others that are 
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part of ‘we’. This opposes ‘Justice for Sean Bell’ or ‘Fairness for all officers’, which 
are not only clear references to the Sean Bell case, but also involve participation of 
mainly other stakeholders.  
 The mayor does delineate the debate on Sean Bell in another, more direct way. 
Although he speaks in general terms about the need (‘the most important thing’) for 
‘open communication’ and ‘constant collaboration’ in his official statement just before 
the acquittals, his words clearly refer to the Sean Bell shooting. At this time, he 
indirectly conveys his desired outcome of debate, by saying that ‘there’s no challenge 
that we can’t overcome’, thus maintaining that the shooting itself is a challenge that 
should be overcome. This desired outcome of debate fits within the stakeholder-
centered perspective, as he purposely includes all stakeholders and does not favor the 
needs and rights of one group over another (‘we’). The means to achieve the desired 
outcome of debate, ‘open communication and constant collaboration’ also fit within the 
stakeholder-centered perspective, as such communication involves the participation of 
all stakeholders, and moreover, does not demand more participation of one group over 
another.  
Thus, the desired outcome of debate conveyed by the mayor in the New York 
Times involves ‘acceptable police conduct’ and ‘to overcome challenges’, while the 
means of achieving this involve ‘open communication and constant collaboration’. The 
analysis refers to ‘desired outcome of debate’ and ‘objective in the debate’ 
simultaneously: While the mayor’s desired outcome of debate is different in nature 
from the clear-cut messages concerning the desired end-result of debate, he still 
conveys how he envisions an end result (i.e. the desired outcome of debate). The 
mayor’s positioning is furthermore not solely directed towards process either (as is that 
of the police commissioner). 
While for now the distinction has been made between ‘desired outcome’ and 
‘means to achieve this goal’, it might be possible that — in a similar way to the notion 
of ‘appropriateness’ conveyed by the NYPD — ‘open communication and constant 
collaboration’ can also be seen as overall objectives in the debate, fitting within a 
broader goal to appease the existing and often conflicting feelings of different 
stakeholder groups, while maintaining law and order. The discussion of debate 
challenges at the end of this section further examines this.  
The mayor does not focus on one specific desired outcome from beginning to 
end, while references to open communication are made throughout the aftermath of the 
shooting. The means of debate thus appear more important to the mayor than the 
desired outcome of debate.  
 
Challenges to the desired outcome of debate and negotiation space 
Challenges to the mayor’s desired means and outcome of debate are less obvious than 
those for police critics and police defenders, as they are less clearly defined. However, 
in the weeks after the shooting, two clear challenges do occur. First, the mayor’s 
delineation of debate is challenged by the criticism of the two union leaders towards 
his statement that the shooting was excessive. In his response, the mayor defends his 
initially conveyed stance by deliberately positioning himself as a layman (‘I am a 
civilian’). By pointing out the difference between his ‘personal opinion’ and the 
expertise of a ‘professional law-enforcement officer’, the mayor says that the conduct 
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of the officers is not satisfactory to the mayor personally rather than that it is 
unallowable in law. Second, his objective ‘constant collaboration’ is challenged by the 
protest signs such as ‘Death to pigs’. By saying that these remarks are ‘disgusting and 
disgraceful’ the mayor points out what is unacceptable (in this case ‘not satisfactory’) 
communication and what is not. While delimiting the negotiation space, he does so 
within the boundaries of shared values such as respect for others.  
Whereas the mayor’s desired outcome and scope of debate are only challenged 
twice, he reinforces aspects of his desired outcome of debate more frequently, 
anticipating latent challenges. For example, while his statement just after the shooting 
‘You should know that it is not the policy of the Police Department’ is not a response 
to an imminent challenge, policy infringements do conflict with ‘fair treatment’. Rather 
than responding to an imminent challenge, the remark reinforces the mayor’s desire for 
open communication (‘you should know that’), not only by setting an example for open 
communication, but also by defining its conditions.  
Reinforcements reoccur mostly when the mayor’s desired means of debate, i.e. 
‘open communication and constant collaboration’ are latently challenged by the 
possibility of unrest, such as after the indictments and after the acquittals. At these 
moments, the mayor reinforces his desired means of debate by setting standards for 
what is acceptable in communication, interaction and process and what is not. He does 
this by literally setting the conditions (‘it needs to be said’, ‘a trial will decide whether 
crimes were committed in this case’); by persuasion (‘I think we should’); by 
displaying his mayoral powers (‘nor is there any place for it’); by setting an example 
and by showing shared responsibility between the mayor and citizens (‘that’s exactly 
what we have to do’, ‘all of us have a responsibility’); by presenting acceptable 
behavior as an incontrovertible fact (‘we accept their authority’, ‘we’ll wait to see how 
that unfolds’); by appealing to core values such as progress (‘We have come too far as 
a society’); by indirectly relating dissent to set standards with backwardness and 
savagery (‘to be dragged back to those days’); by dogmatic assertions which link his 
desired outcome/means of debate to his delineation of reality (‘it’s now up to the next 
step in the legal process’, ‘We are not going to have any unrest’) and by appealing to 
communally accepted values such as justice and freedom (‘let our country of laws 
provide the kind of justice that young men and women are fighting around the world to 
protect’).  
The mayor’s reinforcements are not directed at ‘them’, but at ‘us’. He not only 
delimits what is acceptable to him, and what is not, he includes himself and all 
stakeholders in the ‘we’ group (‘we are not going to have any unrest’), and he uses 
mayoral powers to guarantee this (‘we’ll make sure’). The mayor thus uses ‘we’ in an 




This subsection has shown how the different objectives in debate conveyed by Mr. 
Bloomberg can be summarized as the realization and safeguarding of acceptable police 
conduct and fair treatment of all New Yorkers, while overcoming related challenges 
such as the Sean Bell shooting. This overall objective is not rigidly defined, as the term 
‘acceptable’ — used to delimit the objective — rather refers to the mayor’s personal 
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opinion than that it is a rhetorical way to exert mayoral powers. However, this does not 
imply that the mayor will not try to realize his objectives, as his proactive approach in 
reinforcing the objectives shows.  
While other stakeholders focus on their personal needs while placing 
responsibility for such needs mainly with others, the mayor includes the needs of all 
stakeholders and thus does not favor the needs and rights of one group over another. 
Like the police commissioner, he does not proactively speak out about a personal 
desired outcome as the police critics and police defenders do. He also assigns most of 
the responsibility for achieving these goals to himself, and to ‘all New Yorkers’. Such 
a stance fits within the mayor’s stakeholder-centered inclusive approach.  
The means of achieving these objectives, i.e. through ‘open communication 
and constant collaboration’, are, conversely, rigidly defined. The mayor clearly 
distinguishes between acceptable behavior and non-acceptable behavior, and uses his 
mayoral powers to safeguard this process. Open communication and constant 
collaboration become primary objectives by themselves, rather than being methods to 
achieve them. In a broader sense, the mayor aims to appease the existing and often 
conflicting feelings of different stakeholder groups, while maintaining law and order. 
This in itself is stakeholder-centered, as communication and collaboration are inclusive 
acts.  
Because the mayor’s goals are more personal than they are directed at others, 
and are mostly not rigidly defined, the mayor only rarely has to deal with debate 
challenges. These challenges, such as potential public dissent, rather involve the means 
of achieving the objectives than the ‘official’ objectives themselves. Again, the means 
become the objective. Conversely, the mayor more proactively prevents debate 
challenges from occurring, while reinforcing his objectives on numerous occasions, 
with an array of different techniques to safeguard his desired outcome of debate. Only 
on one occasion is the communication evasive and non-reinforcing; a discrepancy that 
is hard to explain. A possible explanation could be that the mayor only presents one 
direct solution in the discourse quoted by the New York Times — i.e. extra funding for 
the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) — as opposed to the indirect, future-
oriented solutions conveyed. 
 
4.3.2 The delineation of reality: An inclusive ‘we’ positioning 
The analysis in previous sections has already provided some insight into the scope of 
the reality held by the mayor. The transitory stakeholder-centered character of the 
mayor’s perceptions and interpretations suggest a more flexibly-held reality, in which 
there is room for more than one version of the truth. This subsection, in turn, 
specifically examines how rigidly the mayor presents his transitory reality. As a 
changing reality can still be conveyed in a rigid manner at different moments during 
the aftermath, this subsection also specifically looks at which parts of the reality held 
by the mayor are flexible and which parts are not.  
The rhetoric used by the mayor to delimit his reality differs starkly from the 
police critics and police defenders’ focus on ‘the truth’. Instead the mayor’s response 
just after the shooting is based on ‘what we know’, which, at first glance, appears to be 
a similar positioning to that of the Police Department at the beginning of the shooting. 
However, while the NYPD’s reasons for the reticence change throughout the 
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shooting’s aftermath, the mayor’s reasoning remains the same (i.e. ‘what we know’). 
Hence his initial reticence/reality evolves into a more detailed and opinionated 
response when more details on the shooting come to the surface, and moreover, 
changes pursuant to specific events and the effects these events have on stakeholders, 
as demonstrated in the previous section. The mayor also uses synonyms for ‘what we 
know’ to show how flexible the boundaries of his held reality are, by pointing out that 
his reality is based on ‘what the facts are’. However, while the NYPD does not convey 
its reality based on these facts at any point throughout the aftermath of the shooting, 
the mayor conversely does do so when such facts become available. Consequently, his 
reality is constantly transitory and flexible, because the conditions of this reality — the 
facts — can change. 
The condition ‘what we know’ translates itself into specific rhetoric that differs 
starkly from that of other stakeholders. The mayor specifically points out that his 
conception of what happened on the night of the shooting is not necessarily complete, 
and truthful, but rather flexible and transitory. He does so by bringing in his own 
subjectivity and using an explicit epistemic grounding, while refraining from dogmatic 
assertions (‘It sounds to me’; ‘I find’; ‘I do not at this point’). The latter remark in fact 
literally opposes Mr. Palladino’s previously discussed static response ‘My position is 
today what it was from the beginning’. 
However, not all statements comprise a flexibly defined reality. While the 
statement ‘You should know that it is not the policy of the Police Department’ might 
appear similar to that of the police commissioner, as both interpret the event from a 
factual stance, the consequential argumentation from within this interpretative framing 
is very different. While the police commissioner simply states the rule (‘we have a 
policy’), the mayor conversely positions himself by means of his interpretative framing 
of the shooting (‘what we know’). 
When available information consists of proven facts, or appears to do so, the 
mayor’s reality is presented in a more static way (‘there is no evidence’; ‘clearly they 
were victims’; ‘that it is not the policy of the Police Department’; ‘we have a policy 
that prohibits’; ‘being a police officer […] is a very dangerous job’). In such instances, 
the mayor does use dogmatic assertions (‘no’) and empathic vocabulary (‘clearly’) to 
delimit his reality, and also includes other stakeholders in his perception (‘as we were 
reminded several times last week’). Yet the mayor still leaves room for different 
versions of the truth, by building his reality concerning the facts (‘evidence’). 
Moreover, his presentation of reality becomes more flexible again (‘it would appear’), 
when he applies factual information, such as NYPD’s guidelines and policies, to the 
shooting itself, of which not all the facts are known. 
A different type of dogmatic assertion is the remark ‘there are no winners in a 
trial like this’, in which the suffering of all people involved is presented as a rigidly 
defined reality. Yet this reality does not differentiate between stakeholders (the ‘us-
versus-them’ schism), and hence is still stakeholder-centered. 
In addition to these factual elements, the mayor presents his opinion/value-
based perceptions in an apparently equally rigid way, by using forceful, rigid 
dichotomous language (‘unacceptable’, ‘inexplicable’). However, Mr. Bloomberg still 
leaves room for different versions of the truth by emphasizing that his observation is 
based on his own interpretations and thus is not a fixed reality (‘to me’), and moreover, 
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can change based on investigations by experts — i.e. ‘what we know’ — in this matter 
(‘but that’s up to the investigation to find out what really happened’).  
In one instance, the mayor uses definite rhetoric (‘there’s nothing’) to stress 
that he can’t ‘bring back their son or their fiancé’. While his specific statement 
observes the obvious on a superficial level and for that matter does not delimit reality, 
on a deeper level the mayor does convey a rigidly defined conception that the powers 
of the mayor are limited. 
Most of the transitory and non-transitory aspects fit within the realities 
presented by other stakeholders, as discussed in Section 4.2. Moreover, the conveyed 
aspects of specific realities held by other stakeholders conflict only to a limited degree 
with those of others. For example, the mayor’s conveyed reality that ‘being a police 
officer […] is a very dangerous job’ is never refuted by police critics, although it is not 
specifically stressed by them.  
 
Solutions and debate challenges 
Solutions are so ingrained in the mayor’s discourse, that they are part of his desired 
outcome of debate, as discussed in the previous subsection. These solutions are never 
direct measures (except for the funding for the CCRB, which was not directly linked to 
the Sean Bell shooting), but focus on ‘open communication and constant 
collaboration’. By themselves, these solutions are stakeholder-centered and purposely 
include multiple realities, making them both coalition-oriented and broadly delimited, 
in sharp contrast to earlier-discussed solutions.  
The reality held by Mr. Bloomberg is hardly challenged, as it is stakeholder-
centered and thus encompasses mainly future-oriented, optimistic elements that fit 
within the interpretative framings of other stakeholders. Throughout the aftermath of 
debate, the mayor rather reinforces his reality than that he has to defend it. Take for 
example the meeting held with community leaders just after the shooting, when the 
mayor receives criticism on his performance (‘We don’t feel the mechanisms are at 
work to really bring peace and justice’). Such remarks do not particularly challenge the 
reality held by the mayor, as he does not present a rigidly defined reality in the first 
place. Not only does his response ‘both of those groups were right on target’ show how 
he interprets the shooting from a stakeholder-centered perspective, as discussed in 
Section 4.2, it also shows how such a perspective results in a flexible and inclusive 
presentation of reality that does not focus on one single version of the truth, but instead 
incorporates multiple vantage points into one all-encompassing reality.  
There are only a few examples when reality challenges do occur. When the 
mayor is criticized by police unions for conveying value-based dichotomous 
perceptions of the shooting he does not change his positioning, yet responds by 
stressing that there is not one single version of the truth (‘That was my personal 
opinion’), by diminishing the magnitude of his own expertise (‘I am a civilian, I’m not 
a professional law-enforcement officer’) and by focusing on the transitory character of 
his reality (‘was’), while not further mentioning if his opinion has changed.  
 Other reality challenges are closely entwined with the desired outcome of 
debate, as noted in the previous section. The mayor anticipates looming ‘unrest’, by 
affirming that this reality will not materialize (‘we are not going to have any unrest’, 
‘you will be as safe going out on the streets after a decision as you were before the 
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decision’). As spontaneous discourse, these remarks show how the mayor sees the 
current society as peaceful and safe, and how he rigidly delimits this reality. However, 
as part of a strategic communication approach, they help the mayor to safeguard the 
conditions for ‘open communication and constant collaboration’.  
 
From an all-encompassing reality to an inclusive ‘we’ positioning 
The broadly defined reality presented by the mayor, in combination with the 
stakeholder-centered perceptions and interpretations, does not lead to an ‘us-versus-
them’ positioning, as the reality and perceptions of other stakeholders do. However, the 
mayor does use the word ‘we’ often in his discourse and at times also ‘them’. For 
example, just after the shooting, the mayor specifically distinguishes between 
‘Commissioner Kelly, Deputy Mayor Walcott, and I’ and ‘community leaders’, ‘their 
loss’, ‘their son’, ‘their fiancé’. While this distinction resembles the ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
lines held by other stakeholders, these groups are not pitted against each other in the 
positioning of the mayor, as in the ‘us-versus-them’ positioning taken by the other 
stakeholders. Not only is there a strong cooperative link between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the 
mayor is especially detailed on the feelings of the ‘them’ group. The distinction 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is flexible, as the mayor also speaks of ‘us parents’, thus 
creating a new ‘us’ feeling of understanding. While the mayor says that ‘we have a 
policy’, implying that ‘we’ consists of both himself and the NYPD, he also speaks of 
the Police Department as ‘them’ (‘not the policy of the Police Department’).  
Later on in the aftermath, the mayor conveys a similar flexible distinction 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. What stands out foremost is the inclusive way the word ‘we’ 
is used. The mayor especially uses the word when referring directly to open 
communication and constant collaboration (‘if we keep listening to each other, keep 
committing ourselves to be better as neighbors and as communities, there’s no 
challenge that we can’t overcome’), but also in more subtle ways (‘we were 
reminded’). In these instances, the reference to ‘we’ stands for all New Yorkers. 
Moreover, the mayor also uses ‘we’ in these instances to assign responsibility 
(‘committing ourselves’), set communal standards (‘we should step back’) and pinpoint 
shared victimization (‘a terrible moment for New York and certainly for his family’). 
As a final point, the mayor uses ‘I’ to make a distinction between personal 
opinion (‘I think’; ‘I have always thought’; ‘Let me say’) and collective feelings or 
those held by others (‘a lot of people feel’).  
 Thus, instead of an ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, the mayor holds an inclusive 
yet flexible ‘I’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ positioning, in which ‘I’ is used to convey personal 
opinions, ‘us’ to refer to shared responsibility, standards and victimization and the need 
for open communication and constant collaboration, and ‘them’ to show the 
collaborative relationship with ‘us’. There is thus no room for a depersonalized ‘them’, 
or for a delimited ‘us’.  
 
Summary 
This subsection has shown how the mayor’s stakeholder-centered interpretative 
perspective — based on both ‘what we know’ and on the realities of others — as well 
as the transitory, inclusive perceptions — lead to a flexible, changing, personal yet all-
encompassing stakeholder-centered reality which is broadly delimited and allows for 
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multiple vantage points and versions of the truth to coexist. This flexibility becomes 
apparent in his epistemic grounding, which most of the time leaves space for different 
interpretations. While not all elements are equally flexible, for instance when available 
facts are incontrovertible, or when the mayor’s opinion is stakeholder-centered in the 
first place, the mayor in most instances distinguishes between his own opinion and that 
of others, while at times still using forceful, rigid dichotomous language. The solutions 
presented by the mayor are stakeholder-centered, as they focus on open communication 
and constant collaboration. The rigidly presented elements are used as a 
communication tool to underline that the powers of the mayor are limited, but also to 
present the desired outcome of debate and the processes leading to this desired 
outcome as a fact.  
 The flexible, changing, personal and broadly delimited reality presented by the 
mayor is hardly challenged due to its specific nature. Although the mayor does receive 
criticism, such criticism does not pose a reality challenge, as the reality held by the 
mayor allows for such criticism. The mayor thus merely affirms his positioning. The 
mayor responds to the rare reality challenges by focusing on the personal aspect of his 
reality, while diminishing the magnitude of his own expertise, thus allowing for 
multiple versions of the truth.  
The stakeholder-centered inclusive perspective and positioning, as well as the 
conveyed perceptions aimed at appeasing the existing and often conflicting feelings of 
different stakeholder groups, lead to an inclusive ‘we’ positioning that does not allow 
for a depersonalized, culpable ‘them’. The components ‘I’ and ‘them’ have a 
subordinate, functional role within this positioning.  
 
4.3.3 The driving force of response, the character of communication, and  
‘multiple hues of communication’ 
In previous chapters, the discussion of the stakeholders’ positioning included detailed 
analyses concerning the driving force of response, the character of communication 
means, and the existing conciliatory discourse. For the mayor’s communication, this is 
not necessary, as such analyses have been interwoven into preceding sections. This 
section therefore only summarizes and reviews those earlier observations. 
To start with the driving force of response, the analysis so far has shown how 
the mayor’s response is driven by other stakeholders, the need to ‘overcome’ problems 
(by future-oriented solutions), and also by ‘what we know’. These notions also 
function as a filter: Each new development is assessed by looking at the three listed 
elements. This driving force, starting position and filter of debate, has led to a flexible 
and inclusive stakeholder-centered positioning.  
The character of the means of communication has also been discussed 
throughout this chapter. While other stakeholders use harsh communication techniques 
to accomplish the personal desired outcome of debate and to delimit the scope of 
reality, the mayor uses inclusive communication techniques in order to safeguard a 
communal desired outcome of debate and an all-encompassing inclusive reality. Such 
techniques include the display of mayoral powers; the setting of an example in — but 
also the conditions for — open communication and acceptable behavior; references to 
the shared responsibility, standards and victimization between the mayor and citizens 
and the related rhetorical use of ‘we’; the presentation of desired behavior as an 
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incontrovertible fact; the use of persuasion and dogmatic assertions; the making of 
appeals to communally accepted values such as progress, justice and freedom; the 
linking of dissent towards set standards with backwardness and savagery; the 
explanation that there is a difference between the mayor’s ‘personal opinion’ and the 
expertise of a ‘professional law enforcement officer’ and thus indirectly weakening his 
position and broadening the boundaries of his desired outcome of debate; and finally 
the focus on the personal aspect of the mayor’s reality, while diminishing the 
magnitude of his own expertise, thus allowing for multiple versions of the truth. These 
techniques are remarkably different from the harsh and/or deflective techniques used 
by other stakeholders. All of these methods can be ascribed to spontaneous discourse, 
but they are also typical of a strategic communication approach aimed at safeguarding 
the desired outcome of debate and the all-encompassing reality held by the mayor.  
There is only one example in the New York Times of ‘harsh communication’ 
conveyed by the mayor, directed at those prone to unacceptable dissent (‘hotheads’, 
‘they’ll yell and scream’) and those newspapers that will report about this (‘you will 
put it on the front page’). In this instance, the targeted stakeholders are both about to 
perform an act that is not in line with the desired means of debate (‘open 
communication and constant collaboration’). These ‘harsher’ remarks thus show how 
important communication and collaboration are to the mayor. 
There are no multiple hues in the communication of the mayor as there are for 
other stakeholders. Instead, his discourse is conciliatory and hence also consistent. The 
only exception is the previously discussed deflective remark about CCRB funding, and 
the harsher remarks just discussed. The conciliatory discourse used by the mayor 
reaches further than the fourth level of conciliatory discourse described in Part II, 
Chapter 2, as it not only acknowledges the existence of the reality felt by all 
stakeholders involved, it also diminishes personal concerns and desires, and 
distinguishes between personal opinion and communally held opinions. In a broader 
sense, perceptions, interpretations and positioning (especially the desired means of 
debate) are geared towards conciliation.  
 
4.3.4 Conclusion 
This section has shown how the positioning of the mayor is stakeholder-, knowledge- 
and solution-driven. This results in a coalition-oriented, flexible, and inclusive 
stakeholder-centered desired outcome of debate, i.e. the realization and safeguarding of 
acceptable police conduct and fair treatment of all New Yorkers, while overcoming 
related challenges such as the Sean Bell shooting. It also results in a flexible, 
transitory, personal yet all-encompassing stakeholder-centered reality which is broadly 
delimited and allows for multiple vantage points and versions of the truth to coexist. 
Third, it results in an overall inclusive ‘we’ positioning, that does not allow for a 
depersonalized, culpable ‘them’. And finally, it results in a flexible filter through 
which developments are assessed, which in turn leads to a fluctuating, often eclectic 
pattern of discourse. Location and time are less important factors than specific 
developments, and in particular the stakeholder group specifically affected by such 
developments.  
 Flexibility, inclusiveness and conciliation can also be found in the desired 
means of debate, i.e. open communication and constant collaboration; the use of the 
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word ‘acceptable’; the focus on other stakeholders; the assignment to himself and to 
‘all New Yorkers’ of most of the responsibility for achieving these goals; the 
conveying of communally felt victimization and communal standards; the neglect of 
personal desires and concerns; the inclusive and upfront use of language; epistemic 
grounding; and the conciliatory communication strategies aimed at safeguarding the 
desired outcome of debate and bridging the gap between the reality held by different 
stakeholders.  
In turn, the mayor’s objectives and held reality are hardly challenged in the 
aftermath of the shooting. Instead, the mayor mostly affirms his positioning in the 
discourse quoted by the New York Times.  
 The only rigidity in the positioning of the mayor can be found in the 
safeguarding of his desired means of debate. Yet as this means of debate is coalition-
oriented, this specific rigidity does not make the communication of the mayor less 
coalition-oriented. 
The positioning of the mayor thus seeks common ground on multiple levels. It 
makes sense that this positioning has a different impact on the debate in comparison to 
the positioning of previously discussed stakeholders.  
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4.4 Other political stakeholders 
In the aftermath of the shooting, New York State Governors Pataki and Paterson also 
commented on the developments in the Sean Bell case. However, they did not do so as 
often as the mayor.  
 The number of statements is not sufficient to make a full comparison with the 
discourse conveyed by Mayor Bloomberg. However, some all-embracing themes do 
stand out, such as the open, upfront communication of value-based perceptions (‘50 
shots’, ‘excessive’, ‘surprised by the number of shots fired and by the acquittals of the 
three detectives’); the use of dogmatic assertions (‘obviously’) to delimit their held 
reality; the focus on appropriateness and process (‘but the appropriate response to that 
is something that I think the investigation of the mayor and the police commissioner 
will reveal’); the refusal to commit to specific measures; the use of ‘I’ to distinguish 
between personal opinion and public opinion; the references to ‘we’ (or ‘like all New 
Yorkers’) to underline communal responsibility/feelings; and references to an all-
encompassing reality (‘but he also believes’). For that matter, the discourse of both 




4.5 Conclusions and outlook 
This chapter has demonstrated first and foremost that the communications by Mayor 
Bloomberg differ starkly from those of other stakeholders. Whereas the 
communication practiced by police critics, police defenders, and the NYPD can be 
characterized as self-centered, with an either subtle or profound ‘us-versus-them’ 
schism influencing perceptions, interpretations, and a rigid non-coalition-oriented 
positioning, the mayor’s communication, conversely, is stakeholder-, knowledge-, and 
solution-driven, with a profound, inclusive ‘we’ outlook influencing interpretations and 
a flexible, coalition-oriented positioning.  
 The coalition-oriented, stakeholder-centered nature of communication — as 
well as the overall inclusive ‘we’ outlook — can be found on many levels in the 
discourse conveyed by Mr. Bloomberg, for instance in the overall lack of self-images, 
the conveyed perceptions aimed at appeasing the existing and often conflicting feelings 
of different stakeholder groups, the optimistic, future-oriented and transitory 
interpretations which are built selectively upon those of other stakeholders, the positive 
emphasis on the role of others in the debate, as well as the importance of two-way 
communication and collaboration. Also, the mayor does not laud personal efforts in the 
way the police commissioner does. In addition, the stakeholder-centered nature of 
communication can be found in the desired means of debate, i.e. open communication 
and constant collaboration, the desired outcome of debate and with it the use of the 
word ‘acceptable’, the assignment of most of the responsibility for achieving these 
goals to himself and to ‘all New Yorkers’ (‘we’), the conveying of communally felt 
victimization (‘we’), the setting of communal standards (‘we’), the neglect of personal 
desires and concerns, the all-encompassing reality which is broadly delimited and 
allows for multiple vantage points and versions of the truth to coexist, the inclusive and 
upfront use of language, the epistemic grounding and finally all other conciliatory 
communication strategies aimed at safeguarding the desired outcome of debate and 
bridging the gap between the reality held by different stakeholders summed up in 
Subsection 4.3.3.  
 The only dynamic in the mayor’s communication is that just after the shooting, 
the mayor conveys perceptions that are more value-based and judgmental than those 
towards the end, which focus more on the tragedy of the shooting and the prolonged 
pain felt by those involved in it. Instead, discourse appears to be driven by location, 
audience, specific developments, and the stakeholder group most affected by these 
developments.  
 Although the mayor’s communication is upfront and not deflective, and 
moreover, does not have a pro/anti-police agenda-setting purpose, a large part can be 
characterized as a strategic premeditated communication approach rather than as 
spontaneous discourse, as the communication aims to accomplish and safeguard certain 
(communication) goals including the desired outcome of debate and desired means of 
debate, and specifically to control possibly inflammatory situations and to appease the 
existing and often conflicting feelings of different stakeholder groups, while 
maintaining law and order.  
 Although not stated directly, the latter objective can be seen as a strong 
undercurrent in the communication of the mayor. In this respect, the mayor has a 
mediating function aimed at forging a coalition between the desired outcomes and 
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goals of debate as well as the realities of different stakeholders. It can be argued that 
this specific function is an obvious role for the mayor, as he is elected by these 
stakeholders. The discourse of the mayor is hence more geared towards consensus than 
that of the police commissioner, who is not elected, and is chiefly responsible for the 
police force. However, this is not a causal relationship, as the communication of 
preceding mayors in many ways is different, and often less conciliatory, than that of 
Mayor Bloomberg, as seen in Part I.  
 
                                                          
1 For an overview of mayoral powers, see: Bruce F. Berg, New York City Politics: Governing Gotham 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 186. 
2 Damien Cave and Cassi Feldman, “Butts Wants Police to Rein in ‘Savages’ in the Department,” New 
York Times, sec. B, December 16, 2006. 
3 Concise Oxford English Dictionary [CD-ROM], 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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Chapter 5: Judicial stakeholders 
 
This chapter examines the judicial stakeholders’ communication in the debate 
following the Sean Bell shooting. 
This stakeholder group consists of two different entities: It comprises on the 
one hand the Queens District Attorney Richard A. Brown and his team, who led the 
investigation and prosecution of the case, and on the other hand Judge Arthur 
Cooperman, who presided over the trial and eventually acquitted the implicated 
officers. While this stakeholder group is relatively compact, and therefore more 
homogeneous than the scattered groups of both police critics and police defenders, 
there is also a profound schism between the two different entities, as not only the role 
of these entities is different, but also the communication exercised by them and the 
frequency and timing of that communication. The communication conveyed by the two 
different entities will hence be discussed separately. Most of the analysis will focus on 
the discourse by the Queens DA’s office, as the amount and frequency of their 
communication exceeds that of Judge Cooperman to a great extent. Section 5.4, in turn, 
analyzes the full statement by which Judge Cooperman rendered the verdict on April 
25, 2008. 
There is a profound difference between the communication conveyed before 
the trial by Mr. Brown and that conveyed during the trial by Assistant District Attorney 
Charles Testagrossa. While the former is a balanced mix of strategic judicial and PR 
discourse, the latter is — for obvious reasons — much more judicial in nature. This 
bipartite nature makes it hard to determine sustained and profound perceptions, 
interpretations, and positions. The analysis in the sections ahead will mainly be 
structured along the lines of this schism, resulting in a bipartite analysis. 
Not only is the amount of communication from the DA’s office relatively 
limited, partly due to the homogeneous nature of the entity, the discourse in itself is 
also diverse and at times evasive, which again makes it relatively hard to pinpoint and 
analyze perceptions, interpretations, and positioning. However, the office is also 
outspoken at times and hence the discourse differs from that of the NYPD.  
Judge Cooperman’s discourse, in turn, is also unique in nature, as the authority 
only really speaks out at the end of the trial, while rendering the verdict. Debate and 
reality challenges are therefore hard to pinpoint, while it is not possible to identify 
historical dynamic patterns either.  
The district attorney’s positioning at first glance seems to be in line with that 
of police critics, as both appear to have a similar desired outcome of debate, i.e. 
conviction of the implicated officers. Moreover, the district attorney’s role also 
resembles that of the NYPD, as both are occupied with law enforcement, and, as critics 
frequently point out, have a co-dependent relationship. This chapter will give special 
attention to how the district attorney’s communication relates to that of police critics 
and the Police Department, as well as to other stakeholders.  
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5.1 Perceptions and images 
This section looks at the perceptions communicated by the Queens DA’s office after 
the shooting. While the diversity of perceptions resembles that of the mayor, the 
scarcity of perceptions rather resembles that of the NYPD. The DA’s office for that 
matter does not talk in labels in the way the police critics and police defenders do. The 
analysis in this section is chronologically structured and divided into subsections, one 
on perceptions concerning the shooting and one on self-perceptions.  
 
5.1.1 From ‘that which purportedly occurred’ and ‘the kind of incident 
that cries out for an investigation’ to a ‘tale of carelessness’: 
Changing perceptions of the shooting 
Before the trial, Mr. Brown, in a similar way to the NYPD (‘This event’), mainly 
conveys his perception of the shooting in an indistinctive way, by using both non-
individuating vocabulary (‘it’, ‘the case’, ‘the incident’) and evasive, formal judicial 
vocabulary (‘that which purportedly occurred’). The reasons presented for this lack of 
communication are also similar: to safeguard the investigation (‘to ensure that nothing 
compromises or prejudices my investigation’) and to ensure thoroughness and 
factuality (‘unless you’ve got all the T’s crossed and the I’s dotted’). Like the NYPD 
and the mayor, Mr. Brown focuses on ‘the facts’ and hence his communication is not 
emotionally charged. The district attorney suggests that the facts are not known yet, 
and thus he does not provide any further details on them.  
On a deeper level, however, his discourse does show more detailed 
perceptions, focusing on magnitudinal aspects of the shooting, for example by using 
emphatic vocabulary (‘the kind of incident that cries out for an investigation’), and by 
pointing out the significance of the case (‘It’s the kind of story that defines our 
tenure’). His reference to ‘these cops’, not to be confused with the police defenders’ 
reference to ‘these fellows’, is somewhat distant, yet informal, and could even be 
interpreted as somewhat derogatory. 
After the indictments, the character of the discourse changes to a certain 
extent. Although the district attorney still does not convey directly any perceptions of 
the shooting itself, which is still referred to as a ‘case’, he does so indirectly, and much 
more frequently than before. By focusing on the large numbers of witnesses and 
exhibits and the professionalism displayed by the grand jury members, the fact that the 
grand jury deliberated for three days on the case (which is presented as unique), and by 
saying that it was a case that was ‘not easy for them to resolve’, he not only underlines 
the complexity of the case but also its magnitudinal relevance. 
During the trial, Mr. Testagrossa is much more upfront and open in his 
depiction of the shooting — a shift that can be explained by Mr. Brown’s statement 
that certain communication prior to the trial can jeopardize the proceedings of that trial. 
The prosecutor does not shy away from images of magnitude regarding the amount of 
shots fired (‘Two full magazines’), and the magnitude of misconduct (‘tale of 
carelessness’, ‘the preparation for the operation fell far short’, ‘rage’), and 
innocence/helplessness (‘unarmed passengers’, ‘a motionless vehicle’, ‘big barrel of 
fish’). Although Mr. Testagrossa, like the police defenders, speaks of a ‘tragedy’, he 
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does not use it as a label. Moreover, he links the word to ‘a tale of carelessness,’ which 
is not in line with the police defenders’ universal/unattributed usage of the term.  
The prosecutor communicates a vivid picture of the victims’ motivation for 
their actions on the evening of the shooting (‘Then, in a decision which most likely 
saved two lives […]’), and actively conveys their (first) names. This is in line with the 
highly personalized communication by police critics. While the prosecutor conveys 
clear, value-based perceptions pertaining to the culpability of the officers (‘tale of 
carelessness’, ‘can only be characterized as criminal’, ‘rage’), his overall perceptions 
of the implicated officers are less detailed (‘the man’), yet not to the extent of the 
strongly depersonalized images conveyed by police critics.
1
 The reality conveyed by 
the prosecutor, in turn, diminishes the danger experienced by the officers (‘He 
described the bumper’s striking Detective Isnora's leg as accidental, and compared the 
injury to one suffered by a child who falls’), refuting the specific perceptions held by 
police defenders that are captured in the label ‘A matter of seconds’, including 
perceptions pertaining to the danger the cops were facing on the street. While the 
prosecutor does acknowledge the short time frame in which the shooting took place, he 
does not accept the label’s mitigating connotation (‘Defense would have you believe 
that the number of gunshots fired is irrelevant. […] But they certainly have a 
responsibility […]’).  
 Although Mr. Testagrossa’s perceptions show similarities with those conveyed 
by police critics, differences do remain. While the prosecutor does convey images of 
magnitude as well as personalized images of the victims, akin to the police critics, he 
does not lay the specific focus on ‘50 shots’ or on ‘I am Sean Bell’. In addition, only a 
few of his perceptions are emotionally charged, or in other ways vehement in nature 
(‘tragedy’, ‘rage’). Conversely, most perceptions are balanced and factual, yet still 
value-based.  
The Queens DA’s office does not speak in ‘us’ and ‘them’ perceptions 
concerning the shooting like the police critics and police defenders do, and which the 
NYPD more subtly does. Instead, the office conveys ‘stakeholder-observant’ 
perceptions of both the victims and the implicated officers, without identifying or 
showing sympathy for either of them. 
 
Summary 
The analysis in this subsection has first demonstrated how the initial non-committal 
and nondescript perceptions conveyed by the district attorney — characterized by the 
use of evasive, formal judicial vocabulary and captured in the quote ‘that which 
purportedly occurred’ — might at first glance resemble that of the NYPD, yet in fact 
differ on a deeper level. While the evasiveness in itself provides more insight into how 
the NYPD perceives the shooting in an indistinctive way, the nondescript 
communication by the district attorney, conversely, conceals magnitudinal images of 
the shooting. This dual-layered nature of the discourse is captured in the phrase ‘the 
kind of incident that cries out for an investigation’.  
The bipartite nature of the office’s communication becomes clear in the 
discussion of Mr. Testagrossa’s discourse. In contrast to Mr. Brown, the prosecutor 
conveys much more profound, emphatic, emotionally-charged and value-based 
perceptions of the shooting, including much clearer magnitudinal images concerning 
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the amount of shots fired, the culpability and misconduct of the implicated officers and 
the consequential suffering of the innocent and helpless victims, as well as more 
personalized images of Sean Bell and the other victims.  
 
5.1.2 ‘Thoroughness, carefulness, fairness and completeness’: 
Self-labels for the Queens DA’s office 
Outside of the courtroom, the Queens DA’s office also conveys perceptions of its own 
performance. These self-perceptions, which depict the investigation as ‘careful’, ‘fair’, 
‘thorough’ and ‘complete’, are used to characterize not only the conduct of the DA’s 
office, but also the judicial processes it is involved in, and Judge Cooperman (‘one of 
this county’s most respected and learned jurists’). To a certain extent this resembles the 
Police Department’s perception of being on top of the process, by providing adequate 
(i.e. ‘appropriate’) conduct. Yet the difference is that Mr. Brown’s perceptions are also 
conveyed in the future tense, which gives insight into the interpretation of the 
stakeholder’s own role, as well as on the position held in the debate, as will be 
discussed in the sections ahead.  
The notions of thoroughness, carefulness and completeness are also indirectly 
conveyed by statements focusing on the large amount of work (‘great deal of work’), 
the detail of the work (‘unless you've got all the T’s crossed and the I’s dotted’), the 
eagerness for detail (‘Our people want to listen to the prior interviews […] Listen to 
them and go over them’), and the focus on meticulousness (‘until I know, or am 
reasonably satisfied, as to what the facts are’). They are also evidenced by the large 
number of witnesses and exhibits, and the large amount of time spent on the case by 
the grand jury. The notion of fairness, in turn, is also indirectly conveyed by the 
references to the fair and noble objectives held by the district attorney (‘I'm here 
because I want to do the right thing’). In addition, the district attorney conveys images 
of magnitude concerning the difficulties his team is facing by focusing on the volume 




The Queens DA’s office self-image is akin to that of the NYPD: a professional and 
stable entity that is on top of the process. The conveyed images of ‘thoroughness’, 
‘carefulness’, ‘fairness’ and ‘completeness’ can be seen as labels, as they reoccur at 
different moments throughout the aftermath of the shooting. In addition, Mr. Brown 
conveys images of magnitude concerning the difficulties his team is facing, but the 
district attorney’s self-perceptions merely pertain to the shooting’s aftermath, unlike 
the police critics who heavily identify with the victim of the shooting. During the trial, 
Mr. Testagrossa does not convey any self-perceptions. This, in turn, exemplifies the 
bipartite nature of the office’s discourse.  
 On a rhetorical level, magnitudinal references, use of superlatives, allusions to 
the future, and indirect references to judiciary processes and the role of judicial 





This section has demonstrated how the perceptions held and conveyed by the Queens 
DA’s office show some overlap with those of both the NYPD and the police critics. 
While the perceptions of the shooting itself show resemblances to those of both groups, 
those on the aftermath of the shooting mainly coincide with those held by the NYPD as 
an institution.  
 The overlap concerning the perceptions of the shooting can be explained from 
both strategic communication and strategic judicial perspectives, as the Queens DA’s 
office has a close relationship with both groups, and aims to keep this relationship 
strong, as will be further discussed in Subsection 5.3.1. Moreover, like the NYPD, the 
DA’s office has an objective not to provide information too early, yet (at first glance) 
has an objective to win the prosecution, similar to the police critics.
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These objectives explain to a certain extent the bipartite dynamics of the held 
and conveyed perceptions, in which the initial non-committal and nondescript 
perceptions and deeper-lying images of magnitude and personalization of the shooting 
and the victims, and the depersonalization of the officers, are followed by more 
profound images of magnitude of the shooting, culpability, misconduct, suffering and 
innocence, as well as on the depersonalization of the officers during the trial. 
The images can also be explained from a spontaneous communication 
perspective: To a certain degree the DA’s office perceives the shooting in the same 
way as the police critics, yet it does not identify itself with the victim in the same way 
(as in ‘I am Sean Bell’), and with the same emotion (as in ‘We love Sean Bell’), nor 
does it perceive the shooting as having the same magnitude (as in ‘50 shots’). The 
overlap with the NYPD concerning self-perceptions on the aftermath of the shooting, 
in turn, can also be explained from a strategic or spontaneous point of view, as both 
organizations have a similar objective to enforce the law, but also receive a substantial 
amount of criticism after the shooting. The conveyed self-images of ‘thoroughness’, 
‘carefulness’, ‘fairness’ and ‘completeness’ on the one hand, and hardship on the other, 
hence diminish the magnitude of the negative perceptions of the office, as further 
discussed in Section 5.3. From a broader perspective, it is striking how the DA’s office 
conveys more images of the investigation than of the shooting. Although this can be 





This section looks at the interpretations constructed and conveyed by the Queens DA’s 
office in the debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting. The analysis for this 
section is divided into a subsection on interpretations concerning the shooting, and a 
subsection on interpretations of the aftermath. As the schism between courtroom 
rhetoric and press conference rhetoric stands out, the analysis will be structured 
accordingly — but not rigidly — within these subsections.  
 
5.2.1 Framing the shooting: Danger, laws, and social values 
The Queens DA’s office conveys its interpretation of the shooting’s aftermath only 
sparingly. Before the trial, Mr. Brown does not place the shooting within a clear 
historical or organic framing, like police critics and police defenders do. For example, 
there are no references to police shooting patterns. Yet, subtly, and perhaps 
unintentionally, Mr. Brown does interpret the shooting from such framings, as he 
interprets it as a deviation from a pattern of other, less complex and perhaps less 
controversial cases (‘it is the kind of story that defines our tenure’, ‘not easy for them 
[grand jurors] to resolve’, ‘he could not recall a grand jury that deliberated for three 
days on a case’). The fact that the district attorney in his interpretation of the shooting 
refers to the investigation, as opposed to the shooting itself, shows that he interprets the 
shooting both from self-centered (‘my investigation’) and judicial perspectives. The 
strong focus on ‘facts’, in turn, also shows how the shooting is interpreted from a 
factual, rather than an emotional perspective. 
While the district attorney at this point does not reveal how the shooting is 
interpreted, apart from ‘a case to be investigated’, he does give strict criteria on how he 
will do so: ‘Our decisions will be based solely on the law and upon the facts as we and 
the grand jury determine them to be’.3 Only the law, which ‘gives police somewhat 
more latitude in using deadly force than it gives civilians’, determines at what point a 
‘mistake’ by police officers becomes a ‘criminal act’. While this judicial framing is in 
itself unremarkable, as prosecutors apply the law and the facts to prosecute the case, it 
is disparate from that of police critics, which is emotional, and moreover, focuses on 
broader historical and organic patterns of police misconduct and racial injustice. In line 
with this interpretation, aspects of the shooting are thus narrowly interpreted by the law 
and the facts of the case, and are limited to this specific case (‘I don’t see this as being 
a hate crime or a racially motivated crime in any sense’).  
While Mr. Testagrossa, in his closing arguments, does interpret the conduct of 
the officers as a deviation from broader socially accepted values concerning how the 
police should behave (‘We ask police to risk their lives to protect ours, not to risk our 
lives to protect their own’; ‘But they certainly have a responsibility to cease using 
deadly physical force as soon as they can safely do so’), this framing is still in line with 
the judicial framing conveyed by Mr. Brown, as such values are closely linked to the 
legal system. Then again, Judge Cooperman does not include them in his interpretation 
of the shooting and the law, as discussed in Section 5.4. While Mr. Testagrossa’s 
framing appears akin to that of the police critics, the prosecutor interprets the conduct 




The DA’s office also interprets the framings of other stakeholders on the 
shooting. These specific ‘stakeholder-observant’ interpretations, which do not occur in 
such a comprehensive fashion in the discourse conveyed by other stakeholders, give a 
new, analytical dimension to the way the DA’s office interprets the Sean Bell case. 
While the focus on the interpretative framings of other stakeholders at first glance 
resembles Mayor Bloomberg’s stakeholder-centered approach, the DA’s office 
approach is different in that it does not use all existing framings as guiding buoys for 
its own interpretation, but rather evaluates the framing of the police critics as an 
outsider. The discourse is thus not so much stakeholder-centered, but stakeholder-
observant and self-centered. For example, during Mr. Testagrossa’s closing arguments, 
he seeks conciliation between the different realities held by stakeholders in the debate 
(‘The truth […] lies somewhere in between the polar extremes’), and also interprets 
them (‘If you are a police officer or sympathetic to police officers, the defendants are 
tragic heroes and the victims are thugs. If you are friends of the victims, then the 
defendants are murderers’). Moreover, Mr. Testagrossa values these interpretations 
negatively (‘prism of their own prejudices’). In another example, the DA’s office 
distances itself from the police critics framing of the shooting, and interprets it as being 
much broader than it can be from a judicial perspective, or even from a general 
perspective (‘issues that go well beyond the incident itself’, ‘It’s the mistrust in the 
minority community’). This example also gives insight into the office’s interpretation 
(or more narrowly that of the officer quoted), which is in line with that of the police 
defenders (‘It’s cops that are faced with danger every day and have to react in seconds. 
It’s safe to say, if they’re wrong, somebody dies — whether a civilian or an officer’).  
 
Summary 
The Queens DA’s office interprets the shooting — as well as the inherent culpability 
question, and the racial aspects of the case — from a judicial, non-emotional, factual 
and process-oriented perspective in which only the law determines at what point a 
mistake by police officers becomes a criminal act and only the facts of the case 
determine whether there was any racial motivation. While the shooting is part of a 
historical and organic framing that entails danger and chaos and in which police 
mistakes are easily made, the conduct of the officers is not interpreted as a mistake but 
as a criminal act that should be prosecuted, as it is not in line with the law and is a 
deviation from a broader pattern of socially accepted values concerning how the police 
should behave, including the protection of the lives of citizens over the lives of 
policemen, and the responsibility to use deadly force. In addition, the shooting is 
interpreted as a deviation from a pattern of other, less complex and perhaps less 
controversial cases. 
Although the DA’s office does acknowledge that racial tensions still exist in 
the city and that police officers are faced with danger every day and have to react in 
seconds, it does not incorporate the first framing in its interpretation of the shooting 
and incorporates the second framing only to a limited extent. This framing is mainly 
self-centered, and also narrow.  
From a strategic perspective, Mr. Brown’s earlier remarks can be seen as 
defensive communication aimed at countering the interpretations held by police critics 
on the shooting, and their consequential desire for immediate indictments, while the 
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statements made by Mr. Testagrossa are conversely in line with those of police critics, 
as the assistant district attorney aims to assure conviction of the implicated detectives.  
 
5.2.2 Framing the aftermath of the shooting: A history of proper and 
professional conduct 
While the Queens DA’s office is somewhat more open about its interpretations of the 
aftermath of the shooting, this aftermath is similarly interpreted from within a narrow 
judicial, factual and process-oriented framing (‘our decisions will be based solely on 
the law and upon the facts’, ‘The case should be tried in the courtroom and not on the 
courthouse steps’), in which carefulness, thoroughness and completeness (‘unless 
you’ve got all the T’s crossed and the I’s dotted’), as well as fairness (‘The interests of 
a fair and balanced prosecution’) and ‘the facts’ are foremost, and are placed above 
swiftness in action. The organic dimensions of this interpretation are only subtly 
conveyed, by statements that do not specifically refer to the Sean Bell case, but 
conversely can apply to numerous cases (‘the interests of a fair and balanced 
prosecution’, ‘a grand jury does not decide whether a person has been proven guilty’) 
as well as a clearer reference to universality (‘you never go before a grand jury […]’). 
Moreover the discourse refers to the investigative process (‘a great deal of work that 
needs to be done’, ‘we will reach no conclusions until all of the facts are in’, ‘the case 
should be tried in the courtroom and not on the courthouse steps’), rather than the 
broader historical processes that either police defenders or police critics refer to. 
Similar to the NYPD, Mr. Brown interprets the shooting’s aftermath also from 
a self-centered perspective, in which he looks at his personal stake in the aftermath of 
the shooting (‘great deal of work that needs to be done’, ‘my investigation’). Mr. 
Brown interprets his own role in the aftermath of the shooting, and indirectly that of his 
office, from within a historical framing of competence (‘I think my career has already 
been defined’) and accountability (‘the confidence that the residents of this city have 
placed in us’). This interpretation appears to have both self-centered (‘It’s the kind of 
story that defines our tenure’), and stakeholder-centered elements (‘I want to do the 
right thing’). However, the district attorney does not expound exactly what ‘the right 
thing’ entails in regard to benefiting other stakeholders. Instead, he focuses on his own 
‘stake’ in the debate (‘I want to be certain that we come out of this investigation with 
that reputation intact’).  
While the district attorney does at times recognize the interpretative framings 
of other stakeholders (‘You’re damned if you do and you’re damned if you don’t’, 
‘They didn’t hear what it is perhaps they wanted to hear, that it would be immediately 
presented to a grand jury and that we would immediately seek an indictment’), he does 
not use these interpretations as guiding buoys, like the mayor does, but refutes or 
underemphasizes them. In a broader sense, the DA’s office mainly expounds its 
interpretation of its own role, while it is not as outspoken about how it interprets the 
role of other stakeholders in the debate. This by itself underlines the self-centered 
perspective. However, the DA’s office does occasionally interpret these roles. At these 
moments, Mr. Sharpton’s role is placed in a historical framing of criticism that can 
cause damage (‘I just don’t want to see us fall into a trap where the rhetoric so 
prejudices the case that a fair trial cannot be provided for, if indeed it reaches that 
point’). His remark — to a certain extent — resembles that of police defenders, yet Mr. 
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Brown more rigidly interprets Mr. Sharpton’s rhetoric within the judicial process-
oriented framing. While this rhetoric, according to Mr. Brown, can ‘prejudice’ and 
‘cause hysteria’, like it did in the past (‘Amadou Diallo’), he only interprets this 
behavior as being able to cause ‘a fair trial’ to be jeopardized. He does not speak of 
police victimization, or of ‘professional police haters’.  
The DA’s office more generally interprets the perceptions and interpretations 
of all stakeholders within both a historical framing (‘When you listen to people in the 
community talk about a case like this’ and ‘more than any other case in memory’) and 
an organic framing (‘most people [of prejudice] view through the prism of their own 
prejudices’) with broader agenda criticism (‘goes well beyond the incident in 
question’). In turn, the debate in general is indirectly interpreted within a framing of 
polarized debates between the police defenders and police critics (‘polar extremes’) as 
one in which different interpretations dominate the process of debate (‘This, more than 
any other case in memory, is one that most people view through the prism of their own 
prejudices’). Thus, not only is the shooting placed within a pattern of other cases, the 
‘polarized nature’ of the Sean Bell case within this pattern is also emphasized. In 
regard to the notion of broader agenda criticism, the DA’s office on one occasion refers 
to wider issues for which the implicated officers themselves are not responsible (‘It 
goes to other incidents in the past. It goes quite frankly to the general interaction 
between cops and people in the community’), while also linking police critics to issues 
the police as a whole are not solely responsible for (‘It’s the racial tension that still 
exists in the city’). 
 
Summary 
The Queens DA’s office interprets the shooting’s aftermath within a narrow, organic, 
judicial, factual, process- and future-oriented framing void of emotions, in which 
carefulness, thoroughness, completeness and fairness are more important than 
swiftness in action. In a broader sense, the aftermath of the shooting is interpreted from 
a stakeholder-observant perspective, in which the processes following the shooting are 
part of a broader pattern of ‘polarized’ debates between the police defenders and police 
critics; in which different interpretations dominate the process of debate; but in which 
the Queens DA’s office pursues the judicial and factual interpretation. The personal 
stake the office has in the aftermath of the shooting — i.e. the investigation to be 
conducted — plays a central role in this interpretation, which makes the interpretation 
self-centered. While the conduct of the district attorney is placed within a historical 
framing of competence and accountability, the communication by police critics and 
police defenders is placed within a historical framing of (broader agenda) criticism and 
prejudice that leads to polarization and potential damage. 
 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
The analysis in this section has demonstrated that the Queens DA’s office interprets 
both the shooting and the events following the shooting from a judicial, non-emotional, 
factual and process-oriented perspective, in which only the law determines at what 
point a mistake by police officers becomes a criminal act and only the facts of the case 
determine whether there was any racial motivation, while carefulness, thoroughness, 
completeness and fairness are more important than swiftness in action. Through this 
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perspective, the detectives’ conduct is interpreted as a criminal act that should be 
prosecuted, as it is not in line with the law and a deviation from a broader pattern of 
socially accepted values concerning how the police should behave, while the aftermath 
of the shooting is part of a broader pattern of ‘polarized’ debates between the police 
defenders and police critics, in which different interpretations dominate the process of 
debate. 
 The core of both the interpretation of the shooting and the events ensuing after 
the shooting is self-centered, although there are certainly stakeholder-centered 
elements in the interpretative framing of the DA’s office. Yet the communication that 
focuses on other stakeholders rather evaluates the communication used by these 
groups; the DA’s office does not incorporate elements of the communication conveyed 
by other stakeholders into its own framing. The framings constructed and conveyed by 
the office concerning the shooting and its ensuing events resemble, but also deviate 
from, those of the police critics and the NYPD, but also resemble — to a more limited 
extent — those of the mayor.  
 These framings are the roots of the perceptions discussed in the previous 
section. More specifically, these perceptions, shifting from ‘that which purportedly 
occurred’ to ‘the kind of incident that cries out for an investigation’ and finally a ‘tale 
of carelessness’ — and with it their bipartite nature — are products of the broader 
interpretations based on laws and socially accepted values concerning how the police 
should behave, but also how the case should be prosecuted.  
 The rhetoric used to convey the cognitive associations within these broader 
framings is nondescript, factual and detached, yet during the trial it was more 





The analysis for this section examines the elements that make up the positioning of the 
Queens DA’s office, i.e. the delineation of debate and reality, as well as the driving 
force and filter of debate, the character of communication, and the level of conciliation 
with other stakeholders. The latter three elements are again combined in one 
subsection.  
 
5.3.1 The delineation of debate: ‘Doing the right thing’ 
Unlike the police defenders and police critics, the Queens DA’s office does not focus 
clearly and profoundly on one specific desired outcome of debate. While the official 
charges by themselves can be seen as a desired outcome that is in line with ‘Justice for 
Sean Bell’, the necessity for conviction does not reoccur in the communication 
conveyed by the office in the same way as in that of police critics. Instead, Mr. Brown 
delineates his desired outcome of debate in a similar way to the NYPD, by focusing on 
the process (‘conduct a careful, thorough, impartial investigation’). The desired 
outcome of debate hence appears inferior to the process of debate, i.e. to conduct a 
careful, thorough and impartial investigation and consequential prosecution. Mr. 
Brown also argues that the debating process should be continued ‘through passionate 
and reasoned argument’. By using affirmative and decisive vocabulary (‘to ensure that 
nothing compromises or prejudices my investigation’; ‘our investigation […] will be 
thorough and complete’) detailing how the DA’s office is going to safeguard its 
promised thoroughness, the office interprets its own conduct within a framing of active 
participation. While this self-centered approach is akin to that of the NYPD, and while 
the delineation of debate is similarly driven by a narrow process-oriented reality, the 
office focuses much more actively on personal responsibilities towards other 
stakeholders, which, in turn, is a stakeholder-centered approach.  
 Although Mr. Brown focuses on ‘a fair and balanced prosecution’, ‘a fair and 
impartial jury’ and ‘a fair trial’, like the police defenders do, he does not stress the need 
for this in the same way, nor does he limit the notion to one stakeholder group. While 
his objective thus appears to be similar to that of the mayor and can be seen as 
stakeholder-centered and broadly delimited, as it presents the need for fairness as a 
universality that applies to all stakeholders involved, the district attorney does delimit 
it to the process of the trial. 
 Not all statements focus on the desired process of debate; some early remarks 
made by the district attorney are more directed to the actual outcome. However, this 
outcome does not involve ‘prosecution leading to conviction’. Instead, his commitment 
(‘I’m here because I want to do the right thing’) resembles the active participation 
promised by the mayor to aid other stakeholders. Yet while the district attorney does 
stress the fact that ‘the office has the respect of the police as well as the confidence of 
Queens County residents’, thus including other stakeholders in the desired outcome of 
debate, the object of this outcome (‘I’ and ‘we’), as well as the fact that the district 
attorney wants to keep the good name of his office (‘I want to be certain that we come 
out of this investigation with that reputation intact’), is self-centered.  
In short, the process-driven, partially delimited and variably centered desired 
outcome of debate entails ‘doing the right thing’, i.e. coming out of the investigation 
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with the office’s reputation intact, both with the community and the police, by means 




The desired outcome of debate for the DA’s office is challenged throughout the 
aftermath of the shooting foremost by an atmosphere of criticism. Several times, police 
critics, in particular Al Sharpton, convey their belief that the district attorney cannot 
independently conduct his investigation, and that a fair trial is thus not guaranteed. The 
office is also criticized for the apparent lack of rapidity of the investigation. This 
atmosphere is a challenge to the desired outcome, as it could harm the desired process, 
and in addition can have a detrimental effect on the reputation of the office. The 
desired process is also challenged by requests that are not in line with this process, 
such as requests for more information, and the police critics’ aim of preventing the 
defendants’ request for a judge instead of a jury.  
The DA’s office responds to such challenges, in particular the criticism 
towards the speed of the investigation, foremost by factually stating the steps that are 
taken, by explaining the process itself (‘It deserves repeating that a grand jury does not 
decide whether a person has been proven guilty’) and by showing how external factors 
(‘still awaiting the results of ballistics reports from the police’) prevent them from 
moving forward. While this resembles the NYPD’s focus on process, the difference is 
that the prosecutors specify processes and convey how actively they are involved in the 
process (‘our people want to listen’).  
The office also responds to debate challenges with an explanation of how 
certain actions and communications can have a negative effect on the ‘fairness’ and 
speed of the trial and its preceding investigation, for example by linking the reverend’s 
rhetoric to ‘prejudice’ and ‘hysteria’, thus warning the reverend, by using decisive 
vocabulary, not to continue with such rhetoric for the sake of the investigation (‘to tone 
down the level of rhetoric’). Similarly, he delimits the notion of fairness by setting 
conditions for it to take place (‘The interests of a fair and balanced prosecution prevent 
me from providing you with more information than I have already provided’). 
In defending his desired outcome of debate, Mr. Brown, akin to Mayor 
Bloomberg, also links his desired outcome/means of debate to his delineation of reality 
(‘we will be thorough and complete’). The decisive language used by the district 
attorney delimits the scope of debate, as it does not give in to the pressure of critics 
(‘we will reach no conclusions until all of the facts are in’). The notion of fairness is 
similarly presented as an incontrovertible fact (‘I’m certain that they will receive a fair 
trial’). The office also responds to challenges, by presenting realities held by other 
stakeholder groups as distorted (‘Defendants’ portrayal of the media coverage of this 
case is seriously skewed’).  
The acquittals themselves are not a debate challenge to the Queens DA’s 
office, as the verdict, from a procedural perspective, is in line with the desired outcome 
of debate. It is the fair process itself, and not the verdict, that determines fairness. Not 
only does he stress that he accepts the verdict, he also links acceptance to fairness (‘I 
urge all fair-minded individuals in this city to do the same’), implying that the trial 
itself was fair, and thus the verdict is too. The judge hence remains one of the ‘most 
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respected and learned jurists’. Similarly, the prosecutor runs down ‘a list of statistics’ 
to show that the process, and thus the desired means/outcome of debate, was a success. 
The desired means of debate should also be continued after the acquittals, as he urges 
the public to continue the debate through passionate and reasoned argument. He also 
demonstrates proactive behavior, by elaborating on the next steps (‘He said he had 
called Mr. Kelly to volunteer his office’s help’).  
 
Summary 
This subsection has shown how the Queens DA’s office’s process-driven, partially 
delimited and variably centered desired outcome of debate entails ‘doing the right 
thing’, i.e. coming out of the investigation with its reputation intact, both with the 
community and the police, by means of conducting a careful, thorough and fair 
(impartial) investigation and consequential prosecution. Although the desired outcome 
and means of debate are two interdependent components, the latter is so strong that— 
to a certain extent — it becomes an outcome by itself, similar to that of the NYPD.  
The discussion of debate challenges has shown not only the variable 
delimitation and the stakeholder-centered and self-centered components of the desired 
outcome of debate, it has also shown the different communication means used by this 
stakeholder group to defend and safeguard this outcome. When the process of debate is 
in jeopardy, in the eyes of the Queens DA’s office, it responds with an explanation of 
how actions and communications both by the office and by others can have a negative 
effect on the ‘fairness’ and speed of the trial and its preceding investigation, but also by 
pointing towards personal responsibilities and the necessity for the desired means of 
debate; by showing proactive behavior; by presenting a delimited reality in order to 
safeguard the desired process of debate and by using decisive language and dogmatic 
assertions concerning what is believed to (and should) happen. Thus, while the office 
often acknowledges the different objectives of other stakeholders, it does not give in, 
and provides reasons for not doing so. The delineation of debate and reality at times 
coincide, as both the desired outcome and means of debate are at times presented as 
rigidly delimited reality.  
 As a final point, the analysis of debate challenges demonstrates how the 
objectives of the Queens DA’s office differ from that of police critics, in that the 
former seeks fairness in process, while the latter seek justice for Sean Bell. Hence, the 
office’s desired outcome of debate is more broadly delimited than that of police critics, 
while the means of debate are more rigidly defined.  
 
5.3.2 The delineation of reality: A stakeholder-observant ‘us’ and 
‘them’ positioning 
This subsection scrutinizes the scope of the reality held by the Queens DA’s office. 
Unlike the police critics and police defenders, the Queens DA’s office does not focus 
profoundly on ‘the truth’. Only on one — important — occasion does the office focus 
on this notion: 
 
At the end of the trial (April 2008)  
 




“This, more than any other case in memory, is one that most people view through the 
prism of their own prejudices,” he said. “If you are a police officer or sympathetic to 
police officers, the defendants are tragic heroes and the victims are thugs. If you 
are friends of the victims, then the defendants are murderers.” 
 
“The truth,” he continued, “lies somewhere in between the polar extremes.”4 
 
In this statement, Mr. Testagrossa defines the truth of the shooting as ‘somewhere in 
between the polar extremes’, the polar extremes being ‘the defendants are tragic heroes 
and the victims are thugs’ on the one side and ‘the defendants are murderers’ on the 
other side. He literally positions himself and the truth he holds in between those of 
police critics and police defenders. Although he does not specify exactly what the truth 
is, it is clear that he does not fully accept the realities presented by either police critics 
or police defenders. He emasculates these realities by labeling those holding them as 
narrow-minded (‘one that most people view through the prism of their own 
prejudices’).  
 Mr. Brown similarly delimits the scope of his reality concerning the shooting 
by setting it against a reality based on ‘preliminary information’ and ‘unsubstantiated 
facts’. By doing so, he maintains that the reality that will be conveyed by him at a later 
point will be a truthful, unprejudiced one. By saying his reality is ‘based solely on the 
law and upon the facts’, he excludes emotions and broader framings held by other 
stakeholders, while suggesting that his office has the exclusive right to construct this 
reality, as the office and the grand jury determine the facts of the case.  
The scope and nature of the reality presented by the Queens DA’s office at first 
glance might show resemblances to that of Mayor Bloomberg. Yet while the mayor 
holds and conveys a universal, all-encompassing stakeholder-centered reality built 
upon the different realities of all stakeholders, the reality held and conveyed by the 
DA’s office is stakeholder-observant, self-centered, and delimited within the polar 
extremes of the realities held by other stakeholders. Moreover, while the mayor uses 
his perceptions and interpretations as guiding buoys, the DA’s office does not, and 
instead constructs its own, based on facts that are determined solely by them. The 
office thus constructs ‘one single version of the truth’.  
Before the trial, the district attorney uses decisive language to construct this 
reality (‘It’s a no-brainer that it’s the kind of incident that cries out for an investigation 
by a grand jury’, ‘I don’t see this as being a hate crime or a racially motivated crime in 
any sense’). During the trial, Mr. Testagrossa is much more detailed on what happened 
on the night of the shooting, and focuses clearly on one version of the truth. He uses 
techniques similar to those used by both the lawyers representing police critics and 
police defenders, i.e. the use of dogmatic assertions and emphatic, unambiguous 
vocabulary (‘There’s no way of sugarcoating it’, ‘this was a slipshod operation’). By 
doing so, he presents an uncompromising reality regarding the guilt of the police 
officers, in which no other interpretations, perceptions and viewpoints are possible in 
regard to the culpability for the shooting (‘can only be characterized as criminal’). This 
type of communication can be classified as courtroom rhetoric, aimed at winning the 
court case.  
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The Queens DA’s office is much more explicit in its communication on how 
rigidly/broadly the organization defines the process after the shooting. The reality 
concerning the office’s performance is rigidly delimited by use of superlatives and 
dogmatic assertions, as in that the proceedings led by the district attorney are ‘as 
thorough and complete as I’ve ever participated in’, while they acted ‘in the most 
responsible and conscientious fashion’, his performance ‘has already been defined’, he 
is certain he won’t disappoint the ‘residents of this city’ who already have confidence 
in him, and he is not afraid to make decisions. Phrased differently, community 
confidence, as well as police accountability and professionalism are presented as 
definite, irreversible certainties. By doing so, Mr. Brown ignores the reality of some 
residents of the city, who are not confident that the district attorney can be completely 
independent. Like the police commissioner, Mr. Brown sets his own conditions for 
accountability and professionalism, asserting that the confidence of the community can 
be maintained by thoroughness, carefulness, fairness and completeness, whilst ignoring 
issues such as co-dependence.  
 
Challenging reality 
The reality of the DA’s office on the shooting is only really challenged during the trial, 
when the prosecutor is in debate with defense lawyers. In response to such reality 
challenges, the prosecutor does acknowledge yet does not accept the police defenders’ 
reality (‘Defense would have you believe that the number of gunshots fired is 
irrelevant’ […] ‘But they certainly have a responsibility […]’). The prosecutor 
furthermore emasculates other truths by labeling them as incredible (‘defense would 
have you believe’, ‘suspiciously’, ‘lie concocted’). The office’s reality of the shooting 
is also challenged by the verdict itself. The reality presented by Mr. Brown, now, is not 
universal, but personal (‘I accept his verdict’). Although he maintains that the verdict is 
not ‘an acquittal of serious management weaknesses that he believes led to the Bell 
shooting’, such weaknesses were not the focal point of the reality conveyed by Mr. 
Testagrossa during the trial. This, in turn, implies a more flexible scope of reality. 
The DA’s reality concerning the aftermath of the shooting, in particular that in 
regard to the performance of the office, is challenged by the same atmosphere of 
criticism as described in the previous subsection, and hence the responses do overlap. 
The DA’s office responds to the atmosphere of criticism on its conduct by lauding its 
performance (‘confident that I’d go where the evidence led me’, ‘the trial revealed 
significant deficiencies in’), thus reinforcing the self-centered interpretative framing of 
its conduct; by proactively making personal promises (‘I have promised a full, fair and 
thorough investigation’); by presenting the future as a fact (‘an investigation that will 
be completed as expeditiously as possible’); by emasculating other truths as incredible, 
without real justification (‘There exists no basis in law or in fact for the appointment of 
a special prosecutor’); by conveying references to the effects of such realities 
(‘demands for the appointment of a special prosecutor are neither helpful nor 
productive’); by factually stating the steps the office is taking; by showing how 
external factors prevent them from moving forward; by reinforcing the held reality 
(‘our people want to listen’, ‘It is what it is’); by altering criticism to fit within the 
scope of the held reality (‘But the fact of the matter is, knowing how hard all of the 
members of this team worked, the criticism meant nothing’); by presenting the notion 
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of fairness as an incontrovertible fact (‘I’m certain that they will receive a fair trial’); 
by maintaining that critics do not understand the reality held by the Queens DA’s 
office (‘It’s very easy for people’) and hence by denouncing the criticism of this group 
(‘the criticism meant nothing’); and by using decisive, personal rhetoric to determine 
the scope of debate (‘it simply cannot be allowed’, ‘I cannot allow’).  
The reality challenges presented by other stakeholders are only partially 
accepted. While the district attorney acknowledges and agrees with critics that the 
investigation is moving slowly (‘I recognize’, ‘I understand Mr. Herbert's impatience’), 
he provides clear arguments that aim to refute the perception that such a slow pace is 
negative. Moreover, he ignores the criticism concerning the partiality of the office by 
reinforcing his held reality that the investigation is impartial (‘our decisions will be 
based solely on the law and upon the facts as we and the grand jury determine them to 
be’). By doing so, he indirectly argues that the police critics’ perception of a flawed 
system must be skewed, thus revealing the delimitation of his own reality and the 
dismissal of others. The police critics’ condemnation of the prosecution, conveyed 
after the acquittals, is also rigidly refuted (‘the criticism meant nothing’). 
 
‘Us-versus-them’ 
While the Queens DA’s office does not distinguish between personalized ‘us’ 
perceptions and depersonalized ‘them’ perceptions, and moreover, does not interpret 
the interaction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ within a historical and organic framing, the 
district attorney does make a distinction between the realities held by themselves and 
others (‘I want to do the right thing’). The Queens DA’s office sees the others (‘them’) 
in two different ways. First, the general public are portrayed as ‘laymen’ who do not 
fully understand the complex judicial reality held by ‘us’. Second, ‘them’ also 
comprises the defendants, who have a ‘seriously skewed’ conception of reality. This, in 
turn, also gives insight into how the DA’s office sees ‘us’. More specifically, ‘us’ is 
narrowly defined as the office itself, as well as, to a certain degree, the professional 
group of prosecutors. Conversely to ‘them’, ‘us’ is a group of knowledgeable and 
objective experts.  
 
Summary 
The Queens DA’s office constructs and conveys a (mostly) single and rigidly defined 
stakeholder-observant yet self-centered version of the truth concerning the shooting, 
based on the law and on facts that are solely determined by the office, while rigidly 
excluding emotions and broader framings held by other stakeholders. The office’s 
(‘us’) truth both falls within but also stands apart from the polarized and prejudiced 
truths of other stakeholders (‘them’).  
 The office’s reality concerning the aftermath of the shooting, and in particular 
that in regard to its own conduct, is delimited by the presentation of definite, 
irreversible certainties regarding community confidence, and the office’s 
accountability and professionalism, while largely excluding the reality held by police 
critics with respect to independence, and to a lesser extent the pace of the investigation 
and the quality of the ensuing trial.  
Strategies used to delimit the scope of reality include the presentation of clear 
arguments based on the office’s interpretative framings; the elaboration of the process 
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of investigation and lauding the outcome; the presentation of a rigidly defined reality in 
regard to the performance of the office, thus reinforcing its own self-centered 
interpretative framing regarding conduct; the emasculation of other realities by labeling 
them as incredible and the people holding these realities as narrow-minded; the 
delimitation of the notion of fairness by presenting it as an incontrovertible fact; the 
presentation of personal yet exclusive views; the use of dogmatic assertions, 
superlatives, and convincing, emphatic and unambiguous vocabulary underlining 
certainties but also what the office believes will and should happen; the use of decisive, 
personal rhetoric to determine the scope of debate; the misinterpretation of criticism in 
order for it to fit within the scope of the reality held by the office; the emphasis on the 
unique expertise of the office; the making of promises in regard to future conduct and 
the safeguarding of the process; and finally the display of fact determinism.  
However, the DA’s office also conveys conciliatory communication, such as 
the acknowledgement of segments of the reality held by police critics, and the 
suggestion that the reality concerning its own conduct might not be universal. The 
latter is mainly done in response to the judge’s verdict. In the main, the office does not 
elaborate in the New York Times on the criticism that it is not independent from the 
police. Conversely, it usually responds to process challenges.  
 
5.3.3 The driving force of debate, the character of communication, and 
‘multiple hues of communication’ 
As in Part II, Chapter 4, the driving force of debate, the character of communication 
means, and existing conciliatory communication will be combined in this brief 
subsection.  
The analysis so far has shown how the responses of the Queens DA’s office are 
fact-, law- and process-driven. Facts, laws and processes also function as filters, as 
each new development is assessed from a factual, judicial and procedural perspective. 
This can be seen as spontaneous discourse, but also as deflective PR discourse, aimed 
at delimiting debate and reality, similar to the NYPD’s communication. To a lesser 
extent, the response of the Queens DA’s office is also driven by the agenda-setting 
approach of police critics, as the office, like the Police Department, is faced with the 
magnitudinal images and the passionate oratory used by this group, as well as by the 
critical questions regarding its conduct. Whereas the DA’s office is proactive in regard 
to the investigation and the ensuing trial, it is reactive in regard to criticism from police 
critics.  
In his conception of what happened on the night of the shooting, the Queens 
DA does not deploy harsh communication means before the trial. During the trial, the 
tone of voice is harsher and the choice of language more emphatic, but never reaches 
the level of the zealous oratory used by police critics, and moreover, does not include 
strategies such as name-calling, personally addressed attacks, ridiculing, use of irony, 
etc. The prosecutor does not deliberately shield himself from realities held by other 
stakeholders, like police critics do, yet he does question the trustworthiness of 
attorneys and defendants. 
In response to questions on the office’s handling of the case, the 
communication means resemble much more those used by the NYPD. More 
specifically, the office also profoundly lauds its own conduct (and thus implies that the 
428 
 
perceptions of police critics must be skewed), and moreover, addresses broader issues 
(such as the ‘subjective’ relationship a district attorney has with the Police 
Department), by focusing on process. Yet the communication means used by the 
Queens DA’s office are far less evasive than those of the NYPD. All of these methods 
can be seen as spontaneous discourse, but they are also typical of strategic PR 
discourse aimed at safeguarding the desired outcome of debate and the reality held by 
the office.  
 It is hard to pinpoint the extent of conciliatory discourse in the communication 
used by the DA’s office as it is less clear with whom the office needs to seek coalition 
than it is for other stakeholders. In fact, it depends on the topic. The office does, at a 
certain point, seek coalition with the reality held by the judge on the shooting (‘I accept 
his verdict’). However, the reality held by police critics on the conduct and co-
dependence of the office is not understood, and often not even acknowledged. The 
scope of debate consists of conciliatory elements too, as the DA’s office shows much 
more proactivity than the NYPD does.  
 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
This section has demonstrated how the positioning of the Queens DA’s office at first 
glance resembles that of the NYPD, in that it has rigid elements, and is characterized 
by factuality and process. In addition, it is akin to that of the mayor, i.e. in the 
delineation of debate and reality, the office focuses on other stakeholders. Yet this mix 
itself, as well as the difference in positioning before the trial and during the trial, makes 
the positioning of the DA’s office unique, resulting in a stakeholder-observant, 
partially delimited, variably centered, process- and fact-driven positioning.  
 The variably-centered positioning can be found in the dual-layered desired 
means of debate, which focuses on both the stake of stakeholders and on that of the 
office itself, but also in the personal responsibilities towards other stakeholders (all 
captured in ‘doing the right thing’), and on the analysis of the realities held by others.  
 The variable rigidity within the positioning of the Queens DA’s office is 
characterized by both broadly and narrowly delimited notions of fairness, presentation 
of a single version of the truth in regard to the shooting and the office’s conduct in the 
handling of the prosecution at large, rigid exclusion of emotions and broader framings 
held by other stakeholders, and harsher and milder means of communication.  
Process and facts, but also the police critics’ powerful agenda-setting 
perceptions and positioning, function as the driving force of debate. In addition, 
process and facts serve as a filter through which actions are perceived, assessed, and 
responded to.  
All of this results in a different kind of ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, in which 
an impartial, capable and knowledgeable ‘us’ decides on ‘the law and the facts’, while 
the reality of ignorant and prejudiced others is negatively valued and — to a large 
extent — purposely not taken into account. The stakeholder-observant positioning only 
barely seeks common ground with other realities or desired outcomes of debate.  
 Location and time are factors that influence the positioning of the Queens 
DA’s office. Before the trial, the office focused on its scope of debate and reality with 
regard to the aftermath of the shooting. During the trial, this focus shifted to the 
shooting itself.  
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5.4 Judge Arthur Cooperman  
Judge Arthur Cooperman’s communication on the Sean Bell case occurs at only one 
moment in the aftermath of the debate, i.e. his reading of the verdict.
5
 It is hence not 
possible to analyze historical dynamics in the communication conveyed by the judge. 
Moreover, ‘reality and debate’ challenges do not really occur, as the judge only speaks 
out once, and thus is not in debate. The analysis hence scrutinizes the judge’s full 
statement, in order to highlight organic synergies in the discourse.  
 The judge speaks about the totality of the shooting in rather evasive terms (‘the 
business at hand’, ‘the events of that morning’). By doing so, the judge conveys a 
rather nondescript, evasive and non-magnitudinal image of the Sean Bell shooting in 
its totality. His more descriptive perceptions, in turn, do not focus on magnitudinal 
aspects of the shooting. The word ‘shooting’, for example, does not occur in his 
statement, nor does he focus at any point on the amount of shots fired. Even when he 
elaborates on the moment Detective Isnora started to fire his gun, he does not focus on 
the magnitude of the amount of shots fired after that (‘Defendant Isnora yelled, “gun” 
and fired. Other officers, indicted and unindicted, joined in from different locations on 
the street’). The judge’s depiction of the shooting is in line with the police defenders’ 
perception of what happened as ‘a matter of seconds’. Not only does the judge focus on 
the short time frame in which the shooting took place (‘The court has found that the 
incident lasted just seconds’), he also describes the danger and chaos felt by the 
officers (‘“strip clubs” often generate criminal activity’, ‘gave the impression that he 
had a gun’). The judge underlines these perceptions by using emphatic word choice 
that highlights danger and chaos (‘heated’, ‘threat’, ‘provocative confrontation’).  
Judge Cooperman does not provide such a three-dimensional picture of Sean 
Bell or the other victims of the shooting. Although the judge refers to the victims by 
using their names, he does not use the name Sean Bell as a label. On no occasion does 
he identify, personalize or show sympathy for Sean Bell. Moreover, the judge does not 
focus on the victimization felt by the victims, or police critics in general, in the way 
that that group does. Although he refers to the notion of ‘suffering’ on two occasions, 
he does so in a way similar to that of police defenders (‘And, in many ways, this trial 
was a hardship’, ‘the unfortunate consequences of their conduct were tragic’). By using 
words such as ‘hardship’ and ‘tragic’ in an unattributed and universal manner (similar 
to the notion of ‘tragedy’), and by using understatements such as ‘unfortunate’, the 
judge plays down the culpability of the officers.  
While the judge on no occasion conveys perceptions that emphasize culpability 
in the judicial sense of the word, he does convey value-based perceptions on the 
conduct of the implicated officers (‘carelessness and incompetence’), subtly alluding to 
the fact that he might hold such perceptions in regard to the conduct of the officers, and 
that the officers might be culpable in a different venue.  
In a broader sense, the judge subtly conveys his perceptions of both police 
defenders and police critics. More specifically, by explicitly ordering people to ‘remain 
quiet after the verdicts are rendered’, by suggesting that people can ‘overreact’ and by 
saying he ‘ruled out sympathy and prejudice and any other emotional response to the 
issues presented’ he perceives the actions of these stakeholders from a stakeholder-
observant perspective. By doing so, he perceives police defenders and police critics as 
overreacting, emotional, and polarized.  
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The judge also subtly conveys self-perceptions concerning objectivity (‘the 
trier of fact’, ‘an objective consideration of the proof’) and professionalism (‘the court 
personnel and the attorneys who handled their responsibilities with the highest level of 
professionalism and skill’). The judge hence conveys self-perceptions similar to those 
of the Queens DA’s office and the NYPD concerning the proper conduct of himself 
and other judicial stakeholders.  
The judge interprets the shooting from a narrow judicial and factual 
perspective, i.e. by ‘determining what the facts are’ and applying ‘those facts to the 
applicable law’. Within his framing, there is no room for non-judicial standards such as 
carelessness and incompetence, and moreover, the shooting should be interpreted from 
the vantage point of the implicated officers and not that of the victims (‘it was 
necessary to consider the mind-set of each defendant at the time and place of 
occurrence, and not the mind-set of the victims’). Within this framing, the conduct of 
the officers is judged to be not criminal. He does not refer to any historical patterns, 
nor does he look at broader organic patterns such as police misconduct and racial 
injustice (‘The court did not view the victims or the NYPD as being on trial here’). 
However, the judge does suggest that the officers’ behavior is a deviation from normal 
and proper police conduct in regard to care and competence.  
The judge similarly interprets the aftermath of the shooting from a narrow 
judicial and factual interpretation. He does not elaborate on other events that took place 
after the shooting. Although he speaks of ‘hardship’, which could refer to broader 
patterns of suffering too, he links the word to ‘this trial’, thus delimiting its scope. The 
roles of other stakeholders, in turn, are only subtly referred to in a limited fashion. 
More specifically, by purposely ordering people to ‘remain quiet after the verdicts are 
rendered’, by suggesting that people can ‘overreact’, and by saying he ‘ruled out 
sympathy and prejudice and any other emotional response to the issues presented’, the 
judge not only conveys his perceptions of police critics and police defenders, he also 
interprets the aftermath of the shooting from a stakeholder-observant perspective, 
placing the roles of different stakeholders in court in a broader organic framing of 
polarization outside of the court.  
The judge does interpret his own role and that of the court in the debate (‘the 
trier of fact’, ‘a trial is defined as a formal examination of the facts of a case by a court 
of law to decide the validity of a charge’) but these roles, again, are by nature judicial 
and factual, and thus fall within the narrow interpretative framing held and conveyed 
by the judge.  
On no occasion does the judge speak of his desired outcome of debate. In fact, 
he opposes such an outcome, by stressing that the trial ‘was not a competition’. He 
only speaks of his desired means of debate, which, thus, can be seen as a desired 
outcome (‘weighing of facts to assure a fair trial’). As the judge only speaks out on one 
occasion, his desired means/outcome of debate is not challenged in the way it is for 
other stakeholders. However, the judge does suggest that the narrow judicial desired 
means of debate were challenged by other stakeholders throughout the trial (‘hardship’, 
‘To overreact to the outcome while you are in this courtroom, whether you are satisfied 
or dissatisfied with the result, would detract from the great effort that was expended to 
assure a fair trial’). He responds to these challenges, by subtly describing them and by 
shifting focus to the trial again (‘would detract from the great effort’).  
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The scope of reality is similarly delimited by the narrow judicial perspective. 
Throughout the statement, the judge uses dogmatic assertions to construct one single 
version of the truth as to what happened on the night of the shooting. Similarly, he uses 
such assertions, as well as emphatic and unambiguous language, in regard to the 
court’s and his own conduct and that of other judicial stakeholders (‘the trier of fact’, 
‘an objective consideration of the proof’, ‘the highest level of professionalism and 
skill’), thus delimiting the reality concerning the judicial stakeholders’ performance. 
He ignores the reality held by police critics on the magnitude of the shooting and the 
broader historical and organic framings of police misconduct and racial injustice 
completely. He does not speak of ‘us’ and ‘them’. However, he does see the court and 
himself as a unique entity that is able to seek the truth (‘the trier of fact’). He also 
points out that other stakeholders do not embrace such objectivity, and moreover tend 
to ‘overreact’. Thus, he does not embrace a panoptic all-encompassing ‘us’ reality, but 
instead a polarized reality, from which the judge distances himself from a stakeholder-
observant perspective.  
The communication means used to convey his perceptions, interpretations, and 
positioning include on the one hand clear, upfront non-emotional rhetoric aimed at 
explaining the task of the judge and the rendered verdict, and on the other hand more 
subtle, descriptive and non-descriptive rhetoric that supports this verdict more 
indirectly, but also hints at broader interpretations, while safeguarding the desired 
means of debate. However, what is also important is what the judge refrains from 
saying: he ignores a large part of the reality held by police critics, as it does not fit 
within the limited interpretative framing set out by him. 
It is hard to distinguish a ‘driving force of debate’, as the judge is not ‘in 
debate’ in a way other stakeholders are, and does not react to events in the aftermath of 
the shooting. More narrowly, the driving force of Judge Cooperman is the weighing of 
facts.  
In the communication used by the judge there is no ‘other side of the coin’. 
Reasons for this include the limited amount of discourse, but also the consistent nature 
of the available discourse. Moreover, the judge does not seek conciliation with any 




5.5 Conclusions and outlook 
This chapter has analyzed the communication used by the judicial stakeholders in the 
debate, i.e. the Queens DA’s office led by Mr. Brown on the one side and Judge Arthur 
Cooperman on the other.  
Overall, the discourse of the Queens DA’s office is less consistent, and at 
times more intricate than that of other stakeholders. This results in less profound labels, 
interpretations and positioning.  
Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics that stand out. The 
communication of the DA’s office can be characterized as proactive, judicial, variably-
centered, partially delimited, self-praising, fact- and process-oriented, and stakeholder-
observant. The latter manifests itself in the low level of identification and emotion 
within the conveyed perceptions of both victims and defendants; the comprehensive 
analysis and evaluation of other stakeholders’ interpretations; the presentation of a 
polarized reality from which the office distances itself, and ultimately the ‘us-versus-
them’ schism, in which an impartial, capable and knowledgeable ‘us’ is set against a 
prejudiced, emotional and ignorant ‘them’.  
The self-centered elements of this communication include the large amount of 
self-perceptions (‘thoroughness’, ‘carefulness’, ‘fairness’, ‘completeness and 
hardship); the narrow judicial framing of both shooting and aftermath, in which the 
personal stake and function of the DA’s office play central roles; the dual-layered 
desired outcome of debate (i.e. ‘doing the right thing’); and the rhetorical focus on ‘I’ 
and ‘we’. The stakeholder-centered elements of the communication can be found in the 
dual-layered desired outcome of debate (i.e. ‘doing the right thing’); the proactive 
promises made to other stakeholders; and the focus on personal responsibilities 
towards other stakeholders. Rigid elements include the unambiguous perceptions of the 
shooting conveyed during the trial; the interpretative framing on the shooting, in which 
only the law determines at what point a mistake by police officers becomes a criminal 
act and only the facts of the case determine whether there was any racial motivation; 
the presentation of a single version of the truth in regard to the shooting and the 
office’s conduct in the handling of the prosecution at large, including the presentation 
of community confidence, police accountability and professionalism as definite, 
irreversible certainties; and the rigid exclusion of emotions and broader 
framings/realities held by other stakeholders. These rigid elements, in turn, ultimately 
lead to an ‘us-versus-them’ schism, in which ‘us’ decides on ‘the law and the facts’, 
while the reality of ‘them’ is negatively valued but — to a large extent — purposely 
not taken into account.  
 The communication also contains more flexible elements, such as the 
acknowledgement of segments within the reality held by police critics, the suggestion 
that the reality concerning its own conduct might not be universal, and the universality 
of the notion of fairness.  
 While the discourse prior to the trial tends to focus on the aftermath of the 
shooting, the discourse in the courtroom concentrates on the shooting itself. Moreover, 
the discourse is much more emphatic and emotional in court, as opposed to the 
nondescript, evasive and judicial discourse prior to the trial. The discourse prior to the 
trial can be explained from a strategic communication perspective, while the discourse 
during the trial is much more judicial in nature.  
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 The communication conveyed by the Queens DA’s office on the shooting thus 
shows resemblances to, but also deviates from, those of both the NYPD and the police 
critics. First, while the office in a way sees itself as similar to the NYPD, i.e. a 
professional and stable entity that is on top of the process, and it defends its conduct in 
a similar, rigid way, it is also much clearer, argumentative and more proactive in its 
communication to the public, as the extensive list of communication means has shown. 
Second, while the DA’s office has a stake in the debate similar to that of the police 
critics, i.e. a successful prosecution, the office’s desired outcome of debate is more 
broadly delimited and the means of debate are more rigidly defined. Moreover, the 
DA’s office holds a different interpretation of the shooting, in which it interprets far 
more positively the conduct of the officers as a deviation from a broader organic 
pattern of behavior that is in line with socially accepted values concerning how the 
police should behave. On a rhetorical level, the passionate oratory and the overall level 
of harshness in the communication of the police critics is never met.  
 Judge Cooperman’s communication is similar to that of the Queens DA’s 
office, in that it is also stakeholder-observant, self-praising and marked by a similar 
delimitation of the interpretative framing concerning both shooting and aftermath, by 
the focus on the desired means of debate, and by ‘one single version of the truth’. 
However, the truth in regard to the shooting itself is different, leading to a different 
verdict. This difference is due to a different explanation of the law, and that the judge 
does not venture into the reality held by police critics at all.  
How have the perceptions, framings and positioning held, constructed and 
conveyed by the judicial stakeholders — either negatively or positively — influenced 
the process of debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting? While the 
communication conveyed by the Queens DA’s office is more geared towards open 
communication than that of the NYPD, certain elements could have a detrimental 
effect on the outcome of debate. More specifically, the self-centered elements in the 
desired outcome of debate held by the DA’s office, the rigidly defined reality 
concerning personal conduct, the limited acknowledgement of criticism, and the 
deflective communication means used to thwart that criticism, could be unproductive, 
and even have a negative effect. In turn, the fact that Judge Cooperman does not show 
understanding for the reality of police critics could have a similar negative effect. 
                                                          
1 Although Mr. Testagrossa does not refer to the officers by using their names it can be assumed that this 
is due to the paraphrasing of the New York Times, as Mr. Testagrossa does not shy away from venturing 
into the reality held by the implicated officers. 
2 Some critics subtly question the neutrality of the Queens DA’s office. See discussion in Part II, Chapter 
7, Section 5. 
3 Of course, the act of prosecution in itself can be seen as an interpretation of the shooting as a ‘criminal 
act’ that is not in line with the ‘laws’ and hence the officers should be prosecuted. 
4 Michael Wilson, “Sean Bell Case Goes to Judge After 7 Hours of Angry Closing Arguments,” New York 
Times, sec. B, April 15, 2008.  




Chapter 6: The media 
 
Relevant insights into the media’s role in the debate can be deduced from the in-depth, 
face-to-face interviews held in October 2009 with key people/representatives from 
each of the discussed stakeholder groups (see the introduction to Part II for an 
overview), including New York Times reporter Michael Wilson, who wrote extensively 
about the shooting and talked at length about the choices he (and other journalists) 
made. The analysis that will be summarized here focuses on the question of whether 
the media are agenda-setters themselves, or if others set the agenda for them. In 
addition, Mr. Wilson’s responses will be compared to those of other interviewees, as 
they can shed light on apparent discrepancies, some of which have been mentioned 
previously, such as the fact that Mr. Browne maintains that Police Commissioner Kelly 
did offer sympathy to the Sean Bell family on public occasions. Another discrepancy 
which will be discussed is how interviewees from both sides of the debating arena 
maintain that the media, including the New York Times, are biased in favor of the 





6.1 Interviewees’ appraisals of the media 
CHARLES BARRON 
While City Councilman Charles Barron does see slight differences between the 
reporting in the New York Post and the New York Times (‘the Times was maybe a little 
more telling it like it really was’), he believes that overall, the media conveyed an 
untruthful conception of the reality concerning the conduct of the implicated officers 
(‘none of the papers gave a kind of justice that we needed’).1 He positions the media on 
the side of the NYPD and the police defenders.  
The reality conveyed in the press clashes with the rigidly delimited reality held 
by the city councilman on the shooting and its aftermath: While the media report 
negatively about both Sean Bell and Detective Oliver, the media still ‘went after Sean 
Bell more than [they went after] the police’, because the criticism about Detective 
Oliver is the truth (‘They weren’t negative; they told the truth about him’), and that 
about Sean Bell is not.  
 
DELORES JONES-BROWN 
John Jay College Professor Delores Jones-Brown argues that the reality held and 
conveyed by print journalism is rigidly defined, as the press is run by ‘mainstream 
people’ (‘I mean mostly white and mostly men’), who hold a rigid set of perceptions 
and interpretations that are ‘not sophisticated enough to reflect the reality of modern 
life.’2 She gives examples of how the newspapers — as well as mainstream New 
Yorkers in general — in her view subtly discredit the victim, by focusing on elements 
that are not considered ‘mainstream’, such as the character of Club Kalua (‘then they 
call the bar a sleazy bar’) and the focus on the fact that Sean Bell already had children 
before getting married. The coverage hence becomes ‘pro-police’ in her view, as the 
rhetoric used is ‘loaded’, depicting an overall partisan picture of Sean Bell’s life which 
is not in line with how mainstream people act, while pitting a mainstream ‘us’ against 
an immoral ‘them’ (‘Those people … they have the kids first, and then they get 
married’). This rigidly defined reality (‘that is a matter of opinion, people who frequent 
it may not think it is sleazy’) could bring the process of (judicial) debate into jeopardy 
(‘because in a way nice people don’t go to sleazy bars’, ‘innocent victims don’t have 
arrest records’). From a different vantage point, the coverage in the New York Times 
clashes with her own reality, which can be typified as rigidly defined in this sense too.  
Ms. Jones-Brown is also critical of the uninformed and sensationalist way the 
newspapers write about the shooting and on other topics, arguing that the media’s 
response to the public’s need for ‘sensationalism and stimulus’ filters out informed 
opinions (‘so anything that is reasoned and informed is boring’) while exacerbating the 
schism between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and inflaming the debate by focusing on emotions 
rather than on reason. As a result, the media not only gives a skewed view of the 
perceptions and interpretations held by police critics (‘my informed discussion never 
made it in the paper’), they also reinforce held prejudices and lump together groups of 
people (‘Unfortunately, the bad people do a bunch of extra stuff, which then the news 





Sean Bell’s representative King Downing, in line with Ms. Jones-Brown’s depiction of 
‘mainstream’ people, argues that the media are run by ‘major corporations’ which hold 
a rigid set of perceptions and interpretations (they are ‘more sympathetic with the ideas 
that the government has to control crime’, ‘they believe that it serves a useful 
distraction for corporate crime’), resulting in subtly skewed, biased coverage (‘they 
have their own biases which are not usually revealed’), which does not focus on the 
opinions of community leaders on a variety of topics (‘It is going to stack the deck 
against community leaders speaking whether it is about police shootings or not’).3 Yet 
while Mr. Downing focused throughout the interview on the negative, biased role of 
the media, he also believes that community leaders such as Charles Barron and Al 
Sharpton have the ability to shape the story, and thus set the media’s agenda.  
Mr. Downing also believes that the media do not conduct in-depth research 
(‘stenography school of journalism’), which results in skewed coverage that does not 
show the broader context of police shootings. However, he does not give any specific 
examples of such bad reporting. His statements reveal the rigidity of Mr. Downing’s 
own delimited reality and his disparagement of other realities, as well as of those 
entities holding or disseminating them.  
 
CHRIS DUNN 
New York Civil Liberties Union Director Chris Dunn distinguishes different 
background forces that interact when a public debate takes place on a controversial 
shooting such as that of Sean Bell. First, he argues that the newsworthy ‘high profile’ 
elements of the shooting result in press coverage.
4
 Yet the press is also immediately 
(and to a certain extent effectively) influenced by the Police Department ‘to report it in 
a particular way’ (‘they are very aggressive about giving things to reporters, if they 
think that it will help them, [and] they are very aggressive about trying to freeze out 
reporters, if they don’t want those reporters to have information’). The press hence 
only partly acts autonomously, by proactively focusing on the incident, while they are 
to a large extent tied to the Police Department, resulting in skewed coverage. Mr. Dunn 
also elaborates on the effects of this close relationship (‘I routinely have reporters 
telling me things that Browne has said off the record, not for attribution when they are 
reporting about this sort of controversy’) and how the media are successfully 
influenced by this (‘that information is more important than the sort of official 
statements they make’). 
 Yet the NYCLU director also points out that other stakeholders, including 
himself, have the ability to influence the press to report about police–community issues 
in a particular way (‘they get a pretty good play’, ‘we get a fair amount of play in the 
press’), but also to ‘generate’ new stories about the Police Department (‘getting the 
press to report things about the Police Department’). While the NYCLU is able to do 
so because of their history of factuality (‘we are the one group that is out there with 
facts and with a history’, ‘if we have the information, we have it right’) and their clout 
and presence (‘we are a pretty high profile organization’), Charles Barron and harsher 
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critics can manipulate the press because of their ‘extreme statements’. The autonomy 
of the press, in Mr. Dunn’s view, is thus limited, yet all the different forces at play do 
result in a more balanced press coverage. In fact, the New York Times also make 
decisions that the NYCLU leader does not completely agree with (‘there are stories 
that the Times run that we think don’t adequately reflect our perspective on 
something’; ‘There are lots of stories that the Times just does not run’). To Mr. Dunn, 
this ‘is a real problem’, a statement that also reveals the limits of his own reality that 
the New York Times should write extensively about the NYPD as the Police 
Department according to the NYCLU should be ‘a main target of reporting’. 
 
PAUL BROWNE 
The Police Department’s Deputy Commissioner of Public Information Paul Browne, 
who lays particular emphasis on how the New York Times reported the shooting and its 
aftermath, clearly does not label the newspaper as an intermediary, objective 
stakeholder, but as a police critic on a par with Al Sharpton and other police critics, as 
they share a similar agenda (‘He [Sharpton] is giving them what they want’), and a 
similar mindset (‘meeting of minds’).5 Apart from that, the New York Times (and also 
other media) ‘seek edges’ in their reporting, and ‘feed on controversy’. The shooting is 
hence magnified and polarized in the reporting, as the media aimed to ‘milk’ the Sean 
Bell shooting by focusing on its newsworthy ingredients, such as the wedding itself, 
‘the beauty of the fiancée’ (‘if she had been homely, there would not have been as big 
an interest’), and the death of Sean Bell.  
This results in a skewed representation of reality in regard to the shooting and 
its aftermath, but also in regard to the conduct of the NYPD in general, as ‘they filter 
out too much of the Police Department’s side of the story and tend to give greater 
space to their critics’ and moreover, give ‘repeated prominence to any failure or 
perceived failure by the Police Department’, while filtering out more positive news on 
the NYPD (‘stories that they do not cover’), and more conciliatory remarks made by 
the police commissioner (‘you don’t read about it’, ‘they are not interested in those 
kind of statements’). On this matter, Mr. Browne insists that Police Commissioner 
Kelly ‘expressed his concern for the family’ but that the New York Times did not pick it 
up, which, in Mr. Browne’s perception, ‘is a failure in their reporting’. Mr. Browne 
also argues that the newspaper gives a skewed perception of the racial aspects of the 
shooting (‘They didn’t want to say that one of the shooting officers was black, and they 
tried to kind of dance around that issue for a while’). The skewed presentation is often 
subtle, for example by giving ‘credibility to people on the street, who turn out later not 
to have witnessed anything’. 
His observations are only to a certain extent in line with the excerpts discussed 
in this research. While the wedding itself is one of the focal points of the New York 
Times, as can be deduced from the excerpts discussed in Part II, Chapters 1 to 5, the 
newspaper does not in particular focus on the beauty of Nicole Paultre Bell. Moreover, 
Mr. Browne — not only in this statement, but in the entire interview — ignores the ‘50 
shots’ fired by the implicated officers, a label not only used in the communication 
conveyed by police critics, but also by the press.
6
 Viewed as spontaneous discourse, 
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Mr. Browne’s statements suggest that the media’s ‘human interest’ attention does not 
fit within his rigidly defined reality concerning the magnitude of the shooting, while 
from a strategic PR perspective his statements can be seen as a way of downplaying the 
magnitudinal images conveyed in the press. In this context, the fact that the fiancée 
was beautiful tells less about the potential culpability of the officers, and that of the 
NYPD, than the label ‘50 shots’ does. Moreover, it tells less about the innocence of 
Sean Bell than the images inherent in the label ‘Sean Bell’ do. By focusing on these 
aspects, the spokesman in fact avoids the culpability issue during the interview. From a 
different vantage point, it can be argued that the media’s general human interest focus 
in regard to the Sean Bell shooting, which certainly drove the New York Times to a 
certain extent, has a negative effect on the perceptions held by Mr. Browne on the 
media. In his view, the newspaper and its (perceived) filtering, magnifying, polarizing, 
skewed, anti-police and agenda-setting reporting influenced (‘the result was’) its 
readers to believe ‘that the police were at fault’, and moreover, made them 
‘sympathetic to the casualties in that shooting’. Mr. Browne is thus subtly suggesting 
that the press is pitting the public against the police.  
 
MICHAEL PALLADINO 
The President of the New York City Detectives’ Endowment Association, Michael 
Palladino argues that the media are misinformed and influenced by biased critics 
(‘Sharpton […] and all these political cronies’), because the media act unprofessionally 
(‘nobody ever asked that question or did any investigating’), and are oblivious to the 
facts (‘the reporters did not want to listen’).7 The media’s intermediary role is thus 
misused by police critics (‘misinformation that is being disseminated and is being 
leaked out to the public’), resulting in skewed, untruthful reporting that has the 
potentiality to ‘turn the public against the police force’, while poisoning the justice 
system and jury pool.  
The reality presented by the newspapers at large is thus not accepted by the 
union leader and is not in line with the single version of the truth maintained by him. 
The coverage, according to Mr. Palladino, results in a negative effect on the process of 
debate both in the media and in the court of law, including potential victimization 
(‘justice system was being poisoned by very critical media’). The untruthful reporting, 
in his view, focused on the race of the officers and the question of whether they were 
intoxicated (‘the first thing they wrote about was: “It was another racially motivated 
police shooting’”). He does not mention the media’s focus on the number of shots fired 
by the implicated officers, which is in line with the public statements made by him and 
police defenders, which do not focus on ‘50 shots’, but rather on ‘it’s a matter of 
seconds’. The union leader stresses that he himself does hold and disseminate the truth 
on what happens (‘I spent about $50,000 to take the full page ads out to explain the 
facts to the public’), again demonstrating how the union leader holds a rigid conception 





Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) administrator Walter Liddy, while 
admitting that he is not an ‘avid Times reader’, argues that the New York Times is not 
always biased, but that it is misinformed and influenced by biased critics and their 
aggressive strategies (‘they will only get the side of the rabble-rousers like Sharpton or 
Barron’), while the police defenders show modesty towards the press (‘we don’t try a 
case […] on the newspaper pages’).8 Combined, consequently this results in skewed 
coverage (‘you are going to get a biased report, not a straight, fair, “I am just reporting 
both sides” type of deal’). These latter observations are only to a certain degree in line 
with this research: While the police critics’ approach indeed has an agenda-setting 
effect, partly due to the passionate oratory and the specific means of communication 
used, the police defenders equally have a profound role in the media, which is perhaps 
only slightly less profound than that of the police critics. Only the NYPD is less visible 
in the press due to its restricted communication outreach.  
 Mr. Liddy also maintains that the bias in the New York Times stems to a certain 
degree from the outlet itself. In his view, the messages conveyed by Mr. Sharpton 
serve the purposes of the media well, as he is ‘the go-to guy’ and ‘the easy quote’. 
Moreover, the newspaper is ‘left to center’, which results in ‘a slant on the story’ and 
‘a less than sympathetic portrayal of any incident that the police are involved in’. This 
interpretation can be viewed in two different ways. First, it shows how the perceived 
focus of the New York Times on police critics and their critique results in a negative 
perception of the PBA on this newspaper in general. From a different vantage point, it 
also shows that within the rigid ‘us-versus-them’ reality held by the PBA, all 
perceptions and interpretations that do not fit within this reality are denounced (‘anti-
police’), or ignored (‘not an avid reader of the Times’).  
 
GARY LEMITE 
New York Police Detective Gary Lemite is distrustful towards the media’s depiction of 
the Sean Bell shooting (‘I have no confidence in the media’), without being able to 
provide specific details on the coverage of the shooting (‘I am not sure. I really don’t 
know’), apart from the prolonged time span in which the incident was covered (‘Well, 
they definitely wanted to keep the story going.’).9 His perceptions are shaped by the 
way he interprets the media’s role within a historical framing of previous negative 
experiences with the media, who have a tendency to ‘inflame things’. In his view, the 
media hence act independently, rather than being influenced by other stakeholders. 
Their focus on sensationalism, in turn, results in Detective Lemite’s lack of confidence 
in the media (‘I take everything with a grain of salt really’, ‘I just don’t trust the 
media’), who report ‘definitely not in the police’s favor’.  
 The detective hence maintains that the coverage in the Sean Bell case is 
probably ‘anti-police’, as it aims to ‘keep the story going’, which ultimately causes 
‘escalation’ and ‘problems’ that are not favorable to the police. He strengthens this 
assertion by giving an example of his police work, which corresponds to the self-
centered interpretative framings discussed in Part II, Chapter 3, delineated by the 
concerns, feelings, thoughts and previous experiences of police officers. 
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 Overall, Detective Lemite holds a rigidly defined reality concerning the 
coverage of the police in the media, which is reflected in the use of dogmatic assertions 
and other decisive language (‘they are definitely not in the police’s favor. I don’t see it 
that way at all’).  
 
CHARLES TESTAGROSSA 
Contrary to the interviewed police defenders, the Queens Assistant District Attorney, 
Charles Testagrossa believes that the media are heavily influenced by the unions, 
rather than by police critics.
10
 In his view, the Daily News and the New York Post 
particularly acted as exponents of the role that the police defenders take in the debate 
(‘they are basically acting as spokesmen for the Detectives’ Endowment Association’), 
as he believes that both papers aim to disseminate this group’s perceptions, 
interpretations and positioning. According to the prosecutor, these newspapers have a 
fixed role in the debate, like other stakeholders do. This specific function, in turn, 
results in a rigidly delimited portrayal of reality (‘all so one-sided’). In addition, the 
prosecutor also denounces the communication methods of these two newspapers, such 
as the ad hominem attacks and the use of harsh language (‘they were really being very 
nasty, personally nasty’). As a result, the prosecutor shields himself from the reality 
presented by these newspapers (‘I was only reading the Times after a while because I 
was just getting very angry’).  
The prosecutor does distinguish between different media outlets, arguing that 
Michael Wilson was the only reporter who did not convey a skewed, rigidly delimited 
version of reality (‘Mike Wilson from the Times was really the only one who was 
trying to give a balanced account of what was going on’). The prosecutor perceives the 
role of the New York Times from a stakeholder-observant perspective, in which he does 
not see himself as part of either police critics or police defenders (‘When you are being 
criticized from both sides it means you must be doing something right’). From this 
perspective, he sees how the newspaper’s balanced reporting conflicts with the rigidly 





6.2. In retrospect: The perceptions of Michael Wilson 
While New York Times reporter Michael Wilson and the newspaper at large can be 
seen as intermediary stakeholders, the reporter still perceives the shooting in a certain 
way, as do all stakeholders involved in the Sean Bell case.
11
 His initial perceptions of 
the shooting show stark resemblances with those of the police critics, as he 
immediately focuses on the number of times Sean Bell was shot. However, he argues 
that this was not just the perception of police critics, but of New Yorkers at large, 
including himself. He is hence not merely an intermediary stakeholder that reports on 
how the symbolic number ‘50’ ‘just caught fire in town’, but is also part of that group 
(‘the whole city was focused on the “50 shots” and everyone wanted to know why this 
happened’). 
Mr. Wilson’s coverage of the shooting is thus driven by both the perceptions of 
the public and his own curiosity: The fact that the detectives fired ‘50 shots’, Sean Bell 
was unarmed, Detective Oliver fired more than ‘30 shots’, and that all of this caused 
inflammation in the city, made the shooting — in the words of Mr. Wilson — 
‘sensational’, and hence newsworthy too (‘when an unarmed man is shot 50 times on 
his wedding day … I mean that’s just a big story’). While Mr. Wilson does focus on 
the human interest side of the story, the wedding is not the first thing that comes to 
mind when he is talking about the case; instead it is the complexities of the shooting 
and the fact that Sean Bell was shot 50 times (‘what happened that night … did the 
detectives identify themselves … how did Sean Bell react’).  
Mr. Wilson’s perception of the shooting changes along the lines of the 
perceived transitory perceptions held by the general public (‘now the trial is over […] 
we’ve learnt many things about what happened that night at the trial’; ‘We learnt the 
officers’ side of the story’; ‘We learnt Sean Bell was extremely intoxicated’). He 
makes an indirect distinction between the general public and police critics for that 
matter, as the anger of the latter group in fact increased after the acquittals of the 
implicated officers. These transitory perceptions result from the interpretative framing 
constructed by the reporter, by which the shooting is interpreted as a conundrum and a 
deviation from usual police behavior. The reporter’s perceptions and interpretations are 
hence not necessarily anti-police. In fact, he does show understanding for the 
interpretative framing of the police (‘if you’re not a police officer it is hard to imagine 
50 shots’). 
Still, it is a fact that the New York Times quoted police critics, especially Mr. 
Sharpton, more than Police Commissioner Kelly after the Sean Bell shooting. In 
response to questions on this, Mr. Wilson argues that Al Sharpton, to a certain extent, 
sets the agenda for the New York Times (‘let’s just go find Sharpton ’cause he’s got 
something to say about this’). In fact, he sets the agenda more than the police 
commissioner does, for the mere reason that he ‘can be very vocal’ while the 
commissioner ‘might not be’. By saying this, the reporter shows that he does not set an 
‘anti-police’ agenda himself by intentionally ‘ignoring’ statements made by the police 
commissioner, as Mr. Browne claims the New York Times is doing. In fact, if the police 




 The reporter expounds on this specific point, when asked about why the 
newspaper did not print an ‘expression of sympathy’ by the police commissioner in the 
days after the shooting, arguing that due to the specific newsworthy aspects of the case, 
and the function of the New York Times as an intermediary news provider, the focus of 
the story is on the number of shots fired, rather than on ‘whether the police 
commissioner feels bad about what happened’. However, the reporter argues that he 
would not have purposely excluded such an expression of sympathy either (‘most of 
what he said got into the paper’). Whereas this response does not give insight into 
whether or not the police commissioner actually made an expression of sympathy, it 
does suggest that such an expression was not the focal point of the NYPD’s 
communication, as it would then have been included in its coverage.  
During the interview, Mr. Wilson also responds to some of the criticism 
conveyed by other interviewees, which, in his view, is partly caused by the overall 
negative stance towards the media (‘No one says “Oh, I really like the way the media 
handles me”’), and by the rigidity of the interviewees’ positioning, in which not only 
the facts that clash with the rigidly defined reality held by the interviewees are 
denounced, but also the sender of these facts (‘even though the same newspaper might 
have printed their belief too’). The reporter maintains that the newspaper’s reporting is 
not driven by any pro- or anti-police sentiments, but by newsworthy ‘facts’ (‘I don’t 
remember the New York Times saying that club was sleazy, but I do know that it is 
sleazy’, ‘If I was shot 50 times, they would find out things about me’). However, his 
statements do show that the newspaper magnifies elements that are sensational, ranging 
from ‘50 shots’ to the fact that the club is sleazy (‘it was to tell the readers “Hey here’s 
what this club looks like”’), which results in an overall skewed focus on sensationalist 





6.3 Conclusions and outlook 
The first part of this chapter has shown that, while all interviewed stakeholders believe 
that the media play an important role in the public debate, there is a difference in how 
they perceive the nature of this role. Whereas some see the media essentially as an 
independent entity that effectively sets its own agenda, others — from both sides of the 
debating arena — argue that the media’s agenda is set by either those critical of the 
police or the police themselves, the latter mostly depending on the stakeholder group to 
which the interviewee belongs. The first scenario, i.e. a position/role that is relatively 
‘independent from other stakeholders’, does not entail overall objectivity, as the media 
are still shaped by their own prejudices (either ‘mainstream’, ‘corporate’ or ‘anti-
police’, depending on the vantage point) and therefore have their own agenda. In 
addition, objective media reporting is also constrained by a lack of professionalism, 
reporting skills and capacity, according to some interviewees. Moreover, and more 
importantly, most interviewees argue that ‘independent’ media are driven by 
sensationalism, extremities, and controversy, and hence are not interested in informed 
opinions and background information. From a more positive perspective, the media 
also listen best to organizations with credibility and clout, although this is only brought 
up by Mr. Dunn, who is mainly referring to the credibility and clout of his own 
organization. Others do not focus on this aspect, or even refute the fact that the media 
pay attention to credibility.  
In the second scenario, the media are manipulated by aggressive techniques 
such as behind-the-scenes strategies like the exclusion of journalists by the NYPD, the 
presentation of false or incriminating information, and behind-the-scenes relationship-
building with friendly commentary journalists. In addition, the media are also 
manipulated by more visible strategies such as the deliberately harsh, yet ‘easily 
quotable’ rhetoric used by some police critics. Some of these influences are also to the 
advantage of the media, which shows the interdependent relationship between the two.  
While it would appear that all these different forces — originating from both 
sides of the debating arena — must result in an overall balanced press coverage, this is 
only mentioned by Mr. Dunn and by Mr. Testagrossa (the latter merely referring to the 
New York Times). Conversely, regardless of which role they ascribe to the media, all 
interviewed stakeholders see the media as an opposing ‘them’ in the debate, as they, in 
their view, report inaccurately, subjectively, and either too infrequently and 
superficially or too frequently and aggressively about police conduct issues, while 
exacerbating contrasts such as the schism between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In fact, in their 
view, it is the role taken by the media that results in such reporting, and in coverage 
that reflects a skewed, rigidly delimited, but also polarized reality held by either those 
that work for the media, or by those manipulating the media. On all occasions, this 
perceived reality clashes to a certain extent with that of the interviewed stakeholders, 
and, in their opinion, portrays their stakeholder group in an unfavorable way.  
All of the assertions above apply to the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting, 
according to the interviewees. Police critics, and to a certain extent Mr. Testagrossa as 
well, believe that the media reported in favor of the police by portraying Sean Bell, the 
other victims, and the police critics at large in a negative way by using loaded language 
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and by reinforcing prejudices, while preferring sensationalism/emotions over informed 
opinions. Moreover, they accuse the media of not adequately focusing on the 
misconduct of the officers and the handling of the case by the NYPD and the mayor. 
The NYPD and the police defenders, conversely, maintain that the reporting on the 
Sean Bell shooting was mainly anti-police, as the shooting is magnified and polarized 
by the media, who also inaccurately reported on aspects of the shooting such as race, 
while incriminating the implicated police officers and portraying the NYPD at large in 
a subjective, polarizing and ‘cold’ way. Moreover, like the police critics, they also 
believe the media preferred sensationalism over informed opinions in their portrayal of 
the Sean Bell shooting. 
Both the interviewed police critics and police defenders argue that the media 
coverage is detrimental to their own positioning, especially their desired outcome of 
debate (not bringing ‘justice’, ‘fairness’ or ‘appropriateness’), while affecting both the 
process of debate in the public and in court in a negative way. Whereas police critics 
maintain that prejudices are reinforced and people are turned against the victims, 
ultimately leading to victimization, police defenders and the NYPD maintain the exact 
opposite. It is striking that some of the effects caused by the media are mentioned by 
interviewees from both sides of the debating arena, such as inflammation, escalation, 
simplification, and an exacerbation of emotions, prejudices and an ‘us-versus-them’ 
schism. On a personal level, the reporting results in negative perceptions and a lack of 
confidence in the media, while interviewees literally shield themselves from the 
realities presented in the coverage.  
These negative perceptions are to a certain extent the result of the rigidly 
defined reality held by the interviewees: While they dismiss perceptions and 
interpretations in the media that are not in line with their own, they consider those 
perceptions and interpretations they agree with to be the truth. The different 
stakeholders hence almost automatically label the media as ‘them’, although some 
interviewees could not even bring up specific examples of negative reporting. In a 
positive sense, the media, and in particular the New York Times, conveyed a balanced 
picture of the shooting, as the coverage comprised elements of the different truths on 
the event, which stakeholders who hold a rigid conception of reality protest against.  
However, the overlap between some of the perceptions discussed in this 
chapter, not only between the different interviewees, but also with the analysis of Mr. 
Wilson’s interview responses, revealed more of the specific role played by the 
media/the New York Times in the debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting. More 
specifically, the analysis of divergent interview responses suggests that the media’s 
news- and controversy-driven reality (including a focus on controversial issues of race) 
results in coverage that magnifies the controversy and human interest level of the 
shooting, while exacerbating emotions and contrasts between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the 
written articles and consequently also in the public debate.  
The New York Times does not purposely take sides in its day-to-day reporting. 
The analysis of Mr. Wilson’s interview responses particularly has shown that this 
desired outcome of debate is both self-centered and public-centered, i.e. ‘to find and 
report the facts’, which in itself is not anti- or pro-police, as his perceptions are 
transitory, in contrast to the static perceptions conveyed by both police critics and 
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police defenders. However, the ‘unlimited space’ given to unusual police conduct, such 
as the Sean Bell shooting, results in a skewed pattern of negative ‘unusual’ NYPD 
news taking precedence over normal conduct, while also exacerbating unusual/negative 
images of both the NYPD and others involved in such incidents, ranging from a focus 
on ‘50 shots’, to the background of the victims. The analysis has also shown how Mr. 
Wilson’s coverage to a certain extent is shaped by both those who explicitly seek 
media attention, such as Mr. Sharpton and Mr. Barron, and those who have the facts on 
the shooting (the NYPD) but also by the specific newsworthy, sensationalist, human-
interest character of the event, as this type of information is assumed to be what the 
New York Times’ readers prefer to read.  
 The New York Times quotes analyzed in this research hence do not reflect the 
totality of communication, but rather the stakeholders’ communication focus, 
combined with the newspapers focus on newsworthy, unusual, human interest, and at 
times even sensationalist news. These two forces explain the difference in volume 
between Mr. Sharpton’s statements and that of Police Commissioner Kelly, while also 
giving insight into the fact that the latter is not quoted as offering an ‘expression of 
sympathy’ in the newspaper, contrary to the mayor, who specifically and consistently 
practiced conciliatory communication throughout the aftermath of the shooting and is 
quoted as doing so. 
 
                                                          
1 Charles Barron, interview by author, October 5, 2009. 
2 Delores Jones-Brown, interview by author, October 6, 2009. 
3 King Downing, interview by author, October 9, 2009. 
4 Chris Dunn, interview by author, October 20, 2009. 
5 Paul Browne, interview by author, October 30, 2009. 
6 Mr. Browne only confirmed that ‘50 shots’ was a focal point in the media when I asked him about it, but 
then immediately moved on to a different topic. He did not bring it up proactively. 
7 Michael Palladino, interview by author, October 21, 2009. 
8 Walter Liddy and Joseph Mancini, interview by author, October 15, 2009. 
9 Gary Lemite, interview by author, October 15, 2009. 
10 Charles Testagrossa, interview by author, October 19, 2009. 
11 Michael Wilson, interview by author, October 13, 2009. 
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Chapter 7: The dynamics of communication —  
Cross-stakeholder appraisals 
 
This chapter examines how the communication per stakeholder group is appraised by 
the other stakeholders involved in the Sean Bell debate. As in Chapter 6, these cross-
stakeholder appraisals have been investigated through the interviews held with relevant 
stakeholders (see the introduction to Part II for an overview). 
The analysis of the interviews has been structured along four reoccurring focal 
points, i.e. the perceived role taken by stakeholders; their communication in general; 
their specific communication after the Sean Bell shooting; and the effects of this 
communication. In addition to these four themes, the discussion at times also focuses 
on how interviewees believe that communication can be improved, and on the 
perceived restrictions of the communication of certain stakeholders, such as that of the 
NYPD. Throughout the analysis, the interviewees’ perceptions of the communication 
of other stakeholders are compared to the earlier analysis of perceptions, interpretations 
and positioning expressed in the stakeholders’ communication. In the concise 
presentation of the analysis in this chapter, opinions shared by some or most of the 
interviewees are not always attributed to individual interviewees. This information can 
be accessed in the full analysis in the appendix at http://irs.ub.rug.nl/data/2. 
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7.1 Interviewees’ appraisals of police critics 
The communication practiced by police critics after the Sean Bell shooting is a topic of 
discussion not only in this research, but also in the public debate. Police defenders 
especially, who see the conduct of police critics as part of a broader pattern of unfair 
criticism and unfair methods of, and motives for, conveying this criticism, convey their 
negative perceptions and interpretations of police critics frequently and profoundly 
through an array of media outlets, including the New York Times. These perceptions, 
discussed in Part II, Chapter 3, can also be traced in the way the stakeholders appraise 
police critics during the interviews.  
When talking about the debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting, almost 
all interviewed stakeholders speak of a fixed (‘everybody plays a role’), predictable 
(‘the usual suspects round up’), calculated (‘a window of opportunity’, ‘there is an 
agenda’), agenda-setting (‘get attention in the media’, ‘they take control of the media 
machine’), catalytic (‘The whole thing now starts to snowball’) role taken by those 
critical of the police, not only in the Sean Bell shooting, but in police conduct debates 
in general. The interviewed police defenders especially comment at length on the 
nature of this role. They consider this role to be self-assigned (‘he’s parlayed this, his 
brand … into Al Sharpton’), and interdependent with that of Mayor Bloomberg (‘the 
agitators, they don’t need to create their own issue, they just quote Mayor Bloomberg’) 
and the press (‘He is the ‘easy quote’, ‘they give this man legitimacy that he has never 
earned’). This role is also interdependent with that of the NYPD (‘at some level there is 
a mutual need there’) as well as that of police defenders, as Mr. Liddy indirectly 
reveals in an anecdote that shows how Al Sharpton’s concocted positioning and 
resulting harsh communication seems to emanate from a mutual agreement between 
the unions and Mr. Sharpton himself (‘This is not personal, this is business’).1 
While the casting for this specific role changes over time, the nature of the role 
stays practically unchanged, as shown by Mr. Liddy’s characterization of Mr. 
Sharpton: ‘He used to help Jesse Jackson who is the original huckster-in-chief, he 
served Jesse and he has made himself’. The interviewed stakeholders do not 
unanimously agree on who currently takes this role. While Mr. Barron and particularly 
Mr. Sharpton are mentioned by most interviewees (‘So I mention him, because he is 
the one who comes to mind. He is the one I guess who is usually in the forefront at this 
point in time’), some point out that Mr. Sharpton has a different role now than in the 
past (‘Sharpton is not the person he was 10 years ago’, ‘Sharpton at the very least [is] 
not being as vocal a critic as he has been for a long time’). Moreover, the interviewees 
see differences between the roles taken by Mr. Sharpton and Mr. Barron, the latter 
being more of an outsider (‘So he has made himself an outsider, a crusader’) and the 
former more of an agenda-setter (‘let’s just go find Sharpton because he’s got 
something to say about this’). The interviewees’ consistent focus on both is 
remarkable, though. Most interviewees who do not fall under the label ‘police critics’ 
agree that the role taken by both police critics is driven by a fixed agenda, comprising 
(unwarranted) anti-police sentiments (‘historically … everything he [Sharpton] does is 
anti-cop’) as well as broader frustrations with government and race relations. Mr. 
Testagrossa, speaking from a stakeholder-observant perspective: ‘They just take 
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incidents like this and view them in terms of a larger history of relations between the 
Police Department and government and the minority community and they just look at it 
as … “Well, here it goes again, here it is again”’.2 Some argue that the role is also 
driven by unfair and opportunistic objectives, ranging from political aspirations 
(‘seeking elective office’) to the making of money (‘he only gets involved if there is a 
dollar to be made’, ‘stuffing their pockets with the taxpayers’ money’).  
Interviewees believe that the resulting communication is not geared to 
solution-building and has a reflexively biased, extreme and emotions-driven character, 
a predictable script (‘The first thing that certain interest groups look for is …’) 
focusing selectively on controversial police wrongdoings (‘New York City cops were 
being painted with a very broad brush as “racist murderers”’, ‘trying to denigrate the 
cops’) and the patterns of police misconduct and racial injustice, while giving a one-
sided, rigid (and according to some) misleading account of the reality as to what 
occurred, who is responsible, and what are the solutions. Mr. Palladino, in particular, 
expounds on this:  
 
“I tell you what shapes up. The first thing that certain interest groups look for is ‘Can 
we claim, whether it is or it isn’t, can we claim that this is a racially motivated police 
shooting?’ It’s the first thing. The first thing. And the usual suspects round up. People 
like Sharpton, this other guy here, the city councilman, Barron. What develops is this 
swell of misinformation; it has nothing to do with the facts or what really occurred. It 
is almost like they say: ‘Let’s not get the facts in the way of what we really want to 
say.’ All of a sudden it becomes a forum for opportunists to get their message out, 
when sometimes their messages and the facts don’t coincide.”3 
 
Police critics’ means of communication are also believed to be predictable. They 
include rash judgment (‘conclusions are drawn right away’), the use of harsh, 
inflammatory, loud and at times even threatening rhetoric (‘throwing gasoline on a 
situation’), the deliberate preservation of racial tensions, uncooperative/obstreperous 
attitudes both to the (judicial) process of debate (such as the preference for media 
communication over face-to-face communication) and to the reality held by the NYPD, 
the agenda-setting/manipulation of the media, distortion including misleading 
assertions/racial claims (‘racist, drunk, out of control’), the latching on to issues (‘they 
don’t need to create their own issue, they just quote Mayor Bloomberg’), the lumping 
together of incidents (‘we were lumped into that fire’), the exacerbation of (racial) 
contrasts and the ‘us-versus-them’ schism (‘it is this appealed notion of white racist 
cop, black victim’), simplification/generalization, and deliberate disregard of 
established processes/deliberate making of false accusations (‘even if they know that’s 
the fact, they will try to exploit that and make it look like we are trying to cover up 
stuff’). Mr. Browne observes: ‘I think that our critics try to keep the story as simple as 
possible. Keep it with the police as the complete wrong-doers and the people that they 
are speaking on behalf of as completely faultless’.4 
The assertions above apply to the public debate following the Sean Bell 
shooting, according to the interviewed stakeholders, despite the fact that the 
interviewees focus on the historical pattern rather than on the Sean Bell shooting itself, 
as shown by Mr. Liddy in his characterization of Mr. Sharpton: ‘Al Sharpton cut his 
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teeth on Tawana Brawley. […] All proven lies, the whole case is made up, and one of 
the attorneys got disbarred. Sharpton never paid, they lost the civil law suit, and they 
lost the libel suit, and they never paid. He was involved in an incident on 125
th
 Street. 
It was a clothing company called Freddy’s and it was run by a white gentleman and 
they had a boycott at the store and he [Mr. Sharpton] was making fiery speeches up on 
125
th
 Street about white interlopers and what happens … people get excited and 
somebody set the store on fire and killed several employees, all minority employees. 
So Sharpton’s reputation should have been shredded after those two incidents. I’m 
talking 10, 15 almost 20 years ago probably […] and here he is you know, he is a 
vulture when it comes to things like this … a vulture’. The use of passionate oratory 
with harsh, inflammatory rhetoric and the focus on the historical interpretative framing 
of police misconduct and racial injustice are linked especially to the Sean Bell 
shooting. However, not all interviewees agree with this. Mr. Testagrossa, Mr. Browne 
and Mr. Dunn believe that Mr. Sharpton’s conduct during the aftermath of the Sean 
Bell shooting deviated from the historical pattern described above. Mr. Testagrossa 
points out: ‘In this case I thought that Rev. Sharpton was more conservative in his 
remarks than the police union officials were, which is kind of an odd situation because 
most people usually look at it the other way around’. 
The communication described above, in turn, affects the process of debate in 
several ways. Interviewed stakeholders argue that police critics’ communication — 
particularly the strategic means used — can result in inflammation, mistrust, hostility, 
alienation and even violence towards the NYPD (and to a lesser extent the DA’s 
office), exacerbation of the schism between police and victims/community, police 
victimization (‘They [the police] are fearful of being criticized or ridiculed for the 
work they are doing’), retaliation (‘I had to go on a little bit of an attack on Sharpton, 
and people like Barron … because if you recall what Barron was saying’), polarization 
(‘creating racial tension in the city’, ‘them–us type of an attitude’), the deterioration of 
the safety and conduct of the police (‘So it is very dangerous for these cops […] they 
are going to hesitate’), and mutual communication inaction: While Mr. Dunn, for 
example, does not communicate directly with Mr. Browne (‘Chris Dunn doesn’t call 
me up’), the latter does not communicate with Mr. Dunn either. Overall, the 
communication results in a jeopardizing of the judicial processes (‘They are poisoning 
the jury pool’), and a hampering of the public debate (‘causing the public to get very 
angry’), and the day-to-day encounters between police and community (‘bound to 
undermine community relations’). 
More positive effects mentioned by the interviewees include the mobilization 
of police critics and the setting of the agendas of both the media and the NYPD. Mr. 
Dunn observes that ‘the paper is not going to offer that criticism by itself, it has got to 
have someone to give voice to that’ and ‘by virtue of having the so-called police critics 
you have a community of people who are raising issues that the police were never 
going to raise’.5 Not all interviewed stakeholders view these effects as positive; In 
particular Messrs. Palladino, Mancini, and Liddy disagree. While police critics’ 
communication could result in some policy changes, no interviewee believes that the 
police critics’ communication will change the (rigid) mindset of the group defined in 
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this research as police defenders. Moreover, such policy changes are rarely mentioned 
by the interviewees. 
The interviews also reveal some immediate effects of the police critics’ 
communication. More specifically, this communication can lead to the reinforcement/ 
exacerbation of the perceptions held on police critics, their agenda, the predictability of 
communication, the strategic means used and their lack of knowledge. As a part of this, 
most interviewees who do not fall under the label ‘police critics’ mention that they 
question the credibility of police critics (‘you don’t give Sharpton another thought’) 
and their messages (‘He doesn’t mean a word he says’). Other immediate effects 
include the inability/unwillingness to understand the content of the messages (‘It 
almost sounds like poetry. And eh, what does it all mean? I don’t really know’), anger 
towards police critics, mockery, perceived amplification of the harshness of rhetoric 
(‘because if you recall what Barron was saying, cops blood would eh … cops bleed too 
and their blood was going to roll’), and the direct polarization of the positioning of 
different stakeholders. This polarization includes direct retaliations (in particular by the 
union representatives) as well as simplification/generalization and consequential 
disapproval of both critic and criticism. For example, the interviewed union 
representatives (both DEA and PBA) denounce all of the communication practiced by 
police critics by mainly focusing on just two of them, i.e. Al Sharpton and Charles 
Barron (unless explicitly prompted to comment on others), and, in addition, by 
focusing on just a portion of the criticism conveyed by these protagonists. The 
polarization also includes deflective strategies such as ‘the lauding of 
personal/organizational conduct’ by the NYPD. Mr. Browne, for example, responds to 
some of the police critics’ criticism during the interview by saying: ‘Actually the 
Police Department more than any other city agency and more than any police 
department in America is more diverse and I guarantee it is more diverse than any 
police department in the world’. Similarly, police defenders respond with emotional 
blackmail/victimization and communication of their self-centered reality. Mr. Palladino 
responds to some of the criticism by saying: ‘It is very dangerous for these cops to feel 
like it is a “them–us” … and then they are going to hesitate.’ Overall this leads to 
predictability and repetition, but also exacerbation of the NYPD’s and the police 
defenders’ communication. There are also positive immediate effects: recent 
communication by the Rev. Sharpton receives Mr. Testagrossa’s more positive 
appraisal.  
Thus, according to most interviewees who do not fall under the label ‘police 
critics’, the role taken by police critics and the communication resulting from this is 
not desirable. Conversely, different communication aspects, such as use of fair means 
of communication, a coalition-oriented, problem-solving approach, a role that is not 
‘agenda-driven’ or at least more in line with the positioning of the mayor or the police 
commissioner, and messages that are less harsh and predictably one-sided lead to better 
perceptions, a higher perceived credibility, and to a certain extent to 
approval/acceptation of messages. For example, speaking about how he disapproved of 
the role taken by William Thompson, city comptroller at the time, Mr. Palladino 
observes: ‘I expect a politician at that magnitude to say: There should be calm in the 
city, let’s not rush to judgment, we have a great criminal justice system, let’s let the 
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justice system take over, and we trust the justice system’. Detective Lemite similarly 
points out: ‘First slow down in doing an investigation and drawing conclusions, and 
when things don’t go your way, and there is no money to be made, then maybe it is 
also time to speak up. […] You only hear from Sharpton and Jessie Jackson when they 
are looking to — usually — beat up the police. But there is [sic] a lot of things going 
on, and what are they doing to stop all this violence?’6 Moreover, interviewees point 
out that such communications improve the relationship between police critics, police 
defenders, and the NYPD. State Senator Malcolm Smith and to a lesser extent also Mr. 
Sharpton are hence praised by many interviewees, the latter merely in reference to 
more recent communication efforts, including the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting.  
 Of course, the perceptions conveyed by the other interviewees are not merely a 
result of police critics’ communication. Instead, these perceptions are also shaped by 
the interviewees’ own positioning. The police defenders hence are more critical than 
the more stakeholder-observant, coalition-oriented interviewees such as Mr. 
Testagrossa, Mr. Wilson and Ms. Ventura. As confided by Messrs. Liddy and Mancini, 
police defenders in fact benefit from the calculated hostile relationship too. This 
positioning could also explain the discrepancy in the way Mr. Sharpton and the 
NYCLU are viewed by the NYPD and the police defenders (although interviewees 
bring up different reasons). Mr. Dunn observes: ‘[Mr. Sharpton] is walking both sides 
of the street with the department. I think he is generally friendly with Commissioner 
Kelly and I think that at some level there is a mutual need there because Sharpton, 
unlike what he was like 10 years ago or 15 years ago, he is now operating in a world 
where having the kind of legitimacy, of having a relationship with the police 
commissioner is important to him. And Kelly certainly benefits from having Sharpton 
at the very least not being as vocal a critic as he has been for a long time’.  
The communication characteristics mentioned by interviewees and the direct 
effect this communication has on them correspond to great extent with the discussed 
perceptions, interpretations and positioning of these stakeholders in this research, 
especially that of police defenders, who see the conduct of police critics as part of a 




7.2 Interviewees’ appraisals of the NYPD 
Interviewees from both sides of the debating arena talk extensively about the NYPD’s 
role and communication, as well as the effects this communication has on an array of 
broader processes. In addition, the interviewees — from a more stakeholder-observant 
perspective — give new insight into the communication restrictions that the NYPD has 
to deal with, discussed in Part II, Chapter 2. Some interviewees, in particular Mr. 
Barron, see the NYPD and police defenders as one, and hence hardly distinguish 
between these two different stakeholders.  
While the characterization of the NYPD’s communication is more diverse than 
that of police critics, there are certainly common characteristics in the answers given 
by interviewees. First of all, it is salient how most interviewees — either explicitly or 
implicitly — view the role taken by the NYPD in public debates as fixed and 
predictable (‘a reflex action’, ‘their first impulse’, ‘their instinct is that’), similar to the 
static portrayal of police critics in the previous section. Yet while the latter group — 
according to these interviewees — manifests itself reflexively as an anti-police 
aggressor, the NYPD is conversely mostly viewed as reflexively and rigidly pro-police 
and hence acts highly defensively, while being indifferent to the needs of other 
stakeholders. Mr. Dunn argues: ‘Their impulse is: “they’ve done nothing wrong”’ and 
‘Their first impulse is not to reach out and start talking to communities’. More harshly, 
Mr. Barron observes: ‘They automatically protect the police and they automatically 
look out for number 1: Them’.7 This characterization is shared by a number of 
interviewees from both sides of the debating arena, hence also by some police 
defenders. Mr. Liddy: ‘[Mr. Browne] will not sit down for an interview or for a profile 
of describing Ray Kelly and his career unless he knows before you sit down that it is 
going to be glowing, that it is going to be totally basically making Ray Kelly the 
greatest crime fighter since Batman, you know what I mean? So Paul Browne gets the 
marching orders from Ray Kelly and that is why Paul Browne either doesn’t say 
anything or says it as blandly as possible. Nobody does anything in that building 
without it coming directly from Kelly’. Not all interviewees agree with this portrayal: 
Mr. Palladino and Detective Lemite believe that the NYPD performs a dualistic role 
geared towards its direct constituency but also to the outside world, and thus also takes 
this role in the public debate (‘the Police Department is playing a balancing act’), i.e. 
that of a representative of the Police Department for the entire city (‘it is paramount 
that the public have confidence in their police force’). Others do point out the existence 
of such a role, but present it as a desired role rather than a current one, as in their view 
the NYPD right now positions itself rigidly as pro-police. Mr. Barron: ‘He is not there 
just to represent police. That is a poor communication. He is there to represent the 
people of New York City, the eight million residents of New York City’.  
Interviewees point out that the role taken by the NYPD does not stand on its 
own, but is interrelated with the broader interactions between stakeholders in the 
debating arena. Some specifically point out that the role of the NYPD is linked to that 
of the police defenders and media, each of the different entities playing its part in 
defending the conduct of the officers. Mr. Palladino: ‘So the NYPD has, I guess, a role 
and its responsibility, and we have our role and responsibility’. Mr. Testagrossa: ‘And 
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then you had other things coming out kind of … not into official channels, but making 
their way into newspapers about criminal histories of the victims’.  
According to a number of interviewees, the roles taken by Police 
Commissioner Kelly and Mr. Browne fit within the broader defensive role, although 
some believe that the positioning taken by Mr. Kelly deviates from this pattern (‘I 
found that rather refreshing’, ‘an improvement over the immediate past 
commissioners’), as they believe he actively responds to the community, thus 
acknowledging the existence of their held reality concerning issues and their desired 
outcome of debate. Ms. Jones-Brown, for example, points out that ‘He is responsive in 
that kind of way’, ‘not to incite things further than they were already volatile’.8 
Conversely, those interviewees discussing the role of Mr. Browne unanimously agree 
that he is pro-police, highly defensive (‘he is gonna protect the police reflexively’), and 
indifferent to the needs of the community. Ms. Jones-Brown: ‘he says things that insult 
the intelligence of the New York people, particularly the minority community’. These 
stakeholders’ appraisals are to a great extent in line with the nondescript, evasive, and 
cautious character of most of the perceptions conveyed by the NYPD, as discussed 
previously. 
A number of interviewees argue that the NYPD’s role is not driven by fairness 
(‘they are not interested in fairness, they are interested in defending themselves’), but 
instead is rooted in political motives (‘political animal’), a hypersensitivity to criticism 
(‘essentially any criticism [towards] the Police Department can be couched as kind of 
helping the bad guys’), a self-centered facts-driven reality (‘they are good at getting 
their side out’, ‘It is a very self-serving statement’, ‘an unwillingness to take sides 
publicly’), and a black-and-white perspective, i.e. the ‘us-versus-them’ schism. Mr. 
Dunn: ‘Their instinct is that everyone else are the bad guys. They are the good guys. It 
is a very black-and-white sort of perspective’. From a different vantage point, the role 
is shaped by certain communication restrictions, some of which are enforced by other 
stakeholders, such as unions, lawyers and police officers, but also by the rigid 
positioning of police critics. Ms. Jones-Brown observes: ‘When it comes across as too 
sympathetic to the family, the 52,000 people who work for him are going to be pissed, 
or at least some of them’, and ‘Good attorneys, they can take anything that you say, 
[also] “I feel sorry for the family” and [turn it against you]’. For these reasons, the role 
taken by the NYPD is pessimistically accepted by some as an incontrovertible fact. In 
turn, interviewees frequently base the existence of this role on the historical framing of 
typical and reflexively defensive responses. Mr. Testagrossa: ‘The Police Department, 
usually through the police commissioner, or his spokesman, will make statements that 
will defend the conduct of the police officers initially and that is really typical I think’. 
Those who maintain that the NYPD takes a defensive role in the debate 
consequently argue that the resulting communication is predictable, selectively 
cautious (‘there is a certain amount of measured caution that is included in the 
statements of the department’) restricted (‘never communicates’, ‘they’re secretive’) , 
uninformative (‘They are not going to say anything — it is going to be a script’, ‘a 
vague but not an informative answer’), self-centered (‘paint a picture that makes them 
look good and makes the people who got shot look bad’), non-committal, especially in 
regard to culpability (‘because he never says […] “If my officers are wrong they will 
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be punished to the fullest extent of the law”’), process-focused (‘say that it is under 
investigation and just leave it’), non-empathetic (‘not big in empathy’), defensive and 
even unreliable. Mr. Dunn: ‘I think that Paul Browne oftentimes says things that he 
knows are not true and I think that when they give out information that there is a 
reason to believe that it is not true’. According to some interviewees, the statements 
made by the NYPD paint a polarized picture of the NYPD on the one side and those 
critical of the police, or the victims of police shootings, on the other. Only some of the 
interviewees stress that the department communicates openly, rapidly, honestly and 
diplomatically. All believe that the communication is facts-driven, yet this does not 
always result in factual communication.  
A number of the interviewees who believe that the NYPD is defensive, 
especially police critics, consider such communication insufficient, unhelpful, weak, 
incomprehensible and unnecessary. In response to the question on how to characterize 
Police Commissioner Kelly’s communication after the Sean Bell shooting, Mr. Barron 
said: ‘Terribly, he never communicates. First, he’ll either say that it is under 
investigation and just leave it. That is not enough; we know that it is under 
investigation, we don’t need you [Police Commissioner Kelly] to tell us that’. A 
number of interviewees point out that the communication should be more informative 
and more committal, while it should reflect the desired outcome of debate of the 
community, as well as their held interpretative framing on the pattern of police 
misconduct and racial injustice. Mr. Barron: ‘We have to get a commissioner that is 
gonna say that they will leave no stone unturned in getting to the justice question, that 
“while I am not gonna jump the gun and convict anybody before they have a trial, that 
under my watch I will not tolerate any form of police misconduct, brutality, excessive 
use of force”’. Others approve of or understand the NYPD’s defensive communication, 
as it is in line with their objectives and reality, or they understand the restrictive 
boundaries and the difference between how communication is intended and how it 
comes across. 
 The NYPD’s response to the Sean Bell shooting is, according to most 
interviewees, in line with the way the department usually communicates. While some 
believe that the commissioner communicated candidly, honestly and rapidly, others 
believe that he did the opposite. Either way, it is striking how interviewees often can’t 
bring up examples of such communication. In other words, they are intuitively 
referring to their interpretation of the role usually taken by the department, while 
maintaining that their perceptions of the Sean Bell shooting are in line with this 
interpretation, without actually knowing any such examples. Mr. Wilson recalls: ‘I 
don’t remember that day of course, but I worked with that office long enough to know. 
I’m sure that’s what happened’.9 Mr. Downing: ‘I can’t name specific examples but 
there is a certain amount of measured caution that is included in the statements of the 
department’.10 When discussing the statements made by Mr. Kelly and Mr. Browne 
after the Sean Bell shooting, most agree that the communication is non-committal and 
self-centered. While some disapprove of these characteristics, others again understand 
the restrictions, and hence appreciate what was said, especially by Police 
Commissioner Kelly, or approve of the communication, especially when it is in line 
with their desired process of debate.  
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What is striking is how a number of interviewees, mainly police critics, believe 
that the NYPD’s actions, such as the fourth man investigation and the sobriety test 
measures, are correlated to the way the department communicates (‘you get nothing, 
and then the police commissioner says nothing’). More specifically, the actions taken 
by the Police Department taint the perception of their communication in general and 
vice versa. Moreover, some of the behind-the-scenes strategies mentioned by critics, 
such as the sharing of criminal records, the exclusion of unfavorable reporters, but also 
self-victimization (‘essentially any criticism [towards] the Police Department can be 
couched as kind of helping the bad guys’), show resemblances with some of the 
communication characteristics displayed in the public debate, both by the NYPD and 
by police defenders. Mentioned communication strategies include depersonalization 
(‘dehumanize the situation’), mitigation/moderation, polarization, the simplification 
and the lumping together and rejection of all criticism (‘their approach is to lump 
everyone together, and take the most extreme statements, and kind of treat them as 
being representative’), evasion of communication, and the shielding from the reality 
held by police critics.  
The interviewees bring up different and diverging developments as a result of 
the communication approach of the NYPD. Those negative towards its communication 
argue on the one hand that it fuels racism (‘it sends a signal that black life is not as 
important as the lives of others’) and stimulates police misconduct (‘you can kill black 
people with impunity and no one is gonna punish you’), while it upholds the public’s 
inability to understand the NYPD and its intentions (‘you are going to have two-thirds 
of the people that don’t know what the word visceral means’) and sustains their 
negative image on the other hand. They also argue that it leads to a skewed, polarized 
presentation of reality in the media, which, in turn, exacerbates these effects, and can 
affect the opinions of the general public, who can become afraid to criticize the police. 
Mr. Dunn: ‘But, if there is a newspaper story and there is some extreme person and 
there is us, oftentimes in people’s minds, those groups all get lumped together and 
certainly from the Police Department’s perspective it is easy to lump them together’. 
Of further interest is how the police’s shielding from all criticism, according to 
interviewees, results in the rejection of valid criticism. In his characterization of the 
NYPD’s communication approach and its effects, Mr. Testagrossa argues: ‘That is the 
problem you have when you paint everybody with a broad brush and mop them all 
together and then don’t listen to anything they say; some valid points may be raised 
and you should, if you’re responsible and you try to improve the department, avoid 
these situations in the future. You should try to cross through everything and find those 
valid points that people are making’. Overall, the communication cultivates an ‘us-
versus-them’ schism (‘so it pitted the Police Department against the community’), 
exacerbating patterns of victimization and antagonism (‘everybody hates him’, 
‘nobody likes him, none of the people I know in the press like him’, ‘that is his 
reputation’). All of this can harm the judicial processes, the public debate, and the 
relationship between the police and the community. 
Immediate effects, especially towards Mr. Browne’s communication, include 
intuitive negative characterization, simplification and rejection; a pessimistic (and at 
times unrealistic) outlook on future communication (‘I think that when they give out 
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information that there is a reason to believe that it is not true’, ‘It will take you a year, 
it will take you half a year to get someone who will talk to you, they wouldn’t know 
what to say’); direct inflammation, antagonism and loss of trust towards the conduct of 
the department (as actions and communication are correlated), and an unwillingness to 
communicate (‘Nothing I could say to Paul Browne’), leading to an obstruction of the 
communication processes. In turn, those elements appraised positively, such as the 
sobriety test measures, lead to approval and an increase of trust amongst interviewees 
(‘it is definitely an improvement’, ‘good communication’). Moreover, the interviewees 
argue that the positive aspects of communication can result in a higher level of 
credibility amongst community members and de-escalation of the tense relationship 
between community and police. Ms. Jones-Brown: ‘I think that in terms of his 
handling of the situation, [Mr. Kelly] did some very astute things to keep this from 
being escalated’. This, in turn, can lead to awareness, trust, calmness, and 
understanding. Those who positively appraise the overall communication effort 
maintain that the statements themselves are fair and thus positively influence the 
process of debate. Ms. Ventura: ‘I did not feel like they were hiding as they were 
reporting it, as it was happening. I think that really, as it was unfolding, and when they 
were gathering facts, they were trying to give it to the public, to let them know, to ease 
them, or to let them understand, this is what is unfolding right now, this is what we 
have’.11 
 What is salient in the analysis is that some of those interviewees who believe 
that the police communicate defensively, also believe that the communication that is 
more open or empathetic can have negative effects too. Such effects include 
obstruction of the judicial and departmental disciplinary process, as well as the day-to-
day operations of the NYPD, police victimization, decrease in morale, a loss of trust, 
decreased relationship with the unions and mistakes in judgment leading to overall 
alienation. In his characterization of the NYPD’s response to the Stansbury shooting, 
Mr. Liddy, who during the same interview argues that the NYPD usually 
communicates in a defensive and purposely uninformative ‘bland’ manner, observes: 
‘[Mr. Kelly] created a huge controversy and it almost caused an irreparable rift 
between the police officers and the commissioner. In fact, we felt so strongly that he 
prejudged our officer and really betrayed what we were all about, he betrayed his 
brother and sister officers, that as a union we had a vote of ‘no confidence’ at a union 
meeting and that was unanimous, so it was quite controversial at the time, but I will 
say, ever since then he has been very careful with what he says publicly. […] Those 
words, whether it was a slip or he uncharacteristically said the wrong thing — that was 
a major blow to our self esteem’).  
Yet in spite of all these mentioned drawbacks, there is certainly some leeway 
in the way the department can communicate, as most interviewees do partly support a 
more emotional, visceral reaction in response to police shootings. Replying to the 
question on whether the police commissioner could have communicated an ‘expression 
of sympathy to the victims’ in the press, Mr. Liddy answered: ‘No, no, absolutely no 
problem, in fact the commissioner and Mayor Bloomberg made it a point to go to the 
wake, go to the service. That’s a terrible situation that. That was just a horrible 
situation. Of course you sympathize with the family’. 
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Overall, this analysis has revealed the complex position that the NYPD to a 
certain extent is forced to take in its communication, due to the paradoxical character 
of stakeholders’ appraisals; while the defensive nature of the communication is 
accepted as an incontrovertible fact due to the restrictions that are often enforced by 
other stakeholders, and while some even approve of this defensive nature, as it is in 
line with their own objectives, the communication will nevertheless sustain the 
negative image held by the community, but also the intuitively held perceptions of the 
interviewees themselves, including those of some of the interviewed police defenders. 
Ms. Jones-Brown: ‘If they can’t send a strong message … then there is no way that 
they can change their image’. Moreover, communication that is more open can 
antagonize other stakeholders, or have a negative effect on the process of debate, due 
to the restrictions mentioned above. Mr. Lemite points out, in response to the question 
of whether the police commissioner could have made the same statements as the mayor 
did: ‘The police commissioner could have said that, absolutely, and it would have 
probably made the community feel better. But it definitely would have hurt the way 
some of the people that work for him [see him]. They are out there working every day 
and […] risking their lives; it would have made them feel like there is no support’. The 
way this communication comes across to other stakeholders has a more profound effect 
on the process of debate than how the communication is intended, or who/which force 
is responsible for producing it. King Downing: ‘But, from a community point of view, 
if the community reads it, no matter where the responsibility lies [with the media or 
with the department], it can sound evasive’. 
 The appraisal of communication and the rigidity of the interviewees’ own 
positioning entail a two-way causal relationship. Those who are more coalition-
oriented are remarkably milder in their evaluation of the NYPD’s communication than 
those who are not. Moreover, as most interviewees appraise the department’s 
communication from their own self-centered perspective, the appraisal is much more 
positive when the desired process and outcome of debate are in line with those of the 
interviewed stakeholder, although this isn’t always the case. From a broader vantage 
point, the rigid positioning of the NYPD can amplify the rigid positioning of other 
stakeholders, but also vice versa.  
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7.3 Interviewees’ appraisals of police defenders 
Most of the interviewed stakeholders talk at length about their perceptions and 
interpretations of the communication of police defenders. The interviewed stakeholders 
especially have a strong opinion about the two police unions, which are organizations 
that — also in this research — make up an important segment of the group of police 
defenders. Ms. Jones-Brown observes: ‘No police union […] in the world is as 
powerful as the police unions in New York’. 
The analysis for this section has demonstrated that — although judgment of 
characteristics may vary — most interviewees who do not fall under the label ‘police 
defenders’ characterize the communication of police defenders in a similar way. While 
the interviewed police critics are the most critical of the role taken by police defenders 
— Mr. Barron being the most fervent critic — other stakeholder groups, including the 
New York Police Department, also disapprove of certain communication aspects, 
although the latter also lauded other facets. Conversely, some of the other interviewees, 
such as Mr. Dunn, conveyed their perception of the police defenders in a milder and 
more dispassionate fashion. The discussion concerned almost solely the two unions, 
the DEA and the PBA; only Mr. Barron and Ms. Jones-Brown focus on broader 
groups.  
 The interviewees perceive the role taken by the unions in the aftermath of the 
Sean Bell shooting to be ‘fixed’, ‘reflexive’ and ‘predictable’ in their aggressive and 
rigid defense of the police. Mr. Barron observes: ‘[Mr. Palladino] is a pathetic 
unrelenting defender of police brutality and killings and so is Patrick Lynch’. Ms. 
Jones-Brown less vehemently maintains that ‘[They are] pro their clients and 
unreasonably so’. From a broader perspective, she also observes: ‘I think the police 
defender label is correct. Because there are folks that no matter what the police do, 
almost no matter what the police do, they are going to defend them. Why? Because 
they are the police’. The more dispassionate interviewees also point out that this role is 
commonly accepted and a given fact (‘That is just what they do’), as the role is job-
related. Mr. Wilson points out: ‘He stands up for his guys. And when he goes, the guy 
who replaces him will do the same thing’. Mr. Dunn similarly observes: ‘I think that 
people recognize that they are the union and therefore no one thinks it is wrong that 
they are doing anything other than defending their members. You know, they get their 
point across, and they get a fair amount of attention, and they get a pretty good play, 
certainly in the Times’. While the NYPD focuses on the necessity of this role to push 
back some of the harsher critics (‘he took on some of the more extreme critics in 
reminding people that the members of his union and the people being accused here 
have rights too’), Mr. Barron, Ms. Jones-Brown and Mr. Testagrossa denounce the 
rigidity of this specific role taken by the unions.  
The interviewees distinguish different roots for the unions’ reflexive defense, 
ranging from the ingrained deference to the police held by mainstream white New 
Yorkers, the overprotection of police officers, and the ignorance, denial, and racial 
prejudices of this group, including negative perceptions of the victims. Ms. Jones-
Brown observes: [It comes from] people who think that the police can do no wrong. 
And they think the police can do no wrong, because they have the perception of the 
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victims that is very negative’. From a narrower job-related perspective, the role taken 
by the unions results from an ‘agenda’ aimed at making the detectives look as good as 
possible.  
Some interviewees also point out how the police defenders are interdependent 
with the NYPD, for whom they act as a voice, while also working closely together with 
pro-police media, who ‘are basically acting as spokesmen for the Detectives’ 
Endowment Association.’ Mr. Testagrossa observes that the unions and the NYPD ‘are 
both trying to get out the same message’, the former being able to speak out more than 
the latter. This relationship between the police and the unions is perceived by Mr. 
Barron as too fraternal: ‘[Mr. Lynch] has a little boyish relationship, you know, 
teenage relationship with the Police Department: “I’m gonna defend them no matter 
what they do” and that’s what he does and that’s what the detectives’ union does’.  
 Interviewees argue that the role taken by police defenders results in 
predictable, reflexive messages that involve a rigidly delimited reality concerning both 
the shooting and the aftermath of the shooting, especially in regard to the role of police 
critics. In addition, they also argue that the role taken by police defenders results in a 
rigidly delimited desired outcome of debate, by which the unions will denounce 
everything that is not in line with their objectives. Asked how he felt Mr. Palladino 
communicated after the Sean Bell shooting, Mr. Barron responded: ‘[He] 
communicated horribly. He justified it, as a matter of fact, the detectives’ union felt 
that there shouldn’t even have been a trial, there shouldn’t even have been an 
indictment, there shouldn’t even have been a case, they were just doing their jobs and 
Sean Bell caused all of this’. The police defenders’ rigidly defined reality and desired 
outcome of debate are viewed as negative by several interviewees, who maintain that 
the police defenders present a skewed reality as the truth (‘All so one-sided’), and 
moreover, defend their members unreasonably (‘[They are] pro their clients and 
unreasonably so’). Mr. Testagrossa: ‘Michael Palladino was basically making 
statements on the steps of the courthouse from day one about how the police were 
justified and making other statements that were really not particularly temperate’. The 
rigid perceptions and interpretations conveyed by police defenders are seen as strategic 
means of communication aimed at deflecting criticism. Only Mr. Browne is more 
positive about the reality presented by police defenders as it restored the equilibrium 
that was disturbed by harsh police critics.  
The police defenders’ strategies are heavily criticized by interviewees. This 
criticism ranges from general characterizations such as ‘spin’, the trying of the case 
outside of the courtroom and the display of immoderate, harsh and passionate rhetoric, 
to criticism in regard to specific characteristics, such as circumstantial ad hominem 
argumentation and the lumping together of criticism and critics (‘People don’t want to 
look at the issues, so they attack Al. ‘Oh, we shouldn’t listen to what he has to say, 
because he is being self-serving, he just wants the limelight, he is being a hatemonger, 
he is anti-police’). Mr. Testagrossa, characterizing the response of police defenders to 
criticism from a stakeholder-observant perspective: ‘You put everybody together and 
that way you don’t have to actually address any critics’ individual criticism. Basically 
you just paint them all with a broad brush, the raw radicals they’re never happy and 
they’ll always take every opportunity they can to criticize the Police Department and 
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they will always fight the Police Department so therefore we don’t even have to 
address their criticisms’. Interviewees also criticize the police critics’ accusations 
concerning other stakeholders’ rigidity (‘You can’t be rigid, and then complain about 
somebody else being rigid’), as well as their disregard of criticism (‘People don’t want 
to look at the issues, so they attack Al, [while thinking:] “we shouldn’t listen to what 
he has to say”’), the playing down of culpability (‘by saying that it took place in like 
what, 10 seconds’), and the ‘patronizing’ use of the word ‘tragedy’ (‘When it gets 
beyond two times, it is no longer a tragedy, it is a problem […] And so the use of the 
word “tragic” in these incidents now has become patronizing’). Most of the 
interviewees denounce these means; only Mr. Browne is positive about the means used 
by police defenders after the Sean Bell shooting in order to restore the equilibrium.  
The analysis of this section has also shown how the specific nature of the 
police defenders’ communication can result in stakeholders’ direct inflammation (‘I 
was personally offended’, ‘that insults my intelligence’), the sustainment of negative 
perceptions of police defenders in regard to rigidity, reflexivity, indifference and 
racism (‘it says that you don’t care about it’, ‘it is about the type of people who were in 
the car’, ‘[They are] pro their clients and unreasonably so’), the disapproval and the 
premeditated disregard of the reality and desired outcome of debate held by police 
defenders, and a direct obstruction of the communication processes. Concerning the 
latter, when asked whether he has communicated directly with Mr. Palladino, Mr. 
Barron said: ‘In passing. I wouldn’t even waste my time, because he is a pathetic 
unrelenting defender of police brutality and killings and so is Patrick Lynch. So what 
have I got to communicate with Patrick Lynch in passing through the media. [Ironic 
voice] We could sit down and [say] “Stop the police from killing us, and brutality, and 
this is not right Patrick, don’t you understand?” Similarly, Mr. Barron responded to the 
question on what he thinks of Mr. Leuci’s previously discussed opinion article, by 
saying: ‘I try not to read stuff like that. This is absurd. Real people died. I have a litany 
that I can go down the line with you on the forty, fifty people that died at the hands of 
the police’. This latter statement also shows how police critics fall back on their own 
perceptions, interpretations and positioning, which results in predictable 
communication, and a stalemate in the process of debate. From a different vantage 
point, the rigid positioning held by police defenders can have a detrimental effect on 
police–community relations, while providing munitions to harsh critics. Even Mr. 
Browne, who is positive about the unions in regard to their response to the Sean Bell 
shooting, subtly says that the unions can — at times — defend their members too 
zealously (‘[In the Stansbury case] the police commissioner was criticized 
tremendously by the police union’), which has a potentially negative effect on the 
communication processes of the informal debate that takes place between the police 
and the community in street encounters, and moreover, accommodates those critics 
who are not interested in problem-solving but ‘want to generate the old racial 
problems’. Mr. Browne believes that the unions hold a rigidly defined reality 
concerning the effects of apologetic communication:  
 
“[…] These things that I framed [on the wall] are all … most of them are in regard to 
the Stansbury shooting and the importance of the goodwill created: The police 
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commissioner speaking quickly and openly about what happened, the goodwill that 
was created on the street for the cops. The PBA didn’t understand this or appreciate it 
but the next day those same cops that went back on patrol had an easy time because the 
police commissioner said we were wrong. They didn’t get that, that that helped them 
you know.” 
 
The interviewees also point out that the police defenders’ communication will not lead 
to a decrease in inflammatory rhetoric and immediate criticism by police critics after a 
shooting. Mr. Wilson, for example, maintains that while Mr. Palladino ‘stands up for 
his guys’, he will never be able to persuade his adversaries to tone down their 
‘inflammatory’ rhetoric, or the rapidity by which they speak out after a controversial 
shooting. In that specific sense, the communication articulated by police defenders 
proves to be ineffective. From a broader perspective, the New York Times reporter 
maintains that there is a reciprocity between the rigid positioning held by both police 
critics and police defenders, as both groups are not inclined to change their 
communication. While Mr. Wilson argues that the communication of police defenders 





7.4 Interviewees’ appraisals of political stakeholders 
The positive perceptions of the mayor conveyed by police critics just after the shooting 
in the New York Times differ considerably from the responses conveyed during the 
interviews held with selected stakeholders. The analysis for this chapter hence has 
examined some of the statements made by police critics in the New York Times, and 
compared them to those made by the interviewees. The key notion brought up by these 
police critics in their appraisal of the mayor just after the shooting is ‘good 
communication’. To them, such communication entails communication strategies such 
as proactive discussions, pre-emptive meetings, timely outreach, but also rhetorical 
strategies such as acknowledgement of the outrage, display of respect, and expression 
of emotions. These strategies are part of the mayor’s coalition-oriented 
communication, as described in Part II, Chapter 4. The corpus also shows what such 
coalition-oriented communication can do to the perception of other stakeholders: The 
mayor is ‘more open, more inclusive, more honest and less secretive’ than his 
predecessor, a difference of ‘night and day’. The communication thus had an 
immediate positive effect on the quoted stakeholders, and ultimately positively 
influenced the process of debate. Communication by itself, however, is not the panacea 
to all problems, as pointed out by police critics in the New York Times. Communication 
and conduct are thus correlated (‘He got some better manners, but let’s see if we get 
some better policy’). However, communication certainly had a positive effect on the 
perceptions held by stakeholders quoted in the New York Times, and on the process of 
debate (‘We prefer talking than not talking’). The perception towards the mayor did 
slightly change throughout the aftermath of the shooting. As time elapsed, voices of 
criticism became more pronounced among the preponderant volume of positive 
statements made by community leaders in the New York Times. An explanation for this 
is that police critics believe that the mayor’s communication was not sufficiently 
accompanied by actions, which in turn diminished their overall perceptions of the 
mayor (‘He’s patching the wound, but he’s not doing the deep surgery’). However, 
even after the non-guilty verdict, some community members were still positive about 
the mayor and his advisors, because they ‘are at least willing to communicate’. 
The interviewed stakeholders are remarkably less positive about the 
communication and conduct of Mayor Bloomberg than the police critics quoted in the 
New York Times. A reason for this discrepancy could be that those interviewed, 
especially the police critics, are less coalition-oriented. In addition, the date when the 
statements were made could play a role, as the interviews took place more than a year 
after the acquittals and hence the interviewees had more insight into the actions taken 
by the mayor following his communication just after the shooting.  
A number of interviewees expound on how they see the role of the mayor. 
Some of them argue that the role taken by Mayor Bloomberg is fixed and predictable 
(‘That is classic Bloomberg’), while they also maintain that the role of a mayor in 
general is not. There are exceptions: While Detective Lemite argues that the mayor has 
to deal with restrictions on what he can say (‘I don’t think the mayor had any other 
choice’), Mr. Testagrossa and Mr. Browne build their interpretation on the notion that 
the mayor ‘represents the entire city’, and not just the Police Department. Other 
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interviewees argue rather that the interpretation of the role of mayor is more flexible, 
by highlighting the remarkable difference in how former Mayor Giuliani and Mayor 
Bloomberg have responded to controversial police shootings. Mr. Liddy points out: 
‘Mayor Bloomberg has given [Mr. Sharpton] some credit too by meeting with him 
whereas the previous Mayor Giuliani wouldn’t’. Interviewees do not share a common 
vision on what the role of the mayor should be. To police defenders, such a role should 
be that of soother/mediator that merely focuses on the process, but also that of a 
representative of the police, as he is their ‘boss’ (‘communicating empathy […] 
without condemning the police’, ‘You would hope that [he’d] say nothing or give us 
the benefit of the doubt’). Conversely, police critics prefer a more action-oriented role 
for the mayor, as pointed out by Mr. Barron: ‘We are not looking for those irrelevant 
niceties, we are looking for justice, because our people are dying, our people are 
getting beaten and brutalized and our people are getting stopped and frisked’. There is 
hence a discrepancy between the (perceived) position taken by the mayor and his 
expected role/position. 
Those interviewees who see the role taken by Mayor Bloomberg as 
predictable, place his role within a framing of insincerity (‘[He] is a cunning, smooth 
businessman’, ‘I don’t think his communication is genuine’), false concern (‘That 
makes it appear that he is with us’), lack of action, lack of visibility, and a concealed 
disinterest in solving community issues on the one hand (‘Bloomberg is much less 
involved’, ‘He doesn’t want to talk about the police very much. He leaves that to 
Kelly’), and on the other hand insensitivity to the needs of the police (‘he’s got a 
certain detachment to what the real world is, so you’re not shocked when he throws 
you under a bus or prejudges you’) and a willingness to give a platform to unreliable 
police critics (‘you’ll give a huckster like Sharpton at least some credibility, because 
he’ll say, well I’m just quoting the mayor on this’), who are in fact setting his agenda 
(‘caved in to the political pressure’). According to the police critics, this ‘fixed’ 
positioning results in calculated yet meaningless and toothless communication (‘empty 
verbiage’, ‘in reality nothing was going to happen to those police officers in the courts 
or through the commissioner who has the power to discipline them’), while police 
defenders believe conversely that the positioning results in harsh, rash, unfounded and 
insensitive criticism (‘he throws you under a bus or prejudges you’).  
According to a number of interviewees, these communication characteristics 
are also visible in the public debate that followed the Sean Bell shooting. Interviewees’ 
evaluations of the mayor’s public performance in the aftermath of the Sean Bell 
shooting are mixed at best. While the interviewed police critics mostly believe the 
mayor’s initial stance was non-committal, powerless, and disingenuous, especially his 
use of the words ‘it appears’ and the specific use of ‘unacceptable’ (‘[his use of the 
word unacceptable only refers to] unacceptable on sort of a human level’), they also 
believe he backed away from this initial stance (‘he kind of backed down from his 
position’, ‘the word cop-out might be really a little too strong’, ‘backed away from that 
subsequently’), making his positioning even more toothless. More generally, the 
mayor’s stakeholder-centered approach still failed to demonstrate discernment 
(‘indicative of a lack of understanding’) for the reality held by police critics, including 
the racial dynamics of the incident. Conversely, the interviewed police defenders 
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mainly argue that the mayor’s initial stance was too harsh, incriminating, premature 
(‘he too ate his words’), condemnatory and unsubstantiated (‘I think the mayor knew 
that he crossed the line when he said ‘inexplicable’).  
 Only Mr. Browne and Mr. Testagrossa evaluate the mayor’s stakeholder-
centered approach positively, as they argue that it successfully incorporates the realities 
of different stakeholders. Mr. Testagrossa: ‘The mayor represents the entire city, so the 
mayor does not just represent the Police Department; he represents the people of South 
Jamaica who had a lot of questions and a great deal of anger and pain out of this 
incident, so when he says something like that, I understand why the Police Department 
may not be happy with that but the mayor represents a broader constituency than the 
Police Department’. Mr. Browne: ‘I think this is probably universally held, [he did] an 
excellent job in communicating empathy […] without condemning the police’. These 
more positive evaluations are in line with the observations made by community leaders 
in the New York Times.  
What are the effects of Mayor Bloomberg’s communication? What is striking 
is how, to both police critics and police defenders, a stakeholder-centered panoptic 
reality does not always contribute to the process of debate if they feel words are not 
accompanied by action. In fact, as an immediate effect, the mayor’s communication 
results in personal inflammation, disappointment, victimization, (‘It would have made 
them feel like there is no support’), doubt in regard to the mayor’s sincerity 
(‘pretense’), and overall negative perceptions and a rejection of both sender and 
message. The mayor’s communication also results in a perceived skewed and amplified 
reality concerning the messages conveyed by the mayor. For example, while the mayor 
never said in the New York Times that his initial statement was unjustified, it did come 
across to several interviewees that way (‘backed away from that subsequently’). Police 
defenders argue that the communication can lead to alienation, victimization and a 
decrease in police morale (‘It is terrible for the morale of the NYPD, for all officers 
involved’, ‘he may have alienated his entire police force’). Police critics, in turn, argue 
that the communication does not make a difference, or as Mr. Barron puts it: ‘Empty 
verbiage is not better than racists’ verbiage or overprotection verbiage of Giuliani if the 
end results are worse’. From a broader vantage point, interviewees maintain that the 
mayor’s communication has a detrimental effect on both the process of debate (‘he 
taints the whole general attitude now’) and the judicial processes (‘sometimes he says 
things that sound almost like he is prejudging the case’). The stance taken by the mayor 
could even harm the position of the mayor himself (‘The mayor probably is better off 
not saying that’).  
 The almost universal, yet diverging criticism from both sides of the political 
spectrum perhaps gives more insight into the rigid positioning of the interviewed 
stakeholders than it does on the conduct of the mayor. The analysis for this section in 
fact has shown how the panoptic reality held and Mayor Bloomberg’s stakeholder-
centered approach are denounced by those who maintain a rigid positioning, as they 
will not accept perceptions and interpretations that are not in line with their own, while 
arguing that those of the mayor’s perceptions and interpretations that are in line with 
their own are merely the truth. Interviewees who are more coalition-oriented are 
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remarkably milder in their evaluation of the mayor’s communication than those who 




7.5 Interviewees’ appraisals of judicial stakeholders 
The interviewed stakeholders talk only sparingly about the communication of judicial 
stakeholders in the debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting. Moreover, they do 
so mainly at my instigation. Although the interviewees consider judicial stakeholders 
to be important players in the public debate, it is mainly their actions, and not so much 
their communication, that is appraised.  
The fact that interviewees talk so sparingly about the communication of 
judicial stakeholders can indicate that this communication — either in a positive or 
negative sense — does not stand out in the interviewees’ overall perception of the 
public debate. The analysis so far has shown that interviewed stakeholders recall and 
repeat especially those communication elements that were negatively appraised at the 
time they occurred in the public debate. From these observations it can be deduced that 
the evaluation of judicial stakeholders’ communication either ranges from neutral to 
positive, or that the interviewees simply do not find the (communication of) judicial 
stakeholders important. This latter assertion, however, is to a certain extent invalidated 
by the profound attention given by police critics in the New York Times to the 
performance of the judicial stakeholders throughout the entire process and to the 
question of whether a special prosecutor should be installed, as discussed in Part II, 
Chapter 5.  
 The interviewees do not explicitly say that judicial stakeholders take a 
particular role in the Sean Bell debate. However, they do allude to this notion more 
subtly. While Mr. Liddy states that ‘Browne is under a lot of pressure to bring an 
indictment’, Ms. Jones-Brown subtly points out that the district attorney appears to be 
siding with those in defense of the police at certain moments (‘It is not the 
responsibility to make the other person’s defense for them’) and, in addition, that the 
roots for the judge’s actions and communication can be found in pro-police sentiments 
and prejudices towards community members (‘his disdain, his distrust came across 
very clearly’, ‘This unwillingness to see police officers as offenders, and the 
unwillingness to see the victims as victims is a problem that we see in other cases’). 
The amount of attention given by police critics in the press to the ties between the 
police and the judicial system is in line with her perception. 
 Yet the interviewees mainly focus on the actions taken by judicial 
stakeholders, and not on their communication. While Mr. Barron labeled all the district 
attorney’s actions, including his communication actions, as ‘softball prosecution’, Ms. 
Jones-Brown — when supposed to appraise the communication of the district attorney 
— in fact appraised his actions: ‘It is still unclear to me why the prosecutor read the 
officers’ grand jury testimony into the record. To me that is sort of a fatal flaw’. While 
this shows how the actions taken by the district attorney taint her perceptions of his 
communication efforts, her appraisal in fact can also be seen as a response to his 
communication in the public debate, as the statements made by the district attorney did 
not convince the professor that it was necessary to read the grand jury testimony into 
the record. In fact, the district attorney’s justification was not quoted in the New York 
Times, which to a certain extent shows that such a justification for this decision was not 
a focal point of the DA’s communication. As a direct result, this lack of 
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communication fosters the previously discussed police critics’ belief, now subtly 
conveyed by Ms. Jones-Brown, that the district attorney and the police are too close 
and hence the former can’t prosecute the case independently (‘It is not the 
responsibility to make the other person’s defense for them’). During the interviews, the 
appraisal of actions and communication is correlated: The analysis has demonstrated 
that disapproval of actions leads to disapproval of communication, and vice versa. 
While Ms. Jones-Brown and Mr. Barron see the district attorney’s overall conduct — 
including his communication efforts — as weak (‘softball prosecution’, ‘disappointed’, 
‘fatal flaw’), Mr. Liddy appraises the district attorney’s actions and communication as 
competent and strong (‘Richard Browne is extremely professional’, ‘it seemed to me 
from outside that it was professionally handled’). The former believe that 
communication should be more explanatory and emphatic. While Mr. Barron points 
out that the district attorney’s communication ‘could have been stronger and outlining 
what he felt the laws were that they actually violated and why he is seeking these kinds 
of indictments’, Ms. Jones-Brown is unsure about the meaning of his communication, 
stating that ‘he just seemed, in the meetings that we had, not to have decided sort of 
either way you know, who was right and who was wrong’. In the perception of 
the interviewed police critics, the communication of both the Queens DA’s office and 
that of Judge Cooperman is mostly weak and uninformative, while the latter 
communication is also characterized as blunt and harsh (‘what I read is mostly a 
condemnation of the witnesses’).  
 The communication of judicial stakeholders mostly has a negative effect on the 
perceptions held by interviewed police critics on both the communication and the 
overall conduct of the DA, although this effect is not as strong as that of the NYPD. 
Moreover, it resulted in rejection of the message, sender, and motivation, and an 
inability to understand the reasoning of judicial stakeholders. While Ms. Jones-Brown 
was ‘disappointed’ with the prosecution, she said that Judge Cooperman’s verdict 
‘diminishes my view of him, based on what my student has told me that he is normally 
a fair person’. Judge Cooperman’s verdict even led to inflammation: ‘If you read his 
reasoning, he reminded me of Paul Browne. You are going to let that out in public, that 
this is why you came to this decision? I brought it down to: “He hated the witnesses”’. 
In addition, the communication leads to simplification (‘I brought it down to’) and 
amplification (‘he hated the witnesses’) of messages. The chosen communication 
approach in fact functions as noise, deflecting the content of the message, i.e. the 
reasoning for actions taken. Only the communication of the district attorney during the 
meetings prior to the trial has a positive effect on Ms. Jones-Brown, leading to her trust 
and (temporary) approval: ‘[Initially] I felt like he was […] going to prosecute this case 
for the people, which includes the Bell family and the folks in Queens who had their 
neighborhood [shot up]’.  
 Conversely, the communication of judicial stakeholders has a positive effect 
on the perceptions of Mr. Liddy, although he does not always agree with them (‘they 
should never have brought an indictment’). This discrepancy between interviewed 
police critics and police defenders can be explained by their opposing positioning in 




7.6 Conclusions and outlook  
Although the interviewees’ appraisals of stakeholders involved in the Sean Bell debate 
appear to be divergent, the analysis for this chapter has distinguished a number of 
trends in the perceived roles and character of communication of these stakeholders, as 
well as the effects this communication had on the debate and related developments. 
This section both looks at these overarching trends and developments and discusses 
some of the statements made by (stakeholder-observant) interviewees who also shed 
light on this.  
It is striking that almost all interviewees immediately speak about Mr. 
Sharpton and Mr. Barron on the one hand and Police Commissioner Kelly and Mr. 
Browne on the other, while they only rarely talk about the communication of judicial 
stakeholders, and usually only do so at the interviewer’s instigation. Whereas the 
judicial stakeholders are also appraised by the interviewees, it is not so much their 
communication, but rather their conduct that stands out in this appraisal. 
Most interviewees believe that stakeholders (other than the stakeholder group 
to which the interviewee belongs) have a fixed, predictable role in the aftermath of the 
Sean Bell shooting, but also in other debates in which the police are pitted against the 
community. Although the nature of these roles may vary, ranging from agenda-setter, 
anti-police agitator and catalyst (police critics, particularly Mr. Sharpton and Mr. 
Barron), to that of indifferent, self-centered, reflexively defensive police supporters 
(the NYPD, police defenders, particularly the unions, and to a lesser extent judicial 
stakeholders), these roles are generally characterized as rigid, reflexive and calculated. 
Only the perceived role of the mayor varies to any great extent, depending on the 
positioning of the interviewees. Just a few interviewees bring up exceptions to such 
fixed roles, arguing that the roles taken by the Rev. Sharpton and Police Commissioner 
Kelly deviate from the past.  
Interviewees repeatedly mention that these fixed roles are driven by an 
‘agenda’, often rooted in political/economic motives, prejudices, and ‘us-versus-them’ 
sentiments, but are also more stakeholder-typical concerning broader-agenda criticism 
(police critics), fraternal sentiments, ingrained deference, over-protectionism (police 
defenders) and a hyper-sensitivity to criticism, a self-centered facts-driven reality, and 
an unwillingness to take sides publicly (NYPD). Other interviewees do not look at the 
background of these roles, but — more fatalistically — believe that the roles of the 
NYPD, the mayor and judicial stakeholders are job-related and often restricted by 
external factors. 
It makes sense that these fixed, predictable roles result in an equally fixed and 
predictable arena of debate, as pointed out by some of the stakeholder-observant and 




Interviewees describing the characteristics of the debating arena that emerged after 
the Sean Bell shooting 
 
Mr. Wilson:  
 
“It’s sort of like everyone plays their role in a situation like this. And then […] it dies 
down and then it is going to happen again. Sharpton is going to do what he does, 
Barron is going to do what he does, the Police Department and whoever the mayor is 
then, they are going to do what they do.” 
 
Mr. Testagrossa:  
 
“You generally have in a situation like this, I guess interest groups giving their point of 
view on the incident that happened and the Police Department reflexively defending its 
own people so I guess the reaction in the wake of the Sean Bell shooting was typical 
for this type of case, although it is unusual, they do seem to happen every five, ten 
years or so.” 
 
“[…] Neither the department view nor the view of Mr. Sharpton and other 
community spokesmen are particularly nuanced. They basically go right to their 
usual positions and then argue from there.” 
 
Because each of the stakeholders plays a fixed (‘reflexively’), premeditated and rigid 
(‘Neither the department view nor the view of Mr. Sharpton and other community 
spokesmen are particularly nuanced’) role in controversial debates such as that about 
the Sean Bell shooting, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Testagrossa maintain that the debates 
themselves become predictable too (‘it dies down, and then it is going to happen 
again’, ‘typical for this type of case’). In fact the Sean Bell debate can be characterized 
as a predictable play, in which stakeholders commence from exactly the same point as 
they did in previous debates (‘They basically go right to their usual positions and then 
argue from there’).  
From there on, the overall communication and interaction between 
stakeholders is predictable, in line with the anticipated nature of the messages 
conveyed and rhetorical strategies deployed by individual stakeholders. These 
messages are generally characterized as biased and selective, yet differ in nature, 
depending on the stakeholder group. The communication of police defenders and 
police critics is mainly described as inflammatory and emotions-driven; that of the 
NYPD (and to a lesser extent judicial stakeholders) as uninformative and non-
committal, process-focused, non-empathetic; and that of the mayor either as toothless 
or as too harsh. Moreover, the interviewees argue that the statements tend to convey 
the diverging interpretations and rigidly defined realities held by stakeholders. 
Strategies that are used by stakeholders from both sides of the debate include 
distortion, displays of immoderate, harsh and passionate rhetoric, the exacerbation of 
(racial) contrasts and the ‘us-versus-them’ schism, simplification/generalization, and 
the lumping together of both incidents (police critics) and criticism/critics (police 
defenders/NYPD). Stakeholder-observant interviewees describe how these messages 




Interviewees describing the overall communication that occurred after the Sean Bell 
shooting 
 
Mr. Wilson:  
 
“No one is really communicating after a situation like that in New York. They are 
just yelling at each other through the newspapers and TV. They are not talking to 
each other physically; there were no police critics who were sitting down with the 
police.” 
 
Mr. Testagrossa:  
 
“Well, I mean there were people who were crying out that the police were 
unjustified you know, some of the participants are the same participants you see in 
this type of incident historically like, you know, the Rev. Al Sharpton, some political 
figures will make their statements. The Police Department, usually through the 
police commissioner, or his spokesman, will make statements that will defend the 
conduct of the police officers initially and that is really typical I think. We saw that in 
Sean, Diallo and some of the other cases involving deaths caused by police officers in 
their on-duty activities.” 
 
Both interviewees show how the combination of messages and communication 
strategies lead to a situation where all stakeholders follow a predictable script (‘will 
make their statements’), but in which no actual dialogue occurs (‘No one is really 
communicating after a situation like that in New York. They are just yelling at each 
other’).  
 The analysis of this chapter also discussed the immediate effects of this 
communication on the interviewed stakeholders, and the perceived effects on the 
public debate. What is striking is that interviewees mainly bring up communication 
that is perceived as negative, which indicates that bad communication especially 
influences the debate, whereas good communication has a more neutral effect.  
By looking at the immediate effects, it is remarkable that the communication 
from opposing stakeholders often has a similar immediate effect on the interviewees, 
ranging from simplification/generalization and consequential rejection, distrust, 
retaliation, personal inflammation, mockery, inability/unwillingness to understand the 
content of the messages (due to ‘noise’), amplification and distortion of 
communication, and reversion to the stakeholder’s reflexive perceptions, 
interpretations, and positioning, for example the ‘lauding of personal/organizational 
conduct’ (NYPD), the reversion to the interpretative framing of police misconduct and 
racial injustice (police critics) and emotional blackmail/victimization and 
communication of self-centered reality (police defenders). Thus, a rigid positioning and 
an unwillingness to communicate lead to equal rigidity and evasion, and — from a 
broader vantage point — to a predictable, repetitive, polarized and deadlocked 
dialogue, or even worse, a downward spiral of action and reaction.  
 On a broader scale, this also occurs in the public debate after the Sean Bell 
shooting. Apart from the immediate effects just mentioned, which thus also take place 
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in the broader debating arena, interviewees argue that stakeholder communication can 
lead to alienation, violence, prejudices and racism, thus exacerbating patterns of 
victimization, antagonism and ‘us-versus-them’ sentiments. Also important is how the 
shielding from all criticism can result in the rejection of valid criticism. More 
positively, communication can serve to maintain equilibrium by countering the 
communication of other stakeholders (agenda-setting, toning down of rhetoric, etc.). 
Yet interviewees also point out that other stakeholders will never be persuaded to take 
a less rigid stance. Some communication is perceived to have no effect at all, such as 
that of the mayor (in the perception of police critics).  
 Overall, the communication does not just have a negative effect on individual 
stakeholders, but also affects the entire process of debate, the judicial processes, the 
conduct and safety of the police, and the long-term relationship between the police and 
the community. These overall effects are summarized by a few of the more 
stakeholder-observant/coalition-oriented interviewees:  
 




“I don’t think anything would ever change as long as those same forces are at 
work.” 
 
“[…] I still think it will never change, because I think all the shouting back and 
forward and saying the opposite things, it is all just part of the process; it is a 
process that the city sort of goes through.” 
 
“[…] I think it’s just a human process, at least a New York City human process. 
Through these people a city feels what happened and tries to sort it out and have 
it make sense to them and then it dies back down again. If Al Sharpton goes away 
somewhere and someone else will replace him, it is all going to be the same. […]. It is 
all going to be the same. They’re not going to have a shooting or something and have 
critics and police sit down together and talk, you know, like this and come out of the 
meeting and say everything is going to be fine, don’t everyone get excited, let’s wait 




“[…] Whatever the verdict was in that case there is always going to be one large 
segment that was going to be very unhappy. So you’re either going to have the 
Police Department happy because there is an acquittal and then you’ll have an unhappy 
community and families of the victim and friends of the victim or the other way 
around, the families of the victim, friends and community are happy and the Police 
Department is very upset.” 
 
“[…] On both sides what happens in these incidents [is that it] affects the morale of 
either the community and their feeling of either being full-fledged partners in our 
society or not and the Police Department as feeling like you’re doing a very 






“I don’t think there was ever any opportunity for any of the groups involved to 




“I would generally say that the communication during the Sean Bell incident and what 
followed afterwards pretty much followed the polarized state of police and 
community relations.” 
 
“[…] Well I think on the one hand that the police are defensive because they have had 
a history of having these kinds of high visibility shootings take place and there doesn’t 
seem to be any end to them and the solution that the system seems to have come up 
with is — find the officers not guilty, but pay the families large sums of money, 
relatively large sums of money, almost as if it is a form of economic compensation, 
but not a form of ending the problem, or solving the problem. People got paid for 
the damages: So, the system worked.” 
 
These excerpts expose the interviewees’ beliefs that, while on a superficial level the 
system might appear to ‘work’, in fact all that worked was the succession of 
predictable steps in the process, as the debate was not resolved (‘all the shouting back 
and forward and saying the opposite things’, no ‘common ground’ was found), and 
hence sowed the seeds for the next debate, which will have a similar format (‘I don’t 
think anything would ever change’), due to the interaction of the powerful forces 
described in this chapter (‘as long as those same forces are at work’). This process is 
fatalistically seen as an incontrovertible fact (‘it is all just part of the process’, ‘I think 
it’s just a human process, at least a New York City human process’, ‘there is always 
going to be one large segment … very unhappy’), yet nevertheless has a negative effect 
on the morale of both the community (‘their feeling of [not] being full-fledged partners 
in our society’), and that of the police (‘feeling like you’re doing a very dangerous job 
and you are totally unappreciated’), which in turn leads to a ‘polarized state of police 
and community relations’. What is interesting is how Mr. Testagrossa’s 
characterization of this process of mutual victimization and decrease in morale relates 
to the perceptions ‘I am Sean Bell’ on the one hand and ‘A matter of seconds’ on the 
other, as well as on the self-centered interpretative framings of police critics and police 
defenders, as discussed in Part II, Chapters 1 and 3.  
 While interviewees mostly want stakeholders to communicate and position 
themselves in a way that is in line with the interviewees’ own positioning, they — from 
a more general perspective — positively appraise communication that is fair, mild, 
variable, apologetic, coalition-oriented, problem-solving, and agenda-free. This 
communication can lead to understanding, trust, diminishing of tensions, and even 
partial acceptance. Some of the communication is evaluated this way, in particular, that 
of State Senator Malcolm Smith, Mayor Bloomberg, the Rev. Sharpton, Police 
Commissioner Kelly, Mr. Browne, and Inspector Blake (for Inspector Blake’s 
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communication see the detailed analysis for Part II, Chapter 2 in the supplement and 
Ms. Jones-Brown’s appraisal in the detailed analysis for this chapter). 
However, if an individual stakeholder chooses to adapt to such desired 
communication, it would not necessarily lead to an improvement in the overall 
processes of the public debate. First of all, communication and actions are entwined, 
and hence communication should be accompanied by actions. Second, the 
communication that can appease one stakeholder group will often inflame another, 
partly due to conflicting perceptions of the role of stakeholders, for example that of Mr. 
Bloomberg as boss (police defenders), or of representative of the city (police critics). 
Different communication can also have adversary effects on the process of debate, due 
to specific restrictions, as pointed out by several interviewees.  
In any case, the communication in itself is hard to change: The stalemate 
position sketched by different interviewees is the result of the equilibrium created by 
different forces, which are hard to change due to the paradoxical perceptions and 
desires of different stakeholders. For example, while the NYPD and police defenders 
denounce the role of harsh community leaders such as Mr. Barron and Mr. Sharpton, 
they do not proactively talk about the communication of Mr. Smith, as his milder, less 
confrontational communication does not set the agenda of the newspapers and of the 
NYPD/police defenders. Moreover, they use techniques such as depersonalization and 
mitigation, which call for an opposite force to restore the equilibrium. The 
communication of the NYPD/police defenders reinforces the role of harsh police 
critics. Such paradoxical perceptions can also be found on the other side of the 
debating arena: While the NYPD’s communication is partly restricted by external 
stakeholders, including police critics, these same forces also criticize the nature of the 
communication of the NYPD, maintaining that it is defensive and cautious. Hence, the 
NYPD is labeled as ‘defensive’, although stakeholders often cannot produce specific 
examples. The paradoxical perceptions thus result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. From a 
more general perspective, the stakeholders’ own positioning influences the perceptions 
of other stakeholders, while sustaining the actions that are negatively appraised. For 
example, whereas police critics and police defenders criticize each other, they also 
benefit from this rigid positioning and therefore are reluctant to change the created 
equilibrium.  
The discrepancy in appraisals is partly due to the rigidity of the interviewee’s 
own positioning, as discussed throughout this analysis. Mr. Wilson observes how such 
rigidity in fact can come from both sides of the debating arena:  
 
Mr. Wilson talking about why people from both sides of the debating arena talk 
negatively about the press 
 
“I just think that people like to trash reporters and the media. Everyone thinks, 
everyone believes that everyone else has an agenda you know […] both sides are 
inclined to criticize a newspaper that prints the other side’s belief even though the 
same newspaper might have printed their belief too, you know, get them both in 




In other words, stakeholders will reject perceptions and interpretations that are not in 
line with their own, while arguing that those perceptions and interpretations that are in 
line with their own reflect the truth. 
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated on different occasions how the 
perceptions, interpretations and positioning discussed in the previous chapters overlap 
with those brought up by interviewees, either explicitly or implicitly. Interviewees’ 
evaluations of these characteristics, in turn, show an overlap with the general 
perceptions, interpretations, and positioning of the stakeholder group to which the 
interviewees belong, demonstrating the effects of stakeholders’ communication on the 
evaluations and overall communication of other stakeholders.  
 
                                                          
1 Walter Liddy and Joseph Mancini, interview by author, October 15, 2009. 
2 Charles Testagrossa, interview by author, October 19, 2009. 
3 Michael Palladino, interview by author, October 21, 2009. 
4 Paul Browne, interview by author, October 30, 2009. 
5 Chris Dunn, interview by author, October 20, 2009. 
6 Gary Lemite, interview by author, October 15, 2009. 
7 Charles Barron, interview by author, October 5, 2009. 
8 Delores Jones-Brown, interview by author, October 6, 2009. 
9 Michael Wilson, interview by author, October 13, 2009. 
10 King Downing, interview by author, October 9, 2009. 
11 Lourdes Ventura, interview by author, October 30, 2009. 
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Conclusions and outlook 
 
A New York Times excerpt on Mr. Testagrossa’s closing arguments: 
 
“This, more than any other case in memory, is one that most people view through the 
prism of their own prejudices,” he said. “If you are a police officer or sympathetic to 
police officers, the defendants are tragic heroes and the victims are thugs. If you are 
friends of the victims, then the defendants are murderers.”  
 
“The truth,” he continued, “lies somewhere in between the polar extremes.”1 
 
This study has aimed at providing insight into which factors contribute to the apparent 
stagnation of the debate on police violence in New York, both on the micro level of 
individual incidents and on the historical macro level. This study has shown that it is 
not just the current debating processes that are stagnated, but that there has been an 
impasse in the debate from the department’s inception onwards.  
 Part of this study’s insights are condensed in Mr. Testagrossa’s remark, which 
captures the highly diverging realities held and conveyed by stakeholders in the debate 
on the shooting of Sean Bell. This study has shown that it is not only these diverging 
realities themselves, but particularly the fact that stakeholders rigidly cling to them that 
prevents stakeholders from communicating with each other and seeking common 
ground.  
 The stakeholders’ rigid positioning is only one aspect of a much larger, 
complex, dynamically changing picture encompassing a variety of different factors, the 
interplay of which continues to have a detrimental effect on the process of debate. 
 This study has sought to expose this dynamic picture, first by looking at how 
societal context influenced the macro dynamics of debate between the New York 
Police and its critics on police problems and vice versa, from the department’s 
inception until now. The second part of this study has aimed at providing insight into 
how (the sum of) stakeholders’ discourse influenced the debate that ensued after the 
Sean Bell shooting. Together, these two parts have exposed several factors that have 
led to the stalemate position of the debates on police violence and police problems.  
In order to give insight into the factors that contributed to this stalemate 
position, these conclusions do not follow in a chronological order, but look first at how 
and why the current debate is in a deadlock position, and then expand the viewpoint to 
a larger, historical perspective. Hence the first section of these conclusions dwells on 
the factors that have been identified on the micro level of the Sean Bell debate. The 
second section discusses how these factors are a result of, but also influence, the macro 
patterns of debate discussed in Part I of this study. Following this discussion, Section 
III reflects on this study’s outcomes from the perspective of the theoretical tenets on 
which this study is built. The last section contains some concluding comments on this 




I — The power of language: An equilibrium between stakeholders’ 
communications on the micro level of the Sean Bell debate 
Part II of this study has researched the nature of the discourse used by stakeholders in 
the Sean Bell debate, as well as the interplay between these different discourses. The 
analysis for this section has aimed at providing insight into how the totality of 
communications influenced the debate that ensued after the Sean Bell shooting.  
Three main points stand out. First, the communication strategies and language 
used by police critics, police defenders and the NYPD appear to be mostly consistent, 
both regarding time and place, and between the different stakeholders within a group. 
Although multiple hues do exist in their discourse, such shades do not have the upper 
hand in the statements found in the New York Times. Second, in the communication 
practiced by these three stakeholder groups, there is only little evidence of coalition-
oriented communication that truly seeks common ground between personal concerns 
and the perceptions and interpretative framings of others. Third, the NYPD’s 
communication is in many ways the antithesis of that of police critics. This is also the 
case for the police defenders’ communication: While their style and techniques do 
show some likeness with those of the police critics, their perceptions, interpretations 
and positioning diametrically oppose each other.  
These three main characteristics shape the interaction between stakeholders’ 
discourses in different ways. By looking at this interaction, several factors can be 
identified that hamper the process of debate, as will be discussed in the subsections 
below. While the mayor’s discourse is notably different, in the sense that it is much 
more coalition-oriented, the effects of his communication are limited (see discussion in 
Subsection (I.5). The effect of judicial stakeholders’ communication is relatively 
limited in comparison to that of other stakeholders. Hence the discussion below will 
focus primarily on the other stakeholders. The influence of the media on the Sean Bell 
debate is discussed in Subsection I.8. 
 
I.1 — Speaking in different languages: ‘50 shots’ versus ‘A matter of seconds’ 
Police critics, police defenders and the NYPD have conveyed highly diverging 
perceptions concerning the shooting and (those involved in) its aftermath. The police 
critics’ labels ‘50 shots’, ‘I am Sean Bell’ and ‘We love Sean Bell’ — which comprise 
depersonalized images of magnitude and injustice, guilt and lawlessness, but also 
personalized images of the shooting’s victims and communal suffering — linearly 
oppose the police defenders’ labels ‘A matter of seconds’, and ‘Every day is hell for 
these guys’, as well as the NYPD’s label ‘This event’, the department’s 
characterization of its own conduct, and the events that have taken place after the 
shooting, by the notions of ‘preparedness’, ‘order’ and ‘peace’.  
The lack of alignment between police critics on the one hand, and police 
defenders and the NYPD on the other, exacerbated by the large amount of self-
perceptions conveyed by each group, demonstrates how different stakeholders perceive 
the same shooting in a very different way; how they do not (wish to) speak the same 
language. In addition, police critics and the NYPD also use language in a very different 
way: There is no alignment between the police critics’ passionate oratory and easy-to-
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digest messages, and the department’s nondescript, factual and detached vocabulary. 
The police defenders’ and police critics’ use of vocabulary and rhetoric do show 
considerable overlap, however.  
As police critics, the NYPD, and the police defenders do not speak the same 
language, and moreover, the first two use language in a very different way, the debate 
becomes a discussion in which each party is unresponsive to what the others say. These 
three stakeholder groups are not communicating with each other, but only to their own 
constituency, a group that does not need to be persuaded or convinced. This has caused 
a confusion of tongues, but also a lack of understanding and irritation, further 
polarizing the debate. These developments are exacerbated by the fact that the 
perceptions of police defenders and the NYPD are a response to those of police critics 
and that perceptions both affect and are a result of the stakeholders’ interpretative 
framings and positioning. 
 
I.2 — Living in different worlds: Diametrically opposing interpretations of the 
shooting and its aftermath 
Police critics, police defenders and the NYPD each hold and convey self-centered, 
narrow interpretative framings of the shooting and its aftermath. Their interpretations, 
in particular those of the police critics and police defenders, are characterized by an 
‘us-versus-them’ schism in which ‘them’ comprises outsiders that will never 
understand the victimized ‘us’.  
The interpretations held by police critics diametrically oppose those of the 
NYPD and police defenders. While most police critics interpret the shooting within a 
broader framing of pervasive police misconduct, unfair policies and procedures, abuse 
of power and racial injustice in the broadest sense of the word, the Police Department 
interprets the shooting, from a statistics-driven, deterministic view, as an aberration 
and a case number, part of an unchangeable pattern of shootings. In addition, the 
shooting is interpreted as part of a historical and organic pattern of continuous 
improvement, professionalism, superiority in comparison to other cities, calmness, 
restraint in shootings, and arrests without incidents, in which the unique character of 
the police, and the unruliness and lawlessness in the streets, are the cause for the 
incidents that do occur. This latter interpretation is much in line with that of the police 
defenders, who interpret police conduct as part of a historical and organic pattern of 
proper training, strict guidelines and strong leadership, while the shooting and its 
outcome fit within the historical and organic interaction process that entails danger and 
chaos, but in which the officer shows restraint and astute assessment, and in which the 
officer is rather a victim than a perpetrator of the danger inherent in this interaction.  
 Also the aftermath of the shooting is interpreted differently by the police critics 
on the one hand, and police defenders and the NYPD on the other hand. Police critics 
frame the shooting’s aftermath as part of the protracted civil rights fight started by 
African Americans and their community leaders against police misconduct and racial 
injustice, which has been continuously thwarted by systematic judicial and political 
inadequacy, incapacity, failure, impasse and unwillingness, partly caused by political 
ties and cooperation, in turn resulting in further feelings of victimization and fatalistic 
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sentiments. This framing linearly opposes the police defenders’ interpretation of the 
shooting as part of a historical and organic pattern of prolonged and profound unfair 
criticism (with occasional bursts of unfair public outrage) as well as unfair methods 
and motives instigated and maintained by police critics, which in turn has led to a 
pattern of police suffering and victimization and a weakening of the criminal justice 
system. It also takes exception to the NYPD’s interpretation of the shooting as part of a 
historical and organic pattern of competence, openness, diplomatic skills, 
accountability and the ability of building relationships and dealing with police–
community problems.  
Thus police critics maintain definitions that are very different from those of 
police defenders and the NYPD regarding key factors such as the notions of 
lawlessness, excessiveness and race, as well as for the functioning of the criminal 
justice system, and the role of both the police and the civil rights movement. This lack 
of alignment between these stakeholders’ interpretations shows how police critics live 
in a very different world from police defenders and the NYPD. This has several effects 
on the process of debate. Not only has it led to a lack of understanding on both sides, 
but it has also increased ‘us-versus-them’ sentiments and feelings of victimization, as 
stakeholders are feeling unheard. The extent of these effects is related to the 
positioning of each of the stakeholders, as discussed below. 
 
I.3 — The negative effects of stakeholders’ rigid positioning in the 
Sean Bell debate 
Police critics, police defenders and the NYPD each hold and convey a rigid positioning 
regarding the desired outcome of debate, the prerequisites for the debate to come to an 
end, the negotiation space, the realities, truths and solutions held and presented in 
regard to the shooting and the broader patterns of police misconduct and racial 
injustice. Their rigid views are not coalition-oriented and do not seek common ground: 
None of these stakeholder groups have changed its perceptions, interpretations and 
positioning throughout the course of the shooting’s aftermath. The unbending character 
of these stakeholders’ rigid positioning has also been exposed during debate and reality 
challenges, as well as during the interviews held with stakeholders.  
 There is no alignment between the police critics’ rigid positioning on the one 
hand and that of police defenders and the NYPD on the other. First, the police critics’ 
positioning regarding the development and outcome of debate, captured in the labels 
‘Justice for Sean Bell’ and ‘No justice, no peace’ literally oppose both the police 
defenders’ labels ‘All police officers deserve fairness’, and the NYPD’s dual-layered 
objective of ‘appropriateness’. Second, there is also a lack of alignment between the 
broader realities held by these three different stakeholders. Each of these realities 
accommodates a single version of the truth regarding the incident itself and who is 
responsible, as well as regarding the broader patterns of police conduct. Their rigidly 
defined realities result in an overall ‘us-versus-them’ positioning, in which the ‘us’ and 
‘them’ components are rigidly defined by anticipated behavioral patterns and delimited 
by varying aspects (per stakeholder) such as level of support, victimization, race, 
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criticism, moral obligation and (in)ability to feel the suffering. In the police critics’ and 
police defenders’ positioning, victimization and blame are exacerbated and polarized.  
The lack of alignment and the rigid character of these three stakeholders’ 
positioning affect the process of debate, as it prevents both conciliation and an open 
dialogue. Criticism is often rejected no matter who gives such criticism or what the 
nature of the criticism is. Other desired outcomes of debate and broader realities are 
dismissed and criticized, and there is little leeway for negotiation.  
The communication strategies used by different stakeholders to position 
themselves in the debate have had a profound effect on the overall communication, as 
discussed in the next subsection.  
 
I.4 — The detrimental effects of harsh communication strategies on the 
process of debate 
Police critics, police defenders, and the NYPD (and to a much lesser extent the judicial 
stakeholders) use harsh and/or deflective communication strategies that have a 
detrimental effect on the perceptions, framings and positioning of other stakeholders. 
There are several reasons for this. 
 First, the discourse used by each of these groups is perceived by their 
opponents as calculated and strategic rather than as spontaneous communication. As a 
result, not only the positioning but also the perceptions and interpretations conveyed by 
these groups are dismissed by their opponents, as they are perceived as insincere. Of 
course, the stakeholders’ choice to convey the perception that communication is 
insincere may be strategic too. Yet from this strategic perspective the communication 
techniques have an equally detrimental effect on the process of debate, as police critics, 
on the one hand, and the NYPD and the police defenders on the other hand, are 
continuously giving each other ammunition in the Sean Bell debate. In particular, these 
stakeholders’ communication techniques legitimate their opponents to use equally 
detrimental strategies, such as the simplification and the lumping together and rejection 
of all criticism, the shielding from another reality, and the questioning of the 
trustworthiness of stakeholders that criticize them, while suggesting that these 
stakeholders deploy unfair strategies. One of the communication tools that increases 
negative perceptions regarding stakeholders’ motives is the use of broader/second 
agenda criticism. Groups such as the New Black Panthers very outspokenly and 
blatantly use the police as a tool for political gain. Other, milder police critics do not do 
so. However, police critics do lay heavy emphasis on broader historical framings such 
as perceived widespread racial inequality, which, in certain instances during the 
shooting’s aftermath, appear to prevail over the direct cause for concern. This focus is 
to a certain extent in line with the prolonged use of the police as a vehicle for political 
communication, police issues being the most visible part of a broad array of issues.  
Second, as a result of stakeholders’ communication strategies, the perceptions, 
interpretations and positioning held by their opponents are reinforced/exacerbated, for 
example causing inflammation, mistrust, hostility, alienation, victimization, 
polarization, an unwillingness to communicate, as well as a pessimistic (and at times 
unrealistic) outlook on future communication. For example, the use of broader/second-
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agenda criticism can increase feelings of victimization, as the police are the focal point 
in a much broader battle, and they feel blamed for issues they cannot solve. Some of 
the effects of stakeholders’ communication strategies on other stakeholders have been 
observed directly during the interviews.  
Third, police critics on the one hand, and police defenders and the NYPD on 
the other perceive each other’s communication as fixed, reflexive and predictable, and 
often the role taken by these stakeholders as an incontrovertible fact. As a result, the 
communication falls on deaf ears: At no point (covered in the New York Times) does 
the communication by police critics convince police defenders and the NYPD and vice 
versa to change their point of view. 
These developments are further intensified by the fact that stakeholders tend to 
remember and convey these rigid strategies rather than the conciliatory communication 
by some other stakeholders. 
Thus, the communication practiced by police critics, police defenders, the 
NYPD, and to a lesser extent judicial stakeholders, has a detrimental effect on that of 
one another. In particular, these communication strategies make the police critics’ and 
police defenders’ communication harsher and more confrontational, and both the 
NYPD’s and police defenders’ communication more defensive and deflective. 
Moreover, feelings of victimization amongst these stakeholder groups are increased, 
while perceptions and interpretations are reinforced/exacerbated. All of this leads to an 
overall predictability of communication and a stalemate in the process of debate, or 
even worse, a downward spiral of action and reaction.  
 In other ways, these harsh communication techniques do accelerate the process 
of debate, as they result in police critics’ mobilization and the setting of the agendas of 
both politics and the media (see Subsection I.6). However, the police critics’ 
communication has not been able to change the (rigid) mindset of the police defenders 
and NYPD and vice versa. While police critics’ communication could lead to policy 
changes, this is rarely mentioned by stakeholders.  
 
I.5 — The constraints and limited effects of conciliatory, 
stakeholder-centered communication  
While most of the communication by stakeholders is self-centered and does not seek 
conciliation, that of the mayor is very different in this respect. First, his eclectic array 
of value-based, non-value based, factual and emotional perceptions seek alignment 
with those of different stakeholders. Second, the mayor is the only stakeholder that 
holds transitory and dynamic interpretations that are clearly coalition-oriented. Within 
this perspective, the mayor’s interpretations are built upon those of other stakeholders, 
selectively incorporating optimistic, future-oriented aspects of such framings — using 
the latter as guiding buoys — while also positively emphasizing the role of others in 
the debate as well as the importance of two-way communication and collaboration, 
rather than lauding personal efforts. Third, also his positioning is stakeholder-centered 
and focused on conciliation. He holds a flexible, changing, personal yet all-
encompassing stakeholder-centered reality, which is broadly delimited and allows for 
multiple vantage points and versions of the truth to coexist. The mayor is the only 
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stakeholder that consequently uses inclusive communication techniques in order to 
safeguard a communal desired outcome of debate and an all-encompassing inclusive 
reality. Moreover, the mayor is the only stakeholder able to vary his rhetoric, 
depending on the audience. 
 In general, this type of communication, practiced by the mayor, but also (to a 
much lesser extent) by others, such as milder police critics, can lead to understanding, 
trust, diminishing of tensions, and even partial acceptance. However, there is no 
guarantee that such communication will lead to an improvement in the overall 
processes of the public debate. First, conciliatory communication that is not 
accompanied by actions can have an adverse effect, for example leading to distrust, 
disappointment and feelings of victimization. Second, the communication that can 
appease one stakeholder group will often inflame another, partly due to conflicting 
perceptions regarding the role of the stakeholders. In particular, stakeholders who 
position themselves rigidly, will not accept communication that is not in line with their 
own perceptions, interpretations and positioning. Third, some stakeholders are 
restricted in their communication in several ways (as their communication can hamper 
judicial processes, and also cause a vehement, undesirable reaction from police 
defenders), and hence cannot practice more conciliatory communication.  
Only the mayor’s communication is stakeholder-, knowledge-, and solution-
driven, and in theory has more potential to change the pace and course of debate than 
those of other stakeholders. However, the effects are limited due to the non-
conciliatory positioning of other stakeholders.  
 
I.6 — The exacerbating effect of the interplay between labels, framings and 
positioning  
Perceptions, framings and positioning strongly interact with each other. First, 
interpretative framings produce perceptions/labels and function as the departure point 
of stakeholders’ positioning. In turn, labels serve as catalysts for these framings and 
positioning, while condensing, magnifying, and reiterating captured images and 
perceptions. Positioning, lastly, can further exacerbate the use of labels and 
stakeholders’ interpretations. This interaction between labels, framings and positioning 
has an exacerbating effect on (the interaction between) stakeholders’ discourse.  
First, this interaction results in complex communication structures and 
perpetual patterns that are difficult to break. The ‘us-versus-them’ schism, for example, 
is a product of interpretative framings, is fuelled by perceptions, and manifests itself in 
the positioning of stakeholders. This positioning, in turn, influences the perceptions 
and interpretations of these stakeholders, as well as those of others. This schism is so 
deeply entrenched in the police critics’, police defenders’ and NYPD’s communication 
that it will be hard to break the perpetual loop of interpretations, perceptions and 
framings.  
 Second, this interaction also leads to predictability. For example, because 
police critics on the one hand and police defenders and the NYPD on the other rely 
heavily on their interpretative framings, they perceive and appraise each other’s 
communication by looking at what (they believe) happened in the past. During the 
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interviews, some could not even bring up examples of the communication used in the 
Sean Bell debate, yet still negatively appraised this communication. As a consequence, 
their perceptions regarding each other’s communications become predictable, and 
hence their communication does too, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy as 
stakeholders’ mutual stereotypical views regarding the predictability of other 
stakeholders’ discourse become reality.  
Third, the police critics’ positioning and communication strategies, on the one 
hand, and those of police defenders, the NYPD and to a lesser extent judicial 
stakeholders, on the other, reinforce and exacerbate these existing framings, further 
intensifying this self-fulfilling prophecy in the Sean Bell debate. 
 
I.7 — The exacerbating effect caused by paradoxical perceptions  
The perceptions held by stakeholders in the debate ensuing the Sean Bell shooting are 
in various ways paradoxical.  
 First, while stakeholders focus on and denounce those on the opposite side of 
the arena who hold a rigid positioning and practice harsh/deflective communication 
strategies, they do not focus or proactively praise those that hold a more flexible 
positioning and convey more conciliatory communications. By doing so, they are 
allowing radical voices to set the agenda of the debate and communicate their 
messages, while failing to give more conciliatory voices a platform. From a strategic 
perspective, some stakeholders can benefit from the rigid positioning held by these 
radical voices and therefore are reluctant to change the created equilibrium, by 
focusing on milder critics. From a more general perspective, stakeholders naturally 
focus on polarized views, in line with (and perhaps as a consequence of) the polarized 
media portrayal of the shooting and its aftermath.  
 Second, while stakeholders focus on and denounce those on the opposite side 
of the arena who hold a rigid positioning and practice cautious communication 
strategies, i.e. the NYPD and judicial stakeholders, they also know that these 
communications are in many ways restricted by external stakeholders, including 
themselves. This reinforces the NYPD’s and judicial stakeholders’ negative image and 
puts them in a difficult situation. 
 
I.8 — The polarizing effect of the media 
In many ways, the media, and in particular the New York Times, have portrayed a 
balanced picture of the shooting, as their coverage comprised elements of the different 
truths on the event. This is illustrated by the fact that the media are criticized by those 
stakeholders (on both sides of the debate) who hold a rigid conception of reality. Yet 
while the New York Times does incorporate different viewpoints in its storytelling, its 
news- and controversy-driven reality (including a focus on controversial issues of race) 
magnifies the controversy and human interest level of the shooting, while exacerbating 
emotions and contrasts between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The ‘unlimited space’ given to 
unusual police conduct, such as the Sean Bell shooting, results in a skewed pattern of 
negative ‘unusual’ NYPD news taking precedence over normal conduct, while also 
485 
 
exacerbating unusual/negative images of both the NYPD and others involved in such 
incidents, ranging from a focus on ‘50 shots’, to the background of the victims.  
The media coverage is influenced by stakeholders’ communications. For 
example, the police critics’ zealous, agenda-setting communication can result in a 
higher frequency of citations in the New York Times, and so can, to a lesser extent, the 
powerful police defenders’ communication, while the NYPD’s nondescript, non-
individuating and non-committal communication can diminish the 
frequency/magnitude of citations in the media. Moreover the overall character of these 
stakeholders’ communications can also influence the way they are represented in the 
media (e.g. the police critics as emotional, the NYPD as defensive). The New York 
Times quotes analyzed in this research hence do not reflect the totality of 
communication, but rather the stakeholders’ communication focus, combined with the 
newspapers focus on newsworthy, unusual, human interest, and at times even 
sensationalist news.  
 
I.9 — Summary 
Together, the different elements described in the previous subsections result in a power 
equilibrium between the discourse of different stakeholders that is difficult to break: 
While each stakeholder is able to hand out blows and/or defend themselves, none of 
these blows or defense moves are decisive, resulting in a stalemate position in the 
debate. This equilibrium is not a tranquil condition, but rather a power balance between 
opposing discourses, including rigid positioning and harsh communication strategies.  
Specific language, in particular that of the police critics, is a powerful driving 
force in the Sean Bell debate, controlling its overall development, as well as the 
specific language of other stakeholders. The police critics’ zeal to ‘fight for justice’ and 
their emotions and feelings of victimization, together with the Rev. Sharpton’s 
passionate oratory, serve as catalysts that prevent the debate from losing pace and 
moving to the background, while ensuring prolonged media attention for this fight. 
Moreover, the reverend, as well as other outspoken police critics, both act on and 
stimulate police critics’ feelings, perceptions and interpretations, hence perpetuating 
images during the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting. Hence the police critics’ driving 
force also serves as a force that drives the debate. In this respect, the police defenders’ 
and NYPD’s communications are largely driven by the agenda-setting labels and 
positioning of police critics. As a result, the debate becomes a process of action and 
reaction between outspoken police critics on the one hand and the NYPD and 
outspoken police defenders on the other. Yet, the police defenders’ communication 
also likens that of the police critics to a certain extent: While their communication is 
less emotions-driven and catalytic, spokesmen still build on and exacerbate the police 
officers’ existing feelings, perceptions and interpretations. 
Yet actions, too, are a driving force of debate. The actions taken by 
stakeholders taint the perceptions others hold of their communication and vice versa. 





II — The power of language and social context: A perpetual loop of  
incidents, perceptions, framings and positioning  
“All groups, liberals, radicals, conservatives, hard hats are caught up in the problem of 
the police. The difference is only that of support or attack. None think of ignoring the 
police and looking elsewhere.”2 
Cyril Robinson 
 
“There is an investigation, followed by a trial or a round of public hearings and a call 
for reform. Edicts are issued, regulations promulgated, watchdog bodies created or 
strengthened. Time passes, the crisis fades, and … something like the same drama is 
enacted all over again!”3 
James Lardner and Thomas Reppetto 
 
From its inception onwards, the NYPD has been the central figure in a series of debates 
regarding police–community relations related issues, as well as issues relating to the 
professionalization of the force. Overall, and from the very start, the processes in these 
debates have been stuck in a perpetual loop and they still continue to be so.  
Part I of this study has identified several causes for this perpetual loop. The 
factors that have led to the stalemate position on the micro level of the Sean Bell 
debate both result from and contribute to these macro patterns of debate. Together, 
they give insight into the pattern of police-violence incidents and the strained 
relationship between the police and its critics, while answering the question of which 
factors contribute to the stalemate position of the debate on police violence in New 
York, both on the micro level of individual incidents and on the historical macro level. 
The following subsections discuss these combined insights.  
 
II.1 — A continuing power equilibrium  
The history of police debates is marked by a dynamically changing power landscape. 
In the current power equilibrium that has emerged during the second half of the 
twentieth century, stakeholders in debates about police problems are powerful enough 
to hamper reform processes, stall the debate, or give the debate a new impulse, yet 
none of them have the capacity to adopt lasting reforms and/or improve the debating 
processes substantially and/or have the debate come to a closure. 
This current equilibrium is the result of certain historical developments that 
took place in the twentieth century, including police unionization, the civil rights 
movement, and the professionalization and bureaucratization movements, but also 
earlier developments, such as the (continuous) use of the police as a vehicle for 
political communication, society’s conflicting views on the police, police cultural 
features and discretionary liberties, and the Police Department’s ties to Tammany Hall 
in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.  
The deeply-rooted character and robust power of these forces that contribute to 
this power equilibrium suggest that a balance-shift will be hard to realize for any 
stakeholder in debates about police problems. For example, police culture and police 
unionization will continue to empower rank-and-file officers, and minority groups’ 
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agenda-setting powers will also remain strong. Moreover, from its inception onwards, 
the NYPD as an organization has proven to excel in impeding reform and resisting 
change. In the future, the role of police commissioners will remain delicate and the 
mayor’s power will continue to be limited by reelectability, as well as by the diverse 
group of different stakeholders within his electorate.  
 This constant power equilibrium on the historical macro level is also visible in 
the Sean Bell debate, in which stakeholders have enough power to compete in, but not 
to win, the battle: Police critics have been unable to realize change or hold an open 
dialogue with the police, the NYPD and police defenders have been unable to silence 
their critics and prevent reputational damage, and the mayor has been unable to 
substantially improve the debating processes. Yet the equilibrium of stakeholders’ 
discourse on the micro level is not only a result of, but also contributes to, the power 
equilibrium that has evolved in the second half of the twentieth century. More 
specifically, while Part I has shown primarily that stakeholders’ power derives from 
their solid position in society, their political influence, and their highly developed 
degrees of organization and awareness, which in turn are the result of broad historical 
developments and social context, Part II has shown that a stakeholder’s power is also 
shaped by his discourse and communication strategies.  
 
II.2 — The deeply-rooted positioning and communication of key stakeholders 
From the department’s inception onwards, stakeholders’ positioning and 
communication has influenced the dynamic process of debate both directly and 
indirectly. It is remarkable how stakeholders’ positioning and communication have 
barely changed over the centuries. Already in the nineteenth century, the police were 
pitted against hostile critical groups, both in the formal and informal arenas of debate 
(e.g. where the police interact with citizens during street encounters). 
From the outset, the positioning of both the police and its critics has been 
uncompromising. Over the years, this rigid positioning intensified, due to society’s 
conflicting views on the police, the discretionary liberties and police cultural traits, and 
the growing gap between the public and the police, but also more recent developments, 
such as police unionization and the police professionalization and bureaucratization 
movements. Moreover, as the awareness and power of the rank and file and minority 
groups grew in the twentieth century, these groups have been able to convey their 
positioning in debates on police problems in the public debate.  
As part of their rigid positioning, the communication strategies used by 
different stakeholder groups have been mostly consistent. Historically, police critics — 
including moral crusaders, elitist professionalists, civic reformers, and minorities — 
have consistently applied zealous and agenda-setting, and at times opportunistic and 
aggravating, communication strategies and language. The police has been used as a 
vehicle for political communication by many of these critics. The rank and file, too, 
have consistently used similar communication strategies and language in order to 
deflect criticism and reform initiatives. The variety of techniques increased as the 
police professionalized, and after police unions entered the formal arena of debate in 
the twentieth century. The Police Department, too, expanded its techniques over the 
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years, for example by using its independent status to deflect external criticism. In line 
with the police commissioners’ defensive positioning, their communication towards 
those critical of the police also continued to be strongly defensive. 
The analysis of stakeholders’ positioning and communication in the twentieth 
century has shown that stakeholders’ often deeply-rooted ‘us-versus-them’ positioning 
and harsh communication strategies have contributed to the perpetual loop in which 
both debates appear to be stuck. First, certain strategies, such as the use of the police as 
a vehicle for political communication (see Subsection II.3) and the police’s (and later 
also the union’s) strategies to deflect reform and criticism, have directly prevented the 
settlement of issues. Second, the interplay between communication strategies has also 
negatively affected the process of debate indirectly, as certain strategies intensified the 
negative perceptions and detrimental strategies of other stakeholders, causing debates 
on both police professionalization and police–community relations to stagnate, and 
moreover, to aggravate. While some criticism has had an agenda-setting effect and has 
led to mobilization, criticism only sporadically led to immediate change, or even to an 
open dialogue. Overall, stakeholders’ positioning and rigid views resemble that of 
trench warfare, in which no party makes any significant gains, only losses.  
Stakeholders’ discourse in the Sean Bell debate is both a result of and a 
contribution to the historical macro pattern. In particular, these groups’ historically 
rigid positioning is reflected in their uncompromising ‘us-versus-them’ positioning in 
the Sean Bell debate. In this perspective, trench warfare produces trench poetry. Yet on 
other accounts too, the communication of police critics, police defenders and the 
NYPD fits within the broader macro patterns discussed in Part I. Only the mayor’s 
stakeholder-centered approach results in communication different from that of his 
predecessor.  
For example, the NYPD’s interpretation of the shooting as an aberration is in 
line with the NYPD’s usual dissemination of statistics after police-misconduct 
incidents. Similarly, the police critics’ ‘fight for justice’ is not new, nor are their sit-in 
protests and themed marches. The police defenders’ label of ‘these characters’ is in line 
with the overall ‘asshole’ label. Also, the conveyed feelings of victimization of both 
minority groups and the rank and file are in line with their overall feelings of 
victimization. The different interpretations regarding the race of the police officers 
involved in the shooting are in line with the broader diverging cognitive landscapes of 
African Americans and whites concerning racial bias and fairness.  
These examples show the overlap between stakeholders’ communication in the 
Sean Bell debate, and that in previous debates. Thus, not only is their communication 
within the Sean Bell debate predictable, their overall communication is too. As a result, 
the interplay between their discourse also becomes predictable: While these 
stakeholders’ communication reinforces and exacerbates the perceptions, 
interpretations and positioning of others, ultimately causing both impasse and 
intensification at the micro level of the Sean Bell debate, they affect police–community 
relations and overall debating patterns at the macro level. Phrased differently, the 
perpetual loop at the macro level is reinforced by an equilibrium between discourse at 
the micro level: None of the discourse changes the power equilibrium profoundly and 
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hence none of the discourse can change the course of the debate. Moreover, the 
interplay between discourse reinforces the rigid positioning of stakeholders. For 
example, the police critics’ harsh ad hominem communication strategies and broader 
agenda criticism used in the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting reinforce the police 
defenders’ framing of the aftermath of the shooting as being part of a ‘fight against 
professional police haters’, i.e. the historical and organic (perceived) pattern of 
prolonged and profound unfair criticism, methods and motives instigated by police 
critics, which in turn has led to a pattern of police suffering and victimization and a 
weakening of the criminal justice system. While this police defenders’ framing is the 
result of (their interpretation of) historical events, it is highly likely that the police 
defenders will adopt a similar framing when the next incident occurs. As the police 
defenders’ own framings influence their positioning, their feelings of victimization, 
rigid ‘us-versus-them’ positioning and detrimental communication techniques are 
reinforced/will intensify, not only during the Sean Bell debate but most probably also 
in the debates to come. Similarly, the NYPD will cling to their interpretation that their 
handling of the shooting is part of a history of proper and professional conduct, and 
that the department’s overall conduct is ‘the best we’ve ever had’. They will also hang 
on to their defensive and deflective strategies. In turn, all of these developments have a 
detrimental effect on the police critics’ perceptions, framings, ‘us-versus-them’ 
positioning, feelings of victimization and communication strategies, reinforcing their 
belief that they should continue their fight, which is part of the civil rights movement 
against systematic judicial and political failures. This vicious circle is reinforced by 
stakeholders’ convenient use of events in the past as an excuse to dismiss other 
stakeholders’ objectives.  
 
II.3 — The continuous function and use of the police as a vehicle for 
political communication 
From the outset, different groups in society have recognized the benefits of drawing on 
the police as a vehicle for political communication. While the Police Department was 
attacked unremittingly in the nineteenth century by ‘moral crusaders’ and ‘elitist 
professionalists’ who intended to weaken Tammany Hall, as they (and everyone else) 
knew that the police were tied to the political machine, the use of the police as a 
vehicle for political communication has continued until now: Even though external 
political influences within the Police Department diminished, policing continued to be 
seen as an inherently political activity. In this context, the police are not only a very 
visible representation of government, their function is also believed to be detrimental 
to the minorities’ quest for status, power and material rewards in society. This quest is 
part of a broader struggle, characterized by prejudiced (and sometimes racist) views 
and driven by group interest.  
 Together with the police officers’ boundary-spanning roles and their mandate 
to use force, the use of the police as a vehicle for political communication for broader 
issues has put the police in an exceptionally difficult position, as they do not have the 
mandate and power to solve these issues by themselves. While this has hampered the 
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professionalization movement in the past, it continues to cause confusion in regard to 
the issues at stake, and stalls the debating processes.  
The debating processes on the micro level of the Sean Bell debate both partly 
confirm and reinforce these patterns on the historical macro level. For example, the 
New Black Panthers and other radicals have purposely attacked the police during the 
aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting as a strategic means to gain broader control, in a 
similar way to which communist groups have done in the past (and perhaps continue to 
do so). While this is not necessarily the case for milder critics, it can be concluded that 
the police critics’ dissatisfaction with the police and the issues brought up during the 
aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting are linked to a broader set of concerns held by 
these groups regarding the criminal justice system, government and society, not only 
concerning policing but also concerning racial and financial inequality in general. 
Their (heavy emphasis on) interpretative framings is in line with broader historical 
trends, such as their battle against (perceived) police mistreatment, but also with the 
broader battle for equal rights, the American tradition of ‘diversity politics’, and 
feelings of victimization and alienation. 
More broadly, police critics on the one hand, and police defenders and the 
NYPD on the other, hold prejudicial views of one another, and their communications 
are driven by group interest (defined by each stakeholder’s positioning in the debate). 
Their discourse, in turn, has an exacerbating effect on the processes occurring on the 
historical macro level, considering that the police critics’ use of the police as a vehicle 
for political communication reinforces the interpretative framings held by police 
defenders and the NYPD, and gives them ammunition to attack police critics. These 
framings, in turn, comprise the starting point of debates to come, while police critics’ 
current discourse can be used as ammunition in future debates.  
Moreover, the NYPD’s and police defenders’ communication focus on more 
rigid and radical critics gives the latter a continuous platform to use the police as a 
vehicle for political communication, resulting in self-fulfilling prophecies both during 
the aftermath of the Sean Bell debate, and in debates to come: While the police critics 
are criticized by police defenders and the NYPD for harsh and ‘unfair’ communication 
strategies, they are implicitly supporting these strategies. 
 
II.4 — Society’s continuing conflicting views on the police 
Society is not an unqualified entity. From the outset, society has held conflicting, 
unbalanced and ‘taken-for-granted’ expectations and views regarding the police. While 
the police were given a powerless mandate to start with, because society was reluctant 
to give the police substantial powers, the resulting police force nevertheless received 
an extensive amount of criticism, hostility and disrespect from various groups in 
society. While the existence of such negative sentiments was a direct result of the bad 
shape the NYPD was in at the time, the criticism appears to be rather paradoxical and 
even unfounded, as the creation of the new force was to a great extent a reflection of 
the anti-professional and anti-authoritarian desires also held by the public.  
While certain views and expectations of the police definitely changed in the 
twentieth century, their paradoxical character did not. Expectations of the police are 
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sometimes unrealistically high and the police are presented with incompatible 
demands. Yet society also continues to hold conservative views regarding the police, 
by defining expectations of policing in traditional terms and by showing an 
unwillingness to support reforms. In addition, people have shown an unwillingness to 
cooperate with the police, due to a lack of knowledge, skepticism, or fear. Up until 
now, people hold many stereotypical views regarding the police.  
These expectations and views have had a profound impact on both the power 
of the police and the evolvement of the power landscape as a whole, but also on the 
NYPD’s organization and the rank and file’s cultural traits, as well as both groups’ 
positioning in debates. In the second half of the twentieth century, society’s views and 
expectations continued to increase the rank and file’s level of cynicism and demand for 
respect. Moreover, they have had a dampening effect on reform and the 
professionalization movement, resulting in quick fixes and cosmetic reform efforts. In 
effect, societal constraints have impeded the police’s power to effectuate change. 
 Stakeholders’ discourse on the micro level of the Sean Bell debate are both a 
result of, and a contribution to, society’s conflicting views and expectations of the 
police. While the police and judicial stakeholders are criticized by police critics for 
being too defensive, those critics also know that their communications are in many 
ways restricted by external stakeholders, including the police critics themselves. In 
turn, the NYPD’s defensive positioning in the Sean Bell debate can be seen as a result 
of the continuous pressure put on the police in the past and present.  
 
II.5 — Language and social context as catalysts of micro and macro patterns 
The interaction between discourse and social context does not only contribute to a 
stakeholder’s individual power on both micro and macro levels, but is also a powerful 
driving force of the overall debate, considering that each new incident of police 
violence fuels the police critics’ stamina, awareness and anger. This results in agenda-
setting perceptions that in turn serve as catalysts for both micro and macro processes of 
debate. More broadly, the interaction between labels, framings and positioning has a 
powerful exacerbating and perpetual effect on (the interaction between) stakeholders’ 
discourse, not only on the micro level of the Sean Bell debate, but also on the historical 
macro level, as a stakeholder’s interpretations serve as the starting point of debate, and 
these interpretations are continuously influenced by other stakeholders’ 
communication. Moreover, in the long run negative perceptions cause prolonged 
damage to the public opinion and police–community relations, but also to the broader 
social context of policing, such as the success of law enforcement practices, reform 
initiatives and the overall legitimacy of the police. The media’s polarized refraction of 
reality exacerbates these processes, as shown in the analysis of the Sean Bell case, as 
well as in the historical analysis of macro patterns.  
Language in the formal arena of debate also influences processes in the 
informal arena, considering that stakeholders’ communication has a negative effect on 
the perceptions, interpretations and discursive practices of stakeholders that meet each 
other in this informal arena. More specifically, in the informal arena of debate, a 
hostile, victimized group of police critics is pitted against an equally hostile, victimized 
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group of police officers, who see each other in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, while viewing 
themselves as part of a minority group that does not receive the respect it deserves. 
While it cannot be concluded that these circumstances in the informal arena of debate 
lead to increased (police) violence, it can be assumed that these circumstances, to a 
degree influenced by processes in the formal arena of debate, do not have a positive 
effect on the interaction processes between the police and minorities, leading to moral 
disputes engendered, molded and driven by racial disparities. 
Some of these interactions in the informal arena have been exposed during 
demonstrations and riots. Here, the informal and formal arenas of debate come 
together, as these demonstrations, often orchestrated by key spokesmen, are also used 
as strategies in the formal arena.  
 
II.6 — Perpetual debating processes on the micro and macro level 
Over the years, stakeholders in police-violence and police-problem debates have used 
similar discourse that is a product of strongly held, fossilized beliefs on the police, on 
the issue of police violence, and on different stakeholders. Their communication is a 
product of events in the past, both regarding the police violence itself and the 
communication about such violence.  
Together with the other factors discussed in this section, this has led to a 
perpetual loop of debating processes and a power equilibrium on the macro level and 
an equilibrium and interplay of and between discourse on the micro level, which 
reinforce each other. More specifically, the formal arena of debate is characterized by a 
perpetual cycle of reoccurring scandals, media coverage, public outcry, protests, 
debates, defensive responses, and reform efforts, but also by reoccurring perceptions, 
interpretations and positioning. The Sean Bell debate is no exception to this pattern, 
and can be characterized as a predictable play, in which stakeholders commence from 
exactly the same point as they did in previous debates.  
In the informal arena the debate is stuck in a perpetual loop too, as interactions 
continue to be moral disputes engendered, molded and driven by racial disparities.  
 
III — Theoretical tenets 
This study is built on four theoretical tenets. This section reflects on this study’s 
outcomes from the perspective of these tenets.  
 
Theoretical tenet A: The dialectics of discourse and society 
This study aimed at providing insight into the debate about police violence, by 
examining, from a critical-discourse-analysis perspective, the mutually influential 
relationship between the language used by different stakeholders in this debate on the 
one hand and societal context as well as the dynamics of the debate itself on the other. 
From this perspective, several conclusions can be drawn from the results of the 
historical analysis and the Sean-Bell case study:  
1. Research into the historical depth of this dialectical relationship has shown that, 
from the outset, societal developments (e.g. society’s expectations, the role of 
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Tammany Hall) have influenced the overall behavior (discursive practices) of 
groups involved in debates about police problems (e.g. the development of police 
culture, the NYPD’s rigid structure), as well as their perceptions, interpretations 
and positioning, which in turn has influenced their discourse, and vice versa.  
2. In this respect, stakeholders’ behavior (discursive practices), as well as their 
perceptions, framings, culture and positioning serve as intermediaries between 
language and social context, as they are shaped by broader social context, and 
reflected in discourse, and vice versa. In this sense, the longstanding trench 
warfare (stakeholders’ positioning) produces trench poetry (stakeholders’ 
discourse. Moreover, the discourse of stakeholders also becomes the social context 
that shapes the discourse of other stakeholders.  
3. The study has shown that the dialectical relationship is historically deep, and also 
transcends time: Social developments and events that took place in the nineteenth 
century comprise the roots for stakeholders’ current discursive practices and 
discourse in police-violence debates, including that of Sean Bell.  
4. The micro-analysis of this dialectical relationship in Part II has shown that the 
equilibrium of discourse, i.e. the interplay between the perceptions, interpretations 
and positioning conveyed by stakeholders in the Sean Bell debate, is both a result 
and reinforcement of the power equilibrium and debating loop on the historical 
macro level.  
5. Combined, the micro-analytic case study and research into the historical depth of 
the dialectical relationship have shown that — in line with Fairclough’s theory that 
language is simultaneously constitutive of (i) social identities, (ii) social relations, 
and (iii) systems of knowledge and beliefs — the discourse used by participants in 
the Sean Bell debate both reflect social identities (each stakeholders’ dynamic 
character), social relations (e.g. the power landscape, police–community relations) 
and systems of knowledge and beliefs (e.g., police culture; the minorities’ 
oppositional subculture), but also reinforces these identities (stakeholders’ realities, 




6. Even when stakeholders’ communication is strategic rather than spontaneous, it 
still has a dialectical relationship with society, as it is the product of social events 
and processes (for example society’s low esteem of the police and persistent 
community relations problems have led to the appointment of PIOs), but also 
influences societal developments, as these strategies can impact perceptions, 
interpretations and positioning on the micro level, and reform efforts, perceptions, 
culture, and the quality of police–community relations on the macro level.  
7. While this study is built on the premise that the dialectical relationship between the 
discourse on police violence and the society in which a debate takes place is 
dynamic rather than static in nature, the perceptions, framings and positioning of 
different stakeholders have been mostly constant and rigid over the years, resulting 
in a clogged debate with little movement. This discrepancy can be explained by 
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distinguishing between process and outcome: Whereas the processes that shape the 
dialectical relationship are indeed dynamic (existing interpretations serving as the 
starting point of debate; different societal developments influencing stakeholders’ 
communication), these dynamic processes are stuck in a loop, and result in 
gridlock: Hence both the discourse and discursive practices resulting from the 
dialectical relationship are not dynamically changing. In this sense discourse 
serves as a gauge for impasse, rather than a gauge for change.  
8. Stakeholders’ communication does not just lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy 
regarding each other and the ultimate process of debate, but also regarding the 
dialectical relationship between the communication about police issues and the 
existence of these issues, considering that stakeholders’ communication in the 
formal arena of debate negatively affects police–community relations, and the 
context in which debates are held in the informal arena. 
 
Theoretical tenet B: Discourse as manifesting and sustaining power and ideology  
This study, built on the critical-discourse premise that discourse reflects and sustains 
power and ideology, sought to give insight into the link between the power of different 
stakeholders in the police-violence debate and the language they have used. Yet, to a 
degree deviating from Critical Discourse Analysis, this study is also built on the 
premise that power manifests itself in a multidimensional way within debates on police 
problems and that power relations and dominance are not merely top-down, but rather 
involve an organic and dynamic struggle between different stakeholders. From this 
perspective, several conclusions can be drawn:  
1. Language used by different stakeholders in the debate on police violence has both 
a stake in, and is a site of, the struggle for power and ideology:  
(a) From a historical-dynamic perspective, this study has shown that stakeholders 
who have gained power over the years due to a series of social developments 
and events, are more successful in either initiating and continuing or 
stagnating debates on police problems than those that are not. For example, the 
police unions’ current powerful position in police-violence debates has been a 
result of the broader public-sector unionization movement, but also a 
consequence of both the police professionalization and civil rights movement.  
(b) From this same historical-dynamic perspective, this study has shown how 
different ideologies (police professionalism, civil rights movement) have 
motivated and empowered stakeholders to take part in debates on police 
problems. 
(c) The power of a stakeholder group’s discourse contributes to its overall power, 
while also serving as a driving force of debate. Hence the equilibrium of all 
discourse on the micro level of the Sean Bell debate contributes to the overall 
power equilibrium on the macro level of the debate on police problems, as 
well as the loop in which this debate is stuck. 
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(d) The dialectical relationship between discourse and social context contributes 
to a stakeholder’s individual power, but is also a powerful driving force of 
debate. More specifically, (the interaction between) the labels, framings and 
positioning conveyed by stakeholders have/has a powerful exacerbating and 
perpetual effect on (the interaction between) stakeholders’ discourse, as well 
as on long-term social developments, and vice versa.  
(e) As a consequence of this perpetual effect, the perceptions, framings and 
realities conveyed by stakeholders in the Sean Bell shooting also reflect and 
contribute to each stakeholder’s ideology in the long run.  
2. In line with olo inov et al.’s theoretical assumption that the battle for power takes 
place within ‘linguistic signs’ and that this battle is also a battle for the significance 
of these signs, this study has shown that there is a continuous struggle between 
stakeholders’ perceptions, interpretations and truths regarding the use of force and 
the debate about this.
5
 Yet while  olo inov et al. maintain that language may be 
used to make certain depictions of society and with this any unequal distribution of 
power appears as factual, rational, and natural for everyone, this study has shown 
how police critics, police defenders and the NYPD each present their reality, 
including their perceptions regarding the distribution of power, as factual, rational, 
and natural. 
3. In line with the theory that the relationship between hegemony (“the predominance 
in and dominance of political, ideological and cultural domains of a society”) and 
discourse can be explained by seeing the power over ‘discursive practices’ as a 
battle for supremacy over ‘orders of discourse’ (the totality of discourse types of an 
institution and the relationships between them), this study has shown that the 
police-violence debate is indeed a battle for supremacy over ‘orders of discourse’ 
(resulting in the equilibrium of all discourse), and at times has led to a lack of 
access to discourse for some groups (for example caused by the NYPD’s defensive 
positioning).
6
 However, this lack of access has not necessarily led to a lack of 
communicative power for these groups. Perhaps it has even increased the powers of 
minority groups, as this lack of access negatively affects minorities’ perceptions 
regarding the police, giving them more stamina to continue their fight for justice. 
In turn, this stamina comprises an important element in the overall power held by 
police critics. Moreover, the lack of access to NYPD’s communication, in 
combination with the availability of communication of police critics, such as the 
police critics’ agenda-setting rhetoric, has led to a polarized media portrayal, 
further increasing the anger and stamina of police critics.  
4. In line with Wodak’s ‘life of arguments theory’, this study has shown how 
arguments of stakeholders in debates concerning police problems are 
recontextualized over time, as stakeholders’ interpretations, a product of a 
stakeholder’s previous (perceptions) regarding historical events, are influenced by 
stakeholders’ positioning. In turn, these interpretations serve as the starting point 
for new debates. 
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5. This study has shown that power relations are not merely vertical and dominance is 
not merely top-down, but that power relations rather involve an organic and 
dynamic struggle between different stakeholders. The effects of this struggle are 
equally diffuse. For example, the NYPD, an organization that represents the power 
of the dominant groups in society in the eyes of many people, was not in fact given 
much power in the beginning, which affected both the overall power landscape and 
the discursive practices of particular stakeholders. As a consequence of the 
professionalization movement, rank-and-file officers felt attacked in their 
discretionary powers, and more broadly in their social identity. The use of broader-
agenda criticism is another example: The police have been the leading character 
and focal point of attack in debates that often involve broader problems that they 
are not chiefly responsible for, and even broader problems unrelated to the police. 
This has resulted in increased feelings of victimization, bitterness and alienation. 
Accordingly, not only African Americans but also rank-and-file officers see 
themselves as minorities, both holding and conveying a strong ‘us-versus-them’ 
positioning and interpretative framings in which ‘them’ comprises outsiders that 
will never understand the victimized ‘us’. Power thus operates not merely top-
down: The police are in this sense a lightning rod, as Paul Chevigny observed, in 
the center of a broad struggle between dominant and subordinate groups.
7
 In this 
struggle, characterized by prejudiced (sometimes racist) views and driven by group 
interest, the police are criticized for policies imposed by the government, while the 
agenda-setting of police issues is done as a strategic means to gain broader control.  
 
Theoretical tenet C: This study’s stance towards communication: no single truth 
The police-violence debate has been marked by different stakeholders conveying 
highly diverging perceptions, framings and interpretations. From the outset, this study 
has stressed the importance of being critical towards stakeholders’ communication by 
placing discourse in a historical context, while also being self-reflective. This study’s 
stance has led to several conclusions:  
1. From a critical-discourse perspective, this study sought to appraise the 
communication of all stakeholders involved in debates featuring the police, not just 
that of dominant groups. In this context, the analysis for this study has shown that 
power lines and communication processes are organic rather than top-down, 
considering that all stakeholders contribute to, but also suffer from, the stalemate 
position of police-violence debate and its causes.  
2. This study’s broader focus on police problems rather than just police violence, 
partly chosen to steer away from bias, has shown that the factors that hamper the 
police-violence debate have also hampered the debates on police 
professionalization and reform in general. Moreover, this study has shown how 
these broader movements have impacted the communication processes in the 
debate on police violence.  
3. This study has treated discourse as a product of societal context, rather than as a 
single version of the truth. Although this study intended to research the impact and 
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not the validity of different perceptions, interpretations and positioning represented 
in the available discourse, some conclusions regarding the validity of the realities 
held by different stakeholders can still be drawn:  
(a) While police critics, police defenders and the NYPD each convey a single 
version of the truth regarding the Sean Bell shooting and its aftermath, 
consistent with these groups’ rigid positioning at the historical macro level, 
their perceptions are sometimes indisputably skewed and a refraction of 
reality. Yet whether true or not, their single version of the truth nevertheless 
influences their own perceptions, interpretations and positioning as well as 
those of others. For example, negative appraisals of other stakeholders’ 
communications in the Sean Bell debate are to a certain extent the result of the 
stakeholders’ rigidly defined reality. While stakeholders dismiss perceptions 
and interpretations that are not in line with their own, they consider those 
perceptions and interpretations that are in line with their own to be the truth. 
Similarly, on the macro level of debate, the reality held by police officers was 
often a polarized reflection of reality, for example regarding violence and 
negative attitudes against the police. Their perceptions often led to 
demoralization. In both the formal and informal arena of debate, police and 
minority perceptions of one another, which do not necessarily reflect reality, 
can become self-fulfilling prophecies. 
(b) This study has shown that the media’s portrayal of the police and the police-
violence debate is not a reflection of reality either, but rather a mediated ‘good 
cop’ versus ‘bad cop’ reality, as well as a polarized reflection of the debate. 
The media are gatekeepers that can construct and/or distort reality, shaping the 
attitudes of specific groups towards the police, especially those of African 
Americans, who are more receptive than whites to mediated images of police 
violence and — after seeing such images — have a stronger conviction that 
the officers are guilty of police violence.  
4. In line with Wodak’s critical theory of text planning, which states that strategies 
are an integral part of the ‘planning of texts’, but that speakers are not always 
aware of this, this study has examined the goals formulated in stakeholders’ 
discourse and has also examined the communication from both a ‘strategic PR 
perspective’ and a ‘spontaneous’ perspective. This research has shown that 
regardless of whether stakeholders’ discourse and communication strategies are 
spontaneous or strategic, they influence those of other stakeholders as well as the 
overall process of debate. In this context, communication that is perceived as 
strategic usually has a negative effect on the perceptions of others. On the macro 
level of debate, PR strategies by different stakeholders often backfired, as they 
were perceived as untruthful and insincere. In this respect, reform efforts often 
turned out to be shallow PR instruments that ultimately failed to convince 
stakeholders. At the micro level of the Sean Bell debate, the (perception of) certain 
strategic communication means has been used as an argument by some to disregard 
the entirety of communication by a stakeholder group.  
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5.  From the critical perspective that ‘there is no single truth’, the definitions of the 
scope of debate and the labels chosen in this study for those involved sought to 
facilitate the analysis rather than serve as fixed entities. While this study has shown 
that multiple hues exist in the communication of different stakeholders, this study 
has also shown that the labels chosen in this study to identify police critics, police 
defenders etc. as well as their communication, are a reflection of the way 
stakeholders label each other and lump together criticism. Irrespective of their 
validity, these stereotypical labels affect the process of debate.  
 
Theoretical Tenet D: The definition of successful communication and a 
successful debate 
The fourth tenet on which this study is built concerns the definitions for successful 
communication and a successful debate. Within this context, this study has shown that 
the overall quality and success of both communication and overall debate are indeed 
low. In this light, the totality of communication discussed in this study are the very 
opposite of Habermas’ quixotic ‘ideal speech situation’ or even the (marginally) less 
idealized “proper social-psychological space for making a responsible collective 
judgment”.8 While Habermas believed that arguments ideally should be weighed in a 
nonpartisan quest for the truth, the debates on police problems are partisan quests 
driven by idiosyncratic versions of the truths.  
It is highly unlikely that an ideal speech situation will ever be approached, 
considering that police critics, police defenders and the NYPD are unlikely to change 
their communication strategies and deeply-rooted perceptions, interpretations and 
positioning regarding police violence and each other. Even Mayor Bloomberg’s 
communication, which meets the pragmatic presuppositions defined by Habermas, i.e. 
full inclusion, non-coercion, and equality, did not have a decisive impact on the overall 
process of debate, as the effects of conciliatory communication were dampened by the 
rigid positioning of others. Nevertheless, certain recommendations for improvement 
can certainly be made, as will be further discussed in Section IV.  
 
IV — Research ambitions and outlook 
This study’s foremost aim is to provide insight into the dynamics of the debate itself. 
This goal was driven by three main research ambitions: To contribute — from a 
modest academic standpoint — to a better understanding and possibly a resolution of 
the apparent stalemate in the existing debate; to provide a deeper understanding of the 
pattern of police-violence incidents and the strained relationship between the police 
and its critics; and to contribute to the methodological discussion on how to deal with 
police-violence issues, offering an alternative way to research them. This final section 
examines to which extent these three ambitions have been achieved, while giving 




IV.1 — Breaking through the perpetual loop 
From the outset, this study has aimed at providing, from a modest perspective, a better 
understanding of, and possibly a resolution for, the apparent stalemate in the existing 
debate on police violence. However, the analysis for this study has shown that such a 
resolution is particularly difficult, as the current power equilibrium is unlikely to shift, 
and stakeholders are unlikely to change their deeply-rooted perceptions, interpretations 
and positioning, including their communication strategies. While an immediate 
breakthrough is not realistic, this study’s analysis can contribute to an evolution rather 
than a revolution of the current public debate, in two important ways: 
 
1. Creating awareness and encouraging change 
In line with Critical Discourse Analysis’ general ambition to “make human beings 
aware of the reciprocal influences of language and social structures of which they are 
normally unaware” this study has not only provided insight into these reciprocal 
influences, but has also shown the necessity for and benefits of this.
9
  
There is indeed a lack of knowledge concerning the dialectical relationship 
between language and social context in the debate on police violence. First, 
stakeholders have little knowledge of the long-term effects of their own 
communication. In this context, this study has shown that while stakeholders choose 
non-conciliatory harsh communication strategies and a rigid ‘us-versus-them’ 
positioning in debates about police problems, perhaps believing that this strategic 
choice will support their short-term strategic goals, their choice turns out to be harmful 
to the process of debate and ultimately also to their own objectives in the long-run. 
Second, while stakeholders do have knowledge of other stakeholders’ discourse and 
discursive behavior and their (negative) effects on the development of debate, they also 
often overstate them. The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Third, while some (more 
stakeholder-observant) stakeholders have shown some understanding concerning the 
dialectical relationship between social context and other stakeholders’ discourse, this 
understanding is not a predominant characteristic of stakeholders’ communication, in 
particular of those that are more rigid. In fact, some stakeholders have appraised 
discourse without even being able to provide examples, which can also result in a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  
Providing understanding into the dialectical relationship between social 
context and the discourse used by stakeholders in debates about police violence can 
thus have a positive outcome on the process of debate. First, by providing stakeholders 
with insight into the effects of their own communication, and by showing stakeholders 
that their short-term strategies are detrimental to their own goals, they may be 
persuaded to adopt different, more beneficial strategies. Second, by providing insight 
into the dialectical relationship between the communication of other stakeholders and 
social context, stakeholders might change their views on each other and choose more 
conciliatory language, especially considering that those who show comprehension of 
this relationship have a more conciliatory tone of voice than those who do not. In 
particular, this understanding could change a stakeholder’s opinion that the opponents’ 
communication is premeditated and strategic, rather than spontaneous and driven by 
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powerful interpretative framings that have deep historic roots. Yet change in this 
regard may be difficult, as those that rigidly position themselves in the debate are also 
the ones that are less interested in understanding other stakeholders’ discourse and its 
dialectical relationship with social context.  
 
2. Providing guidance for change 
The perpetual loop of the debate on police problems, characterized by a perpetual cycle 
of reoccurring scandals, media coverage, public outcry, protests, debates, defensive 
responses, and reform efforts, resembles the problem of the chicken and the egg, in that 
it is not only unclear who started this deeply-rooted pattern, but also irrelevant. In order 
to enhance the communication processes, each stakeholder needs to take his own 
responsibility and look at future improvements, rather than focus on the (perceived) 
failure of others in the past.  
Ideally, stakeholders should alter their rigid positioning, and stop/diminish 
their use of communication techniques that are harmful to the process of debate, in 
order to improve the processes of debate, and work towards long-term strategic goals. 
These strategies have been discussed in Part II. Stakeholders also need to invest time in 
understanding the dialectical relationship between language and social context in the 
debate, in order to change their fossilized views.  
 However, such radical change is hard to accomplish, in particular as for this to 
occur other stakeholders need to change their perceptions, interpretations, 
communication strategies and rigidity of positioning as well. Yet police critics, police 
defenders, and the NYPD could start by making small alterations to their 
communication, which would not only improve the overall process of debate, but 
which could also lead to better (personal) results. Based on this study’s conclusions, 
the following bullets provide a (non-exhaustive) set of recommendations for these 
three stakeholders in the debate on police violence.  
 
• The NYPD. From a strategic perspective, the NYPD could improve its 
communication by incorporating less process-oriented, nondescript, non-individuating 
and detached rhetoric, for example by communicating more frequently the names of 
the victims, the number of shots fired and other vital details of the shooting, thus 
seeking more alignment with the nature of the police critics’ perceptions (rather than 
with the perceptions themselves). This could prevent the police critics’ perception of 
the police being indifferent to their needs and felt emotions, and it would also change 
the NYPD’s representation in the media. In its vocabulary, the NYPD could choose to 
relate more to the emotionally-charged reality held by police critics. While the 
department’s communication would improve by including more committal statements, 
it is highly likely that such communication will not be accepted by the police 
defenders. Moreover, these committal statements cannot always be made, as they could 
affect the judicial processes. However, there is certainly some leeway, as even police 
defenders have stated that they would not have protested against an ‘expression of 
sympathy’ towards the victims. Moreover, the department could convey its messages 
in a more clear-cut fashion, in line with the easy-to-digest messages conveyed by 
police critics, which would also make the department appear more determined to 
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improve police–community relations problems in the media’s coverage. The NYPD’s 
heavy focus on its achievements and the laudatory comments on police officers’ 
conduct have an adverse effect on the interpretative framings of police critics, and 
should thus be avoided.  
 
• Police critics. If police critics were to apply less rigid communication strategies and 
focus less on their interpretative framings, this would not only result in a less vehement 
response by police defenders and a less defensive response by the NYPD, these 
strategies could, in the long run, also change the police defenders’ deeply rooted 
interpretative framings, including their feelings of victimization and distrust. In this 
respect, the statement “We can be angry without being mad” should not only refer to 
refraining from using violence, but also to the use of vindictive language and verbal 
attacks regarding the officers involved in the shooting. While multiple hues exist in 
stakeholders’ communication, police critics, their opponents, but also the media, tend 
to focus on the most rigid and emotional elements. In this respect it would be better if 
police critics spoke in one clear voice, while dampening the voices of more extreme 
stakeholders. By doing so, police critics would be giving less ammunition to their 
opponents (e.g. police defenders’ use of circumstantial ad hominem argumentation), 
and moreover, their representation in the media could change. In this respect, police 
critics could choose to align their communication with that of the facts-driven 
communication of the NYCLU, the statements of which do not focus on the emotions 
and victimization felt after the Sean Bell shooting, but instead comprise arguments 
based on statistics and other facts. While police critics might fear that by adopting 
these changes, their communication will have less agenda-setting power, they should 
realize that agenda-setting on its own will not necessarily lead to effective change.  
 
• Police defenders. The communication by police defenders can be improved in 
similar ways as that of police critics. In general, police defenders should realize that 
their rigid positioning and harsh communication strategies not only reinforce the police 
critics’ deeply rooted interpretative framings, but from a strategic perspective also give 
police critics ammunition in the debate. In this respect, police defenders should in 
particular stop their overall reflexive response to criticism, and circumstantial ad 
hominem argumentation. Moreover, by changing their seemingly conciliatory discourse 
into discourse that is indeed conciliatory, their image of being insincere could 
diminish.  
 
IV.2 — The dialectical relationship between police problems and communication 
By looking at the dynamics of the police-violence debate, and more broadly, the debate 
on police problems, this study aimed at providing a deeper understanding of the pattern 
of police-violence incidents and the strained relationship between the police and its 
critics. The analysis for this study has shown that police-violence incidents not only 
serve as catalysts for the negative perceptions of minority groups as well as a driving 
force of debate, but that this debate negatively affects those who are involved in 
police–citizen interactions. These interactions include those situations leading to 
procedural injustices and even police violence. 
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Thus, this study has shown that stakeholders’ communication does not just 
lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy regarding each other’s discourse and the ultimate 
process of debate, but also regarding the dialectical relationship between 
communication about police issues and the existence of these issues. This worrying 
development should be forefront in the minds of everyone dealing with police–
community relations issues, or involved in the debate concerned with this topic.  
 
IV.3 — Methodological considerations and outlook 
This study has contributed in several ways to the methodological discussion on how to 
deal with police-violence issues. In addition it has also contributed to the advancement 
of knowledge in the disciplines of history and communications. 
First, this study has contributed to this discussion and these fields by giving 
insight into a subject that has not been researched before: the history of public debate 
on police problems. This subject, in turn, is an aspect of a contentious topic that 
deserves thorough investigation: police violence. This research has shown how 
understanding the debate about violence is essential in order to understand its 
persistence and societal repercussions. It has shown how communication in debates can 
lead to the problems central in those debates. More broadly, by examining the debate 
about police violence, rather than the violence itself, the methodology for this study 
has provided new insights into both the pattern of debate and the pattern of incidents, 
showing which factors have led to the current stalemate position, and providing 
guidance on how to improve communication processes. By treating discourse on police 
violence as interpretations of reality, rather than a reflection of reality, this study has 
provided a multidimensional overview of a discussion that is heavily charged with 
diverging one-dimensional ideologies and emotions.  
This study has specifically contributed to the discipline of history, by showing 
how the current debate is influenced by much broader historical developments than one 
would assume, some of them affecting debating processes from the Department’s 
inception onwards. It has contributed to the discipline of communication by showing in 
detail what the effects of stakeholders’ communication can be on others, on the 
development of debates, and on historical developments.  
This study has also contributed to both disciplines by showing how they can 
complement each other. While historical research excels in pinpointing the historical 
causes of a problem, it often pays too little attention to contemporary consequences. 
The reverse can be said about communication research. This study has shown how 
communication has a history, history leads to communication, and contemporary 
communication becomes the historical cause for future debates. A significant 
conclusion is that stakeholders’ communication not only impedes the debates about 
police problems, but also negatively influences societal contexts, such as police–
community relations and police-professionalization efforts. In this respect, it is relevant 
for researchers and professionals in these fields to widen their scope and scrutinize not 
just stakeholders’ actions, but also their communication.  
Yet this study’s most important contribution is towards the progress of the 
public debate itself. While this study will not resolve the stalemate position of the 
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debate immediately or directly, it can do so indirectly, as a key to the debate’s 
resolution lies in the understanding of the effects of communication on other 
stakeholders and the debate at large. And while changes in rhetorical strategies may 
appear straightforward to those who are not participating in the debate, this is not the 
case for those involved in it. History has shown how stakeholders have not altered their 
own communication in the past and thus they are not likely to do so in the future. 
 It is important to realize that communication by itself is not a panacea for all 
problems. The interviews with stakeholders have shown that the actions taken by other 
stakeholders taint the perceptions regarding their communication and vice versa. It 
would be interesting to examine the direct effects of reforms effectuated in the 
aftermath of incidents such as the Sean Bell shooting, as well as those aimed at 
improving police–community relations in the long run, on the perceptions, framings 
and positioning of stakeholders involved in the debate. Such research could include 
quantitative surveys, but also qualitative methodologies similar to this study.  
 The historical analysis for this study is based primarily on secondary literature, 
and has been structured along the historical development of the NYPD. Hence the 
historical development of other stakeholder groups, such as police critics, has been tied 
to that of the department. These choices have allowed for a broad helicopter view of 
the history of police debates in New York. Future in-depth research into the roots and 
historical developments of other stakeholders could give more detailed insight into the 
factors that specifically influence these groups’ communications. It would also be 
interesting to examine certain incidents in the past more closely, in order to expose in 
more detail the micro processes that took place in the aftermath of these incidents, in a 
similar fashion to the Sean Bell case. Also, it would be interesting to compare current 
discourse to historical discourse on police violence, for example by comparing two 
different cases. 
The Sean Bell shooting is a pivotal case in the history of police shootings. The 
incident is often mentioned in the same breath as the Amadou Diallo shooting and the 
brutal assault on Abner Louima. By choosing this celebrated and widely-publicized 
case, this study has been able to expose in detail stakeholders’ perceptions, 
interpretations, and positioning on this particular incident, and police shootings in 
general. It would be interesting to examine more closely debates on other police–
community related issues, such as racial profiling. In these debates, different types of 
police critics participate, such as facts-driven organizations including the NYCLU and 
Human Rights Watch, as well as less outspoken politicians. More research into the 
communication processes of the racial profiling debate would be particularly 
interesting, as this debate is ongoing, does not concern one individual person (and 
hence could be less emotionally charged) and these different, less vehement and 
emotional stakeholders appear to take a more prominent role. Moreover, it could be 
possible that the Police Department communicates in a different, perhaps more 
outspoken way, as it is not constrained by the same judicial processes as in the 
aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting, although the analysis for Part I has shown that the 
NYPD’s communication has been overall defensive and that processes on the macro 
level of the debate on racial profiling are protracted. It would be interesting to examine 
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the micro level of this debate in a similar fashion to that of Sean Bell. Do stakeholders 
communicate in a different way than during the aftermath of the Sean Bell shooting? 
And what is the effect of this communication?  
This study’s interdisciplinary methodology aimed at researching both the 
historical depth and organic, interactional width of one particular problem. This 
exploratory study has been a first attempt to combine historical research with research 
within the Critical Discourse Analysis tradition. While Critical Discourse Analysis 
recognizes the importance of historical research, it focuses perhaps too much on the 
analysis of texts, rather than on historical research. It would be interesting to further 
explore and fine-tune the analytical possibilities of this two-pronged approach: Which 
alternative ways can be explored to research the historical depth and organic, 
interactional width of one particular problem? Which specific analytical tools can be 
used in the analysis of texts and historical developments?  
Researching both the historical depth and organic, interactional width of one 
particular problem, this study has shown that communication research and historical 
research form a dynamic, perhaps inseparable duo, the combined research of which can 
provide insight into the how and why of a particular problem. By adopting a similar 
interdisciplinary framework as that of this study, future research could provide 
similarly relevant insights into other debates that are surrounded by emotions and 
appear to be stuck in a perpetual loop, and in which stakeholders claim that they hold 
the only version of the truth. These debates do not necessarily have to involve the 
police. In this context, it would for example be interesting to research the Israel-
Palestine conflict, the diverging views regarding Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, or 
even the Dutch ‘Zwarte Piet’ (Black Pete) discussion, in a similar fashion to the police-
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